Suchergebnisse

Internationally, the border has been presented as a site of unique opportunity for the identification and protection of victims of human trafficking. In the UK, the establishment of specialist safeguarding and anti-trafficking (SAT) units within the border force has raised questions about the challenges for border force officers (BFOs) of balancing the enforcement of strict immigration rules with the protection of victims under anti-trafficking legislation. In this paper we draw on data collected from a study of anti-trafficking initiatives at Heathrow airport to consider a particular area of BFO frustration with SAT work: the collection and use of evidence and intelligence to support investigation and pursuit of potential SAT cases at the border. Our findings focus on the use of intelligence and data to inform initiatives and develop a comprehensive understanding of the trafficking problem; and the scope of BFO powers of evidence-collection on the frontline. The experience of BFOs points to a team often working in isolation as they attempt to traverse gaps in data collection and limits to their powers to gather evidence in pursuit of their duty to identify victims of trafficking at the UK border. We conclude by making proposals for how the border force and central government could improve evidence and intelligence practices in ways that translate into both more coherent anti-trafficking policy and better identification and support for victims.

Abstract
The value of intelligence gathered from cell approaches in police custody suites remains largely unexplored, presenting a crucial area for research. This study explores the collection of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and the generation of Source (Covert Human Intelligence Source, CHIS) referrals during cell approaches. Data was collected from 102 cell approaches by which 54 were undertaken by dedicated intelligence officers and 48 by detectives in a police custody suite in England over a 3-month period. Results revealed that detectives, when tasked, were significantly more successful than dedicated intelligence officers in securing intelligence during cell approaches and to make source (CHIS) referrals. A detainee's willingness to engage was associated with intelligence provision, with revenge and lifestyle as key motivating factors. Detainees were significantly more likely to provide intelligence post-charge rather than pre-charge, though the time of day and detainee age showed no significant correlations with intelligence gathering. This study discussed the importance of optimizing intelligence collection and source referrals during cell approaches.

In the age of the War on Terror, high-quality, reliable intelligence is more crucial to our national security than ever. Effective intelligence saves lives. Yet from September 11, 2001 in New York to Bali, Madrid, London and the unfolding situation in Iraq, we hear endless claims and counter-claims about what went wrong and why.As former intelligence officers with the military and ASIS, Lance Collins and Warren Reed are ideally placed to assess these claims. From the policy-makers to the agents on the ground, the authors examine the chain of command and the role of vested interests. They provide an overview for the general reader of how intelligence services work in the post-September 11 world.Non-partisan and clearly written, Plunging Point outlines the historical context, the present problems and future solutions for intelligence services and their societies.Every aware Australian needs to read this.

"Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, An Anthology, Fourth Edition, is the most up-to-date reader in intelligence studies. Editors Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz present a diverse, comprehensive, and yet highly accessible set of readings from leading experts in the field. The anthology includes: * Articles examining a wide variety of important issues (satellite surveillance, 9/11, the search for WMDs in Iraq, homeland security, and counterterrorism) * An epilogue analyzing the current state of intelligence * Introductions at the beginning of each piece that help to contextualize chapter content * Discussion questions at the end of each chapter that reinforce key concepts and encourage class participation * Comprehensive coverage of many hot topics including the history of intelligence, how the United States gathers and interprets global information, the meaning of security intelligence, methods of intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, the danger of intelligence politicization, relationships between intelligence officers and the policymakers they serve, covert action, counterintelligence, accountability and civil liberties, the implications of major intelligence failures in 2001 and 2003, and intelligence as practiced in other nations The most engaging, current, and expertly edited anthology available, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, An Anthology, Fourth Edition, is ideal for courses in intelligence and homeland security"--

