Suchergebnisse

This article considers three different concepts of the role of the teacher. Buber understands the teacher as the builder-teacher of a dialogical community playing a fundamental role in the character formation of individuals. Freire develops this notion, adding a political tinge, and argues for a political-teacher who plays a central role in the formation of critical individuals and in the liberation of the oppressed. Gur-Ze'ev is critical of Freire and defends the improviser-teacher, who is always critical and encourages criticisms, but without reference to utopias. The article compares and assesses critically these concepts of the role of the teacher; and indicates the implications of adopting them, not only for education, but also for society more generally. ; Três conceitos distintos relacionados ao papel do professor são considerados neste artigo. Buber compreende o docente como professor-construtor de uma comunidade dialógica que desempenha um papel fundamental na formação do caráter dos indivíduos. Freire desenvolve essa noção, acrescentando um matiz político, e defende um professor-político que desempenha um papel central na formação de indivíduos críticos e na libertação dos oprimidos. Gur-Ze'ev é crítico de Freire e defende o professor-improvisador, que exercita e incentiva a criticidade sempre, mas sem referência a utopias. O artigo compara e avalia criticamente estes conceitos relacionados ao papel do professor e indica as implicações de adotá-los não apenas para a educação, mas também para a sociedade em geral.

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) makes fundamental changes to the legislative landscape governing patent law in the United States and will bring about corresponding changes in the manner in which inventors and attorneys address patent issues. While the law is newly implemented, inventors in all sectors of the economy are eager to formulate reactions to it. In this Article, we explore the effects of the AIA on nonprofit research organizations dedicated to global health and life sciences. We report the perspectives of counsel representing such organizations throughout the Pacific Northwest. We also consider the patent system, and the Act's effects on the system, in the context of scientific and humanitarian motivations.

Public perceptions about the quality of business education received at commercial (for-profit) universities, relative to the quality of business education received at publicly supported state universities and private not-for-profit universities are mixed and somewhat controversial (Verschoor, 2011). Relatively little information exists concerning the quality of education received with a bachelor's degree from a commercial university (U. S. Government Accountability Office, 2011). This research compares average CPA exam pass rates of graduates from three types of higher education institutions: for-profit universities, state sponsored public universities, and private not-for profit universities. Comparing average CPA exam pass rates of graduates of each type of university is one means to assess the quality of accounting education provided by each type of university. Our findings indicate the average CPA exam pass rates of candidates completing their accounting educations at commercial for-profit universities are strikingly lower than those of candidates completing their accounting educations at either publicly supported state schools or at private not-for-profit universities. In addition we find that a much lower fraction of graduates from commercial universities sit for the CPA exam compared to publicly supported state universities and private not-for-profit universities. Together these empirical data suggest if passing the CPA exam is a goal, then the educational path of commercial for-profit accounting education may not be optimal.

We study a Condorcet jury model where voters are driven by instrumental and expressive motives. We show that arbitrarily small amounts of expressive motives significantly affect equilibrium behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Enlarging voting bodies always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between expressive and instrumental preferences is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit, and large voting bodies perform no better than a coin flip in selecting the correct outcome. Thus, even when adding informed voters is costless, smaller voting bodies often produce better decisions. . Adapted from the source document.

We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. Regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability compared to contracting only on votes. The option to contract on votes and vote shares, on the other hand, is extremely valuable: it allows the first mover to effectively nullify competition and obtain its preferred policy at almost the monopoly cost.

We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. Regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability compared to contracting only on votes. The option to contract on votes and vote shares, on the other hand, is extremely valuable: it allows the first mover to effectively nullify competition and obtain its preferred policy at almost the monopoly cost. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is voluntary and costly, we show that turnout adjusts endogenously so that the outcome of a large election is always first-best. Adapted from the source document.