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Jordan's political-liberalization program, initiated in 1989, represents the longest sustained such opening in the Arab world today. During this time, Jordan has held three national parliamentary elections, enacted a number of liberalizing laws, removed many restrictions on the press, and minimized the role that the security services, or mukhdbarit, play in repressing opposition. Moreover, the liberalization program has survived a number of severe challenges, including the second Gulf War and the subsequent loss of Jordan's major regional trading partner, Iraq; the implementation of a difficult domestic austerity program; and the conclusion of a controversial peace treaty with Israel. Democratization in Jordan has not followed the same path as the recent democratic transitions in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. By closely examining Jordan's program of political liberalization' since 1989, I will argue that the process is best understood as a series of pre-emptive measures designed to maintain elite privilege in Jordan while limiting the appeal of more fundamental political change. The regime has skillfully managed and directed a process that has throughout protected the four pillars of power in Jordan: the monarchy and its coterie, the army and security services, wealthy business elites, and East Bank tribal leaders. It has simultaneously sought to undermine the only social force legally able to disrupt key regime policies, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, and its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). In other words, uncertain about its ability to survive a deepening crisis, the regime undertook sufficient reform to assure its political longevity, but without altering the core structures of power in Jordan. I term this "defensive democratization." The concept of defensive democratization provides an additional nuance to our understanding of democratic transitions more generally by focusing attention on pre-emptive liberalizing strategies available to rentier states. This essay concludes by arguing that the strategy of defensive democratization in Jordan may not be able to withstand the likely political volatility in, and Islamization of, Palestinian politics in Jordan. Ironically, what may pose the greatest threat to the democratic transition in Jordan is peace, with the sorts of demographic and political challenges the 1994 agreement with Israel has unleashed. Indeed, contrary to the optimistic forecasts found in many of the recent works on civil society, the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict may well usher in a new era of authoritarianism in Jordan-and elsewhere in the Arab world.

Anecdotal evidence from pre-modern Europe and North America suggests that rulers are forced to become more democratic once they impose a significant fiscal burden on their citizens. One difficulty in testing this taxation causes democratization hypothesis empirically is the endogeneity of public revenues. I use introductions of value added taxes and autonomous revenue authorities as sources of quasi-exogenous variation to identify the causal effect of the fiscal burden borne by citizens on democracy. The instrumental variables regressions with a panel of 122 countries over the period 1981-2008 suggest that revenues had on average a mild positive effect on democracy.

Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little risk. In some cases, the risk of democratization to authoritarian incumbents is so low that ending authoritarianism might not mean exiting power at all. This article develops a unified theory of authoritarian-led democratization under conditions of relatively low incumbent risk. We argue that the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is the most pivotal factor in authoritarian-led democratization. When incumbent party strength has been substantial enough to give incumbent authoritarian politicians significant electoral victory confidence, nondemocratic regimes have pursued reversible democratic experiments that eventually culminated in stable, thriving democracies. Evidence from Europe's first wave of democratization and more recent democratic transitions in Taiwan and Ghana illustrate how party strength has underpinned authoritarian-led democratization across the world and across modern history.

This article examines the effects of human rights and transitional justice on memories of Timor-Leste's resistance to the Indonesian occupation, which lasted from 1975 to 1999. Data comes from ethnographic fieldwork in Timor, centered around remembrance of two major acts of resistance: an armed uprising in 1983 and a peaceful demonstration in 1991. The article argues that in Timor, an "apolitical" human rights has caused a post-conflict "democratization of perpetration", in that similar culpability is assigned to all those who caused suffering in the conflict with Indonesia through physical violence, irrespective of context. Transitional justice has thus expanded the category of perpetrator in Timor, to include some who legally used armed resistance against Indonesian rule. Studies of violence have belatedly turned toward examining perpetrators of state terror; this article examines how discourses of human rights and transitional justice shape perceptions of those who resist state terror with violence.

Disintermediation allows citizens to directly access political communication. The greater diversity of interactions between political actors results in increased flow of information. This causes decreased effectiveness for gatekeepers and agenda-setters (old media), and makes way for the creation of a deregulated, non-hierarchical, and borderless space, resulting in the empowerment of citizens and the democratization of political communication. This is a modernizing time that affects the development of political process and the role of different political actors. However, this transformation is shaped by bias and structural factors that limit its universalization and, a priori, encourage the emergence of a citizen elite that is capable of managing and benefiting from change.

From the act of ordinary humans in shaping the world around them, to a structuralized professional practice, the perception and meaning of design has evolved. The institutional and closed definition of design in the years since the industrial revolution has failed to recognize the ingenious designs that come from the common man, the everyday designer. These solutions are contextual, sustainable and affordable and a necessity, especially for developing countries. This paper on the democratization of design seeks to recognize the ingenuity of this 'diffuse' or non-expert design and present cases of a few successful and path breaking innovations from the grassroots of India. It further explores the idea of a democratized design world where everyone would design. It would not mean de- professionalizing design, rather a new role for the designer as a facilitator to create this new reality of a participative co-design process. As we increasingly take cognizance of the impact of design in domains like businesses, organizations and even governance we are already on our way to create a pluriverse of design which creates value through a collective design capacity.

The two contributions featured here appeared in the 'CODESRIA Bulletin' (No. 2, 1991). They were written as a contribution to the agenda of CODESRIA's December 1991 General Assembly, organised around the theme of 'Democratization Processes in Africa'. Although intervening events may have affected the validity of one or two minor points made, their focus on the twin objectives of individual liberties and social justice provides a valuable insight into the debate unfolding in Africa. It is a debate of universal significance: the reconciliation of political rights with social justice rights remains one of the fundamental problems confronting the socialist project. We are grateful to the CODESRIA Bulletin for permitting us to publish these abridged versions of the two papers. Readers interested in consulting the full originals, and of engaging in the debates sponsored by CODESRIA should write to them at Boite Postal 3304, Dakar, Senegal

A key dilemma facing a military which considers democratization is whether it is confident that civilians will protect its interests. A military's confidence is a function of three factors: preference alignment with parties (trust), an expectation that allied parties will survive the transition (party institutionalization), and an expectation that allied parties can win power to protect it (party strength). When parties which the military trusts are institutionalized and strong, the military is confident that democratization will not endanger its interests. When these factors are absent, the military seeks to generate credible commitments through bounded democratization—a strategy of setting parameters on open contestation and popular sovereignty to constrain civilians. I test this argument using an original dataset on 525 regime transitions and a novel measure of bounded democratization. I find that when the institutionalization and strength of trusted parties decrease, the military proactively sets constraints on the developing political system.