Suchergebnisse

Die am 19. August 1998 in Moskau wiederaufgenommenen, seit Jahren sich hinziehenden Verhandlungen zwischen Estland und Rußland über einen Grenzvertrag sind nur ein, wenn auch ein folgenschwerer, Aspekt der bilateralen Probleme. Die Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Estland und Rußland werfen eine Vielzahl regionaler Probleme auf: der fehlende Grenzvertrag und damit verbunden keine Regelungen für den kleinen Grenzverkehr sowie doppelte Zölle auf sämtliche Importe aus Estland, die russischsprachige Bevölkerung in Estland, die Konzentration von Aussiedlern aus Estland in der russischen Grenzregion sowie infrastrukturelle Probleme der Anbindung zwischen russischen und estnischen Verkehrswegen und Energiesystemen. Ein Teil der regionalen Entscheidungsträger instrumentalisiert diese Probleme für einen antieuropäischen (auf russischer Seite) bzw. antirussischen (auf estnischer Seite) Kurs. Dabei ist die von einem anderen Teil der regionalen Eliten bereits heute forcierte grenzüberschreitende Kooperation ein wichtiger Ansatzpunkt, um die Chancen wirtschaftlicher und gesellschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit zur Vermeidung neuer Trennlinien durch Europa zu nutzen. Da Estland zu den Kandidaten der ersten EU-Erweiterungsrunde zählt, werden die regional nicht zu lösenden Schwierigkeiten zu europäischen Problemen. (BIOst-Dok)

Die vorliegenden Empfehlungen befassen sich mit den Risiken und Herausforderungen, die sich aus einem EU-Beitritt der Ukraine ergeben. Zunächst beleuchten die Autoren den schwierigen Transitionsprozess in der Ukraine seit der 1991 erlangten Unabhängigkeit. Außenpolitisch wird ein erfolgreicher Balanceakt zwischen Russland und dem Westen vollzogen. Die innenpolitischen Reformen hin zu mehr Demokratie, Marktwirtschaft und Zivilgesellschaft hingegen werden nur sehr langsam vorgenommen, wofür neben einem Mangel an Fachkräften vor allem Korruption und die Nutzung staatlicher Institutionen für private Interessen verantwortlich sind. Obwohl es der Regierung im Jahr 2000 gelungen ist Strukturreformen durchzusetzen, die eine Maximierung des Wohlfahrtseffektes zum Ziel haben, stellen die zuvor erwähnten Probleme ein Risiko für die Transformation und die Beziehungen zur EU dar. Dies wird durch die neue Anti-Reform-Koalitionsregierung, die seit April 2001 regiert, noch verstärkt. Die Autoren bemängeln in diesem Zusammenhang das Wirtschaftswachstum, den nicht vollzogenen Beitritt zur WTO, fehlende administrative und strukturelle Reformen, die prekäre Situation des Staatshaushaltes sowie das schlechte Investitionsklima. Im Anschluss daran wird die europäische Politik gegenüber der Ukraine und hier vor allem das Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsabkommen, untersucht. Eine Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine hängt zum einen von der Entwicklung des Transformationsprozesses ab und zum anderen von dem Interesse der Ukraine selbst, EU-Mitglied zu werden. Abschließend geben die Autoren noch einige Strategieempfehlungen hinsichtlich der Beziehungen mit der Ukraine, aber auch der Osterweiterung im allgemeinen. Es wird deutlich, dass die EU in zunehmendem Maß Verantwortung für Sicherheit und Stabilität in Europa übernimmt. Das Defizit seitens der EU-Kommission besteht allerdings in einer mangelnden Differenzierung der potentiellen Beitrittskandidaten. (ICD)

" From the early 1990s, European-Russian relations were driven by two key concepts: building a market-based democracy within Russia and using EU enlargement as a mechanism to promote democratic changes throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The year 2004 can be seen as the turning point in this approach, one that has required reshaping relations between the European Union and Russia, a task that remains incomplete. President Putin's second term in office, which started in March 2004, led to changes in Russia that altered the chaotic but open-minded Yeltsin period into an era characterized by attempts to create a strong state based on (1) recentralisation of the political system, (2) the "dictatorship of law" and (3) a Souverenaya Democratiya. Since 2004, Russia has staked its claim to a new role in the international system as an energy-based power to be taken seriously in international organisations, in conflict resolution and in fighting against terrorism. Even if Russia and the European Union do not share the same values, both partners need each other and widespread linkages have superseded Cold War thinking.

