Suchergebnisse

In drei Aufsätzen gehen Vedran Dzihic, Hakan Akbulut und Cengiz Günay der Frage nach, ob die EU und die USA in den von ihnen untersuchten Ländern und Regionen - also auf dem Balkan, in der Türkei sowie in der MENA-Region - an Einfluss verlieren und von anderen Akteuren wie etwa Russland oder China verdrängt werden. Dzihic analysiert und zeichnet nach, wie die EU und die USA ihre einstige Rolle als dominante Sicherheitsprovider, größte Investoren und unangefochtene normative Role-Models auf dem Westbalkan sukzessive eingebüßt haben und einer verstärkten Konkurrenz durch insbesondere Russland und China (aber auch der Türkei) ausgesetzt sind. Parallel hierzu lässt sich eine De-Demokratisierung und Etablierung autoritärer Herrschaftsmodelle feststellen, zeigt Dzihic in seinem Papier auf. Hakan Akbulut belegt mit historischen Verweisen, dass die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und ihren westlichen Partnern in den letzten Dekaden beständig wechselhaft waren, während auch die Beziehungen zu Russland eine gewisse Ambivalenz aufweisen, in ihrem Potenzial beschränkt und von vielen Divergenzen gekennzeichnet sind. Er argumentiert, dass die Türkei angesichts ihrer geopolitischen Lage ihre multidimensionale Außenpolitik weiter forcieren, die westliche Dimension hierbei aber die dominante blieben wird. Er rechnet nicht mit einem Bruch mit dem Westen, sondern mit weiterhin wechselhaften Beziehungen mit konjunkturellen Höhen und Tiefen. Cengiz Günay illustriert zunächst die Verschiebungen in den Prioritätensetzungen der USA und der EU gegenüber Ländern der MENA-Region. Dem sicherheitszentrierten Zugang mit all seinen Widersprüchen und Doppelstandards in demokratiepolitischen Fragen folgten mit dem sog. Arabischen Frühling größere Anstrengungen auf Seiten der EU und der USA, die Demokratisierungsprozesse in der Region zu unterstützen. Auf europäischer Seite fehlten jedoch sowohl die Finanzmittel als auch der Enthusiasmus, um hier einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu leisten. Die normative Agenda ist inzwischen nicht ganz verschwunden, aber deutlich in den Hintergrund getreten, meint Günay, während Sicherheitsinteressen wieder in den Vordergrund gerückt sind. Außerdem sehen sich die USA und die EU mit anderen Geldgebern und Investoren in der Region konfrontiert (siehe etwa China, Katar oder Saudi Arabien), während Russland vor allem Rüstungsgüter und Nukleartechnologie anzubieten hat. Auf Seiten der USA wurden mit der Wahl Trumps ins Präsidentenamt normative Ansätze beinahe gänzlich fallengelassen. Der Trend geht hin zu "sektoralen, transaktionalen Partnerschaften" und öffnet Spielräume für andere Konkurrenten auf dem "Jahrmarkt der Möglichkeiten", was gleichzeitig die Durchsetzungskraft der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik schwächt.

This paper raises the problem of the quality of governance in the microfinance sector in the MENA region. It suggests the construction of an aggregate index to assess the institutions operating in this sector. The quality of governance is increasingly at the forefront of the major challenges faced by most MFIs, on the road to sustainability. Our sample consists of 18 MFIs belonging to MENA. The analysis of the aggregate index resulting from the data of our sample reveals deterioration in the quality of the governance of the MFIs observed. This observation tends to weaken the viability prospects that are legitimate in terms of microfinance.

"This book takes a critical approach to analyzing the socio-economic development of the MENA Region and the role of politics and various social issues in this development by highlighting research-based perspectives from global leaders on topics such as decentralization, international affairs, the Arab Spring, foreign direct investment, and education in the Middle East and Northern Africa"--

In recent decades, militias and sub-national armed groups have played a decisive role in politics and security in the MENA region. Their prominence with local and outside actors in areas where state institutions have collapsed presents multiple policy challenges. Armed groups have access to substantial resources and in some cases enjoy considerable local legitimacy. That makes them formidable but also resilient forces. This is why their suppression – through coercive measures or marginalization – can bring more costs than benefits to already fragile state institutions and exhausted populations. This volume addresses the void in the current debate on subnational armed groups, focusing particularly on the multiple ongoing conflicts and turmoil in the MENA region. It places a particular emphasis on whether armed groups can be integrated into state-building initiatives and whether they can play a constructive role with other key actors.

