This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
The article raises two interconnected questions: first, what is the place of three Baltic States in Russia's security image, and second, how Baltic States cope with their own negative perception of Russia. The proposed idea is that the problems of mutual representation and interaction can be understood analysing the conceptualisations of space, which influences the way in which the closest environment, including the neighbours, is approached. This representation, together with historical narratives, formulates and justifies the comprehensive, consistent, and objectivised self and the other. Thus, the goal is to show how the tense relations between Russia and Baltic States, full of mistrust, can be explained as a clash between two conflicting geo-spatial views. This idea is developed, first, by presenting the theoretical assumptions on the relation among territory, identity, and borders and the principles of the neighbourhood analysis, and second, by demonstrating how the spatial representation by Russia and Baltic States is formulated and supported in their spatial identity and foreign policy practices. In the conclusions, the answer is given as to how this clash between the two different and competing understandings is reflected in the bilateral interactions and how these insights allow contributing to the analysis of the foreign policy of the states. ; Straipsnyje keliami du tarpusavyje susiję klausimai. Pirma, kokia yra Baltijos valstybių vieta Rusijos saugumo vaizdiniuose. Antra, kaip Baltijos valstybės susidoroja su neigiamu Rusijos suvokimu. Šiame straipsnyje teigiama, kad Rusijos ir trijų Baltijos valstybių abipusio reprezentavimo ir sąveikos problemas geriausiai galima suprasti atskleidžiant šių valstybių erdvės suvokimą, kuris visų pirma formuoja požiūrį į artimiausią aplinką, taigi ir savo kaimynus. Šis suvokimas, kylantis ir iš istorinių reprezentacijų, pagrindžia ir pateikia išsamų, objektyvizuotą savęs ir "kito" suvokimą. Taigi siekiama parodyti, kaip įtemptus ir nepasitikėjimo kupinus Rusijos ir trijų Baltijos valstybių santykius veikia susiduriantys ir konfliktuojantys savo vietos tarptautinėje politikoje apibūdinimai ir iš jų kylantys veiksmai. Ši idėja straipsnyje atskleidžiama, pirma, išplėtojant teorines prielaidas, kad yra teritorijos, tapatybės ir sienų ryšys, ir iš to kylančius kaimynystės analizės principus, antra, parodant, kaip Rusija ir trys Baltijos valstybės savo užsienio politika išreiškia, formuluoja ir dar kartą įtvirtina savo erdvinį tapatybinį pasaulėvaizdį. Išvadose parodoma, kaip skirtingų ir vienas kitą neutralizuoti bandančių pasaulėvaizdžių susidūrimas formuoja dvišales sąveikas ir kaip jie leidžia analizuoti kiekvieno veikėjo užsienio politiką.
The article raises two interconnected questions: first, what is the place of three Baltic States in Russia's security image, and second, how Baltic States cope with their own negative perception of Russia. The proposed idea is that the problems of mutual representation and interaction can be understood analysing the conceptualisations of space, which influences the way in which the closest environment, including the neighbours, is approached. This representation, together with historical narratives, formulates and justifies the comprehensive, consistent, and objectivised self and the other. Thus, the goal is to show how the tense relations between Russia and Baltic States, full of mistrust, can be explained as a clash between two conflicting geo-spatial views. This idea is developed, first, by presenting the theoretical assumptions on the relation among territory, identity, and borders and the principles of the neighbourhood analysis, and second, by demonstrating how the spatial representation by Russia and Baltic States is formulated and supported in their spatial identity and foreign policy practices. In the conclusions, the answer is given as to how this clash between the two different and competing understandings is reflected in the bilateral interactions and how these insights allow contributing to the analysis of the foreign policy of the states.
During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].
During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].
During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].
The article analyses the information that spreads in the media during the election campaign. It looks at the aspect of promises made by politicians through an academic lens. The definition of a political promise is explained; some insights are devoted to an analysis of the reasons why some promises are more commonly fulfilled. The paper mostly concentrates on the role of the media, combining ideas of media theorists with the investigation of pre-election TV debates "Lyderių forumas".
The article analyses the information that spreads in the media during the election campaign. It looks at the aspect of promises made by politicians through an academic lens. The definition of a political promise is explained; some insights are devoted to an analysis of the reasons why some promises are more commonly fulfilled. The paper mostly concentrates on the role of the media, combining ideas of media theorists with the investigation of pre-election TV debates "Lyderių forumas".
The article analyses the information that spreads in the media during the election campaign. It looks at the aspect of promises made by politicians through an academic lens. The definition of a political promise is explained; some insights are devoted to an analysis of the reasons why some promises are more commonly fulfilled. The paper mostly concentrates on the role of the media, combining ideas of media theorists with the investigation of pre-election TV debates "Lyderių forumas".
The article analyses the information that spreads in the media during the election campaign. It looks at the aspect of promises made by politicians through an academic lens. The definition of a political promise is explained; some insights are devoted to an analysis of the reasons why some promises are more commonly fulfilled. The paper mostly concentrates on the role of the media, combining ideas of media theorists with the investigation of pre-election TV debates "Lyderių forumas".