Skepticism and the basis of morality
In: New perspectives in philosophical scholarship Vol. 6
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In: New perspectives in philosophical scholarship Vol. 6
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 107-119
ISSN: 1467-8683
ABSTRACTManuscript Type: ConceptualResearch Question/Issue: This paper frames the debate on corporate governance convergence in terms of the morality underlying corporate governance models. The claims and arguments of moral relativism are presented to provide theoretical structure to the moral aspects of corporate governance convergence, and ultimately the normative question of whether convergence should occur.Research Findings/Results: The morality underlying different models of corporate governance has largely been ignored in the corporate governance convergence literature. A range of moral philosophies and principles that underlie the dominant corporate governance models are identified. This leads to a consideration of the claims and arguments of moral relativism relating to corporate governance. A research agenda around the claims of descriptive and meta‐ethical moral relativism, and which ultimately informs the associated normative argument, is then suggested.Theoretical Implications: The application of moral relativism to the debate on corporate governance convergence presents a theoretical structure to the analysis and consideration of its moral aspects. This structure lends itself to further research, both empirical and conceptual.Practical Implications: The claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a means of analyzing calls that are made for a culturally or nationally "appropriate" model of corporate governance. This can assist in providing direction for corporate governance reforms and is of particular relevance for developing countries that have inherited Western corporate governance models through colonialism.
Considers arguments between relativists & antirelativists during debates over the UN's 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According to antirelativists, there exists a set of principles that transcends any particular culture. This position is refuted by relativists, who point to differing cultural concepts of rights around the globe & suggest that any effort to apply one standard to all will result in intolerance. A coherentist position, which focuses on background features of competing conceptions of cultural concepts to reveal their commonalities, may mediate between the relativist & antirelativist positions. Through use of this method, one may concede that knowledge is relative, but must also insist on the possibility that a universal theory of human rights may be developed. Pursuit of this method would require an expanded role for communication theory & research to develop descriptions not only of existing conceptions, but also of the possibilities for advancing cultural constructs. D. M. Smith
In: The journal of business & industrial marketing, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 109-123
ISSN: 2052-1189
PurposeThe research sought to expand the conceptual understanding of the antecedents of decision-making under ethical conditions. This study aims to better understand the relationships among need for cognition (NFC), the individual ethical positions of ethical idealism and ethical relativism, organizational and professional socialization, work-related norms and ethical perceptions.Design/methodology/approachThe study compared the impact of environmental influences (i.e. socialization and work-related norm) and individual temporally stable characteristics (i.e. NFC and ethical position) on ethical perceptions. The research surveyed marketers and tested a hypothesized model using structural equation modeling.FindingsNFC influences marketers' individual ethical position, their professional socialization and their work norms. The work norms of marketers are influenced by individual ethical position and organizational socialization, but not by professional socialization. Professional socialization is influenced by ethical idealism and not ethical relativism.Research limitations/implicationsA judgmental sampling technique was used and the findings cannot be generalized to other populations.Practical implicationsThis research provides managers with alternative tools to encourage compliance with professional and corporate guidelines. If managers are seeking an enduring positive influence on work norms, they should be as concerned about the thinking of their employees and their employees' ethical positions as they are with the vocational rules their subordinates adopt.Social implicationsSociety will benefit from better understanding the different ways in which the ethical perceptions of individual employees are influenced and the various ways in which managers can contribute to ethically responsible corporations.Originality/valueAlthough NFC has been examined in other vocational and decision-making contexts, its influence on individual ethical position, vocational socialization and work-related norms has not been empirically examined in ethical contexts for business decision-making.
Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- PREFACE -- PART 1 INTRODUCTION -- 1 What Is Philosophical Ethics? -- Ethical Opinion and Human Life -- Ethical Inquiry: Normative Ethics -- Philosophical Inquiry About Ethics: Metaethics -- Philosophical Ethics -- A Plan of Study -- PART 2 METAETHICS -- 2 Metaethics: The Basic Questions -- The Objective Purport of Ethical Conviction -- What Is There for Ethical Convictions to Be About? -- A Related Problem Concerning Evidence in Ethics -- A Fundamental Dilemma of Metaethics -- Suggested Reading -- 3 Naturalism -- Metaphysical Naturalism and Ethics -- Ethical Naturalism -- Problems for Ethical Naturalism -- Suggested Reading -- 4 Theological Voluntarism -- Reductive Versus Nonreductive Supernaturalism -- Theological Voluntarism -- What Theological Voluntarism Is Not -- A Reductive Account of God's Authority -- Problems for Theological Voluntarism -- Suggested Reading -- 5 Rational Intuitionism -- Irreducibility and Objective Purport -- Ethical Perception? -- The Nature of Rational Intuitionism -- Necessity and Rational Perception -- Problems for Rational Intuitionism -- Suggested Reading -- 6 The Ideal Judgment Theory -- Hume's Challenge, Again -- Three Models of Ethical Judgment -- Aspects of Ideal Judgment -- Problems for the Ideal Judgment Theory -- Another Version of the Ideal Judgment Theory? Ideal Practical Judgment or Agency Theory -- Suggested Reading -- 7 The Error Theory and Ethical Relativism -- The Error Theory -- Ethical Relativism -- What Ethical Relativism Is Not -- Could Ethical Relativism Be True? -- Suggested Reading -- 8 Noncognitivism -- Varieties of Noncognitivism -- The Sources of Noncognitivism -- Problems for Noncognitivism and Possible Responses -- Suggested Reading -- 9 Interlude -- PART 3 PHILOSOPHICAL MORALISTS -- 10 Hobbes I
