Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting
In: Public choice, Band 98, S. 59-82
ISSN: 0048-5829
Presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate. The model assumes no abstentions, sincere voting, & maximization of expected vote by each candidate. After deriving a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty, it is shown that, under concavity, convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum-sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized. Also discussed is the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance. Examples are presented in which computer analysis indicates that nonconvergent equilibria are only locally stable & disappear as voter uncertainty increases. 1 Figure, 2 Appendixes, 23 References. Adapted from the source document.