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Research summarized here indicates that, despite a certain degree of success, particularly in the area of environmental protection, German—Polish transboundary planning cooperation is being hampered by considerable lags between political agenda-setting, European Union structural programming, and postsocialist institutional transformation. Furthermore, though German—Polish cooperation institutions have been created largely from the 'top down', research indicates that transboundary regionalism must also develop local roots through a slow and gradual process of routinized interaction. The real test of German—Polish regionalism will thus be the development of new networks between public and private actors stabilizing the institutions now in place, but there nonetheless remain questions as to the intrinsic economic development potentials of transboundary cooperation within a context of European integration and expansion.

Since the late 1990s, local governments in China have been relying heavily on land, which is a state-owned asset in urban area, to generate a significant amount of extra-budgetary revenue. Whilst this striking phenomenon has attracted numerous academic attentions, not many literatures shed the light on the process of central-local interactions. Adopting the procedural approach, this study examines the central-local fiscal and policy relations in the context of land finance. Taking the evidence from Guangdong province, this study understands the central-local relations as a process of policy interactions. After the central's attempt to recentralize the fiscal resources of local governments in the mid-1990s, localities have been facing fiscal stress, which led them to rely heavily on land conveyance income, an extra-budgetary revenue in order to complement the fiscal shortage in budgetary account. However, a series of socioeconomic consequences of local fervent land development have attracted frequent central interventions. The most noticeable example is the housing macro-regulations introduced in light of the soaring housing prices. The example of the housing macro-regulations rejected the classic centrist model of the central-local relations in China, which implies a zero-sum game. On the contrary, in face of an issue influencing the conflicting core interests of both actors, both the powers of central and local governments were intensified to the extent that no one single actor will totally win over another. The powers of the central and local governments were also mutually transformed in the course of the game. It is argued that local governments display a sense of resistance against the central interventions as they have strong interests in land and real estate industry after tax sharing reform. On the other hand, it is unlikely for the central government to give concession to local governments as the failure to alleviate the consequences of land finance may cause public discontent and even political crises. The possible outcome is either a "win-win" situation or loss for both actors. To avoid a negative-sum outcome, collaboration and compromise are recommended. The centre is urged to address the root problem of misalignment of revenue and expenditure and to institutionalize the relationship between the centre and subnational governments. ; published_or_final_version ; China Development Studies ; Master ; Master of Arts in China Development Studies

Pub. also as Studies in history, economics and public law, vol. 9, no. 1. ; Academic record. ; Thesis (PH. D.)--Columbia university. ; Bibliography: p. 279-287. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Since 2000 intergovernmental relations in New Zealand have been evolving rapidly as a result of a significant shift in government policy discourse towards a strong central-local government partnership. New statutory provisions empowering local government to promote social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing have significant implications for the range of activities in which local authorities are engaged. In turn, this has consequences for the relationship between local government and central government. The effectiveness of the new empowerment and the prospects for further strengthening of the role of local government are critically examined. Despite some on-going tensions, and an inevitable mismatch in the balance of power between central and local government, it is argued that there is a discernible rebalancing of intergovernmental relations as a result of new legislation and central government policy settings which reflect a 'localist turn'. On the basis of developments since 2000 it may be argued that the New Zealand system of local government is evolving away from the recognised 'Anglo' model. However, further consolidation is needed in the transformation of intergovernmental relations and mechanisms that will cement a more genuine central-local government partnership.

Since 2000 intergovernmental relations in New Zealand have been evolving rapidly as a result of a significant shift in government policy discourse towards a strong central-local government partnership. New statutory provisions empowering local government to promote social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing have significant implications for the range of activities in which local authorities are engaged. In turn, this has consequences for the relationship between local government and central government. The effectiveness of the new empowerment and the prospects for further strengthening of the role of local government are critically examined. Despite some on-going tensions, and an inevitable mismatch in the balance of power between central and local government, it is argued that there is a discernible rebalancing of intergovernmental relations as a result of new legislation and central government policy settings which reflect a 'localist turn'. On the basis of developments since 2000 it may be argued that the New Zealand system of local government is evolving away from the recognised 'Anglo' model. However, further consolidation is needed in the transformation of intergovernmental relations and mechanisms that will cement a more genuine central-local government partnership.

The popular image of industrial relations in local government is one in which negotiations consist of genteel tête‐à‐têtes over coffee and (if the meetings spill over into the afternoon) tea. Though there is little in the activities of 1984 to justify this conception the traditions which give rise to it were real enough. The main white collar union, NALGO, had its origins in a nineteenth century campaign by senior officers, led inevitably by a Town Clerk, to press for a local authority pension scheme. The union was officially launched in July 1905 and saw itself as an association of professionals rather than a union of employees. Indeed it was not until 65 years after its launch that NALGO sanctioned its first‐ever strike when 18 of its 400,000 members took industrial action in Leeds.