By 2004 the European Union was a success story of simultaneous broadening and deepening. The EU grew to 27 member-states, eight of them from the former Soviet bloc and sensitive about building new relations with the Kremlin. Since then, however, European integration has suffers from both the failure to adopt the constitutional treaty and a more general enlargement fatigue. Decision-making in the EU of 27 depends greatly on national influence and strategic alliance building among members.

The formula of partnership and cooperation between Russia and the EU is a low ebb. A genuine European position is still steeped in the spirit of the 1990s, when EU enlargement guided democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. But neither the rhetoric of a democratic Russia that is an integral part of the West nor an EU strategic partnership with Russia functions any longer. This deterioration of relations affects more than just Russia itself. Moscow sees countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Kazakhstan as its "near abroad," while Brussels regards them as the "new neighbourhood." Disputes with the Kremlin are also carried out by proxy in these states.

Individual governments have been using EU institutions to pursue narrow national interests, rather than acting within the Union's framework. To illustrate the current situation one has to differentiate between three groups of actors: first, the group of Russia sceptics, who are guided by legacies of the past and are blocking cooperation with Russia. The Polish veto of the mandate for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the problem of the Druzhba pipeline in Lithuania and the conflict surrounding Tallinn's war memorial are all examples. Second are countries, which do not care much about Moscow, such as Portugal and Greece. Third are the proponents of fruitful relations with Russia, such as Finland and Germany. " [author's abstract]

"Ukraine's parliamentary elections on 30 September 2007 were supposed to deliver clarity. Either the Party of Regions would complete the comeback it began in the March 2006 elections—signaling closer cooperation with Russia and giving Ukraine's internal political development a particular direction, or the Orange parties led by Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushenko would gain a stable majority—making integration into Euro-Atlantic structures a national priority. Neither happened. The closely balanced parliament yielded a government of the Orange parties with a razor-thin majority, far from what would be necessary to renovate the constitution, and slender enough to raise doubts about the government's ability to rule for a full term. Ukraine, it seems, is certain to face more uncertainty.

Ukraine is the only country with the potential to re-order both the European Union and the "post-Soviet Space." A country transformed into a democracy and market economy would mean the EU could welcome a new member the size of France. The shape of new strategic preconditions would also increase pressure on Russia to reform its attitude towards its "near abroad" and to move in the direction of democratic integration. As far as the West is concerned, Ukraine remains the most important stone in the mosaic of a new Eastern Policy that still requires further development before it can be implemented." [author's abstract]

"Die gegenwärtige demokratische Dynamik auf dem Gebiet der früheren Sowjetunion
und der Rückschlag für das europäische Verfassungsprojekt bedeuten neue
Herausforderungen für alle europäischen Staaten. Die Erwartungen der osteuropäischen
Staaten an die EU haben sich verändert, gleichzeitig geben sie neue
Impulse, kämpfen aber auch mit neuen und alten Problemen.
Welche Konzepte hat die Europäische Union zur Gestaltung ihrer Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen,
sind sie angesichts der neuen Situation noch adäquat? Welche
Chancen bieten diese Konzepte, wo sind ihre Grenzen? Welche Alternativen gibt es
für die Gestaltung der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und ihren Nachbarstaaten?" [Textauszug]

