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The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe—essential for building that order—faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders—one dominated by China, the other by the United States—poised for waging security competition between them.

AbstractThe crisis of the American-led international order would seem to open up new opportunities for rising states—led by China, India, and other non-Western developing countries—to reshape the global order. As their capacities and influence grow, will these states rise up and integrate into the existing order or will they seek to overturn and reorganize it? The realist hegemonic perspective expects today's power transition to lead to growing struggles between the West and the "rest" over global rules and institutions. In contrast, this essay argues that although America's hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, and multilateralism—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. And even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do.

Although Jacques Rueff (1896–1978) is known as a liberal thinker, what he means by the term "economic liberalism" should be specified. Indeed, for Rueff, the notion of economic liberalism leads to the notion of the liberal social order: i.e., a situation where the freedom of the individual is maintained and State intervention is justified in order to ensure a harmony of interests. This paper aims to bring out the particularism of the Rueffian liberal social order and to explore the connections between Rueff's vision of this concept and his specific approach to liberalism, where private property (the pillar of freedom in liberal thinking) may be called into question under certain circumstances.

AbstractThe liberal international order is being challenged today by populism and unilateralism. Though it has been resilient in the past, the current challenges from within the order are unprecedented. Without being too pessimistic, I expect the LIO will survive but retract to its original core states in North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia, shedding some of its universal pretensions. States that remain within the liberal order, in turn, will compete with an alternative Chinese-led international hierarchy built around all or part of the current Belt and Road Initiative countries. While international institutions can facilitate cooperation, they do not bridge this emerging divide sufficiently to forestall conflict and, in any event, will not be sufficiently robust to prevent a new cold war. As part of the roundtable "International Institutions and Peaceful Change," this brief essay sketches this argument and concludes with some possible ways of moderating future conflicts.

The Liberal World Order was a political project designed to keep together as harmoniously as possible state sovereignty—in its liberal-democratic version—and market economy—entailing free trade on the international level. Framed in this unique way, those three concepts—'international order,' 'sovereignty' and 'market economy'—have characterized the rise of political modernity. This book states that since the 1980s the Liberal World Order has been gradually replaced by a 'Neoliberal Global Order' and exposes the intellectual premises to revive and restore the balance between democracy and market-based economy, the fundamental premise upon which both liberal democracies and the LWO have been built. Vittorio Emanuele Parsi is Professor of International Relations at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Milan, Italy) and Director of ASERI (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations). " Vittorio Parsi offers a sweeping and penetrating account of the rise and fall of the modern liberal international order. Elegant, erudite, and insightful, Parsi chronicles the stormy voyage of the Western democracies as they search for calmer seas and gentler winds." G. John Ikenberry, Princeton University, USA "Vittorio Parsi, one of Italy's leading scholars of international politics, has produced an important contribution to the ongoing debate over the postwar liberal order, what went wrong with it, and whether it might be restored. Michael Mastanduno, Dartmouth College, USA "One of Europe's most original thinkers offers a penetrating assessment of the Liberal World Order and its prospects. Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University, USA "Parsi has written a book of tremendous importance. For anyone interested in a serious examination of the emerging world order, post-Trump and post-COVID, The Wrecking of the Liberal World Order is a must read". Mehran Kamrava, Georgetown University, Qatar "Vittorio Parsi's is exactly the right book for anyone—student, teacher, news reporter, or policymaker—who wants to understand how our domestic and global politics and economics came to such a sorry state, and what we can do to build a better future. Joseph M. Grieco, Duke University, USA.