Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-Off
In: NBER Working Paper No. w22966
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w22966
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In: Duke I&E Research Paper No. 2017-04
SSRN
Working paper
In: The public manager: the new bureaucrat, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 37-40
ISSN: 1061-7639
In: The black scholar: journal of black studies and research, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 45-49
ISSN: 2162-5387
SSRN
Working paper
In: American journal of political science, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 341-354
ISSN: 1540-5907
Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats and agencies that are directly comparable with those of other political actors. These estimates produce insights into the nature of the bureaucratic state and provide traction on a host of questions about American politics. We discuss what these estimates reveal about the political environment of bureaucracy and their potential for testing theories of political institutions. We demonstrate their utility by testing key propositions from Gailmard and Patty's influential model of political control and endogenous expertise development. Adapted from the source document.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 341-355
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Congress & the presidency, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 225-239
ISSN: 1944-1053
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 367-386
ISSN: 0003-0554