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The use of indicators is not only technical and science-led, but also a value-laden social process, and thus concerns public participation, political judgment and decision-making. This article approaches the Chinese SEA indicator system from a science-policy interface and aims at: 1) contributing to the general recognition of indicators functioning at science-policy interfaces in SEA, and 2) analysing, through a Chinese case-study, to what extent national guidelines mediate the science-policy interaction. The overall finding is a strong emphasis on technical/science aspects found in the Chinese SEA guidance, and a weak explicit recognition that policy plays a role in choosing and using indicators. Recent development, however, indicates a growing recognition of the politics involved and thus also leads to more involvement of stakeholders.

In the last few decades, we have developed a substantial body of knowledge about CEO succession. However, except for some studies of family businesses that lack direct applicability to nonfamily CEO succession, the past studies of succession have not examined the very first succession event in a firm, when the Founder-CEO is replaced, on a large-scale basis. The critical differences between later-stage succession and Founder-CEO succession include the higher level of attachment between Founder-CEOs and the firms they create, the much larger equity holdings of Founder-CEOs (which give them much more control of the firm), the fact that many Founder-CEOs remain in the firm (even though it is being run by their successors), and the fact that nearly all early-stage succession events involve outside successors (in contrast to later-stage succession research, which has focused on the insider-outsider distinction). These differences make it hard to extrapolate from later-stage succession findings to Founder-CEO succession. Therefore, in order to examine Founder-CEO succession, I used field research and grounded theory building to study the factors that should affect Founder-CEO succession in Internet start-ups. I find that there are two central intertemporal events that may affect Founder-CEO succession: The completion of product development and the raising of each round of financing from outside investors. I develop testable hypotheses about how each of these events affect the rate of succession, and then test these hypotheses using an event-history analysis of a unique dataset containing the succession histories of 202 Internet firms. My findings point to multiple "paradoxes of success" in which the Founder-CEO's success at achieving critical milestones actually causes the chance of Founder-CEO succession to rise dramatically.

Never before translated into English, this official history of the reign of King T'aejo--founder of Korea's long, illustrious Chos?n dynasty (1392-1910 CE)--is a unique resource for reconstructing life in late-fourteenth-century Korea. Its narrative of a ruler's rise to power includes a wealth of detail not just about politics and war but also about religion, astronomy, and the arts.

Are we dead yet? -- My city? my home? Hong Kong is not Hong Kong any more -- Between and beyond postcolonialities : Hong Kong's postcolonial self-writing reconsidered -- Who speaks for the Lion Rock? : Cantonese and the languaging of Hong Kong identities -- Strategic erasure and milkyway image : (beyond) mainland-Hong Kong co-productions -- Cantopop as sonic memories : overtones and undertones in new Hong Kong cinema -- This is just the beginning

AbstractFirms managed by the scions of founders continue to be prevalent in the United States despite the increase in shareholder activism over the last few decades, calling into question the argument that such organizational structures reduce firm value. Founder‐family successions are rare in high‐growth industries where the benefits of selecting from a larger pool of managers is significant. Rather, they tend to happen in low‐growth industries, in manufacturing/retail firms. Once we account for the differences in firm characteristics, we do not find that founder‐family successions reduce firm value. We explore a mechanism that compensates for the costs of choosing from a smaller pool of managers and document evidence consistent with family firms benefiting from improved labor relations.

"From New York Times columnist and bestselling author Frank Bruni comes a wise and moving memoir about aging, affliction, and optimism after partially losing his eyesight. One morning in late 2017, New York Times columnist Frank Bruni woke up with strangely blurred vision. He wondered at first if some goo or gunk had worked its way into his right eye. But this was no fleeting annoyance, no fixable inconvenience. Overnight, a rare stroke had cut off blood to one of his optic nerves, rendering him functionally blind in that eye--forever. And he soon learned from doctors that the same disorder could ravage his left eye, too. He could lose his sight altogether. In The Beauty of Dusk, Bruni hauntingly recounts his adjustment to this daunting reality, a medical and spiritual odyssey that involved not only reappraising his own priorities but also reaching out to, and gathering wisdom from, longtime friends and new acquaintances who had navigated their own traumas and afflictions. The result is a poignant, probing, and ultimately uplifting examination of the limits that all of us inevitably encounter, the lenses through which we choose to evaluate them and the tools we have for perseverance. Bruni's world blurred in one sense, as he experienced his first real inklings that the day isn't forever and that light inexorably fades, but sharpened in another. Confronting unexpected hardship, he felt more blessed than ever before. There was vision lost. There was also vision found"--