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What is a radical? Somebody who goes against mainstream opinions? An agitator who suggests transforming society at the risk of endangering its harmony? In the political context of the British Isles at the end of the eighteenth century, the word radical had a negative connotation. It referred to the Levellers and the English Civil War, it brought back a period of history which was felt as a traumatic experience. Its stigmas were still vivid in the mind of the political leaders of these times. The reign of Cromwell was certainly the main reason for the general aversion of any form of virulent contestation of the power, especially when it contained political claims. In the English political context, radicalism can be understood as the different campaigns for parliamentary reforms establishing universal suffrage. However, it became evident that not all those who were supporting such a reform originated from the same social class or shared the same ideals. As a matter of fact, the reformist associations and their leaders often disagreed with each other. Edward Royle and Hames Walvin claimed that radicalism could not be analyzed historically as a concept, because it was not a homogeneous movement, nor it had common leaders and a clear ideology. For them, radicalism was merely a loose concept, « a state of mind rather than a plan of action. » At the beginning of the nineteenth-century, the newspaper The Northern Star used the word radical in a positive way to designate a person or a group of people whose ideas were conform to those of the newspaper. However, an opponent of parliamentary reform will use the same word in a negative way, in this case the word radical will convey a notion of menace. From the very beginning, the term radical covered a large spectrum of ideas and conceptions. In fact, the plurality of what the word conveys is the main characteristic of what a radical is. As a consequence, because the radicals tended to differentiate themselves with their plurality and their differences rather than with common features, it seems impossible to define what radicalism (whose suffix in –ism implies that it designate a doctrine, an ideology) is. Nevertheless, today it is accepted by all historians. From the mid-twentieth century, we could say that it was taken from granted to consider radicalism as a movement that fitted with the democratic precepts (universal suffrage, freedom of speech) of our modern world. Let us first look at radicalism as a convenient way to designate the different popular movements appealing to universal suffrage during the time period 1792-1848. We could easily observe through the successions of men and associations, a long lasting radical state of mind: Cartwright, Horne Tooke, Thomas Hardy, Francis Burdett, William Cobbett, Henry Hunt, William Lovett, Bronterre O'Brien, Feargus O'Connor, The London Society for Constitutional information (SCI), The London Corresponding Society (LCS), The Hampden Clubs, The Chartists, etc. These organizations and people acknowledged having many things in common and being inspired by one another in carrying out their activities. These influences can be seen in the language and the political ideology that British historians name as "Constitutionalist", but also, in the political organization of extra-parliamentary societies. Most of the radicals were eager to redress injustices and, in practice, they were inspired by a plan of actions drawn on from the pamphlets of the True Whigs of the eighteenth-century. We contest the argument that the radicals lacked coherence and imagination or that they did not know how to put into practice their ambitions. In fact, their innovative forms of protest left a mark on history and found many successors in the twentieth century. Radicals' prevarications were the result of prohibitive legislation that regulated the life of associations and the refusal of the authorities to cooperate with them. As mentioned above, the term radical was greatly used and the contemporaries of the period starting from the French Revolution to Chartism never had to quarrel about the notions the word radical covered. However, this does not imply that all radicals were the same or that they belong to the same entity. Equally to Horne Tooke, the Reverend and ultra-Tory Stephens was considered as a radical, it went also with the shoemaker Thomas Hardy and the extravagant aristocrat Francis Burdett. Whether one belonged to the Aristocracy, the middle-class, the lower class or the Church, nothing could prevent him from being a radical. Surely, anybody could be a radical in its own way. Radicalism was wide enough to embrace everybody, from revolutionary reformers to paternalistic Tories. We were interested to clarify the meaning of the term radical because its inclusive nature was overlooked by historians. That's why the term radical figures in the original title of our dissertation Les voix/voies radicales (radical voices/ways to radicalism). In the French title, both words voix/voies are homonymous; the first one voix (voice) correspond to people, the second one voies (ways) refers to ideas. By this, we wanted to show that the word radical belongs to the sphere of ideas and common experience but also to the nature of human beings. Methodoloy The thesis stresses less on the question of class and its formation than on the circumstances that brought people to change their destiny and those of their fellows or to modernize the whole society. We challenged the work of E.P. Thompson, who in his famous book, The Making of the English Working Class, defined the radical movements in accordance with an idea of class. How a simple shoe-maker, Thomas Hardy, could become the center of attention during a trial where he was accused of being the mastermind of a modern revolution? What brought William Cobbett, an ultra-Tory, self-taught intellectual, to gradually espouse the cause of universal suffrage at a period where it was unpopular to do so? Why a whole population gathered to hear Henry Hunt, a gentleman farmer whose background did not destine him for becoming the champion of the people? It seemed that the easiest way to answer to these questions and to understand the nature of the popular movements consisted in studying the life of their leaders. We aimed at reconstructing the universe which surrounded the principal actors of the reform movements as if we were a privileged witness of theses times. This idea to associate the biographies of historical characters for a period of more than fifty years arouse when we realized that key events of the reform movements were echoing each other, such the trial of Thomas Hardy in 1794 and the massacre of Peterloo of 1819. The more we learned about the major events of radicalism and the life of their leaders, the more we were intrigued. Finally, one could ask himself if being a radical was not after all a question of character rather than one of class. The different popular movements in favour of a parliamentary reform were in fact far more inclusive and diversified from what historians traditionally let us to believe. For instance, once he manage to gather a sufficient number of members of the popular classes, Thomas Hardy projected to give the control of his association to an intellectual elite led by Horne Tooke. Moreover, supporters of the radical reforms followed leaders whose background was completely different as theirs. For example, O'Connor claimed royal descent from the ancient kings of Ireland. William Cobbett, owner of a popular newspaper was proud of his origins as a farmer. William Lovett, close to the liberals and a few members of parliament came from a very poor family of fishermen. We have thus put together the life of these five men, Thomas hardy, William Cobbett, Henry Hunt, William Lovett and Feargus O'Connor in order to compose a sort of a saga of the radicals. This association gives us a better idea of the characteristics of the different movements in which they participated, but also, throw light on the circumstances of their formation and their failures, on the particular atmosphere which prevailed at these times, on the men who influenced these epochs, and finally on the marks they had left. These men were at the heart of a whole network and in contact with other actors of peripheral movements. They gathered around themselves close and loyal fellows with whom they shared many struggles but also quarreled and had strong words. The original part of our approach is reflected in the choice to not consider studying the fluctuations of the radical movements in a linear fashion where the story follows a strict chronology. We decided to split up the main issue of the thesis through different topics. To do so, we simply have described the life of the people who inspired these movements. Each historical figure covers a chapter, and the general story follows a chronological progression. Sometimes we had to go back through time or discuss the same events in different chapters when the main protagonists lived in the same period of time. Radical movements were influenced by people of different backgrounds. What united them above all was their wish to obtain a normalization of the political world, to redress injustices and obtain parliamentary reform. We paid particular attention to the moments where the life of these men corresponded to an intense activity of the radical movement or to a transition of its ideas and organization. We were not so much interested in their feelings about secondary topics nor did we about their affective relations. Furthermore, we had little interest in their opinions on things which were not connected to our topic unless it helped us to have a better understanding of their personality. We have purposely reduced the description of our protagonists to their radical sphere. Of course we talked about their background and their intellectual development; people are prone to experience reversals of opinions, the case of Cobbett is the most striking one. The life of these personalities coincided with particular moments of the radical movement, such as the first popular political associations, the first open-air mass meetings, the first popular newspapers, etc. We wanted to emphasize the personalities of those who addressed speeches and who were present in the radical associations. One could argue that the inconvenience of focusing on a particular person presents a high risk of overlooking events and people who were not part of his world. However, it was essential to differ from an analysis or a chronicle which had prevailed in the studies of the radical movements, as we aimed at offering a point of view that completed the precedents works written on that topic. In order to do so, we have deliberately put the humane character of the radical movement at the center of our work and used the techniques of biography as a narrative thread. Conclusion The life of each historical figure that we have portrayed corresponded to a particular epoch of the radical movement. Comparing the speeches of the radical leaders over a long period of time, we noticed that the radical ideology evolved. The principles of the Rights of Men faded away and gave place to more concrete reasoning, such as the right to benefit from one's own labour. This transition is characterized by the Chartist period of Feargus O'Connor. This does not mean that collective memory and radical tradition ceased to play an important part. The popular classes were always appealed to Constitutional rhetoric and popular myths. Indeed, thanks to them they identified themselves and justified their claims to universal suffrage. We focused on the life of a few influent leaders of radicalism in order to understand its evolution and its nature. The description of their lives constituted our narrative thread and it enabled us to maintain consistency in our thesis. If the chapters are independent the one from the other, events and speeches are in correspondences. Sometimes we could believe that we were witnessing a repetition of facts and events as if history was repeating itself endlessly. However, like technical progress, the spirit of time, Zeitgeist, experiences changes and mutations. These features are fundamental elements to comprehend historical phenomena; the latter cannot be simplified to philosophical, sociological, or historical concept. History is a science which has this particularity that the physical reality of phenomena has a human dimension. As a consequence, it is essential not to lose touch with the human aspect of history when one pursues studies and intellectual activities on a historical phenomenon. We decided to take a route opposite to the one taken by many historians. We have first identified influential people from different epochs before entering into concepts analysis. Thanks to this compilation of radical leaders, a new and fresh look to the understanding of radicalism was possible. Of course, we were not the first one to have studied them, but we ordered them following a chronology, like Plutarch enjoyed juxtaposing Greeks and Romans historical figures. Thanks to this technique we wanted to highlight the features of the radical leaders' speeches, personalities and epochs, but also their differences. At last, we tried to draw the outlines and the heart of different radical movements in order to follow the ways that led to radicalism. We do not pretend to have offered an original and exclusive definition of radicalism, we mainly wanted to understand the nature of what defines somebody as a radical and explain the reasons why thousands of people decided to believe in this man. Moreover, we wanted to distance ourselves from the ideological debate of the Cold War which permeated also the interpretation of past events. Too often, the history of radicalism was either narrated with a form of revolutionary nostalgia or in order to praise the merits of liberalism. If the great mass meetings ends in the mid-nineteenth-century with the fall of Chartism, this practice spread out in the whole world in the twentieth-century. Incidentally, the Arab Spring of the beginning of the twenty-first-century demonstrated that a popular platform was the best way for the people to claim their rights and destabilize a political system which they found too authoritative. Through protest the people express an essential quality of revolt, which is an expression of emancipation from fear. From then on, a despotic regime loses this psychological terror which helped it to maintain itself into power. The balance of power between the government and its people would also take a new turn. The radicals won this psychological victory more than 150 years ago and yet universal suffrage was obtained only a century later. From the acceptance of the principles of liberties to their cultural practice, a long route has to be taken to change people's mind. It is a wearisome struggle for the most vulnerable people. In the light of western history, fundamental liberties must be constantly defended. Paradoxically, revolt is an essential and constitutive element of the maintenance of democracy. ; Die radikalen Strömungen in England von 1789 bis 1848 Formulierung der Problematik Was ist ein Radikaler? Eine Person die vorgefassten Meinungen zuwiderhandelt? Ein Agitator, der die Gesellschaft verändern will und dabei das Risiko eingeht, sie aus dem Gleichgewicht zu bringen? Im politischen Kontext, in dem sich die britischen Inseln am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts befanden, hatte dieser Begriff eine negative Konnotation. Er erinnert nämlich an die levellers und an den Bürgerkrieg. Diese historische Epoche, die als traumatisches Erlebnis empfunden wurde, hat bei den politischen Führern Stigmata hinterlassen, die immer noch vorhanden sind. Die Herrschaft Cromwells hatte bestimmt einen direkten Einfluss auf die Aversion der Engländer gegen jede heftige Form des Protestes gegen die herrschende Macht, vor allem wenn er politisch vereinnahmt wird. Im politischen Kontext in England versteht man unter Radikalismus verschiedene Versuche, eine Parlamentsreform