"The rainbow revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine drew inspiration from, and were oriented toward, Western values and norms. One of the most important objectives driving the new wave of post-Soviet transition has been the desire to join Euro- Atlantic structures. The goal of becoming an EU member is no longer limited to foreign policy declarations but forms a key component of the domestic reform agendas of these states. The unexpected dynamism of democratization and reform emerging from Eastern Europe has put pressure on Western policymakers to develop solutions that go beyond the agenda of an EU enlargement limited to 27 or 28 member states, partnership and cooperation with Russia, and a Neighborhood Policy driven by 'everything but institutions' (Romano Prodi). The French and Dutch rejections of the European Constitution appear to signal that the 'deepening' and 'widening' of the EU have reached their limits for the time being. The European Neighborhood Policy is an important step forward, but it is not sufficient to guide democratic developments in countries that desire a concrete prospect for EU membership, including Ukraine, Georgia, and in the future even Belarus. Ukraine's Orange Revolution once again demonstrated Putin's failure to influence the post-Soviet integration space through personal networks, direct pressure, and economic dependency. At the same time, Russia remains an important actor in Europe as a whole. For the first time, Russia and the EU face the common challenge of shaping overlapping integration spaces between Russia's old neighbourhood or 'near abroad' and the EU's new neighbourhood. Eastern Europe's 'return to Europe' has been driven by individual Eastern European states themselves, together with some of the new EU member states, such as Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia. But all of these efforts will be of limited relevance without support from Berlin. Focusing on Germany's potential role in elaborating and implementing a new Ostpolitik raises key analytical questions: What is Germany's potential impact on a new Ostpolitik, and what German interests and actors would be involved? In considering this new foreign policy agenda, one must focus on the current state of affairs as well as on the strategic concepts that will shape future policy. This paper examines the potential impact of German foreign policy toward Eastern Europe and provides a critical assessment of other national and international actors involved." (author's abstract)

Table of Contents: Preface; I. Policy Recommendations for a Multi-Layered Europe; II. Prospects and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement; 1. Strategic Dilemmas and Risk Reporting; 2. Security and Stability; 3. Transformation Toward Democracy and a Market Economy; III. European Agendas Beyond Eastern Enlargement; 1. Regional Strategies for the Agendas; 2. Eastern Europe: Cooperation and Neighborhood; 3. Southeastern Europe: Association and Regionalization; IV. Toward a Multi-Layered Europe

"In the decade and a half since Western leaders began to sketch out their vision of a Europe whole and free, the European Union and NATO have succeeded in extending a zone of security and stability across much of the continent. However, two key regions - the Balkans and the Black Sea - are not yet fully incorporated into this vision, and the lack of coherent strategies addressing these regions threatens to prevent Europe from achieving its full potential. The Balkans and the Black Sea region are characterised by numerous common risks and challenges, including fragile statehood, a shared history of violent conflict, unconsolidated democratisation and economic underdevelopment. Given the crucial geopolitical position of both regions as (a) direct neighbours to the EU, NATO, and Russia, (b) a bridge to the Middle East and Central Asia, and (c) an increasingly important energy transport route, instability in either region can have significant ramifications for domestic, regional, and international security. External actors have developed different policies for the two respective regions. The Western Balkans are on a path toward European integration, albeit with an unclear plan and timetable. The European Union has introduced the European Neighbourhood Policy as a means to prevent new dividing lines within Europe; this policy is directed toward all non-candidate countries in the Black Sea, although its scope is primarily bilateral rather than regional in nature. Russia, pursuing a strategy that combines personalised networks and economic pressure, has yet to develop an attractive policy to promote cooperation in its immediate neighbourhood. Given the internal challenges and external linkages of the Balkans and Black Sea region, three strategic trajectories for addressing these regions present themselves. Given the diverse and often opposing interests of the various actors involved, business as usual may be the most likely policy outcome. This carries with it numerous risks, however. A more proactive policy that seeks to shape, rather than simply react to, events in both regions would involve intensified engagement, including (a) a clearly formulated plan and timetable for the accession of Western Balkan states into the EU and (b) a more comprehensive policy to address the security, economic, and political needs of the Black Sea region. While intensified engagement represents a desirable policy orientation toward the current challenges in the Balkans and the Black Sea, European leaders and their allies must continue to keep an eye on longer-term processes of Europe-wide integration by engaging in a pan- European debate on Europe's future." (author's abstract)