AbstractBeyond the most immediate and devastating effects being felt by the local populace, the war in Ukraine is also having severe repercussions in other world regions, particularly the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where we find significant effects on domestic and regional politics. This contribution discusses conflict potential along these two dimensions and how they are interrelated, including with global politics. First, the effects of the war were quickly felt at the domestic level via rising prices and shortages of (subsidized) staples. A deteriorating economic situation is heating existing societal conflicts that had led to waves of mass uprisings in the MENA over the last decade, which are very likely to re-appear in the near future. We discuss recent developments in light of existing knowledge about the nexus between socioeconomic grievances and (non-)violent mobilization. Second, we reflect on changes to regional and global politics and their impact on conflicts in the region. The EU's sudden need for alternative oil and gas suppliers has improved the strategic position of Gulf countries, also vis-à-vis Iran in the rivalry over regional hegemony. This shift empowers such authoritarian regimes that support other autocracies as well as conflict parties in civil wars in the region. Instead of allying with either the West or Russia, the ruling elites' relationship with global powers remains opportunistic. Cooperation with Russia and China might very well aggravate political grievances rather than remedy structural socioeconomic shortcomings—both of which will continue to fuel preexisting lines of conflict in the region.

Focusing on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which comprises some of the world's richest countries next to some of the poorest, this book offers excellent insights into the discriminatory consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. With a geographic focus on the MENA region, the multidisciplinary case studies collected in this edited volume reveal that the coronavirus's impact patterns are a question of two variables: governance performance and socioeconomic potency. Given the global, unprecedented, complex, and systemic nature of COVID-19- and its long-term implications for societies, governments, international organisations, citizens and corporations - this volume entails a relevance to regions undergoing similar dynamics. Analyses in the book, therefore, have implications for the comparative study of the pandemic and its impact on societies around the globe. Understanding related dynamics and implications, and making use of lessons learned, are a pathway to deal with future similar crises. Questions covered in the volume are relevant to geopolitics, social implications and the relations between political leaders and citizens as beings embedded in various strategies of communication. The volume will appeal to scholars of international politics, political science, risk or crisis governance, economics and sociology, human rights and security, political communication and public health. The Open Access version of this book, available athttp://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution- Non Commercial- No Derivatives 4.0 licence.

This paper examines the role of institutions (including civil law origin), financial deepening and degree of regime authority on growth rates in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region using panel data through a fixed effect model. The results reveal that English civil law origin and the establishment of the rule of law work with the development of financial institutions to increase economic growth in these economies; however, the democratization of the political institutions and foreign direct investment do not assist financial development in promoting economic growth. The findings emphasize the prominence of overcoming institutional weaknesses and establishing transparent public policy governing businesses as a pre-requisite for successful universal integration in developing countries.