durchzusetzen, die das allgemeine Wahlrecht einführen sollte. Natürlich bedeutet dies nicht, dass die Befürworter solch einer Reform eine gesellschaftliche und ideologische Nähe verband. In der Tat waren sich die reformistischen Verbände oft untereinander nicht einig und ihre jeweiligen Führer hatten wenige Gemeinsamkeiten. Edward Royle und Hames Walvin erläutern, dass der Radikalismus historisch nicht wie ein Konzept analysiert werden kann, da er keine einheitliche Bewegung war, da sich die Führer untereinander nicht einig waren und da keine eindeutige Ideologie vorhanden war. Der Radikalismus war ihrer Meinung nach nur eine vage Ansammlung bunter Ideen. Er sei « eher eine Einstellung als ein Aktionsplan» gewesen. Am Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts verwendete die Zeitung Northern Star den Begriff « radikal » in einem positiven Sinne, um eine Person oder eine Gruppe zu bezeichnen, deren Ideen mit den Ihrigen im Einklang standen. Gegner der Parlamentsreformbewegungen haben diesen Begriff im negativen Sinne verwendet. Der Radikale wurde dann also als Bedrohung wahrgenommen. Der Gebrauch des Begriffes radikal scheint kein semantisches Problem darzustellen im Vergleich zur Verwendung des Wortes Radikalismus dessen Suffix -ismus eine Doktrin bzw. eine Ideologie voraussetzt. Die Tatsache, dass die Radikalen so unterschiedliche Gesinnungen vertraten, scheint eine Definition des Radikalismus unmöglich zu machen. Trotzdem wird sein Gebrauch heute von allen Historikern akzeptiert. Man könnte also behaupten, dass es seit der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts gängig wurde, mit dem Begriff Radikalismus jede Bewegung zu bezeichnen, die Ideen durchsetzen wollte, die nach unserem heutigen Verständnis als demokratisch verstanden werden. Wir können den Begriff Radikalismus zwischen 1792 und 1848 also erst einmal als eine praktische Bezeichnung für die verschiedenen radikalen Volksbewegungen, die das Ziel verfolgten, das allgemeine Wahlrecht einzuführen, betrachten. Diese radikale Einstellung findet man bei einer ganzen Reihe von Menschen und Organisationen wieder. Cartwright, Horne Tooke, Thomas Hardy, Francis Burdett, William Cobbet, Henry Hunt, William Lovett, Bronterre O'Brien Feargus O'Connor, die London Society for Constitutional information (SCI), die London Corresponding Society (LCS), die Hampden Clubs, die Chartisten, usw. Man kann viele Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den Protagonisten erkennen, die sie sich auch eingestanden haben. Auβerdem wird auch der Einfluss erkennbar, den sie aufeinander ausgeübt haben, um ihre Aktionen zu gestalten. Diese Einflüsse findet man sowohl in der Sprache und in der politischen Ideologie wieder, die von den britischen Historikern als « konstitutionalistisch » bezeichnet wurden, als auch in der politischen Organisation von auβerparlamentarischen Gruppierungen. Alle Radikalen wollten die Ungerechtigkeiten beheben, und in der Praxis haben sie sich von einem Aktionsplan anregen lassen, den sie im 18. Jahrhundert in den Pamphleten der true whigs gefunden haben. Wir müssen teilweise das Argument zurückweisen, dass die Radikalen nicht kohärent und einfallsreich waren, oder dass sie nicht genau wussten, wie sie ihre Ziele umsetzen konnten. Ganz im Gegenteil: Die innovativen Formen des Protestes, die ihnen zuzuschreiben sind, waren bezeichnend und haben eine Spur in der Geschichte hinterlassen. Das Zaudern der Radikalen war erstens auf die prohibitive Gesetzgebung zurückzuführen, der die Verbände unterlagen und zweitens auf die kategorische Ablehnung der Behörden zu kooperieren. Die Zeitgenossen der Epoche, die sich von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Chartismus erstreckt, haben nie über den Sinn des Begriffs radikal debattiert. Dies bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass alle Radikalen gleich waren, oder dass sie zu derselben Einheit gehörten. Horne Tooke und der Priester Stephens waren beide Radikale, so wie der Schuster Hardy und der extravagante Burdett. Ob man ein Adliger, ein Mitglied des Bürgertums, ein Handwerker, ein Gutsbesitzer oder ein Mann der Kirche war: Nichts hinderte einen daran, ein Radikaler zu sein. Jeder konnte auf seine Art ein Radikaler sein. In dem Radikalismus gab es in der Tat eine groβe Bandbreite, die sich vom revolutionären Radikalismus bis zum paternalistischen Torysmus erstreckte. Wir waren daran interessiert, genau zu verstehen, was der Begriff radikal bedeutet, denn sein integrativer Charakter wurde von Historikern übersehen. Wir haben uns deshalb so genau mit der Bedeutung des Begriffs « radikal » beschäftigt, weil dieses Adjektiv im Plural im Titel die radikalen Strömungen enthalten ist. Mit dem im französischen Titel enthaltenen Gleichklang zwischen den Wörtern « voie » (Weg, Strömung) und « voix » (Stimme) wollten wir zeigen, dass sich der Begriff « radikal » sowohl auf ein Ideenbündel als auch auf eine Person bezieht. Die methodische Vorgehensweise In dieser Arbeit richtet sich unser Augenmerk weniger auf die Frage, wie eine Gesellschaftsschicht entstanden ist, als auf die Umstände, die die Menschen dazu bewogen haben, ihrem Schicksal und dem Ihresgleichen oder gar der ganzen Gesellschaft eine andere Wendung zu geben. Wir stellten das Werk von E.P.Thompson in Frage, welcher in seinem bekannten Buch "The Making of the English Working Class" radikale Bewegungen, entsprechend einer Vorstellung von Klasse, definiert. Wie kam es, dass ein einfacher Schuster wie Thomas Hardy, während eines Prozesses, in dem er beschuldigt wurde, eine moderne Revolution anzuzetteln, im Zentrum der Öffentlichkeit stand? Wie kam es, dass ein Autodidakt und ein Anhängiger der Ultra- Tories wie William Cobbett sich nach und nach für das allgemeine Wahlrecht einsetzte, zu einer Zeit, in der es unpopulär war? Wie kam es, dass sich die ganze Bevölkerung in Massen um Henry Hunt scharte, einen Gutsbesitzer, der nicht gerade dazu bestimmt war, sich für die Belange des Volkes stark zu machen? Unser Ziel ist es, das Universum, in dem die wichtigsten Beteiligten lebten, wiederzugeben, so als wären wir ein privilegierter Zeuge dieser Epochen. Die einfachste Art diese Fragen zu beantworten und die Beschaffenheit der Volksbewegungen zu verstehen besteht unserer Meinung nach darin, das Leben jener Männer zu studieren, die sie gestaltet haben. Wir hatten den Einfall, mehrere Männer, die in einem Zeitraum von mehr als 50 Jahren gelebt haben, miteinander in Verbindung zu bringen, als uns aufgefallen ist, dass Schlüsselmomente der Reformbewegungen miteinander korrespondieren, wie z.B der Prozess von Thomas Hardy und das Massaker von Peterloo 1819. Je mehr wir uns mit diesen Ereignissen beschäftigten, desto mehr weckte dies unsere Neugier auf das Leben jener Menschen, die sie verursacht haben. Schlussendlich konnte man sich fragen, ob radikal zu sein nicht eher eine Frage des Charakters als eine Frage der Klassenzugehörigkeit war. Die verschiedenen Volksbewegungen für eine Parlamentsreform haben in der Tat viel mehr unterschiedliche Menschen vereint und waren um einiges vielfältiger als es die Historiker behauptet haben. So war es zum Beispiel Thomas Hardys Vorhaben, die Führung des Verbandes einer intellektuellen Elite unter Horne Tookes Kommando zu überlassen, nachdem er es geschafft haben würde, genug Mitglieder der Arbeiterschicht zu versammeln. Auβerdem haben die Sympathisanten mit Freude Führer akzeptiert, deren Schicksal sehr wenig mit dem Ihrigen gemeinsam hatte. O'Connor z. B erhob den Anspruch, der Nachkomme eines irischen Königs zu sein. Cobbett, der Besitzer einer bedeutenden Zeitung, erinnerte daran, dass er aus einer Bauernfamilie stammte. William Lovett, der den Liberalen und einigen Parlamentsmitgliedern nahe stand, stammte aus einer armen Fischerfamilie. Wir haben diese fünf Männer Thomas Hardy, William Cobbett, Henry Hunt, William Lovett und Feargus O'Connor in Verbindung gebracht, um gewissermaßen eine Saga der Radikalen zu erstellen. Dies erlaubte es uns, uns ein genaueres Bild zu machen von den Merkmalen der verschiedenen Bewegungen, an denen sie teilgenommen haben, von dem Kontext, in dem die Bewegungen entstanden sind, von ihren Misserfolgen, von der besonderen Atmosphäre, die in diesen unterschiedlichen Epochen herrschte, von den Männern, die diese Bewegungen beeinflusst haben und zuletzt von dem Zeichen, das sie gesetzt haben. Diese Männer waren im Mittelpunkt eines Netzwerkes und standen in Verbindung mit anderen Akteuren, die an peripheren Bewegungen beteiligt waren. Sie waren umgeben von treuen Weggefährten, mit denen zusammen sie viele Kämpfe ausgetragen haben, oder mit denen sie sich heftig gestritten haben. Unsere Vorgehensweise ist insofern neu, als wir die Fluktuationen der radikalen Bewegungen weder linear bzw. chronologisch beleuchten, noch in einer zersplitterten Weise, indem wir die Problematik in mehrere Themen unterteilen. Wir sind ganz einfach dem Leben der Männer gefolgt, die am Ursprung dieser Bewegung standen. Jedes Kapitel behandelt eine historische Person und die gesamte Abhandlung ist chronologisch aufgebaut. Manchmal war es notwendig, Rückblenden einzubauen oder die gleichen Ereignisse mehrmals zu erwähnen, wenn verschiedene historische Personen daran beteiligt waren. Die radikalen Bewegungen wurden von Menschen aus verschiedenen Horizonten beeinflusst. Verbunden waren sie vor allem durch ihr Bestreben, eine Normalisierung der politischen Welt zu erreichen, gegen die Ungerechtigkeiten zu kämpfen und eine Parlamentsreform durchzusetzen. Wir haben uns auf die Momente konzentriert, in denen das Leben der Männer mit einem aktiven Handeln in der radikalen Bewegung oder mit einer Veränderung ihrer Ideen oder in ihrer Organisation einherging. Ihre emotionalen Beziehungen und ihre Einstellung zu belanglosen Fragen interessierten uns nicht. Ihre Meinungen zu Fragen, die unser Studienobjekt nicht betreffen, waren auch nicht Gegenstand dieser Abhandlung, es sei denn sie ermöglichten es uns, ihre Persönlichkeit besser zu umreiβen. Unser Augenmerk richtete sich ausdrücklich und vor allem auf die radikale Tätigkeit der Beteiligten. Natürlich haben wir auch die Lebensumstände und die geistige Entwicklung dieser Männer geschildert, denn wir wissen, dass Meinungen sich im Laufe eines Lebens ändern können, wie es der bemerkenswerte Fall von Cobbett verdeutlicht. Das Leben dieser Personen fiel zeitlich mit markanten Momenten in der radikalen Bewegung zusammen, wie z. B die ersten politischen Organisationen der Arbeiterschichten, die ersten Massendemonstrationen oder die ersten politisch ausgerichteten Volkszeitungen. Wir wollten die menschlichen Züge jener Männer wiedergeben, die Reden gehalten haben und die in den radikalen Verbänden anwesend waren. Man könnte uns vorwerfen, dass wir- wenn wir uns auf eine historische Person konzentriert haben- andere Fakten oder Personen, die nicht zu ihrem Umfeld gehörten aber dennoch an der Bewegung beteiligt waren, ausgeblendet haben. Uns schien es aber wesentlich, die analytische Methode oder die historische Chronik, die die Studien über die radikalen Bewegungen maßgeblich prägt, aufzugeben. Unser Ziel war es nämlich, diese Schilderungen zu vervollständigen, indem wir den menschlichen Aspekt in den Vordergrund stellten. Dazu haben wir die biografische Perspektive gewählt und unserer Studie angepasst. Schluss Jeder Mann, dessen Rolle wir hervorgehoben haben, lebte in einer bestimmten Phase der radikalen Bewegung. Der Vergleich der Reden, die sie in verschiedenen Epochen gehalten haben, hat aufgezeigt, dass die radikale Ideologie sich im Laufe der Zeit verändert hat. Die Verteidigung der Menschenrechte verlor an Bedeutung und die Argumentation wurde konkreter: Es ging z. B mehr und mehr um das Recht, die Früchte seiner Arbeit zu genieβen. Dieser Wandel fand in der chartistischen Epoche Feargus O'Connors statt. Die Traditionen des Radikalismus und die Erinnerung daran spielten jedoch weiterhin eine wichtige Rolle. Die Rhetorik des Konstitutionalismus und der Volksmythos waren Themen, mit denen die Arbeiterschichten sich immer identifiziert haben, und die ihre Forderung nach dem allgemeinen Wahlrecht gerechtfertigt haben. Wir haben uns auf das Leben einiger einflussreicher Männer des Radikalismus konzentriert, um seine Entwicklung und sein Wesen zu verstehen. Ihre Lebensläufe haben uns als Leitfaden gedient und haben es uns ermöglicht, eine Kohärenz in unserer Abhandlung zu wahren. Zwar sind die Kapitel unabhängig voneinander, aber die Ereignisse und die Reden korrespondieren miteinander. Man könnte manchmal den Eindruck haben, dass sich Fakten, Handlungen und die Geschichte im Allgemeinen endlos wiederholen. Allerdings ist der Zeitgeist im ständigen Wandel begriffen, so wie dies auch beim technischen Fortschritt der Fall ist. Wir sind der Ansicht, dass diese Besonderheiten fundamentale Elemente sind, die es ermöglichen, historische Phänomene zu begreifen, die nicht auf philosophische, soziologische oder historische Konzepte reduziert werden können. Die Geschichte als Wissenschaft weist die Besonderheit auf, dass die physische Realität und die erwähnten Phänomene auch eine menschliche Realität sind. Daher ist es wesentlich, bei der intellektuellen Auseinandersetzung mit einem historischen Phänomen den menschlichen Aspekt nicht aus den Augen zu verlieren. Wir wollten einen Weg einschlagen, der dem vieler Historiker entgegengesetzt ist. Unser Augenmerk richtete sich zunächst auf die Männer, die ihre jeweiligen Epochen maβgeblich geprägt haben, bevor wir uns mit Konzepten beschäftigt haben. Die Männer, die wir auserwählt haben, gaben uns einen neuen und frischen Blick auf den Radikalismus und brachten uns diesen näher. Natürlich sind wir nicht die ersten, die sich mit diesen historischen Personen beschäftigt haben. Durch die chronologische Anordnung unserer Abhandlung, wollten wir- so wie Plutarch, der griechische und römische historische Personen miteinander in Verbindung brachte- die Wesensmerkmale ihrer Reden, Persönlichkeiten und Epochen aber auch ihre Unterschiede in den Vordergrund rücken. Wir haben also versucht, eine Bewegung zu umreiβen und im Kern zu erfassen und die Wege nachzuzeichnen, die zum Radikalismus führten. Wir behaupten nicht, dass wir eine neuartige und ausschlieβliche Definition dieser Bewegung geliefert haben. Wir haben nur versucht, die Wesensmerkmale eines Radikalen zu begreifen und herauszufinden, aus welchen Gründen tausende Männer an diesen Mann geglaubt haben. Wir wollten uns von der ideologischen Debatte über den Kalten Krieg losmachen, die sogar auf die Interpretation zurückliegender Ereignisse abgefärbt hat. Zu oft wurde die Geschichte des Radikalismus mit einer Art revolutionären Nostalgie erzählt, oder mit der Absicht, die Vorzüge des Liberalismus zu preisen. Der Chartismus leitete zwar im 19. Jahrhundert das Ende der groβen Massenbewegungen in England ein, aber diese Methode hat sich im 20. Jahrhundert überall auf der Welt verbreitet. In der Tat zeigt der arabische Frühling am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, dass die zahlenmäβige Überlegenheit das beste Druckmittel des Volkes ist, um seine Rechte einzufordern und das bestehenden Regime zu destabilisieren. Ein Volk, das demonstriert, zeigt, dass es keine Angst mehr hat. Von dem Moment an, in dem ein autoritäres Regime diese psychologische Waffe, die es ihm ermöglicht hat, an der Macht zu bleiben, verliert, kehrt sich das Machtgefälle zwischen der autoritären Staatsgewalt und dem unterworfenen Volk um. Diesen psychologischen Sieg haben die englischen Radikalen vor mehr als 150 Jahren errungen. Jedoch wurde das allgemeine Wahlrecht erst ein Jahrhundert später eingeführt. Damit es also nicht bei Prinzipienerklärungen bleibt, sondern die Freiheiten in die Wirklichkeit umgesetzt werden, bedarf es einer Bewusstseinsänderung, die nur durch eine langwierige Arbeit zustande kommen kann. Für die Schwächsten ist dies ein langer Kampf. In Anbetracht der abendländischen Geschichte muss man die Freiheiten als Rechte betrachten, die es immer wieder zu verteidigen gilt. Paradoxerweise scheint die Revolte also eine grundlegende und unabdingbare Bedingung zu sein, um die Demokratie zu erhalten.

