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This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of fragmentation used in comparative politics is the "Effective Number of Parties", designed in 1979 by M. Laakso and R.Taagepera. Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of "relevant"parties. This index however produces misleading results in single-party majority situations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved index behaves more in line with Sartori's definition of relevance, without requiring additional information (such as policy positions) in its construction. We thus advocate for the use of our "Effective Number of Relevant Parties"in future comparative research.

This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of fragmentation used in comparative politics is the "Effective Number of Parties", designed in 1979 by M. Laakso and R.Taagepera. Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of "relevant"parties. This index however produces misleading results in single-party majority situations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved index behaves more in line with Sartori's definition of relevance, without requiring additional information (such as policy positions) in its construction. We thus advocate for the use of our "Effective Number of Relevant Parties"in future comparative research.

ABSTRACTAttempts to predict the number of political parties emerging in democracies have usually been based on one of two seemingly incompatible approaches: (1) the 'institutional' approach (e.g., Duverger's Law and Hypothesis) focuses on the nature of the electoral system and also on the number of seats per district; (2) the 'ideological' approach stresses the nature and extent of social cleavages. This article attempts a synthesis by showing that election system and cleavage type interact to affect the number of parties, with the former factor determined in part by the latter. Our most striking finding, however, is that the effective number of parties tends to be obtained by adding 'one' to the number of issue dimensions. Within this broader framework, Duverger's Law emerges as a special case for polities with a single issue dimension, and Duverger's Hypothesis is replaced by a much more quantitative prediction as to the effective number of parties.

Attempts to predict the number of political parties emerging in democracies have usually been based on one of two seemingly incompatible approaches: (1) the 'institutional' approach (e.g., Duverger's Law and Hypothesis) focuses on the nature of the electoral system and also on the number of seats per district; (2) the 'ideological' approach stresses the nature and extent of social cleavages. This article attempts a synthesis by showing that election system and cleavage type interact to affect the number of parties, with the former factor determined in part by the latter. Our most striking finding, however, is that the effective number of parties tends to be obtained by adding 'one' to the number of issue dimensions. Within this broader framework, Duverger's Law emerges as a special case for polities with a single issue dimension, and Duverger's Hypothesis is replaced by a much more quantitative prediction as to the effective number of parties. Copyright © 1985, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

Attempts to predict the number of political parties emerging in democracies have usually relied on one of two apparently incompatible approaches: the institutional approach, exemplified by M. Duverger's law & hypothesis ("The Influence of Electoral Systems on Political Life," International Social Science Bulletin, 1951, 3, 314-352), which focuses on the nature of the electoral system & the number of seats per district; & the ideological approach, which focuses on the nature & extent of social cleavages. A synthesis of these two approaches is attempted. It is argued that electoral system & cleavage type interact to affect number of parties, with the electoral system determined in part by cleavage type. Empirical testing of this approach for 22 postwar democratic polities over the years 1945-1980 supports this formulation & also a more specific model in which the number of parties minus the number of issues equals one. Within this framework, Duverger's law emerges as a special case for polities with a single issue dimension. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 32 References. Modified HA

Empirical research on voting in electoral districts in single-member, simple-plurality electoral systems has demonstrated the general validity of Duverger's law. This article shows that while the law is generally valid for state assembly elections in India, there are exceptions. In a significant number of electoral districts, more than two parties secure votes. We attribute these non-random deviations from Duverger's law to the influence of federal arrangements. The article provides evidence that more than two parties will get votes in an electoral district when either more than two national parties or a combination of national and regional parties compete for votes in a state. We show that an increase in the number of regional parties alone at the state level would not have the same effect on district-level results.

In this paper we study a coordination dilemma that appears in democracies where the Upper and Lower Houses are elected simultaneously using significantly different rules. How do party systems form when some parties are only viable in some districts of one of the chambers? Are party systems independent from one another, as Duvergerian theories expect, or dependent, as the literature on the interactive features of mixed electoral systems predict? Using the case of Spain, where all the possible incentive structures for electoral coordination are present, we test both theories. Our results point out that contamination effects matter, but they are not strong enough to make Duvergerian gravity disappear. Both effects are at play in Spanish elections. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]