In: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy 31
In: Philosophical Studies Series 31
One: A Brentanist Theory of Moral Judgments -- 1.1. The Theory -- 1.2. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Non-Cognitivist Theories -- 1.3. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Cognitivist Theories -- 1.4. Answers to Some Objections to the Brentanist Theory -- Two: The Ideal Observer Theory and Moral Objectivism -- 2.1. An Argument for Accepting the Ideal Observer Theory as a Standard for Determining the Correctness of Moral Judgments -- 2.2. Firth's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- 2.3. My Characterization of the Ideal Observer -- 2.4 Three Versions of the Ideal Observer Theory and Their Implications for the Objectivity of Moral Judgments -- 2.5. Sermonette on the Importance of Empathy -- 2.6. Intuitionism and the Ideal Observer Theory -- Three: Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.1 Some Different Meanings of the Term 'Ethical Relativism' -- 3.2. The Definition of 'Meta-Ethical Relativism' -- 3.3. Some Necessary Conditions of One's Accepting a Moral Judgment or a Moral Principle -- 3.4. Meta-Ethical Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.5. A Non-Nihilistic Version of Meta-Ethical Relativism -- 3.6. Conclusion -- Four: The Wages of Relativism -- 4.1. What Sorts of Attitudes and Commitments Presuppose a Belief in the Objectivity of Normative Judgments? -- 4.2. Causal or Psychological Connections Between Meta-Ethical Views and Attitudes and First-Order Normative Standards -- Appendix I: Nietzsche on the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.1. Nietzsche's Claims Concerning the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.2. What Are Nietzsche's Genetic Claims Intended to Show? -- Appendix II: Normative Relativism and Nihilism -- Appendix III: Hare's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography.
In: Realistische Phänomenologie / Realist Phenomenology Ser v.7
Ethical Personalism proposes to reflect on the person from at least three levels: ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Articulating from various philosophical and religious angles and traditions the ontological and inalienable value of the human person, i.e., her dignity, the contributors to this volume show not just what it means to be a human person, but also what it takes to live accordingly. Hence, beyond the purely theoretical elaboration on ethical personalism that reposes the crucial debates between relativism and realism on the one hand, and consequentialism and deontology on the other hand, this volume offers a range of insights useful for addressing concrete and practical matters that we, as humans, are confronted in our everyday life. With the call "back to the person!" which takes roots from a deep conviction to bring into light the value of the person, Ethical Personalism unequivocally affirms the necessity of (re)placing the person in the centre of our project of society, economic plans, political settings, and environment policies.
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In: International social work, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 11-26
ISSN: 1461-7234
English Given globalization and increasing multiculturalism, growing numbers of social workers face the challenges of respecting culture while upholding professional ethics. This article examines the perspectives of universalism and cultural relativism as applied to ethical decision-making in social work. A moderately universalist stance is recommended for social work, as valuing both diversity and human rights. French Face à la mondialisation et à l'augmentation du multiculturalisme, un nombre croissant de travailleurs sociaux font face à des défis dans un contexte qui demande de tenir compte à la fois du respect culturel et de l'éthique professionnelle. Cet article examine l'application de prises de décisions éthiques dans des perspectives universalistes et de relativisme culturel en travail social. Une position universaliste modérée est recommandée pour le travail social, valorisant à la fois la diversité culturelle et les droits humains. Spanish Dada la globalización y el multiculturalismo creciente, los trabajadores sociales se encuentran con el reto de respetar tanto la cultura como la ética profesional. Se examina la aplicación de las perspectivas universalistas y del relativismo cultural al proceso de decisión ética en trabajo social. Se recomienda una postura universalista moderada que respete tanto la diversidad como los derechos humanos.
In: Review of international studies: RIS, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 211-236
ISSN: 1469-9044
With the precipitate and well-deserved demise of positivism as the only theory of knowledge backstopping international relations, a large number of ethical issues, emasculated by positivism's non-cognitivist views of morality, are emerging for philosophical reflection and analysis. One of the most important of these is relativism. Despite its obvious (and increasing) significance, however, few international theorists have specifically addressed the issues it raises. One of the main reasons for this neglect, this article argues, lies in the conspicuous failure on the part of the newer normative approaches to international relations even to acknowledge that a relativist interpretation is a plausible construal of their position. In the next section, three examples of such failure will be described. It is no accident that these examples derive from anti-realist positions. A perspicuous feature of anti-realism has been its evident incapacity to give sufficient weight to the fact that the world is divided into antagonistic groups which have serious, perhaps even irreconcilable, moral and political conflicts with one another. But whatever may be the case for anti-realists, revisionary political realism is in no position to obscure its relation to relativism. The possibility of relativism, for the revisionary political realist, arises from simple reflection on the realist tradition.