Internationally, the border has been presented as a site of unique opportunity for the identification and protection of victims of human trafficking. In the UK, the establishment of specialist safeguarding and anti-trafficking (SAT) units within the border force has raised questions about the challenges for border force officers (BFOs) of balancing the enforcement of strict immigration rules with the protection of victims under anti-trafficking legislation. In this paper we draw on data collected from a study of anti-trafficking initiatives at Heathrow airport to consider a particular area of BFO frustration with SAT work: the collection and use of evidence and intelligence to support investigation and pursuit of potential SAT cases at the border. Our findings focus on the use of intelligence and data to inform initiatives and develop a comprehensive understanding of the trafficking problem; and the scope of BFO powers of evidence-collection on the frontline. The experience of BFOs points to a team often working in isolation as they attempt to traverse gaps in data collection and limits to their powers to gather evidence in pursuit of their duty to identify victims of trafficking at the UK border. We conclude by making proposals for how the border force and central government could improve evidence and intelligence practices in ways that translate into both more coherent anti-trafficking policy and better identification and support for victims.

Internationally, the border has been presented as a site of unique opportunity for the identification and protection of victims of human trafficking. In the UK, the establishment of specialist safeguarding and anti-trafficking (SAT) units within the border force has raised questions about the challenges for border force officers (BFOs) of balancing the enforcement of strict immigration rules with the protection of victims under anti-trafficking legislation. In this paper we draw on data collected from a study of anti-trafficking initiatives at Heathrow airport to consider a particular area of BFO frustration with SAT work: the collection and use of evidence and intelligence to support investigation and pursuit of potential SAT cases at the border. Our findings focus on the use of intelligence and data to inform initiatives and develop a comprehensive understanding of the trafficking problem; and the scope of BFO powers of evidence-collection on the frontline. The experience of BFOs points to a team often working in isolation as they attempt to traverse gaps in data collection and limits to their powers to gather evidence in pursuit of their duty to identify victims of trafficking at the UK border. We conclude by making proposals for how the border force and central government could improve evidence and intelligence practices in ways that translate into both more coherent anti-trafficking policy and better identification and support for victims.

In the context of the fight against Islamist radicalization in France, prison intelligence rapidly developed from 2015 through the gradual creation of a dedicated service and a specific corps of professionals. This professionalization of prison intelligence work has deeply transformed the prison administration. This article aims to describe and analyse these transformations on the basis of an ethnographic study conducted in radicalization assessment units, which are specific units set up to assess prisoners who have committed or are suspected of committing crimes linked to radical Islam. We shall describe how the guards, probation officers, psychologists and educators participating in assessing the prisoners adapt to the new, encroaching presence of the intelligence mission. We shall analyse the forms of collaboration and competition between this staff and the prison intelligence officers. Lastly, we will examine criticism of the intelligence activity in the radicalization assessment units voiced by various professionals. The interpenetration of the assessment work and the intelligence mission – which are formally distinct missions – produces a specific type of knowledge relating to radicalized prisoners: a reproduction of certain representations or 'profiles'.

This article explores the impact of civil-military relations and an unreliable – even disloyal – local population upon intelligence-gathering and counter-espionage in Cyprus, and therefore adds to the existing literature on British Near and Middle East military intelligence during the First World War. Drawing upon archives in Britain and Cyprus, and a range of published primary sources, a fresh contribution to First World War intelligence studies is offered through a focus on British counter-espionage efforts in Cyprus after 1916. The article covers Anglo-French intelligence cooperation on the Syrian and Cilician coast, the wartime loyalties of Cypriots and their value as spies, and insights into Ottoman and German human intelligence activity in the region. The primary focus is on the civil-military relations between the Cyprus colonial government and the military intelligence officers. It is argued that Cyprus acquired some importance as a post for intelligence-gathering and especially counter-espionage, but the problems derived from inadequate civil-military relations, disloyal Cypriot subjects, and the island's status as a backwater hindered its development as a valuable asset in the Near and Middle East theatre.

Focuses on performance and integrity of the Directorate of Intelligence, the agency's analytic branch; options for change. Examines DOI weaknesses, including politicization, bureaucratization, and the gap between analysts and policy-makers.