Suchergebnisse

a previous version of this paper was presented at the First Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Ottawa, Canada, September 30 - October 1, 2005 and at PrincetonUniversity's Comparative Politics Luncheon Seminar Series

In addition to legal constraints and social-psychological barriers, in a post-conflict setting mutually beneficial economic transactions might not occur due to the widening gap between the health, quality, and environmental standards of the parties. A lack of incentives during the years of conflict prevent the members of the weaker party, the one economically isolated from the rest of the world, from engaging in the collective learning necessary to upgrade the health and packaging standards of their commodities. In this study, we detail the technical, political, and legal challenges external actors must consider in order to successfully help small businesses in a post-conflict environment. Specifically, we explain how the EU helped Turkish Cypriot beekeepers by supplying funds to support training and educational programs, and upgrade the equipment used by the beekeepers. We demonstrate that third parties, like the EU, can provide the impetus for domestic institutions—such as producers associations, chambers of commerce, and cooperatives—to overcome their collective action problem. [JEL codes: D74, H56, O1]

The problem of collective action is usually identified with social dilemmas. A wider notion of the term collective action problem is introduced, as dilemmas are not the only problems to arise in collective action. The article first presents a typology of collective action problems based on matrix game analysis. Five types are distinguished: distribution, defection, co-ordination, disagreement, and instability problems. Second, the article discusses a number of proposals how to resolve these types of collective action problems, such as altruism, norms, focal points, correlated strategies, collective decision-making, external power, and sanctioning. Whereas the political solutions can be used to resolve all types of problems, the motivational solutions can only facilitate the resolution of some of the problems, and the rational expectation solutions can solve some types and help to solve others.

AbstractThe ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner's dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties' inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory.

"The primary structural purpose of the United States Constitution is to empower the federal government to solve problems that the states would need to act collectively to solve, and to prevent the states from undermining these solutions or causing such problems from the perspective of the Constitution or Congress. Any faithful account of what the Constitution is for and how it should be interpreted must include this main structural function. The Constitution was established principally because of the widely recognized failures of its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation, to adequately address "collective-action problems" facing the states, including funding the national government, regulating foreign and interstate commerce, and defending the nation from attack. These challenges are called collective-action problems because the states would need to cooperate or coordinate their behavior-they would need to act collectively, not individually-to solve them, and they would often struggle to do so. In a fundamental sense, the U.S. Constitution is the Collective-Action Constitution, and the sobering problems facing America today-including inadequate access to health care, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic and future ones, opioid addiction, gun violence, racism and other bigotry, political extremism, unlawful immigration, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation-cannot be adequately dealt with by government if Americans do not recognize this truth. The main goal of the Collective-Action Constitution is not to vindicate a conception of economic efficiency, but to create and maintain political and economic union"--

An important read for scholars, lawyers, judges, and students alike, Neil Siegel's 'The Collective-Action Constitution' addresses how the U.S. Constitution is, in a fundamental sense, the Collective-Action Constitution. Any faithful account of what the Constitution is for and how it should be interpreted must include the primary structural purpose of empowering the federal government to solve collective-action problems for the states and preventing them from causing such problems. This book offers a thorough examination of the collective-action principles animating the structure of the Constitution and how they should be applied to meet many of the most daunting challenges facing American society today.

Political scientists commonly use their courses to emphasize the
pervasive nature of collective action problems, whereby group
interests are undermined by individual incentives to "defect" or
"free ride." In a graduate seminar a faculty member may have
students read classics in this area, such as Mancur Olson's
The Logic of Collective Action (1965). Graduate students are often expected
to model a collective action problem as a prisoner's dilemma and be
able to understand the implications in such areas as establishment
of interest groups, voting turnout, budgeting, and military
relationships among nations. Even in lower division undergraduate
courses political science instructors may integrate concepts from
collective action theory. This orientation is also evident in some
textbooks. Thus in their introduction to American politics, Samuel
Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson (2003) offer
an extensive discussion of collective action problems and the role
of government, and return repeatedly to this topic throughout their
book. Similarly, a focus on collective action problems is at the
heart of Walter Stone's introductory American politics text,
Republic at Risk (1990).