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America's practice of mass incarceration is coming under growing criticism as fiscally unsustainable and morally indefensible. Chronic overcrowding of prisons, a problem that epitomizes the destructive and unlawful core of mass incarceration, now afflicts the federal prison system and nearly half the states. Actual reforms, however, like President Obama's recent grant of clemency to forty-six federal prisoners serving long drug sentences for non-violent conduct, or recent one-off sentencing reforms aimed at preventing imprisonment for minor drug or property crimes, are manifestly insufficient to end mass incarceration, or even the chronic overcrowding that represents its most degrading and destructive aspect. The problem with both kinds of measures is that they retain two core presumptions that built mass incarceration in the first place. First, the "presumption of dangerousness" that exists against those currently or formerly caught up in the criminal justice system, no matter how minor their interaction. Second, the "presumption of confidence" in prosecutorial discretion to manage the huge portion of the population subjected to such suspicions. Both of these presumptions operate to narrow channels of relief for individual prisoners and reform for the system overall. To overcome both of these presumptions, this essay proposes a simple extension of the clemency model. The pardoning power under which President Obama granted his recent clemencies, which is possessed by the vast majority of governors with respect to state prisoners, permits the granting of relief (from partial remission of sentence to the complete redaction of the conviction) not only to individuals, but also to whole categories of prisoners. Pardon in this form, known generally as amnesty, has a limited history in the United States, but has been commonly used by European countries precisely to relieve problems like prison overcrowding. President Obama has begun to use this kind of approach to address the related problem of immigration and mass deportation in the United States through his policy, announced in May 2014, that his administration would favor the granting of "deferred action" with respect to whole categories of non-citizens inside the United States and subject to deportation. While deferred action is not a perfect analogy for pardon (for one thing, it is not necessarily permanent), and while other aspects of the administration's action epitomize the very presumptions that are blocking reform in the criminal justice field (particularly the blanket exclusion of so-called "criminal aliens"), deferred action paves the way for the kind of action that is necessary to overcome the toxic situation of prison overcrowding in the United States, as well as the larger system of mass incarceration. Amnesty measures are deeply problematic in advanced legal systems like in the United States and for good reason. However, limited application of such measures takes inspiration from the long religious tradition of "jubilee," and from the existing limited tradition of federal amnesties for those who have violated military service-related laws during major wars. As these traditions suggest, when properly used, amnesties can both relieve immediate problems and improve the legitimacy of legal systems distended by extreme conditions.

La institucionalización del estamento pechero castellano en el siglo XIII significó que frente a la obligación del pago de renta se le reconociera a los rústicos el derecho a la representación política. Sobre el particular se han pronunciado los historiadores señalando generalmente los lugares y las formas de esa representación, aunque se han descuidado las causas y razones esenciales de la naturaleza de la participación política de campesinos especialmente en la Baja Edad Media, cuando esa participación fue limitada por el poder central. Sin embargo, una lectura atenta de los documentos que la testimonian, nos permite aventurar algunas hipótesis a partir del análisis de casos concretos como los que se analizan a continuación. ; The institutionalization of pechero establishment in Castile in the thirteenth century meant that with the obligation to pay rent, it was recognized to rustics the right to political representation. Historians have spoken generally pointing out places and forms of this kind of representation but they have neglected the causes and reasons of the essential nature of the political participation of peasants especially in the late Middle Ages, when it was limited by monarchy. However, a careful reading of the documents allows us to venture some hypotheses from the analysis of specific cases such as those discussed below.

Appeals of criminal prosecutions have resulted in establishing rules for police practice under both federal & state regulations. Two US Supreme Court cases, Mapp v. Ohio (1961) & Miranda v. Arizona (1966), have had considerable impact. Miranda established that a warning procedure must be followed with suspects prior to questioning; Mapp ruled that evidence illegally gained could not be used in a prosecution. Most police officers find these rulings a deterrent to effective criminal investigation on ideological grounds; in practice they seek to minimize the effect of the rules on their pursuit of evidence. Trial judges tend to uphold the use of challenged evidence in ambiguous cases, which are frequent. The implications of both Supreme Court rulings & state appellate court rulings upon police incentive & practice are discussed. Both state & federal effects must be more fully investigated, although the potential of state rulings may be greater. Modified Author Summary.

