Suchergebnisse

International audience ; Deux caractéristiques au moins rapprochent les jeunes auteurs de ce livre : tous ont obtenu à l'Université de Montpellier, ou sont sur le point d'y achever, un doctorat d'histoire consacré à la Grande Guerre ; tous, surtout, mobilisent les ressources, les méthodes, les questionnements des principales sciences sociales de la science politique à la sociologie, en passant par la socio-psychologie et l'anthropologie.Cette approche interdisciplinaire permet de repenser la Grande Guerre, et au-delà, de questionner à nouveaux frais les comportements et les motivations des différents acteurs confrontés à des situations d'exception telles que les guerres et les génocides.

Some of the most celebrated theories of nationalism exemplify the self-confirming, evidence-averse, deterministic, & ideological aspects of social science as we know it. What has gone wrong? The social sciences have modeled themselves on physics, failing to grasp the essential difference between the contingent, historical development of cultural particularity & the universal, lawlike regularities of inanimate matter. The physicist's tools for conducting the method Popper called "conjecture & refutation" are largely inappropriate when dealing with imaginative & therefore unpredictable human beings. Obsessive quantification & the assumption of universal social "laws," in particular, need to be de-emphasized in favor of a Weberian willingness to make conjectures about the cultural causes of unique events, & to test those hypotheses by comparing them to apparently similar cases. References. Adapted from the source document.

Despite the extensive commentary on the work of Peter Winch, there has been inadequate recognition of how his Idea of a Social Science discerned the implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy for confronting issues regarding the nature and interpretation of social phenomena. Winch's subsequent confrontation with anthropology can be further illuminated by examining one of the most contentious contemporary debates in this field. This case illustrates the paradoxes involved in meta-practices such as philosophy and social science seeking to make descriptive and normative claims about conceptually preconstituted forms of life, and it indicates the limitations of philosophical realism as a social scientific meta-theory.

SUMMARYThe fact has been widely recognized that the present stagnation of social sciences is fraught with dangers for the physical existence of humanity. This premise being accepted, the article sets out to discover the factors hampering the development of social sciences. These, it is here suggested, have three sources: (1) the nature of the subject of enquiry; (2) the nature of the empiric method and (3) the limited applicability of the present‐day social sciences to the life of the private individual.The difficulties attributable to the first source are two: the high degree of differentiation in human psychology and the inventive capacity of the human mind. Both of them have the effect of creating a pattern of behaviour distinguished by great variety and rapidity of change. Ensuing, to some extent, from the other two is the third characteristic, namely the fact that some of our lines of behaviour are incapable of being measured quantitatively. Under such conditions, the task of scientific analysis is obviously extremely difficult, and this accounts for the strong "post‐ante" bias inherent in most of our present‐day social sciences.The empirical method of analysis, so much in vogue at present, has contributed two additional difficulties of its own. These are: taxonomic approach and anti‐normative inclination. The former is another way of saying that, unlike their predecessors in the 18th and 19th centuries, which operated on the implied assumption of the perennial uniformity of human behaviour, the present‐day social sciences have adopted the method of dealing with each situation as a unique case. Consequently, the "social laws" derived from this procedure have only a limited validity.It was the very simplicity of the social sciences of the preceding two centuries that made them popular and gave them an influence over the actual shaping of public life, and, incidentally, it is the lack of such simplicity that so effectually prevents the social sciences of today from winning popularity. For it is manifest that, in the present state of social knowledge, an extremely important aim of social science—probably the most important of all its aims—namely, to help the individual to form a comprehensive and consistent outlook on life, is a dream of the very distant future.But, however formidable the difficulties in this field may be, the need for the social sciences of our day to produce a coherent synthesis is most pressing. This is so because of (1) the decline in the influence of religion, (2) the increasing capacity of man for self‐destruction and (3) the existence of sharp political conflict between the communist and non‐communist worlds. This necessity being admitted, a further problem arises. It is a question of popularizing the social sciences. For, assuming that our social sciences are, or will shortly be, capable of serving as a guide to the understanding of social life, it is obvious that unless such knowledge is widely spread it will remain useless. Here the main stumbling‐block is the low earning power of social sciences. Thus it would appear that the prospects of solving the problems connected with the relative underdevelopment of our social knowledge are by no means hopeful.

Begins with a treatment of the inauspicious debut of social science in HI, noting how it aided & abetted colonization. However, although much of the analysis is aimed at elucidating current political issues in HI, its organizing concern is with a general critique of the historical role of social & political science "knowledge." Accordingly, much of the chapter deals with a trajectory of discourses on political analysis, nation-building, & equality throughout the 20th century, to which the primary contributions have been from US social science. To conclude, a way of theorizing inequality that challenges the predicates of state-centric discourses on rights & equality before the law is posited. Adapted from the source document.

Eindringlich und in aller Präzision schildert Franziska Tausig die verzweifelten Versuche, 1938 aus Österreich ausreisen zu können - irgendwohin. Ihren Sohn Otto Tausig - damals 16jährig, heute bekannter Wiener Schauspieler - kann sie 1938 durch einen Kindertransport nach England retten, er lebt dort bis 1945 in der Emigration. Für sich selbst und für ihren Mann bekommt sie durch Zufall zwei Schiffspassagen nach Shanghai. Der Zufluchtsort Shanghai, der Krieg, Blicke in das Leben der EmigrantInnen im Ghetto unter japanischer Kontrolle - aufgezeichnet von einer Frau, die zunächst nur durch Ihre Fähigkeit, Apfelstrudel und Sachertorte zu backen, überlebt und deren Mann im EXil an TBC stirbt. Erst 9 Jahre später kann sie nach Wien zurückkehren. Am Westbahnhof sehen ihr Sohn Otto und sie einander wieder.

This international exploration on different economic systems provides a comprehensive account which brings a wide range of countries to the forefront in terms of both comparability and accountability, this study shines a light on the differences in systems between states, and provides information to equip readers to minimize those differences.