The United States is "prepared" to deploy troops to Haiti as part of a multinational effort if the crisis in the country worsens, though officials are not actively considering such a move, according to the U.S. military commander for Latin America and the Caribbean.
"We wouldn't discount" that U.S. troops could be involved in an international effort in Haiti, said Gen. Laura Richardson, commander of U.S. Southern Command, during a Tuesday event at the Atlantic Council. "We are prepared if called upon by our State Department and Department of Defense," Richardson added, noting that she doesn't envision a "U.S.-only solution" to the deteriorating situation.
The top general's comments highlight the extent of Haiti's current crisis, in which the government has all but fallen apart in the face of armed groups that are now preventing Ariel Henry — the country's internationally recognized leader — from returning from an overseas trip. Pentagon officials are now considering using Guantanamo Bay to hold Haitian refugees if the situation deteriorates further.
Henry, who took over as de facto president following the 2021 assassination of Jovenel Moïse, said recently that he will step down and hand power over to a transitional council made up of key stakeholders from Haitian civil society and political groups. There is, however, one controversial condition: Participants in the foreign-backed council must endorse an international intervention to restore security in Haiti.
A dueling transition effort, led by paramilitary-leader-turned-avowed-revolutionary Guy Philippe, has rejected the prospect of foreign intervention but is unlikely to earn support from Western leaders.
While U.S. officials continue to emphasize their support for a Kenyan-led (but U.S.-funded) United Nations intervention, they have carefully avoided suggesting that American soldiers could be directly involved in any military operations in the country. The Pentagon's only recent operation in the country was a mission last week to airlift U.S. embassy staff out of Haiti.
Washington's concerns about direct intervention are in part due to the long history of U.S. interference in Haitian politics, including a decades-long U.S. occupation in the early 1900s and alleged American interference in several recent Haitian elections. Many in Haiti see the U.S. as partially responsible for the current crisis due to American support for Henry and other Haitian leaders who have crushed protests and steered the country toward authoritarian rule.
But the UN mission has hit its fair share of snags, with Kenyan courts blocking the country's involvement in the intervention over constitutional concerns. In fact, Henry only left the country in order to sign a revised agreement with Kenyan officials before learning that he would not be able to make the trip home. If the UN intervention does come together, U.S. soldiers will provide logistical and sustainment support for Kenya's operations, according to Richardson.
Other obstacles also stand in the way of the Kenya operation, according to Jake Johnston, a senior research associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). Even if Kenyan courts sign off on the operation, Johnston says it's not clear how Kenyan forces could even land in Port-au-Prince given the level of insecurity. And the level of violence required to defeat the gangs by force would risk "ridiculously high" civilian harm in populous areas.
As the Kenyan-led mission hangs in the balance, the situation continues to deteriorate. "The idea of foreign troops, it's basically served as an excuse to not do anything to address the situation on the ground," Johnston said. "For a year and a half, we've been debating how this is going to happen, who's going to fund it, who's going to lead it, what they're going to do."
While the government continues to function in limited ways, local armed groups control large swathes of the capital city, and street violence has forced many Haitians to flee their homes. Food insecurity has also tripled since 2016, giving Haiti "one of the highest levels of hunger in the world," according to the World Food Program.
Haiti watchers blame the crisis on years of corruption and weak governance, in addition to lax policies toward armed groups based in poor neighborhoods. Those paramilitary groups have had an uneasy relationship with Haitian officials, though their interests have at times aligned, as was the case in 2018 when armed groups stepped in to break up anti-government protests.
The current crisis began last month when disparate paramilitary groups declared that they had joined forces to oust Henry. It is unclear whether the groups have enough in common to remain unified in their anti-government efforts; the gangs carried out a similar effort last year that fizzled out after a few weeks, according to Johnston.
Now, the best path forward for foreign officials is to allow Haitians to solve the crisis with minimal foreign influence, Johnston argues. "A huge part of this crisis is a result of U.S. foreign policy, which propped up Henry despite every indication that this was going to blow up in their face," he said. "You can't impose the government from an external source or power. It's not going to work in the long run, however much we might want it to."
"We might not like what happens in a local process," Johnston added, "but it's not really up to us to make that choice."

