Suchergebnisse

As the United States prepares to pull out the entirety of its remaining 2,500 troops from Afghanistan (Liptak, 2021) – a move fast being followed by NATO allies in the war-tattered nation (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO], 2021a, 2021b) – the onus for security and stability will fall on the region's neighbours. However, this is a window of opportunity in which India can lead the way. It will not be an easy or simple process. As the Taliban become increasingly assertive in the ongoing peace talks and potentially set to govern the country again someday, it is vital that New Delhi carves a channel for diplomatic dealings. […]

Polexit is a concept that emerged in the political science discourse when the United Kingdom held a referendum on its continued membership of the European Union on June 26, 2016. The article analyzes the reasons which facilitate a discussion on the withdrawal of Poland from the European Union. On the one hand, this results from disputes on the direction of the evolution of the European project between 'old' and 'new' member states. On the other, its intensity is affected by the dynamics of the dispute between the Polish government and the European Commission on the state of the rule of law in Poland. For supporters of a change in relations between European institutions and member states, the European parliamentary elections offered an opportunity of starting a discussion on the change of treaties. However, due to the fact that proponents of treaty changes failed to win the appropriate number of seats, the vision of an EU of 'two speeds' is becoming realistic. This may mark the beginning of a sequence of events concluded with a referendum on the withdrawal of Poland from the European Union.

Can a Member State choose to leave the European Union (EU)? Are there provisions in the Treaties that establish a right to withdraw? What would the political and economic implications be? In this article, these questions are addressed. In a first step, the Treaties of the EU and the provisions of international law are consulted in order to clarify if a legal right to withdraw exists. The conclusion is that there is no guaranteed legal right to withdraw in the current situation, but the entering into force of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would create such a right. However, a formal right to withdraw does not necessarily mean that leaving the EU is a real option, and therefore the political and economic sides of the issue are also examined. From the literature on secession and Europeanization, a number of issues that could arise in a case of withdrawal are identified – namely 'fear of fragmentation', 'lost investment', 'costs' and 'the effects of Europeanization'. The extent to which these issues were of importance is examined in the only existing case of withdrawal: Greenland. Subsequently, an assessment is made of the extent to which these issues could form obstacles for a Member State that wishes to withdraw in the current situation. The main conclusion is that large economic costs and the constitutional changes that follow from EU membership could rule out withdrawal as a realistic option.

Are there significant domestic political costs for leaders who disengage from long-standing alliances, costs that discourage such disengagement? Leaders of major powers occasionally look for ways to disengage in non-crisis situations from some long-term commitments to other countries following the legal procedures laid out in the alliance treaty or commitment. However, leaders interested in disengagement from alliances sometimes fear that they will pay domestic disengagement costs, for example, a decline in domestic public support, if they try to withdraw from alliances in that manner in practice. To examine if such fears are justified, we conducted two survey experiments among representative samples of the US public investigating the effects of a presidential decision to end an alliance commitment through the legally prescribed means. We find that disengagement costs exist in general and that some characteristics of the country in question can increase their size and make them more long-lasting. For example, withdrawal from alliances with countries perceived as similar on some key criteria to the United States and as loyal allies, or widespread opposition by experts to this withdrawal, will all increase the size of the disengagement costs and make them more long-lasting. Leaving an existing alliance in peacetime will frequently be a politically losing proposition for American leaders in many plausible situations—one possible reason for the endurance of some US alliances.

AbstractThis article aims to analyse the limits of Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) which expressly consecrates a Member State's unilateral right to leave the Union. However, the provision seems to raise more questions than it answers due to the lack of concrete legal guidelines, and Brexit has underlined this reality. For example, the exit procedure contemplates the possibility of signing a withdrawal agreement with the European Union (EU), but it does not discipline its content. In our opinion, any agreement must regulate three questions: fundamental rights, financial settlement, and borders. A second limitation refers to the possibility of a Member State withdrawing its withdrawal notice. This question has recently been decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in a manner that leaves the EU without any say in the process. Finally, the provision does not deal with the constitutional implications of withdrawal: treaty revision, institutional deadlock, and institutional representation. In sum, these critical omissions are analysed considering the relevant legal doctrine, jurisprudence, as well as the Brexit process. It also proposed that Article 50 of the TEU be amended in the future.

Dec. 13, 2001 decision by President George W. Bush to unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union/Russia; US policy rationale, Russian and Chinese reactions, Arms Control Association press conference, and documents; 3 articles. Partial contents: Russia's strategic priorities, by Celeste A. Wallander; Can China's tolerance last, by Bates Gill; Withdrawal is premature, by Charles Peña and Ivan Eland.

One of Saki Dockrill's most significant publications was her monograph, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez.1 In this, the first archival study of the subject, she set Britain's reassessment of its defence priorities in a broad context, looking not only at withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, but also at relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) over such questions as nuclear-sharing and the size of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). She showed that, in reducing spending, the British initially sought cuts in NATO; yet, by 1968, the Wilson government was set on a European future, eager to abandon the world role and enter the European Economic Community (EEC). Saki also looked at the debate over particular weapons systems, such as aircraft carriers and the US-manufactured F-111 aircraft, both vital to a world role. Some previous writers emphasised that the January 1968 decision to quit military bases East of Suez by the end of 1971, was the vital turning point in the process of retreat.2 Others argued it merely marked an acceleration of earlier decisions, especially those announced in July 1967.3 But, Saki looked further back, seeing harbingers of retreat under the Conservative governments of 1959–63.4 Throughout the discussions, a vital question was the need to maintain friendly relations with London's main ally, the United States, which, concerned about its own defence burden, could hardly welcome Britain's retreat.