This volume provides a bird's eye view of novel ways in which money is laundered through illegal activities involving art. Criminals and those involved in illegal activities have discovered the art world to be an effective and clandestine arena through which theycan launder money internationally. Unfortunately, investigators, prosecutors, judges and regulatory agencies in most countries are not equipped to accurately detect, investigate and prosecute this type of criminal activity. Furthermore, international laws and treaties involving the art world have many loopholes that can potentially lead to the laundering of large sums of money. Addressing this gap in the literature, Money Laundering Through Art: A Criminal Justice Perspectivecan serve as a guide for academics, prosecutors, judges, law enforcement officials and others involved in efforts to curb money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It provides an overview of methods of money laundering through art, as well as specific case studies. Additionally, this book reveals why new techniques used by criminals have been largely neglected by law enforcement in many countries. The author, drawing from his own experience with the matter in both Brazil and the United States, makes a case for broader institutional and regulatory improvement, extending beyond mere regulation of the art market. He concludes with a number of concrete recommendations to improve the fight against illegal money laundering via artwork.

In contexts where political corruption is endemic, why would political elites build state capacity to prosecute corruption? Prior studies emphasize exogenous pressure from social movements or international organizations and the rise of political leaders committed to fighting corruption. While important, these factors are not sufficient to explain the case of Brazil, where politicians empowered investigative bureaucracies, even though several political elites later became victims of prosecution. Drawing on document analysis of charges and sentences and on 110 in-depth interviews with prosecutors, judges, and politicians, I develop a framework that focuses on the processes through which corruption is criminalized on the ground. By examining the initiatives of politicians in interaction with the actions of civil servants who investigate and prosecute cases of corruption, I show that political elites empowered investigators because, at the time, these steps seemed innocuous. Prosecutors later reframed how they talked about corruption—getting other colleagues to pay attention to this issue—and learned new strategies to uncover corruption schemes, but these changes happened under the radar: they were not visible to politicians. Popular pressure also led courts to broaden the definition of corruption and lower the threshold of evidence for it, but these decisions took place after the politicians' actions.

The United States is in a quandary regarding immigration. There are over eleven million undocumented aliens residing in the country with about eight million of them working in the American economy. The federal government has criminalized the illegal entry and the illegal reentry into the United States. Moreover, it has enacted a statute making it illegal to smuggle or harbor aliens. Federal prosecutors across the country have aggressively prosecuted people in violation of these statutes. At the same time, Congress criminalized the illegal employment of undocumented workers, but federal prosecutors rarely ever charge employers with violating this statute. The economic principle of supply and demand applies to the labor market. Undocumented aliens come to the United States seeking jobs because American employers regularly hire them. If such employers felt significant consequences for such hires, they would be less inclined to violate federal law. With fewer employers hiring undocumented workers, there would be less demand. Consequently, aliens would be less likely to take the risks to come to the United States seeking jobs if they were unlikely to gain employment. Ultimately, attacking the immigration on the supply side of the issue has failed. Thus, the article proposes targeting the demand side of the issue to promote immigration reform.

In this article the author describes the foundation of the Prosecutor's Office in Russian Empire. It takes place from the reign of Peter I. Firstly, the government officials, who were assigned by the king, have to ensure that management is carried out in accordance with the law. But in many reasons this public structure did not work successfully. So that the next authority, Katerina II, changed their warrants and give to the Prosecutor's Office more power and more responsibilities. For the first time it was good and prosecutors really work and deal with many problems in the empire. On the other hand, there are too many full powers, that causes the impossibility of coping with all of them, especially do it effectively. So that the author emphasize reader's attention to the Court Reform, which Alexander II enacts in 1862. This reform is really leading reform that sets the fundamental principles of the Prosecutor's Office. He reduces the powers to comply with current legislation on all the stages of the criminal process and execution of sentences. What is more, Alexander II gives prosecutors a new function – to maintain public indictments in court. Also, he builds strict subordination system for the servants of the law. So the author of the article wants the reader to see the foundation and development of the Prosecutor's Office in Russian Empire.

