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Competition policy has seen quite significant changes over the past years. With the reform of Merger Control and the application of Article 81 (agreements) an 'effects-based, economic approach' was formally introduced by the Commission. Two other areas of competition policy are under discussion, namely state aid control and the application of Article 82 (abuse of a dominant position). It will be one of the key questions whether and to what extent an 'economic approach' should be followed here too. Some issues of competition policy with regard to industrial policy will be analysed in view of this changes. As the 'economic approach' is based on neoclassical market form analysis and welfare economics, I will try to make these approaches more comprehensive before I point to some problems which occur if the 'theory' were to be applied in real cases.

Cover -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction: Globalization and Public Policy -- 2 Development of European Competition Policy -- 3 EU Merger Review -- 4 The EU and Anticompetitive Practices -- 5 State Aids -- 6 The EU and Global Competition Policy -- 7 Competition Policy in the 21st Century -- Notes -- References -- Index

Regulatory reform and competition policy are two important and inter-related areas of regulatory policy and public administration. Both can play a key role in improving the quality of regulation, and creating healthy and competitive markets and an attractive investment climate. This in turn leads to greater economic growth, employment and incomes. Part one of this paper discusses definitions and key issues associated with regulation, regulatory quality, and competition policy. This discussion focuses on competition policy as it relates to restrictions on competition and also pro-competitive regulation, which involves protecting consumers through economic regulation. Part two of this paper considers institutions and processes for implementing regulatory quality and competition policy agendas, including regulatory agencies, regulatory reform bodies, competition authorities and broader regulation-making processes. Part three notes the importance of assessing competition policy issues on a case-by-case basis and identifies the main objectives and features of competition policy. This includes a discussion about when competition policy issues are likely to play an important role in regulatory assessment and reform. Part four considers mechanisms for coordinating- where appropriate-competition policy and regulatory quality assessments, including undertaking competition assessments and providing advice to decision makers.

In the process of globalization, international convergence of competition legislation has steadily gained importance. Yet, specific aspects of European history gave capital markets, corporate governance and competition policies a special flavor. Historically grown peculiarities have to be taken into account when it comes to evaluate actual policy decisions. In this paper the focus is on four phases of European competition policy. Prior to World War I banks gained a strong position thanks to block holdings, proxy votes, and a high degree of capital intermediation. Closed market structures prevail to our days. The interwar period was characterized by attempts to overcome the economic disintegration by international cartels. This experience influenced post World War II institutions like the European Community for Coal and Steel. After 1945, attempts by the U.S. to provide for a strict antitrust regime in Western Europe had very limited success. Yet, from the late 1950s on, the EEC saw strict competition policy as a vehicle for market integration. While during the 1970s and 1980s in the U.S. antitrust was counterbalanced by efficiency considerations, in Europe a policy aiming for competitive structures gained weight. Those who plead for convergence between European and U.S. competition policies should, however, be aware of the fact that due to closed markets and regional protectionism in Europe antitrust laws need to play a more important role to provide for an efficient economic system.

How large a role is there for government in competition policy? Graham Mather, general director of the Institute of Economic Affairs and a part‐time member of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, argues the case for loosening the Stock Exchange listing requirements.

This paper explores the relationship between competition policy, experience of the application of competition policy, the intensity of local competition and the standard of living. Perception data from the World Economic Forum is used to measure the intensity of local competition. Richer and larger countries in general introduce competition policy earlier than smaller and poorer countries, and industrialized countries earlier than Latin American, African, transition and Asian countries, in this order. A regression analysis for a sample of 101 countries reveals that experience and overall government effectiveness explain a substantial part of the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. During the first years of (new) competition legislation the effectiveness of application improves rapidly, whereas very old competition agencies make little further improvement of their application performance after a certain time. The effectiveness of antitrust policy has a significant influence on the intensity of local competition. The size of the economy also has a significant impact on the intensity of local competition, whereas external protection does not. These results indicate that competition legislation and experience of the application of competition legislation have a large impact on the level of competition in an economy, whereas the influence of external protection is not clear. In countries with a high intensity of local competition the standard of living is higher than in countries with a low intensity of local competition.

Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases consumers' information about alternative brands. For this to work, comparative claims must be credible. Competition policy and legal practice are essential in making comparative advertising (directly and indirectly) informative. In this paper, first we provide a legal background of comparative advertising in in Europe and the US. Second, we provide an economic analysis of comparative advertising. Here, we discuss the ways comparative advertising can affect market outcomes. Third, we provide an analysis of some recent legal cases in Europe and the US. Overall, we focus on the scope of information transmission through comparative advertising and on the way antitrust laws affect it.

Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases consumers' information about alternative brands. For this to work, comparative claims must be credible. Competition policy and legal practice are essential in making comparative advertising (directly and indirectly) informative. In this paper, first we provide a legal background of comparative advertising in in Europe and the US. Second, we provide an economic analysis of comparative advertising. Here, we discuss the ways comparative advertising can affect market outcomes. Third, we provide an analysis of some recent legal cases in Europe and the US. Overall, we focus on the scope of information transmission through comparative advertising and on the way antitrust laws affect it.