In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 28, Heft 5, S. 423-438
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 28, Heft 5, S. 423-437
This article introduces CShapes 2.0, a GIS dataset that maps the borders of states and dependent territories from 1886 through 2019. Our dataset builds on the previous CShapes dataset and improves it in two ways. First, it extends temporal coverage from 1946 back to the year 1886, which followed the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa. Second, the new dataset is no longer limited to independent states, but also maps the borders of colonies and other dependencies, thereby providing near complete global coverage of political units throughout recent history. This article explains the coding procedure, provides a preview of the dataset and presents three illustrative applications. ; ISSN:0022-0027 ; ISSN:0731-4086 ; ISSN:1552-8766
This article introduces CShapes 2.0, a GIS dataset that maps the borders of states and dependent territories from 1886 through 2019. Our dataset builds on the previous CShapes dataset and improves it in two ways. First, it extends temporal coverage from 1946 back to the year 1886, which followed the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa. Second, the new dataset is no longer limited to independent states, but also maps the borders of colonies and other dependencies, thereby providing near complete global coverage of political units throughout recent history. This article explains the coding procedure, provides a preview of the dataset and presents three illustrative applications
This article introduces CShapes 2.0, a GIS dataset that maps the borders of states and dependent territories from 1886 through 2019. Our dataset builds on the previous CShapes dataset and improves it in two ways. First, it extends temporal coverage from 1946 back to the year 1886, which followed the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa. Second, the new dataset is no longer limited to independent states, but also maps the borders of colonies and other dependencies, thereby providing near complete global coverage of political units throughout recent history. This article explains the coding procedure, provides a preview of the dataset and presents three illustrative applications.
This article introduces CShapes 2.0, a GIS dataset that maps the borders of states and dependent territories from 1886 through 2019. Our dataset builds on the previous CShapes dataset and improves it in two ways. First, it extends temporal coverage from 1946 back to the year 1886, which followed the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa. Second, the new dataset is no longer limited to independent states, but also maps the borders of colonies and other dependencies, thereby providing near complete global coverage of political units throughout recent history. This article explains the coding procedure, provides a preview of the dataset and presents three illustrative applications.
In this article, we study the political use of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, a particular form of cyberattack that disables web services by flooding them with high levels of data traffic. We argue that websites in nondemocratic regimes should be especially prone to this type of attack, particularly around political focal points such as elections. This is due to two mechanisms: governments employ DoS attacks to censor regime-threatening information, while at the same time, activists use DoS attacks as a tool to publicly undermine the government's authority. We analyze these mechanisms by relying on measurements of DoS attacks based on large-scale Internet traffic data. Our results show that in authoritarian countries, elections indeed increase the number of DoS attacks. However, these attacks do not seem to be directed primarily against the country itself but rather against other states that serve as hosts for news websites from this country.
In this article, we study the political use of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, a particular form of cyberattack that disables web services by flooding them with high levels of data traffic. We argue that websites in nondemocratic regimes should be especially prone to this type of attack, particularly around political focal points such as elections. This is due to two mechanisms: governments employ DoS attacks to censor regime-threatening information, while at the same time, activists use DoS attacks as a tool to publicly undermine the government's authority. We analyze these mechanisms by relying on measurements of DoS attacks based on large-scale Internet traffic data. Our results show that in authoritarian countries, elections indeed increase the number of DoS attacks. However, these attacks do not seem to be directed primarily against the country itself but rather against other states that serve as hosts for news websites from this country.
Abstract Recent years have seen an increase in governmental interference in digital communication. Most research on this topic has focused on the application level, studying how content is manipulated or removed on websites, blogs, or social media. However, in order for governments to obtain and maintain control of digital data flows, they need to secure access to the network infrastructure at the level of Internet service providers. In this paper, we study how the network topology of the Internet varies across different political environments, distinguishing between control at the level of individual Internet users (access) and a higher level in the hierarchy of network carriers (transit). Using a novel method to estimate the structure of the Internet from network measurements, we show that in autocratic countries, state-owned (rather than privately owned) providers have a markedly higher degree of control over transit networks. We also show that state-owned Internet providers often provide Internet access abroad, with a clear focus on other autocratic countries. Together, these results suggest that in autocracies, the network infrastructure is organized in a way that is more susceptible to the monitoring and manipulation of Internet data flows by state-owned providers both domestically and abroad.
Idean Salehyan - Best practices in the collection of conflict data 105. - Johanna K Birnir, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, James D Fearon, David D Laitin,Ted Robert Gurr, Dawn Brancati, Stephen M Saideman, Amy Pate &Agatha S Hultquist - Socially relevant ethnic groups, ethnic structure, and AMAR 110. - Paul R Hensel & Sara McLaughlin Mitchell - Lessons from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project 116. - Joakim Kreutz - The war that wasn't there: Managing unclear cases in conflict data 120. - Nils B Weidmann & Espen Geelmuyden Rød - Making uncertainty explicit: Separating reports and events in the coding of violence and contention 125. - Joel Day, Jonathan Pinckney & Erica Chenoweth - Collecting data on nonviolent action: Lessons learned and ways forward 129. - Victor Asal, Ken Cousins & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch - Making ends meet: Combining organizational data in contentious politics 134