It's a great first step, but the Louisiana Legislature
can do a whole lot better when it comes to a responsible fiscal year 2024
budget and use of surplus dollars over the last couple of years.

This week, the state's general operations budget HB 1 kicked
off its journey to the consternation of free spenders. Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards and
his partisan followers in the Legislature – and not a few Republicans including
chamber leaders – had grandiose ideas about the using the bonus bucks mainly on
infrastructure and larding out all sorts of new commitments, such as pay raises
for educators and local public safety personnel, in this year's spending plan.

But to accomplish that, the state would have to
bust its spending cap by several hundred million dollars, a move opposed by the
Louisiana Conservative Caucus
that is comprised of most House Republicans as well as the Louisiana
Freedom Caucus, which likely overlaps in membership considerably with the
Conservative Caucus. These legislators argue that the surplus money (past the constitutional
mandates for its use) primarily should go to paying down unfunded accrued
liabilities in the state's retirement systems, which not only would avert
breaching the cap but also would relieve local governments from having to pay
excess contributions into the state systems for defeasance of the UAL
constitutionally mandated by 2029 that would free up money for other uses such
as raising salaries.

The amended bill takes a small step towards that
with an additional contribution to reducing the UAL by $185 million while excising
anticipated new early childhood education spending of $51 million, new higher
education expenditures of $57 million, reducing the size of elementary and
secondary education pay raises by $46 million, and lopping off $159 million to
Medicaid providers other than those involved in catering to disability services.
This shifting apparently is in response to the fact that the Conservative
Caucus with more than a third of House membership (all Republican) can block
jacking up the expenditure limit.

Naturally, this fiscal prudence provoked cries of
horror from leftist media and politicians. The Louisiana Illuminator, a
web-based news site backed in part by extreme leftist funders, scarily
suggested about how the reduction in the rate of growth of Medicaid might
imperil some programs and particularly those related to disability services.
Edwards, when informed about the House committee action, bleated
that he "Didn't know that education ceased to be a priority."

