Suchergebnisse

View that UN peacekeeping can be central dynamic in the transition to a warless world.

Em 2013, após o golpe liderado pelo Séléka, que são grupos rebeldes muçulmanos, as milícias cristãs, também conhecidas como anti-Balaka, decidiram retaliar. Esta disputa violenta deteriorou as condições já pobres na República Centro-Africana (RCA). Embora a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) tenha estabelecido uma missão multidimensional de manutenção da paz na RCA, a MINUSCA não foi eficaz para conter o conflito e evitar uma crise humanitária. Assim, este artigo examina um novo conceito para a estruturação de forças de manutenção da paz na África, particularmente na República Centro-Africana, que é o estabelecimento de uma força africana permanente de manutenção da paz. Após uma pesquisa bibliográfica e uma entrevista com um observador militar brasileiro, que trabalhou na RCA, foi possível verificar que os contingentes militares nacionais que integram a MINUSCA enfrentam graves problemas, como baixo nível de treinamento de tropas, salários atrasados, parcialidade e até mesmo a violação dos direitos humanos da população civil, minando a credibilidade da ONU no país. A fim de melhorar a eficácia da força militar na RCA, uma força africana permanente de manutenção da paz, como um ramo da União Africana (UA) e sob o controle da MINUSCA, parece ter mais chances de ter sucesso, já que esta tropa seria mais imparcial, melhor remunerado e especificamente treinado para as operações de paz.

Token forces - tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions - have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace operations despite its limited relevance for missions' operational success. It conceptualizes token forces as a path-dependent unintended consequence of the norm of multilateralism in international uses of military force. The norm extends states' participation options by giving coalition builders an incentive to accept token forces; UN-specific types of token forces emerged as states learned about this option and secretariat officials adapted to state demand for it. The Element documents the growing incidence of token forces in UN peacekeeping, identifies the factors disposing states to contribute token forces, and discusses how UN officials channel token participation. The Element contributes to the literatures on UN peacekeeping, military coalitions, and the impacts of norms in international organizations.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- A Few Necessary Definitions -- Defining Peacekeeping -- The Evolution of War and Its Impact on Peacekeeping -- Book Outline -- 2 A Brief History of UN Peacekeeping -- The Nascent Period, 1946-1956 -- The Assertive Period, 1956-1967 -- The Dormant Period, 1967-1973 -- The Resurgent Period, 1973-1978 -- The Maintenance Period, 1978-1988 -- The Expansion Period, 1988-1993 -- The Contraction Period, 1993-1999 -- The Era of Unrealistic Expectations, 1999-Present -- 3 Failing Before Beginning -- Organizational Factors -- Deciding to Act -- The Mandate -- The Role of the Secretary-General -- Picking the Right People -- Having to Pick the Wrong People -- Planning, Logistics, and Rapid Reaction -- Conflict-Specific Factors -- 4 Failing While Doing -- Failing at Classical Peacekeeping -- Failing at Multidimensional Peacekeeping -- 5 Angola and Mozambique: Similar Histories, Different Outcomes -- Internal Resources and External Forces -- Mediation and the Mandate -- Picking the Right People -- The Internal Factors -- The Blue Helmets-Too Many Troops with Too Little to Do -- The Police Component-Calling the Wrong Cop -- Humanitarian Functions-Good Intentions and Bad Results -- Demining-Defusing a Time Bomb -- Reintegration-Making Civilians Out of Soldiers -- Disarmament-Ten Guns for Every Soldier -- Demobilization-Giving up the Military Option -- Forming a Unified Army or Simply Creating a Third -- Elections-Free, Fair, and Rejected -- 6 The Real Reasons Peacekeeping Fails -- Classical Peacekeeping -- Protection and Stabilization Missions -- Why Peacekeepers Cannot Succeed Against Violent Extremism -- Multidimensional Missions-Lessons from Angola and Mozambique -- The Real Culprits-The Parties Themselves -- Propaganda-All the News That Is Fit to Invent.

Recent surveys have demonstrated that Canadians value Canada's role as a peacekeeper and peacemaker in an international context. Additionally, research has demonstrated decreasing public support for Canada's involvement in military combat interventions in other parts of the world. However, awareness and understanding of nonviolent alternatives appear to be lacking. This survey examines Canadian public's awareness and understanding of unarmed civilian peacekeeping as an alternative to sending armed troops, and whether the public would support Canada in utilizing unarmed civilian peacekeepers (focusing on mediation, negotiation, relationship and peacebuilding activities) as part of its response to violent global conflicts. The results reveal that Canadians believe unarmed civilian peacekeeping would be more effective in tasks such as reducing human rights abuses, preventing further armed conflict and promoting lasting peace. Respondents also believe the practice would benefit Canada's reputation as a peacemaker and leader. This paper concludes with recommendations for proponents and advocates of the incorporation of unarmed civilian peacekeeping into the official policy of the Canadian government. 1 ; Peer reviewed ; Published

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1 Military Strategic Culture and Doctrine -- 2 British Military Strategic Culture-The Cardwellian Conundrum -- 3 American Military Strategic Culture-The Uptonian Paradox -- 4 Existing Peacekeeping Doctrine at the End of the Cold War -- 5 The American Military in Somalia-Into the Abyss -- 6 The British Army in Bosnia-Adapting on the Hoof -- 7 Strategic Change and Doctrinal Outcomes for Peace Operations -- 8 Conclusion and Policy Implications -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.