Suchergebnisse

Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Acronyms and Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Chronology -- The A to Z of Spycraft -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Y -- Z

Chinese Communist intelligence organizations -- Chinese Communist intelligence leaders -- Notable spies of the Chinese Revolution and the early PRC -- Economic espionage cases -- Espionage during the Revolution and the early People's Republic -- Espionage during China's rise -- Intelligence and surveillance in China, then and now.

Only in 1995 did the United States government officially reveal the existence of the super-secret Venona Project. For nearly fifty years American intelligence agents had been decoding thousands of Soviet messages, uncovering an enormous range of espionage activities carried out against the United States during World War II by its own allies. So sensitive was the project in its early years that even President Truman was not informed of its existence. This extraordinary book is the first to examine the Venona messages-documents of unparalleled importance for our understanding of the history and politics of the Stalin era and the early Cold War years.Hidden away in a former girls' school in the late 1940s, Venona Project cryptanalysts, linguists, and mathematicians attempted to decode more than twenty-five thousand intercepted Soviet intelligence telegrams. When they cracked the unbreakable Soviet code, a breakthrough leading eventually to the decryption of nearly three thousand of the messages, analysts uncovered information of powerful significance: the first indication of Julius Rosenberg's espionage efforts; references to the espionage activities of Alger Hiss; startling proof of Soviet infiltration of the Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb; evidence that spies had reached the highest levels of the U.S. State and Treasury Departments; indications that more than three hundred Americans had assisted in the Soviet theft of American industrial, scientific, military, and diplomatic secrets; and confirmation that the Communist party of the United States was consciously and willingly involved in Soviet espionage against America. Drawing not only on the Venona papers but also on newly opened Russian and U. S. archives, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr provide in this book the clearest, most rigorously documented analysis ever written on Soviet espionage and the Americans who abetted it in the early Cold War years

AbstractThe ethical value of intelligence lies in its crucial role in safeguarding individuals from harm by detecting, locating, and preventing threats. As part of this undertaking, intelligence can include protecting the economic well-being of the political community and its people. Intelligence, however, also entails causing people harm when it violates their vital interests through its operations. The challenge, therefore, is how to reconcile this tension, which Cécile Fabre's recent book Spying through a Glass Darkly does by arguing for the "ongoing and preemptive imposition of defensive harm." Fabre applies this underlying argument to the specifics of economic espionage to argue that while states, businesses, and individuals do have a general right over their information that prevents others from accessing it, such protections can be forfeited or overridden when there is a potential threat to the fundamental rights of third parties. This essay argues, however, that Fabre's discussion on economic espionage overlooks important additional proportionality and discrimination concerns that need to be accounted for. In addition to the privacy violations it causes, economic espionage can cause harms to people's other vital interests, including their physical and mental well-being and autonomy. Given the complex way in which the economy interlinks with people's lives and society, harms to one economic actor will have repercussions on those secondary economic entities dependent on them, such as workers, buyers, and investors. This, in turn, can produce further harms on other economic actors, causing damages to ripple outward across society.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 A New Variation of Cryptography -- Chapter 2 Attackers have the Advantage -- Chapter 3 What Do Cyber Criminals Want -- Chapter 4 The Nations Respond -- Glossary -- For More Information -- For Further Reading -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author -- Back Cover

AbstractRemote-access cyber espionage operations against activists, dissidents or human rights defenders abroad are increasingly a feature of digital transnational repression. This arises when State or State-related actors use digital technologies to silence or stifle dissent from human rights defenders, activists and dissidents abroad through the collection of confidential information that is then weaponized against the target or their networks. Examples include the targeting of Ghanem Al-Masarir (a Saudi dissident living in the United Kingdom), Carine Kanimba (a United States–Belgian dual citizen and daughter of Rwandan activist Paul Rusesabagina living in the United States) and Omar Abdulaziz (another Saudi dissident living in Canada) with NSO Group's mercenary spyware. This practice erodes human rights, democracy and the rule of law and has a negative impact on targeted communities, including social isolation, self-censorship, the fragmentation and impairment of transnational political and social advocacy networks, and psychological and social harm. Despite this, international law does little to restrain this practice. Building on momentum around the regulation of mercenary spyware and transnational repression, this article elaborates on how States could consider regulating dissident cyber espionage and streamlines a unified approach among ratifying States addressing issues such as State immunity, burden of proof, export control and international and public–private sector collaboration.

The case of Edward Snowden, who in May 2013 revealed a huge number of National Security Agency codes, has again raised the question of motivation in espionage and disclosure of documents. Espionage is a crime with complex, multi-faceted motivational factors that do not lend themselves to easy explanation. Most cases present a singular mosaic of intersecting psychosocial forces which culminate in a decision to engage in the crime. Adapted from the source document.

Covering the lives and achievements of five English intelligence officers involved in wars at home and abroad between 1870 and 1918, this exceptionally researched book offers an insight into spying in the age of Victoria. Including material from little-known sources such as memoirs, old biographies and information from MI5 and the police history archives, this book is a more detailed sequel to Wade's earlier work, 'Spies in the Empire'. The book examines the social and political context of Victorian spying and the role of intelligence in the Anglo-Boer wars as well as case studies on five intr

In recent years, governmental and industrial espionage becomes an increased problem for governments and corporations. Especially information about current technology development and research activities are interesting targets for espionage. Thus, we introduce a new and automated methodology that investigates the information leakage risk of projects in research and technology (R&T) processed by an organization concerning governmental or industrial espionage. Latent semantic indexing is applied together with machine based learning and prediction modeling. This identifies semantic textual patterns representing technologies and their corresponding application fields that are of high relevance for the organization's strategy. These patterns are used to estimate organization's costs of an information leakage for each project. Further, a web mining approach is processed to identify worldwide knowledge distribution within the relevant technologies and corresponding application fields. This information is used to estimate the probability that an information leakage occur. A risk assessment methodology calculates the information leakage risk for each project. In a case study, the information leakage risk of defense based R&T projects is investigated. This is because defense based R&T is of particularly interest by espionage agents. Overall, it can be shown that the proposed methodology is successful in calculation the espionage information leakage risk of projects. This supports an organization by processing espionage risk management.