What type of Europe? The salience of polity and policy issues in European Parliament elections
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 570-592
ISSN: 1465-1165
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In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 570-592
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: European Union politics: EUP
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 405-430
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 309-329
ISSN: 1741-2757
The Spitzenkandidaten were meant to personalize European Parliament elections. This paper asks whether and through which channels the lead candidates were actually able to make themselves known among voters - a necessary precondition for any electoral effect. Combining panel surveys and online tracking data, the study explores candidate learning during the German 2019 European Parliament election campaign and relates learning to different types of news exposure, with a special focus on online news. The results show that learning was limited and unevenly distributed across candidates. However exposure to candidate-specific online news and most types of offline news helped to acquire knowledge. The findings imply that Spitzenkandidaten stick to voters' minds when they get exposed to them, but that exposure is infrequent in high-choice media environments.
In: SpringerLink
In: Bücher
In: Springer eBook Collection
This book sheds new light on how lobbying works in the European Union. Drawing on the first-hand professional experience of lobbyists, policymakers, and corporate and institutional stakeholders, combined with a sound academic foundation, it offers insights into successful lobbying strategies, such as how alliances are formed by interest groups in Brussels. The authors present key case studies, e.g. on the shelved EU-US trade deal Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), lobbying scandals, and the role of specific interest groups and EU Think-Tanks. Furthermore, they highlight efforts to improve transparency and ethical standards in EU decision-making, while also underscoring the benefits of lobbying in the context of decision-making. Understanding the tools and techniques of effective lobbying, as well as the dynamics and trends in EU lobbying, will allow professionals involved in the lobbying process, such as policymakers and corporate and institutional stakeholders, to improve their performance and achieve better results when pursuing their respective interests
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 236-258
ISSN: 1741-2757
In this article, we argue that the size and cultural proximity of immigrant populations in people's residential surroundings shape national and European identities. This means that the type of migrant population activates cultural threat perceptions and opportunities for contact to varying degrees. Geocoded survey data from the Netherlands suggests that large non-Western immigrant shares are associated with more exclusive national identities, while mixed contexts with Western and non-Western populations show more inclusive identities. These results suggest that highly diverse areas with mixed immigrant populations hold a potential for more tolerance. In contrast, exclusive national identities become strongly pronounced under the presence of sizeable culturally distant immigrant groups.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 51-76
ISSN: 1741-2757
Previous studies have proposed competing theories to explain European intergovernmental conference (IGC) outcomes, but they fail to test these theories against one another. I examine the literature on IGC bargaining and derive several testable hypotheses. Using data on member state preferences at the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I first examine which member states favor integration and which are most skeptical of integration. I also determine which member states face the highest domestic ratification constraints. I then test the competing hypotheses found in the literature by calculating the bargaining strength of member states. I find that large member states have no more bargaining strength than the average member state; instead, domestic ratification constraints seem to confer power. States preferring less integration appear to outperform states desiring more integration. Supranational actors, as expected, have little power.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 81-101
ISSN: 1741-2757
What are the policy consequences of constitutional differentiation in core state powers? We argue that the most important consequence is not necessarily the exclusion of the constitutional outs from the policies of the ins, but their reintegration by different means. The outs often have strong functional and political incentives to re-join the policies they opted out from, and the ins have good reasons to help them back in. We develop a theoretical framework that derives the incentives for reintegration from the costs of a policy exclusion. We use a novel dataset of reintegration opportunities to map trends and patterns of reintegration across policy fields and member states. We analyze selected cases of reintegration to probe the plausibility of our theoretical argument.
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 215-236
ISSN: 1468-5965
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 410-423
ISSN: 1741-2757
Research into parliamentary speech making–behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) usually takes a static perspective. We offer an interactive and dynamic approach that understands parliamentary debates as a relational network phenomenon and investigates MEPs' debate interactions. This allows us to uncover dynamics of inclusiveness and pluralism, self-reinforcing power relationships and transnational policy alliances. Analyzing 11,408 debate interactions between MEPs using a combination of text and dynamic network analysis, we find that male, senior and influential parliamentarians from powerful member states receive more attention with evidence for a self-reinforcing effect over time. Interestingly, seniority matters more for debate attention than leadership positions. Sharing the same nationality and a similar political leaning also shape debate coalitions with the former being more important than the latter.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 295
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Maastricht Treaty: Creating the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: European Union Politics, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 493-510
The introduction of the euro and closer coordination of economic policies in the European Union are fuelling a debate on Europe's representation in the international financial institutions. A single EU representation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would affect the balance of power in the institution through a fundamental reallocation of quotas and executive directors among its membership. A reduction in the number of European executive directors, and in the total voting power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund's general resources, could go hand in hand with an increase in the Union's impact on IMF decision-making. Such a change would also weaken the cooperative nature of the Fund through a reduction in the number and impact of mixed constituencies.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 345-366
ISSN: 1741-2757
Public sector unions push for unmerited wage increases, exacerbating inflation and deficits. Despite this conventional wisdom, governments in several European countries successfully limited public sector wage growth during the 1980s and 1990s. This article argues that the recent rise in public sector wage inflation in the eurozone is an unintended consequence of the shift towards Economic and Monetary Union. I argue that monetary union's predecessors, the European Monetary System and Maastricht, imposed an institutional constraint on governments, which enhanced their ability to impose moderation: national-level, inflation-averse central banks that could punish rent-seeking sectoral wage-setters via monetary contraction. Monetary union's alteration of this constraint weakened governments' capabilities to deny inflationary settlements.