Such responses range from the disingenuous to fabrication.
HB 1 specifically tells the Department of Health not to touch waiver programs
and supports for people with disabilities when assigning the cut – and keep in
mind that this reduction represents less than one percent of the over $16 billion,
or some 35 percent of the entire state's spending, of the amount apportioned to
medical vendors, or about 7 percent of the state's portion. Consider as well
that for the past few years the state consistently has spent less on Medicaid
than budgeted – even as it badly
underestimated the hit it would take because of Edwards' triggering Medicaid
expansion in 2016 – because of an extreme shortage of nursing providers that
have left without services clients utilizing Medicaid waivers, thus saving the
state money.

Edwards' comment merely continued his history of contrafactual
remarks, premised upon the belief that saying something untrue often enough
will make people think it true, when the shortcomings of his policy preferences
are exposed, as well as displayed his frustration at the deft countering of his
agenda. Obviously, reducing the UAL burden on local education agencies leaving
them more resources for things such as pay raises,  is anything but reducing education as a
priority.

However, legislators can do better. The Freedom
Caucus outlined how that is possible with its issuance of a "Recipe for Fiscal Responsibility"
that proposes using surplus dollars to eliminate entirely the UAL, chunk money
into the Budget Stabilization Fund to its limit, and then spend the remaining
$285 million on infrastructure. The near-term impact would leave the state over
$150 million more a year in discretionary funds, over $100 million more a year
for schools and over $40 million a year for higher education, and allow local education
agencies enough freed funding to pay for around $2,000 pay raises for teachers
(although they would have to allocate additional dollars after 2029 to support these).

Ideas
like this aren't new, but the Freedom Caucus does a service in explaining the
savings amounts and how they project over the next five years. In order for HB
1 to take on this form, it would have to jettison state-funded teacher pay raises
as well as have changes made to capital expenditures in the companion bill HB
550.

Legislators should pursue this, although the
timidity of legislative Republican leadership – apparently more interested in
small capital outlay carveouts for themselves an allies squirreled away in HB 1
than in a true sea change from redistributionist mentality – likely means the
current form of HB 1, in that form only because of Conservative Caucus
leverage, is the best that can be done. Still, a quarter-loaf is better than
none at all.

Adopted in 1991, ethnic federalism indeed paved the way for the recognition, accommodation, and institutionalization of ethnocultural diversity for the first time in the country's history since its modern existence. What is equally important is, the practice of ethnic federalism complicated state-society and inter-group relationships creating a favorable environment for ethnic confrontation and conflict to take place in the country threatening national unity, eroded century-old values of coexistence, a hard ethnic boundary where administrative boundaries are served as political and ethnic differentiators like the Oromo and Somali conflict over contested boundaries. Territorial recognition, and institutionalization of ethnicity gave room for the emergence of 'ethnic like and ethnic others' thinking, made minorities in different regions victims of politics and failed to provide sound accommodation mechanisms from them, severely restricted people's constitutional rights including the right to mobility and right to work, created room for the re-emergence of secessionist tendency. Hence, ethnic federalism while solving old problems of ethnic inequality and injustice; has created new problems of ethnic tensions and conflict across Ethiopia. It is the purpose of this study to investigate how and why federalism is being considered as the source of ethnic conflicts in the Ethiopian context. The study adopted a qualitative comparative approach while FGDs and key informant interviews were used to gather data. The finding of the study shows that though multinational federation plays an irreplaceable role to accommodate and institutionalize ethnocultural diversity, the notion and implementation of federalism instigate ethnic conflict in the Ethiopian context. ; Adoptado en 1991, el federalismo étnico allanó el camino para el reconocimiento, la acomodación y la institucionalización de la diversidad etnocultural por primera vez en la historia del país desde su existencia moderna. Lo que es igualmente importante es que la práctica del federalismo étnico complicó las relaciones entre el Estado y la sociedad y entre los grupos, creando un entorno favorable para que se produjeran enfrentamientos y conflictos étnicos en el país que amenazaban la unidad nacional, erosionaban los valores centenarios de la coexistencia y establecían una frontera étnica dura en la que los límites administrativos servían de diferenciadores políticos y étnicos, como en el caso del conflicto entre los oromos y los somalíes por las fronteras disputadas. El reconocimiento territorial y la institucionalización de la etnicidad dieron lugar a la aparición del pensamiento "étnico como y étnico como otros", convirtieron a las minorías de las diferentes regiones en víctimas de la política y no proporcionaron mecanismos sólidos de adaptación, restringieron gravemente los derechos constitucionales de las personas, incluido el derecho a la movilidad y el derecho al trabajo, y crearon un espacio para el resurgimiento de la tendencia secesionista. Por lo tanto, el federalismo étnico, aunque resuelve los viejos problemas de desigualdad e injusticia étnica, ha creado nuevos problemas de tensiones y conflictos étnicos en toda Etiopía. El propósito de este estudio es investigar cómo y por qué el federalismo se considera fuente de conflictos étnicos en el contexto etíope. El estudio adoptó un enfoque comparativo cualitativo, mientras que para la recopilación de datos se utilizaron FGD y entrevistas a informantes clave. Las conclusiones del estudio muestran que, aunque la federación multinacional desempeña un papel insustituible para acomodar e institucionalizar la diversidad etnocultural, la noción y la aplicación del federalismo instigan el conflicto étnico en el contexto etíope. ; Adotado em 1991, o federalismo étnico realmente abriu o caminho para o reconhecimento, acomodação e institucionalização da diversidade etnocultural pela primeira vez na história do país desde sua moderna existência. O que é igualmente importante é que a prática do federalismo étnico complicou as relações entre estados e grupos, criando um ambiente favorável para que o confronto étnico e o conflito aconteçam no país, ameaçando a unidade nacional, corroendo valores centenários de coexistência, uma dura fronteira étnica onde as fronteiras administrativas são servidas como diferenciadores políticos e étnicos, como o conflito Oromo e Somali sobre fronteiras contestadas. O reconhecimento territorial e a institucionalização da etnicidade deram espaço para o surgimento do pensamento "étnico como etnia e outros", tornaram as minorias em diferentes regiões vítimas da política e falharam em fornecer mecanismos sólidos de acomodação a partir delas, restringiram severamente os direitos constitucionais das pessoas, incluindo o direito à mobilidade e o direito ao trabalho, criaram espaço para o ressurgimento da tendência secessionista. Assim, o federalismo étnico ao mesmo tempo em que resolve antigos problemas de desigualdade e injustiça étnica; criou novos problemas de tensões étnicas e conflitos em toda a Etiópia. O objetivo deste estudo é investigar como e por que o federalismo está sendo considerado como a fonte de conflitos étnicos no contexto etíope. O estudo adotou uma abordagem qualitativa comparativa enquanto as discussões dos grupos de centragem e as entrevistas dos principais informantes foram utilizadas para coletar dados. A conclusão do estudo mostra que embora a federação multinacional desempenhe um papel insubstituível para acomodar e institucionalizar a diversidade etnocultural, a noção e a implementação do federalismo instigam o conflito étnico no contexto etíope.

A través del presente manuscrito se pretende un análisis de la política de defensa y seguridad democrática (de ahora en adelante PDSD) desde el año 2002 al 2010, estableciendo su origen, su contenido ideológico y la aplicación respecto al orden público y la convivencia pacífica, precisando la correlación existente y el grado de adecuación respecto de los elementos jurídicos-constitucionales del Estado social de derecho (de ahora en adelante ESD). Previo a la implementación, vigencia y continuidad de la PDSD y pese al beneplácito de un sector importante de la población colombiana, se suscitaron serias dudas con respecto a su carácter, configuración, eficacia y a los resultados obtenidos en materia de protección a los derechos humanos, generando todo un debate alrededor de las ejecuciones extrajudiciales, el desplazamiento forzado, la desaparición forzada, las torturas y las masacres, entre otros; todo lo cual nos conduce a interrogarnos sobre si la PDSD realmente corresponde al modelo de ESD establecido en la Constitución Política de 1991. Por otra parte, consideramos que la PDSD responde a un concepto restringido de seguridad acuñado en el marco de la lucha global contra el terrorismo, el cual no es más que una versión ampliada de la doctrina de seguridad nacional, lo cual está al margen de la noción de seguridad multidimensional que necesariamente debe desprenderse de la configuración del ESD en la Constitución Política de 1991. Sin embargo, el único concepto posible de estado de seguridad es la que se debe a los ciudadanos en materia de derechos y los riesgos que tras un concepto de seguridad diferente se escondan unas manifestaciones de poder contrarias a la democracia, tal y como se ha concluido. En consecuencia, este artículo pretende realizar un análisis introductorio sobre los principales aspectos de la PDSD y su relación con el ESD –dando por entendido que el pilar fundamental de este modelo de Estado lo constituyen la realización, vigencia y protección de los derechos fundamentales– que nos permita un acercamiento a lo que históricamente ha sido la violencia y las respuestas recurrentes de la autoridad pública, identificando los elementos comunes en materia de seguridad y orden público y el resultado de su aplicación. Para el logro de lo anterior se ha recurrido al método cualitativo realizando el análisis documental de diversos textos relacionados con la historia del país, el análisis de las políticas de seguridad, la violencia e informes, entre otros; así mismo, se ha tenido en cuenta el enfoque de gestión de los derechos como una manera de realizar el juicio sobre la base de su realización efectiva. ; Analysis of the Defense and Democratic Security Policy (from now on PDSD) during the year 2002 to 2010, establishing its origin, its ideological content and the application regarding public order and peaceful coexistence, specifying the existing correlation and the degree of adequacy with respect to the legal-constitutional elements of the Social Rule of Law (hereinafter ESD). Prior to the implementation, validity and continuity of the PDSD, despite the approval of a significant sector of the Colombian population, serious doubts were raised regarding its character, configuration, effectiveness, and the results obtained in terms of protection of human rights, generating a whole debate around the extrajudicial executions, the forced displacement, the forced disappearance, the tortures, the massacres, among others; all of which leads us to question whether the PDSD really corresponds to the ESD model established in the Political Constitution of 1991. On the other hand, we consider that the PDSD responds to a restricted concept of security coined within the framework of the global fight against terrorism, which is no more than an expanded version of the doctrine of national security, which is outside the notion of multidimensional security that must necessarily be derived from the configuration of the ESD in the Political Constitution of 1991. However, the only possible concept of security status is that which is due to citizens in terms of rights and risks that following a security concept different manifestations of power contrary to democracy are hidden, as has been concluded. Consequently, this article intends to carry out an introductory analysis on the main aspects of the PDSD, and its relationship with the ESD –assuming that the fundamental pillar of this model of State is the realization, validity and protection of fundamental rights–, that allows us an approach to what historically has been the violence and the recurrent responses of the public authority, identifying the common elements in matters of security and public order and the result of its application. To achieve this, the qualitative method has been used, making a documentary analysis of various texts related to the history of the country, the analysis of security policies, violence, reports, among others; likewise, the rights management approach has been taken into account as a way to make the judgment based on its effective realization.