On January 1, 2015, the new Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, adopted by the Parliament of Kazakhstan on July 4, 2014, came into force, in which there is no provision for criminal proceedings at the stage of initiation of criminal proceedings. The article examines the grounds and prospects for reforming the beginning of pre-trial proceedings in Russia, with a possible refusal from the stage of initiating a criminal case and the consequences of such a reform that has already taken place in the criminal process of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The authors come to the conclusion that in order to reform the beginning of pre-trial proceedings in Russia, it is necessary, at least, to give Russian prosecutors the powers that prosecutors have in the Republic of Kazakhstan. ; С 1 января 2015 г. начал действовать новый Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс Республики Казахстан, принятый Парламентом Казахстана 4 июля 2014 г., в котором не предусматривается производство в стадии возбуждения уголовного дела. В статье рассматриваются основания и перспективы реформирования начала досудебного производства в России с возможным отказом от стадии возбуждения уголовного дела и последствия уже состоявшегося подобного реформирования в уголовном процессе Республики Казахстан. Авторы приходят к выводу, что для реформирования начала досудебного производства в России необходимо, как минимум наделение российских прокуроров теми полномочиями, какими обладают прокуроры в Республике Казахстан.

The purpose of the article is to analyse the role of the public prosecutor's office as an institution that is specifically embedded in between certain elements of the political system, particularly between the executive and judiciary powers. For this reason, the public prosecutor's office can be regarded, together with courts, as an institution that aims to be actively involved in administering justice and an instrument of the executive power to guarantee internal security and to execute internal functions of the state. The public prosecutor's office, given its specific operation area, is expected to prosecute crimes effectively as well as safeguard the rule of law, which may be threatened by the infringing actions of not only individuals and criminal groups but also of officials and state institutions. Hence, with respect to the accountability of the public prosecutor's office, it should be more independent of the executive power which is subject to political rules. It appears, however, that separating it officially from the executive power does not have to lead automatically to the public prosecutor's office independence of political influence when other direct (the Prime Minister's and the Minister of Justice's authority over the Attorney General) and indirect mechanisms of prosecutors' political dependency (clientelism, politicisation and political bonds of prosecutors with politicians) exist.

It is beyond peradventure that American prosecutors have ple-nary charging discretion in criminal cases; prosecutors with admissible proof beyond a reasonable doubt may nevertheless decline to seek a conviction. Such declinations are sometimes rooted in legitimate law enforcement rationales, such as the absence of sufficient enforcement resources. A prosecutor, however, might decline a meritorious prosecution simply because he or she disagrees with the applicable law or its application in the particular case. This prerogative to engage in what this Article terms "prosecutorial nullification" has been under-theorized, but raises a number of profound questions: Is prosecutorial nullification a subspecies of legitimate prosecutorial discretion, or should it be considered an extra-legal departure from established rules? What is the conceptual relation-ship of prosecutorial nullification to jury nullification and other like actions of discretion-wielding criminal justice actors? Do the unique institutional role and function of the American prosecutor provide a sufficient rationale for the power to frustrate legislative judgment and undermine (or promote) societal values and norms? This Article seeks to sharpen the definition of "prosecutorial nullification," contextualize it within the broader conversation about discretion in the criminal process, and offer a nuanced account of its relationship with prosecutorial authority, legiti-macy, and the rule of law.

"Pfaff argues that existing accounts of the causes of mass incarceration are fundamentally misguided. The most widely accepted explanations--the failed War on Drugs, draconian sentencing laws, an increasing reliance on private prisons--actually tell us much less than we like to think. Instead, Pfaff urges us to look at other factors, including a major shift in prosecutor behavior that occurred in the mid-1990s, when prosecutors began bringing felony charges against arrestees about twice as often as they had before"--Amazon.com