The digital age has dramatically impacted the marketing tools and forever transformed the branding strategies and brand-customers' relationships. Marketers had to adapt themselves to an era characterized by a well-informed and highly discerning customer that is not anymore the passive recipient of communication means but rather the active influencer of a sizable portion of potential others. Engaging the customers with the brand and the larger organization is crucial to sustain the two-way conversation expected by customers and this, oftentimes, is achieved through social media and new digital networking platforms. In order to demonstrate the impact of the digital age on marketing and organizations' business models, I have analyzed the business model of Xiaomi, a Chinese tech start-up that entirely built its brand on customers' involvement and the larger Internet environment. In order to increase the consumers' engagement, the company makes them an intrinsic part of its creation team by asking them for feedback, beta version testing and ideas suggestions. The company is mostly known as a smartphone provider. However, it positions itself more broadly as an Internet company aiming at creating a connected lifestyle through the creation of an Internet ecosystem where it would provide Internet services (e.g. banking, music, gaming) for all consumers to use. The ultimate objective of the company thereby lies in monetizing customers' engagement with the brand through the purchase of a smartphone that serves as the main vehicle leading to its Internet platform of interconnected digital services. The Internet enabled the company to raise awareness among its targeted segment (i.e.: young emerging middle-class willing to purchase high quality devices but who does not own yet the purchase power to do so), to create the buzz around its products through scarcity marketing and enlarge its customer-base through positive e-WOM, all this without spending a single Yuan on advertising. In order to determine whether such a strategy would work on the markets of the MENA region, the region that will witness the fastest smartphone adoption growth in the next thee to five years, right after sub-Saharan Africa. For reasons pertaining to feasibility and length, it analyzing every single country of the Middle East and North Africa was impossible to study all countries of the region. I have thus narrowed down the scope of my research to one specific market. Considering the growing importance of Morocco as an African hub and its being one of the most advanced countries of the continent it terms of telecommunications, providing an entry strategy on this market made complete sense. In order to devise a sound strategy, I proceeded to the thorough analyses of the country's political and economic contexts as well as the social and cultural norms that might impact Xiaomi. A market research was conducted in an attempt to better understand the shopping habits of young Moroccan consumers living in urban areas and determine how they would position themselves with regard to the main dimensions of the Chinese start-up's business model. Drawing upon these analyses and the results of my market study, I will expose what dimensions should be adapted and what advantages the company should rely on to succeed in the country. ; Master [120] en sciences de gestion, Université catholique de Louvain, 2017

The digital age has dramatically impacted the marketing tools and forever transformed the branding strategies and brand-customers' relationships. Marketers had to adapt themselves to an era characterized by a well-informed and highly discerning customer that is not anymore the passive recipient of communication means but rather the active influencer of a sizable portion of potential others. Engaging the customers with the brand and the larger organization is crucial to sustain the two-way conversation expected by customers and this, oftentimes, is achieved through social media and new digital networking platforms. In order to demonstrate the impact of the digital age on marketing and organizations' business models, I have analyzed the business model of Xiaomi, a Chinese tech start-up that entirely built its brand on customers' involvement and the larger Internet environment. In order to increase the consumers' engagement, the company makes them an intrinsic part of its creation team by asking them for feedback, beta version testing and ideas suggestions. The company is mostly known as a smartphone provider. However, it positions itself more broadly as an Internet company aiming at creating a connected lifestyle through the creation of an Internet ecosystem where it would provide Internet services (e.g. banking, music, gaming) for all consumers to use. The ultimate objective of the company thereby lies in monetizing customers' engagement with the brand through the purchase of a smartphone that serves as the main vehicle leading to its Internet platform of interconnected digital services. The Internet enabled the company to raise awareness among its targeted segment (i.e.: young emerging middle-class willing to purchase high quality devices but who does not own yet the purchase power to do so), to create the buzz around its products through scarcity marketing and enlarge its customer-base through positive e-WOM, all this without spending a single Yuan on advertising. In order to determine whether such a strategy would work on the markets of the MENA region, the region that will witness the fastest smartphone adoption growth in the next thee to five years, right after sub-Saharan Africa. For reasons pertaining to feasibility and length, it analyzing every single country of the Middle East and North Africa was impossible to study all countries of the region. I have thus narrowed down the scope of my research to one specific market. Considering the growing importance of Morocco as an African hub and its being one of the most advanced countries of the continent it terms of telecommunications, providing an entry strategy on this market made complete sense. In order to devise a sound strategy, I proceeded to the thorough analyses of the country's political and economic contexts as well as the social and cultural norms that might impact Xiaomi. A market research was conducted in an attempt to better understand the shopping habits of young Moroccan consumers living in urban areas and determine how they would position themselves with regard to the main dimensions of the Chinese start-up's business model. Drawing upon these analyses and the results of my market study, I will expose what dimensions should be adapted and what advantages the company should rely on to succeed in the country. ; Master [120] en sciences de gestion, Université catholique de Louvain, 2017