There is a tendency in academic studies and in the media for inordinate attention to be paid to the competitive and conflictual face of government and politics in federal systems. This is so for a number of reasons. Conflict is played up by representatives of governments because it is easy to blame 'the other side'. State leaders play the game of 'Canberra bashing' because their local media appreciate it, and because it rallies their constituents behind them. Conflict becomes the public face of federalism, too, because disagreement and argument are more newsworthy. This is true of most reporting of politics. The public image of relations between the Northern Territory and the Commonwealth government is certainly no exception to this general rule. In fact, it has often been said that these relations are even more conflictual than is usually the case in Australian federalism, because of the long history of 'benign neglect' and 'colonial' domination of the Northern Territory by the Commonwealth of Australia, and because of the fact that since self-government was given to the Northern Territory in 1978, the Commonwealth government has held back for itself a number of significant responsibilities. A recent discussion of Northern Territory government and politics sums up the standard view: The relations between the Commonwealth and the state governments can normally best be described as a stable condition of mutual suspicion. But relations between the Territory and the Commonwealth go beyond even that. The Northern Territory government exhibits a hostile suspicion towards Canberra that appears to verge on paranoia but in reality reflects the longer term economic and political difficulties faced by the Territory. 'Canberra' assumes an importance in Territory politics that is unique among Australian states, 'Canberra' is the fulcrum of Territory politics. This is so for both constitutional and economic reasons (Gerritsen and Jaensch 1986, 152). This study sets out to paint a fuller picture of the place of the Northern Territory in the Australian federal system. In so doing it seeks to redress the balance somewhat by concentrating not on the public face of federalism which is played out in parliament, in press releases and in election campaigns and which subsequently dominates media reports, but on the private face which is daily life for public servants and politicians. This is the world of intergovernmental relations in which representatives of the Commonwealth, states and territories work alongside one another and are in frequent contact with one another making and implementing public policies across the whole spectrum of government activities. Most of these representatives are public servants; some are ministers. Public servants as a whole do not have a high profile so much of this activity is out of the public eye, unrecorded and hence unreported. Government is a collective term for a large number of individuals: a team of ministers supported by thousands of public servants and other government employees organised into departments and agencies. Intergovernment relations means, therefore, any contact or joint activity between any part of two or more governments. In the Northern Territory's case it may be an informal meeting between the Chief Minister and the Prime Minister (Paul Everingham recalls a fleeting conversation which he had with the Prime Minister between two passing cars in Darwin); it may be a telephone call between a Northern Territory public servant based in Darwin and a Commonwealth public servant based in Canberra; it may be two such officers located in Alice Springs or one of the smaller Northern Territory towns or communities cooperating in a joint program. Some of the relations are formalised: a meeting of the Premiers Conference and Loan Council in Canberra; a workshop for technical experts anywhere in Australia; a Northern Territory Treasury submission to the Commonwealth Grants Commission or to the Industries Assistance Commission. The possibilities are endless. Intergovernmental relations encompass a web of activities, which the professional literature disarmingly calls interaction. This study is about all of these relations. The four major chapters are about the most important elements in the Northern Territory's intergovernmental relations: (i) intergovernmental meetings of many types between ministers and/or officers; (ii)the role in intergovernmental relations of the Northern Territory's central agencies: the Chief Minister's department and the Treasury; (iii) relations which take place in the Northern Territory between a part of the Northern Territory government and a part of the Commonwealth government which is located in the Northern Territory; (iv) the part played in intergovernmental relations by Northern Territory Government representatives in Canberra, including Federal parliamentarians and lobbyists. The aim of this study is to describe as many aspects of the relationship as possible and to generalise about them. As there is not one relationship but very many, generalisation is difficult and potentially dangerous. However, rather than focus on one or two departments, institutions or policy fields the study aims to explore the diversity and variety in the relationships. Where a choice has had to be made, depth has been sacrificed for breadth. Participants whom I have interviewed will all know much more about their particular field than I do, but I hope to have gained a perspective of the whole which very few, if any, participants possess.

COST Action IS1003: 'International Law between Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation',Working Group 1: Territoriality

 

Organizing Fragmented Territoriality

Call for papers:
Working Group meeting & Workshop
November 15-17, 2012, Hamburg (Germany)

Recently, scholars from various fields in legal studies and the social sciences have begun to re-think implied dichotomies (like national/global, public/private, etc.). Facing criticisms like "methodological nationalism" (Beck) or the "territorial trap" (Agnew), the workshop aims to invite perspectives that take issue with the established nexus of state sovereignty and territo-riality and to re-visit territoriality as a phenomenon organized in a variety of sites and by a variety of actors. Although obviously touching upon related social phenomena, scholars from different disciplines (like international law, international relations, sociology, geography, an-thropology, or history) have rarely linked up research agendas, so far. A major aim of the workshop is to prompt trans-disciplinary engagement.

Debates on globalization, even when focussing on international law confronted by constitu-tionalization and fragmentation, have often continued to conceive of territorial state sover-eignty and dynamics of globalization as a zero-sum game. But is this still appropriate: Do states (still) monopolize territoriality? And if they do not, who else does it, and how?

While liberal approaches to international law have made remarkable steps in facing the social complexities of globalized governance by pointing to the increasingly "disaggregated" character of (democratic) nation-state sovereignty (Slaughter), other scholars have pointed out that the implied networked forms of governance through sub-state entities -- like execu-tive agencies or courts -- are not mere functions of a de-territorialized state. Instead of just reacting to "post-modern" security threats or so-called economic necessities, state agencies rather find themselves involved in a substantive "politics of sovereignty".

 These politics of sovereignty are not about choosing more or less state, state regulation or de-regulation, or public or private authority. Rather, diverse and, in part, disaggregated state agencies alongside various other actors establish new modes of governing, including the governing of "former" state territoriality. Although no longer alone in the projection of authority, "the state" itself is taking a decisive part in the reorganization of its own territoriality (Sassen). While, no doubt, states have their stakes in the organization of territoriality, they can be expected (and observed!) practicing governance in newly established sites ranging, as has been detailed in different research contexts, from now well-established forms of international governance in the context of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) to "local" but nevertheless border-crossing arrangements of public-private partnerships. Furthermore, the governance of territory is in danger of slipping out of the states' hands when IGOs establish increasingly autonomous bureaucracies that tend to emancipate themselves from the mem-ber states consent, or when governance capacities of the state are effectively challenged by private actors emerging on the scene. These different processes – conceivable as different communications constituting a "world society" (Stichweh) – profoundly change the idea of territoriality itself.

Their result might be a fragmented (legal and political) order of territoriality. New and multiple forms of regulation, however, can hardly be seen as consequences of fragmentation. Instead, the politics of sovereignty and fragmented territoriality are inextricably linked and dependent on each other. It is but the constitution of territoriality that -- in a paradoxical move -- brings about its fragmented normativity. This new multiplicity of governance raises questions for the reproduction of global normativity:

- How is territoriality (re-) constructed or challenged in different arenas (political system, legal system, and beyond)?
- How can the category of territoriality be conceived in terms of governance instead of government? What is the nexus between territoriality and governance?
- How do legal phenomena like the legalization of world politics and/or constitutional quality beyond the state emerge? What are the processes that advance/impede le-galization or constitutionalization?
- Which actors are involved? How are they related? And how is their social status de-termined and reproduced?
- How are the dividing lines between public and private established? What separates and what links up these spheres?
- How are the boundaries between law and politics drawn and how does this relate to territory?

