Suchergebnisse

Analyzes economic, financial, institutional, organizational, morale, & political problems in the West African Monetary Union; & proposes civil service system reform in its member states. Civil service in industrialized countries (eg, Japan, the US, & France) is reviewed. To strengthen the performance of the union's central government, it is suggested that the state role be redefined & its bodies restructured; state personnel be managed by an independent body; & an educational, economic, & statutory framework fostering the expansion of economic activity be created. 2 Tables, 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

In order to evaluate the empirical relevance of the Lucas Critique, we investigate whether the term structure (the relation of the long interest rate to the short interest rate) showed structural change as the deadline for the euro came closer. Our empirical analysis of the term structures (yield curves) in 12 OECD countries uncovers that econometrically estimated behavioural equations for most EMU countries were stable even in the light of the creation of the euro. This finding would seem to defy the Lucas Critique. However, the significant structural instability found for the euro area's core country, Germany, suggests that the Lucas Critique is relevant in the analysis of the impact of the creation (and future extensions) of EMU.Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at the ECB workshop on yield curve modelling, Frankfurt (1999) and the Finance Seminar at the University of Zurich (2000). Comments by participants of both workshops and by two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.

ECB monetary policy making was designed to disguise real, and to counter imagined, disunity within the bank itself, and among its component national central banks (NCBs) and their governors. The unity of the Eurosystem of central banks and the appearance of unity depended upon the assumption that central bankers keenly supported the German model – which they endorsed in the Delors Report on EMU in 1989. However, several features of the ECB undermined its unity and reputation for impartiality even prior to the start of EMU: notably, the greater representation of individuals from larger member states in the Governing Council. Crucially, though, the potential for disunity is in the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) and the asymmetrical design of EMU. Euro area economic governance was insufficiently developed and, notably, fiscal policy rules were inadequately clarified and enforced. Similarly, in the Treaty, the responsibilities of the ECB to promote financial stability were left imprecise. Notably, due to central banker fears on the monetisation of debt, the ECB was not assigned the typical central bank function of 'lender of last resort'. The disunity in the Eurosystem of central banks that erupted during the sovereign debt crisis from late 2009, demonstrated that unity relied on consensus around German and notably Bundesbank preferences. Disunity stemmed above all from the absence of a road map for ECB policy making in a context of severe existentialist crisis.

This paper studies central bank independence in a model of a monetary union where fiscal policies remain the responsibility of national governments and generate externalities. Governments may either coordinate fiscal policy or not, and three forms of delegation are considered: Rogoff‐type 'weight independence', inflation targets and linear inflation contracts. The key results are as follows. Under fiscal coordination, 'conservatism' holds and targets (or contracts) outperform 'weight independence'. Without fiscal coordination, 'anti‐conservatism' may be optimal when fiscal spillovers are negative, as it reduces governments' activism; and 'weight independence' is restored, since it can alleviate distortions in shock stabilization.

"During the last few years there has been a renewed analysis in currency unions as a form of monetary arrangement. This new interest has been largely triggered by the Euro experience. Scholars and policy makers have asked about the optimal number of currencies in the world economy. They have analyzed whether different countries satisfy the traditional "optimal currency area" criteria. These include, among other: (a) the synchronization of the business cycle; (b) the degree of factor mobility; and (c) the extent of trade and financial integration. In this paper I analyze the desirability of a monetary union from a Latin American perspective. First, I review the existing literature on the subject. Second, I use a large data set to analyze the evidence on economic performance in currency union countries. I investigate these countries' performance on four dimensions: (a) whether countries without a national currency have a lower occurrence of "sudden stop" episodes; (b) whether they have a lower occurrence of "current account reversal" episodes; (c) what is their ability to absorb international terms of trade shocks; and (d) what is their ability to absorb "sudden stops" and "current account reversals" shocks. I find that belonging to a currency union has not lower the probability of facing a sudden stop or a current account reversal. I also find that external shocks have been amplified in currency union countries. The degree of amplification is particularly large when compared to flexible exchange rate countries"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site