Suchergebnisse

Данная статья посвящена анализу политических процессов на территории постсоветской Грузии. В работе поэтапно показаны основные направления и результаты проводимых в республике реформ, начиная с политики Э. Шеварднадзе и до Б. Иванишвили.This article is devoted to the analysis of political processes in the post-Soviet Georgia. The paper shows main directions and results of political reforms in the country, ranging from politics of Shevardnadze and to Boris Ivanishvili.

AFTER SIX MONTHS OF STEADY PROGRESS, THE MOMENTUM OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS SLOWED AT THE APRIL 1990 MEETING BETWEEN U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. THE TWO SIDES IDENTIFIED DISAGREEMENTS OVER LIMITATIONS ON SEA- AND AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AS THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS. DESPITE THE LACK OF PROGRESS, THE DATE FOR THE UPCOMING BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT WAS MOVED FORWARD BY ALMOST ONE MONTH.

TWO MONTHS AFTER SIGNING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE IMBROILED IN A DEBATE OVER THE NUMBER OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOSCOW WILL BE REQUIRED TO DESTROY UNDER THE PACT. THE DISPUTE OVER DATA, THE RESIGNATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE, AND THE SOVIET CRACKDOWN IN LITHUANIA THREATEN TO COMPLICATE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT.

The United National Movement declared the development of small and medium businesses as one of its main aims and promised to remove the taxation issue, the main irritant, from the agenda. Under Eduard Shevardnadze tax evasion was easy: businessmen and bureaucrats established unofficial relations regarded at the top as a natural development pattern of capitalism and primary accumulation. Businessmen were free to break the law, while bureaucrats seized the moment to grow rich by using their official positions to raise their personal prosperity. Even though the country's leaders alleviated state economic pressure on business, they increased their political and bureaucratic pressure by the same token, making the business community a hostage of the state and its bureaucracy. The latter was not only growing rich on bribes, it wanted large chunks of the businesses as well. Corrupt politicians and top bureaucrats protected the lawbreakers. In other words, while economic coercion was alleviated, pressure from the country's political leaders and corrupt bureaucrats was doubled. Businessmen were naturally displeased: they wanted to wriggle out of the double pressure. At one time, Eduard Shevardnadze used this to tighten his control over the business community and strengthen the social base of his power. After coming to power through a coup that toppled the regime of legitimately elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, he badly needed all the support he could master. The deposed president's allies stood opposed to him, while most of the population badly hit by the economic devastation and sliding standard of living posed a serious threat to his political system. To strengthen the regime's economic and social basis, President Shevardnadze assembled a business community out of his friends and political allies and enlisted new allies from among the businessmen connected with his regime. This explains how the National Bank of Georgia squandered credits and damaged the state's interests: advised by highly placed and influential people, its chairman was issuing credits in hard currency to be repaid in depreciated Georgian coupons. Huge capital formed in this way. Being aware that sooner or later he would be called to account, the chairman kept a list of all those who recommended the credit seekers. He shot himself under dubious circumstances during the interrogations. Naturally enough, society refused to accept the official version as true. The members of the top crust were not the only ones to exploit the permissiveness of Shevardnadze's regime: ordinary people who lost their jobs when the Soviet Union fell apart found themselves at the very bottom. Some became petty merchants, others took to smuggling; still others tried to set up small and medium businesses by violating the laws. Permissiveness relieved the state's pressure and let them live.

The author traces the idea of international, cosmopolitan ideas of government throughout Western history to the present. The article is particularly interested in how Russians have received these ideas, with attention to the ideas of pro-Western Soviet intellectuals such as Eduard Shevardnadze. The author also discusses the intellectual climate that engendered the Helsinki Process, noting that it was the product of the West's determination to advance its doctrine of the supranational nature of the human rights issues. K. Cargill

DURING THEIR APRIL 1990 WASHINGTON MEETING, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE MADE LITTLE HEADWAY IN RESOLVING OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE START TALKS. THE UNITED STATES ADDED A NEW WRINKLE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BY PROPOSING A BAN ON MOBILE LAND-BASED MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES. THE SOVIET UNION RESPONDED THAT ANY BAN WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE SEA-BASED SYSTEMS. IN THIS ARTICLE, THREE ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS EXPLAIN THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TALKS.

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Übergangsperiode in Georgien und versucht exemplarisch zu erläutern, wie es Teilen der alten Elite, die über "ausreichendes Vertrauen bei der Masse und den starken Organisationen im Land" verfügte, gelungen ist, den Transformationsprozess trotz aller Rückschläge zu gestalten. Analysiert werden in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Instrumente, derer sich die politisch Handelnden bedienten, um den Regimewechsel unumkehrbar zu machen. (Orient/DÜI)

Text of his address, "The trials which await our people," delivered before the Fourth Congress of the People's Deputies, Moscow, Dec. 20, 1990, and US Secretary of State Baker's subsequent press briefing.

Today, the (Western) geopolitics dominant in the decade following the Cold War must consider the rivalling (Eastern) geopolitics. The present article deals with the use of the military bases situated abroad to support separatism in neighbouring countries. In the relations between Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Georgia and Russia in 1989 – 2008, special attention is paid to the periods of political standstill when the war was continued as the war of statements conducted by representative bodies in which even the UN Security Council came to be included. The article also focuses on the change of geopolitical visions of Georgia following the Rose Revolution or the waning of the myths of Shevardnadze and Russia's foreign policy intentions.