Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system— especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly— can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. The findings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context— and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.
As political scientists start applying the complex-system approach to study party politics and as business scholars start to apply communication theories to study deinstitutionalization, we prospect a new possibility to study and explain politics within a political party. This study employs a systematically collected field observation data to evaluate Clemente and Roulet's (2015) "the spiral of deinstitutionalization" framework. Based on analysis of news events and internal reports within Kuomintang from April 20 to October 17, 2015, we believe that this framework facilitates explanation about how the decision of nominating Hung Hsiu-Chu as the party's first female presidential candidate was replaced three months before the Election Day. We interpret the whole story and provide details that contribute to enriching the framework for future organizational and political party research.
After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan's constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan's president is directly elected while Japan's prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded. ; Over the past few decades, political reformers have embraced mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." Whereas single-member district (SMD) systems offer accountability between representatives and voters, proportional representation (PR) systems in which the composition of the legislature reflects the relative proportion of the votes received by the various political parties offer equity. In a mixed-member electoral system, accountability and equity come together because a certain number of legislators are elected in SMDs under plurality rule and the remainder are elected in multi-member districts under some version of PR. Currently, 32 countries as dissimilar as Mexico, Ukraine, South Korea, Jordan, Hungary, Mongolia, and Germany use some variation of a mixed-member electoral system. In this volume, a group of internationally-recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, pre-electoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system—especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly—can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single non-transferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. ; A group of internationally-recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. ; Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ; After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan's constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan's president is directly elected while Japan's prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded. ; Over the past few decades, political reformers have embraced mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." Whereas single-member district (SMD) systems offer accountability between representatives and voters, proportional representation (PR) systems in which the composition of the legislature reflects the relative proportion of the votes received by the various political parties offer equity. In a mixed-member electoral system, accountability and equity come together because a certain number of legislators are elected in SMDs under plurality rule and the remainder are elected in multi-member districts under some version of PR. Currently, 32 countries as dissimilar as Mexico, Ukraine, South Korea, Jordan, Hungary, Mongolia, and Germany use some variation of a mixed-member electoral system. In this volume, a group of internationally-recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, pre-electoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system—especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly—can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single non-transferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. ; A group of internationally-recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. ; Mode of access: Internet.