Contributions to the workshop could touch upon themes and perspectives including
the historicization of territoriality, international law and politics; state and/or non-state politics of sovereignty; the methodology of overcoming territorial traps; Global Administrative Law (GAL); Governmentality perspectives; Legal Pluralism; Sociology of Law; (Global) Governance.

 Please send paper proposals (max. 300 words) to Philip Liste and Katja Freistein (philip.liste@wiso.uni-hamburg.de; katja.freistein@uni-bielefeld.de) by July 1st, 2012.

Participants from countries participating in COST Action 1003 can apply for funding for this workshop. As a rule, COST reimburses a flat rate of €120,- per night for accommodation and travel costs for two participants per participating country. For more information on COST Action 1003, please check the website: http://www.il-cf.eu If you would like to receive COST funding, please attach a short request (max 150 words) to your paper proposal.

Organization:
Dr. Philip Liste, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Allende-Platz 1, 20146 Hamburg
Email: philip.liste@wiso.uni-hamburg.de
Dr. Katja Freistein, Bielefeld University, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB 882), Universitaetsstr.25, 33615 Bielefeld
Email: katja.freistein@uni-bielefeld.de

In the doctrine, the Spanish Charter of 1978 is deemed as the most successful one ever considered in Spain's constitutionalism. Unlike its predecessors, and mainly inspired in the Italian 1947 Constitution, the Bonn Fundamental Law of 1949, the French Constitution of 1958, and the 1976 Constitution of Portugal, it contains a minimum agreement on the essential, which is a milestone in the history of its legal texts. In this sense, since the Spanish Constitution is an instrument for verifying whether parliamentary supervising methods are typical of certain politicalparticularly Latín American regimes or more cornmon to contemporaneous constitutionalism, these control means are analyzed in this article as well as the problems for their application in a pluralparty democracy.The Spanish Government configuration responds to a strongIy rationalized parliamentarianism, the features of which are evidenced not only in the Constitution texts but also in the legislative houses' regulations. We consider that the parliamentary control instruments, and questions, interrogationl and investigation commissions, are badly regulated because they are limitiB rather than encouraging the Parliament's activity, by this meaning that the are within the reach of the minorities but of its majorities thus bein incoherent within a parliamentarianism scheme, considering that th governments come from the legislative. The constituents of 1978 blessed th Head of Government with political stability by means of mechanisms fo correcting his Form oJ Government; but, moreover, we consider that th presence of lasting parliamentary majorities has been a key element i government stability. However, not any kind of majority can promote tha stability. We have noticed that Spanish Parliamentarianism works much betle by means of alliances: that is, when no specific party holds an absolut majority hence being forced to make pacts as to agree upon investing a ne\ government. Otherwise, when the opposite occurs, the exercise of powe tends from time to time to edge towards almost totalitarian stances, in thi: way ignoring dialogue and tolerance with respect to minorities in all its actions.Finally, this approach to the Spanish Parliamentary Control shows that thl problems put forth by Constitutional Law are similar in all forms o governments, even in those countries having opted for mixed models sud as the Peruvian Political Regime. In this sense, since partybased democrac) is very strong and hard to be challenged in the medium term, we considel that a regular renewal of the parliamentary mandate is necessary to prevell 1a government with a parliamentarian majority from daringIy exercises power with no fear of the opposition's political control. ; La Doctrina considera que la Carta de 1978 es la más exitosa del constitucionalismo español. Se inspira principalmente en la Constitución italiana de 1947, la Ley Fundamental de Bonn de 1949, la Constitución francesa de 1958 y la Constitución portuguesa de 1976. A diferencia de sus predecesoras, contiene un mínimo acuerdo sobre lo fundamental que ha marcado un hito en la historia de sus textos constitucionales. En ese sentido, siendo la Constitución española un medio para comprobar si los problemas de la fiscalización parlamentaria son propios de ciertos regímenes políticos, especialmente iberoamericanos, o más bien comunes al constitucionalismo contemporáneo, en este artículo se estudian los medios de control y sus problemas de aplicación en una democracia de partidos.La Forma de Gobierno española responde a un parlamentarismo fuertemente racionalizado cuyos rasgos se evidencian no sólo en el texto de su Constitución, sino en los reglamentos de las cámaras legislativas. Consideramos que los instrumentos de control parlamentario, preguntas, interpelaciones y comisiones de investigación están mal reguladas porque limitan en vez de impulsar la actividad del Parlamento; es decir, no están al alcance de las minorías sino de las mayorías parlamentarias, lo cual es incoherente dentro de un esquema parlamentarista toda vez que los gobiernos proceden del legislativo. Los constituyentes de 1978 dotaron al Jefe de Gobierno de estabilidad política mediante mecanismos de corrección a su Forma de Gobierno; pero, además, consideramos que la existencia de mayorías parlamentarias duraderas ha sido el elemento clave en la estabilidad gubernamental. Sin embargo, no cualquier tipo de mayoría promueve dicha estabilidad, notamos que el Parlamentarismo español funciona mejor por medio de alianzas, es decir, cuando ningún partido ostenta la mayoría absoluta y se ve obligado a pactar para investir a un nuevo gobierno, ya que, cuando ocurre lo contrario, el ejercicio del poder tiende por momentos a bordear posturas casi autoritarias, olvidándose del diálogo y de la tolerancia hacia las minorías en todas sus acciones.Finalmente, la aproximación al Control Parlamentario español muestra que los problemas que presenta el Derecho Constitucional son similares en todas las formas de gobierno, incluso en aquellos países que han optado por modelos mixtos, como el Régimen Político peruano. En ese sentido, como que la democracia de partidos es muy fuerte, y como será difícil combatirla en el mediano plazo, consideramos que la periódica renovación del mandato parlamentario es necesaria para evitar que un gobierno con mayoría propia ejerza el poder sin temor al control político de la oposición.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: I. Wirtschaftsentwicklung und Wirtschaftsreformen - Hermann Clement: Ist das Wachstum Russlands stabil? (8-11); Pekka Sutela: Langfristige Perspektiven der russischen Wirtschaftspolitik (12-16); Roland Götz: Russland und die Energieversorgung Europas (17-20); Andreas Heinrich: Going global. Internationalisierung und corporate governance in der russischen Erdöl- und Erdgaswirtschaft (21-22); Michaela Hinner: Bankensystem und Bankenaufsicht in Russland. Stand und Perspektiven fünf Jahre nach der Finanzkrise (23-27); Nikolai Beketov: Forschung und Innovationsförderung in Russland (28-33). II. Rechts- und Verwaltungsreform - Georgij Satarow: Korruption in Russland zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts (34-39); Diana Schmidt: Die Agenda für die zweite Amtszeit - der Kampf gegen Korruption (40-44); Stefanie Harter: Reformen des öffentlichen Sektors in Russland im Jahr 2004 (45-50); Elena Malieva: Kleinunternehmer und Behörden: das Beispiel Nishnij Nowgorod (51-53); Angelika Nußberger: Zur Entwicklung der Rechtskultur in Russland (54-58); Rainer Wedde: Rechtsschutz vor russischen Gerichten. Fehlende Rechtssicherheit als Investitionshemmnis (59-60); Sergej Gerasin: Das russische Bodenrecht in Gesetz und Praxis (61-67). III. Soziale Probleme und Sozialpolitik - Petr Bizyukov: Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in Russland (68-71); Jakob Fruchtmann: Arme in Russland (72-78); Maria Kudrjawzewa, Soja Solowjowa: Obdachlose und Bettler in Russland (79-83); Elfie Siegl: Eine tickende Zeitbombe. Die schnelle Verbreitung von HIV/ Aids, Drogen und Tuberkulose in Russland und ihre sozialen und ökonomischen Folgen (84-89); Dmitrij Trawin: Wladimir Putins Sozialpolitik (90-92); Jakob Fruchtmann: Die sozialpolitische Konzeption Putins: Wirtschaftsliberalisierung als Sozialpolitik? (93-99). IV. Einflussgruppen in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik - Julia Kusznir: Russlands "Oligarchen": eine neue Basis in den Regionen? (100-107); Jakob Fruchtmann: Das Image der "Oligarchen" (108-110); Heiko Pleines: Aufstieg und Fall der Bergarbeitergewerkschaften (111-112); Heiko Pleines: Freier Weg für Reformen. Die Ausschaltung der russischen Agrarlobby (113).

