Suchergebnisse

All political scientists offer us their interpretations of the world. Interpretive approaches differ from many others in that they offer us interpretations of interpretations; they concentrate on meanings, beliefs, languages, discourses, and signs, as opposed to, say, laws and rules, correlations between social categories, or deductive models. Of course, this distinction between interpretive approaches and others is not an all or nothing affair: sensible interpretivists allow that the study of laws, correlations, and models can play a role in our exploration of practices; and sensible institutionalists, behavioralists, and rational choice theorists allow that their typologies, correlations, and models can do explanatory work only in so far as they can be unpacked in terms of the actual beliefs and desires of actors. Nonetheless, we can distinguish a family of interpretive approaches to political science that stand out in that they focus on meanings and beliefs – a family that includes decentred theory, ethnography, poststructuralism, practical philosophy, and social constructivism, and that overlaps with other approaches such as the constructivist and ideational forms of institutionalism.

A study of the role of theosophy in the formation of the Indian National Congress enhances our understanding of the relationship between neo-Hinduism and political nationalism. Theosophy, and neo-Hinduism more generally, provided western-educated Hindus with a discourse within which to develop their political aspirations in a way that met western notions of legitimacy. It gave them confidence in themselves, experience of organisation, and clear intellectual commitments, and it brought them together with liberal Britons within an all-India framework. It provided the background against which A. O. Hume worked with younger nationalists to found the Congress.

"On Tradition". Tradition plays a vital role as an ontological and explanatory concept quite apart from its frequent use as a moral and political one. Human scientists often explain features of actions, practices or works by locating them in a tradition, and even scholars who explicitly reject the concept of tradition often adopt related concepts to describe the impact of context upon human activity. It appears, then, that a concept such as tradition, structure, heritage, or paradigm has an important role to play in our understanding of the human condition. This paper analyses this ontological and explanatory concept of tradition. It asks, why do we need such a concept? What content we should give to it? What role does it play in our accounts of human affairs? The analysis takes us away from essentialist accounts of traditions as defined by fixed features toward one that sees them as composed of conceptual and historical connections. It thus seeks to allow for the contingent and fluid nature of social life. ; La tradición juega un papel vital como concepto ontológico y explicativo, además de su frecuente uso como concepto moral o político. Los humanistas suelen explicar las características de las acciones, las prácticas o las labores ubicándolas en una tradición. Incluso los académicos que rechazan explícitamente el concepto de tradición, adoptan con frecuencia conceptos afines para describir el impacto del contexto sobre la actividad humana. Al parecer, pues, un concepto como el de la tradición, la estructura, la herencia o el paradigma, cumple un importante papel en nuestra comprensión de la condición humana. Este artículo analiza ese concepto ontológico y explicativo de la tradición. Se pregunta, ¿por qué necesitamos de tal concepto? ¿Qué contenido deberíamos darle? ¿Qué papel cumple en nuestras consideraciones de los asuntos humanos? El análisis nos conduce, lejos de las posturas esencialistas en torno a las tradiciones que las definen como rasgos dados, hacia una postura que las considera compuestas de conexiones conceptuales e históricas. Busca, de este modo, tener en cuenta la naturaleza contingente y fluida de la vida social.

Sidney Webb is often represented as a descendent of the utilitarians. Social democracy and the welfare state thus stand as the continuing development of Enlightenment rationalism. Alternatively, Webb appears as the representative of a new managerial and administrative class. Social democracy and the welfare state here stand as the elitist and bureaucratic expressions of the power of this class. In contrast to these conventional views, this paper locates Webb in the context of a radicalism, peculiar to the 1870s, composed of ethical positivism and evolutionary sociology. He became a socialist because of his positivist ethic. He defined his socialism in relation to an evolutionary philosophy. And he later adopted collectivism as a result of turning to positivist sociology. Webb's collectivism, however, provided little assistance in dealing with the dilemmas of the inter-war years. His ethical positivism and evolutionary sociology led him to turn to solutions apparently offered by the Soviet Union. This reinterpretation of Webb suggests a new view of social democracy and the welfare state. We should see them as the changing products of particular ideational and political contexts such as those of the 1870s and 1930s

Responds to critics (all, 2002) of his The Logic of the History of Ideas (1999). Discussed are philosophy's relationship to history & sociology; meaning & intentionality; the self & language; & knowledge & truth. A. Lee