The utilization of electricity-based fuels (e-fuels) is a potential strategy component for achieving greenhouse gas neutrality in the European Union (EU). As renewable electricity production sites in the EU itself might be scarce and relatively expensive, importing e-fuels from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) could be a complementary and cost-efficient option. Using the energy system model Enertile, supply curves for hydrogen and synthetic methane in the MENA region are determined for the years 2030 and 2050 to evaluate this import option techno-economically. The model optimizes investments in renewable electricity production, e-fuel production chains, and local electricity transport infrastructures. Analyses of renewable electricity generation potentials show that the MENA region in particular has large low-cost solar power potentials. Optimization results in Enertile show for a weighted average cost of capital of 7% that substantial hydrogen production starts above 100 €/MWhH2 in 2030 and above 70 €/MWhH2 in 2050. Substantial synthetic methane production in the model results starts above 170 €/MWhCH4 in 2030 and above 120 €/MWhCH4 in 2050. The most important cost component in both fuel production routes is electricity. Taking into account transport cost surcharges, in Europe synthetic methane from MENA is available above 180 €/MWhCH4 in 2030 and above 130 €/MWhCH4 in 2050. Hydrogen exports from MENA to Europe cost above 120 €/MWhH2 in 2030 and above 90 €/MWhH2 in 2050. If exported to Europe, both e-fuels are more expensive to produce and transport in liquefied form than in gaseous form. A comparison of European hydrogen supply curves with hydrogen imports from MENA for 2050 reveals that imports can only be economically efficient if the two following conditions are met: Firstly, similar interest rates prevail in the EU and MENA; secondly, hydrogen transport costs converge at the cheap end of the range in the current literature. Apart from this, a shortage of land for renewable electricity generation in Europe may lead to hydrogen imports from MENA. This analysis is intended to assist in guiding European industrial and energy policy, planning import infrastructure needs, and providing an analytical framework for project developers in the MENA region.

"This book addresses the political Instability and its effects on the economics of the MENA countries. It also covers economic growth, brain drain, capital controls, corruption, economic reform, economic shocks, uncertainty, vulnerability, economics inequality, FDI flows, corruption, financial crises, terrorism, stock market crashes/crises, poverty, sustainability, and tourism"--

As hydro-meteorological hazards are predicted to become more frequent and intense in the future, scholars and policymakers are increasingly concerned about their security implications, especially in the context of ongoing climate change. Our study contributes to this debate by analysing the pathways to water-related conflict onset under drought conditions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region between 1996 and 2009. It is also the first such analysis that focuses on small-scale conflicts involving little or no physical violence, such as protests or demonstrations. These nonviolent conflicts are politically relevant, yet understudied in the literature on climate change and conflict, environmental security, and political instability. We employ the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to integrate quantitative and qualitative data at various scales (national, regional, local) for a sample of 34 cases (17 of which experienced conflict onset). Our findings show that pre-existing cleavages and either autocratic political systems or cuts of the public water supply are relevant predictors of nonviolent, water-related conflict onset during droughts. Grievances deeply embedded into socio-economic structures in combination with a triggering event like a drought or water cuts are hence driving such water-related conflicts, especially in the absence of proper political institutions. We thus argue that drought–conflict links are highly context-dependent even for nonviolent, local conflicts, hence challenging determinist narratives that claim direct interlinkages between climate change, hydro-meteorological disasters and conflict.

As hydro-meteorological hazards are predicted to become more frequent and intense in the future, scholars and policymakers are increasingly concerned about their security implications, especially in the context of ongoing climate change. Our study contributes to this debate by analysing the pathways to water-related conflict onset under drought conditions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region between 1996 and 2009. It is also the first such analysis that focuses on small-scale conflicts involving little or no physical violence, such as protests or demonstrations. These nonviolent conflicts are politically relevant, yet understudied in the literature on climate change and conflict, environmental security, and political instability. We employ the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to integrate quantitative and qualitative data at various scales (national, regional, local) for a sample of 34 cases (17 of which experienced conflict onset). Our findings show that pre-existing cleavages and either autocratic political systems or cuts of the public water supply are relevant predictors of nonviolent, water-related conflict onset during droughts. Grievances deeply embedded into socio-economic structures in combination with a triggering event like a drought or water cuts are hence driving such water-related conflicts, especially in the absence of proper political institutions. We thus argue that drought–conflict links are highly context-dependent even for nonviolent, local conflicts, hence challenging determinist narratives that claim direct interlinkages between climate change, hydro-meteorological disasters and conflict.