Suchergebnisse

Live, broadcast defamation is a murky area of law garnering surprisingly scant scholarly attention. But because libel law typically creates republication liability for broadcasters who air defamatory statements uttered by third parties—even when news organizations have no idea what the third parties are about to say— broadcasters covering live, breaking news events face significant risks of liability for remarks by people at the scene. This Article analyzes the case law of live and spontaneous broadcast defamation, explores the statutory backdrop in such cases and, ultimately, proposes a solution in the form of a "breaking news doctrine" that relieves broadcasters of republication liability if five prerequisites are satisfied.

The right of publicity—the right to control commercial uses of one's identity—stands in an ambiguous relationship to First Amendment free speech interests. This article explores the origins of the publicity tort, including its recent expansion into domains formerly thought to be protected by the First Amendment. The article then analyzes two questionable rulings from federal appellate courts in 2013. Both cases held that the First Amendment did not protect a video game maker using the personae of college athletes. These rulings carry serious implications not only for video game creators but also for a variety of media entities.

This article gives Cambria the legal spotlight, at a time when conservatives control the White House and Congress, to discuss the never-ending tension between the First Amendment freedom of speech, which sometimes, although certainly not always, protects the $10 billion adult entertainment industry in the United States and the voices of censorship who would squelch such content. It is a tension that clearly affects many people, given the sheer popularity of sexually explicit speech and the mainstreaming today of adult content; sales and rentals of adult videos in 2002 totaled more than $4 billion, according to the Adult Video News. Pornography on the Internet generates another $2 billion. As a February 2003 article in the Washington Post observed,"[t]he popularization of pornography is everywhere." The Video Software Dealers Association predicted in its most recent annual report that by 2006, adult entertainment will be among the three most significant online content providers. In this article, Cambria discusses, from his perch as one of the nation's leading obscenity lawyers, a myriad of First Amendment-based issues including:(I) the continued viability of the obscenity test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Millerv. California;32 (2) the regulation of so-called virtual child pornography;33 (3) his tactics in both selecting and arguing before juries in obscenity cases; (4) the zoning of adult entertainment establishments and the constitutionality of such efforts; (5) the so-called Cambria List of sexually explicit acts that often attract prosecutors' attention; (6) his beliefs about the intent and purpose of the First Amendment in a democratic society; and (7) his representation of, as well as relationship with, Larry Flynt during the last quarter of a century. Along the way, Cambria comments on the state of the adult entertainment industry and the way it has now become a part of mainstream society

This Article examines the complex and unsettled state of the true threats doctrine through the lens of the equally complicated, controversial and multi- faceted musical genre of rap. Rap, although generally protected by the First Amendment, is frequently caught in the crosshairs of criminal prosecutions focusing on whether or not it constitutes a true threat of violence. Ultimately, this Article offers suggestions for how to clarify the doctrinal issues, with rap illustrating and supporting those ideas.

This article examines the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 ruling in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association for the future use of social science evidence and communication research to supply legislative facts supporting laws that target harms allegedly caused by media artifacts. The Brown majority set the bar for the relevance of social science evidence exceedingly high - perhaps too high, the article suggests - while Justice Stephen Breyer, in contrast, adopted a much more deferential approach in a dissent that embraced the evidence proffered by California. The article also reveals an apparent inconsistency in Justice Antonin Scalia's approach to social evidence when comparing his majority opinion in Brown against his opinion just two years earlier in Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. Ultimately, the article asserts that communication scientists hoping to influence both legislative bodies and jurists should view Brown as a wake-up call to do two things: 1) educate lawmakers and jurists about whether and when social science research can adequately resolve complex questions about media-caused harms; and 2) jettison research that lacks real-world generalizability and legal relevance.

This article analyzes and critiques legislation adopted by states in 2010 to address the burgeoning phenomenon of teen sexting. Sixteen different states in 2010, stretching from California to New York, considered bills or resolutions designed to address, in one manner or another, teen sexting. By early November 2010, sexting bills had been signed into law by the governors of Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois and Louisiana. To illustrate the differences, as well as the strengths and weaknesses among the new sexting laws, the article applies each of them to the facts of realistic sexting scenario. Significantly, this analysis of the laws through the lens of hypothetical fact pattern reveals that the low-tech, downstream transmission of hard copies of sexual images of minors – images that were initially transmitted by cell phones by minors – appears to escape the reach of all of the 2010 sexting laws. The article argues that this gap or loophole in the new laws should be addressed by amending them. Ultimately, the article demonstrates a distinct lack of uniformity across the sexting statutes adopted in 2010. For instance, even when it comes to what would appear to be the most objective element of the offense of sexting – themaximum age of the possible perpetrator – there is disagreement. Such disparity creates an uneven patchwork of legislation that fails to give minors proper notice of what sexting activities are permissible.