As part of his competence for appointments, the president of the 5th Republic has authority to grant jobs, functions, honours or titles to any given person. This dissertation challenges the widely-held assumption that such a competence is often understood to mean the power to choose (to nominate) the persons who are appointed. The first part of the dissertation aims at demonstrating how the president's competence for appointments has evolved into the power of appointment, that is to say the capacity to choose and/or to appoint without authorization or upon mistaken authorization. Such an approach allows to highlight how specific this presidential function is. If the power of appointment is a power that the president has acquired unduly, it can be accounted for by the very essence of the power of appointment. The phenomenon then affects the checks implemented on presidential appointments : the undue acquisition of the power of appointment by the president accounts for their ineffectiveness.The survey of presidential appointments is most instructive. It provides valuable insights into the institutions of the 5th Republic and helps better understand the balance of powers within the political system. This research illustrates how the way institutions are constructed to a certain extent influences the way they are put into effect. ; La compétence de nomination du président de la Ve République désigne l'habilitation par laquelle le chef de l'État peut attribuer un emploi, une fonction, une dignité ou un titre à une personne considérée. Partant du constat de ce que cette compétence est volontiers assimilée à un pouvoir de choisir les personnes nommées (désigner), la thèse se propose d'interroger cette évidence. La première partie s'attache à démontrer la mutation de la compétence de nomination en un pouvoir de nomination, c'est-à-dire en une faculté de désigner et/ou de nommer sans habilitation ou en vertu d'une habilitation fautive. Cette démarche permet de mettre au jour la spécificité de cette attribution ...

In this pioneering book, Boston College Law School's Academic Dean, Lawrence Cunningham, arranges selected contributions of his faculty's scholarship into a meditation upon justice. The book weaves a combination of theory and practice to articulate moral and ethical values that facilitate rational application of law. It envisions legal arrangements imbued with commitments of the Jesuit tradition, including the dignity of persons, the common good and compassion for the poor. This reflective collection of inquiry evokes a signature motif of the BC Law faculty in dozens of different legal subjects. Materials downloadable from this abstract consist of: Table of Contents, Acknowledgements, Introduction and Index of Contributions.

La informalidad laboral como situación o consecuencia del desempleo, esta en aumento ante la presencia de situaciones económicas, como es el Neoliberalismo o apertura del mercado, es mandar la gente a circunstancias de degradación y de pobreza, del rebusque, que ante, el panorama el ejemplo más viviente son los vendedores informales semiestacionarios. El sector informal son aquellas personas que buscan su ingreso al margen de la ley comercial y tributaria, cuyos negocios no están registrados en la cámara de comercio y en un momento dado no pagan impuestos, son un grupo que representa un porcentaje alto de la población económicamente activa, tanto en la industria, el comercio, la construcción, el transporte, la minería, que en un principio va dirigida a las personas de escasos recursos ya que no tienen un capital ni formación académica, ni técnica. Hoy en día con los cambios laborales tanto en los trabajadores del Estado como los del sector privado que al recibir un dinero; ya sea como bonificación o indemnización recurran algunos a comprar un taxi, colocar un negocio… y lo más importante a destacar es que entran a buscar y entregar la creatividad y tiempo para conseguir un dinero; situación que afecta las prestaciones sociales, la seguridad social en salud y pensiones no pudiendo hacer efectivo o estar sometidos a un contrato individual, asociarse, para poder así negociar colectivamente. Este trabajo que buscaba ver la situación de la informalidad de los vendedores ambulantes en lo relacionado en la Seguridad Social (salud, pensiones, Riesgos laborales), vacío que hay donde los fallos Jurisprudencia constitucional – o consejo de estado, no fueron claros ni amplios en este tema. Lo corroboran nuestras encuestas (160) de vendedores en un sector de Bogotá, entrevistas, y videos que corresponden a la venta de mercancías en estos sitios donde da como resultados entre otros la falta de protección, pero que con ayuda del Distrito, los dueños de los productos que se venden, quisieran estos vendedores además con su aporte que se les proteja en la Seguridad Social. Este estudio no solo busca la óptica desde el Estado Social de Derecho, sino también la contenido y protegido desde la O.I.T con sus convenios y recomendaciones, y la comisión de expertos. Es de anotar que en tiempo transcurrido desde marzo del 2011 fecha del trabajo de la encuesta, a hoy 3 años después , es preocupante el aumento de la informalidad sin seguridad social ni prestaciones llegando a un 60% ( porcentaje que amerita la justificación de esta tesis, pero que da un sabor de pesimismo al ver tantos colombianos en esta circunstancia) sobre las personas que tienen un ingreso , pero debemos agregar que ese 40% no es cierto que son formales o están en al formalidad, ya que la mitad aunque están en empresas, estas no cumplen en pagos de prestaciones, ni afilian, ni descuentan de la nomina el valor de las cotizaciones en salud, ni pensiones, , y en muchos aun descontando no transfieren esta cotización al sistema ( la llamada informalidad empresarial ) . Es esta perspectiva el Estado además de lo establecido en A.R.L ley 1562 del 2012 afiliación de los informales; la creación de Pensión familiar, temas que se dieron cuando se desarrollo la investigación; le debemos agregar el pago de la seguridad social por días, el ahorro destinado de las cesantías para la protección del cesante ( ley 1636 del 2013) , lo que muestra no la preocupación por los habitantes del país, por parte del Estado, sino la desesperación ante la imposibilidad de crear empresa real y formal, y cayendo en una situación asistencialista y de poca trascendencia en la protección del trabajo digno, justo y decente. ; Abstract. The informality and unemployment situation or consequence , is increasing in the presence of economic situations, such as neoliberalism or market opening is to send people to conditions of degradation and poverty, moonlighting , that in the picture the more are living example semiestacionarios informal vendors . The informal sector are those seeking admission outside the business and tax law , whose businesses are not registered in the Chamber of Commerce and at any given time do not pay taxes , they are a group that represents a high percentage of the economically active in industry , trade , construction , transportation , mining, which at first is aimed at poor people and do not have a capital or academic or technical training. Today with labor changes in both state workers as private sector to receive money, either as a bonus or compensation resort some to buy a taxi, put a business . and most importantly to note is entering find and deliver the creativity and time to get money , a situation that affects social benefits , social security, health care and pensions can not enforce or subject to an individual contract , associate, and to bargain collectively. This work sought to see the location of informal street vendors in relation to social security (health, pensions , Occupational Hazards ) , where there are empty Constitutional Court rulings - or council of state , were not clear and broad in this topic. Corroborate our surveys ( 160) vendors in a sector of Bogotá, interviews and videos that relate to the sale of goods in these places gives as results including lack of protection, but with the help of the District, owners products that are sold, these vendors also want your contribution to be protected in Social Security . This study not only seeks optics from the rule of law , but also the content and protected from the ILO conventions and recommendations , and the committee of experts. It should be noted that at elapsed time since March 2011 date of survey work , to now three years later, is worrying increasing informality no social security or benefits reaching 60% ( percentage that warrants justification of this thesis but it gives a taste of pessimism to see so many Colombians in this circumstance ) on persons who have an income , but we must add that the 40% that are not true or are in the formal formality as though half are in companies , they do not meet in benefit payments , or join or payroll deducted from the value of contributions in health or pension , and many do not transfer even discounting the contribution to the system (so-called business informality ) . It is this perspective the state in addition to the provisions of law 1562 ARL 2012 informal affiliation , the creation of a Guesthouse , issues that occurred when the investigation is developing , we must add you to the payment of social security for days , saving intended to layoffs for loss protection (Law 1636 , 2013 ) , showing no concern for the inhabitants of the country, by the state , but despair at the impossibility of creating real and formal company , and falling into a welfare and of little importance in the protection of decent , fair and decent work situation. ; Maestría

This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.

The next issue of "Constellations" (vol. 40, no. 4) features articles on The Institute for Social Research (Frankfurt am Main) and the Frankfurt School:"The Institute for Social Research at 100: Continuity and Transformation"Eleven articles are now available online:* Axel Honneth - "The Institute for Social Research on its 100th birthday. A former director's perspective"Excerpt: "There are deeper, less superficial reasons for being skeptical today with regard to the potential of this tradition to guide us in our social–theoretical attempts to comprehend the present situation in a fruitful way, both philosophically sound and empirically productive. In the following, I want to discuss three challenges resulting from structural changes in our social and intellectual environment that make it more and more difficult to preview a fruitful, productive, and energizing future for Critical Theory in its traditional form. These three challenges stem from (1) the growing awareness of the endurance of the colonial past of Western societies, (2) the unmistakable importance of the ecological question, and, finally, (3) the growing uncertainties about the exact format and arrangement of interdisciplinary research."* Rainer Forst: "The rational critique of social unreason. On critical theory in the Frankfurt tradition"  [open access]Excerpt: "In my view, then, critical theory must be reconfigured as a critique of relations of justification. This calls, on the one hand, for a critical social scientific analysis of social and political relations of domination that includes cultural and, not least, economic structures and relationships. In this regard, two dimensions of domination must be distinguished: subjugation to unjustifiable norms and institutions, and subjugation to conditions that prevent practices of justification. Such critical analysis must be combined with a discourse-theoretical, genealogical critique of the justifications and justification narratives that confer legitimacy on unjustifiable relations. On the other hand, we must pose the constructive question of how a "basic structure of justification" can be conceived as a requirement of fundamental justice and be realized in social practice - not as an ideal or a model to be imposed on societies, but as a normative order to be developed autonomously. Essentially, a theory we call critical ought to be based on the principle of criticism itself. Its medium is reason striving for practices of autonomous justification among equals."* Alessandro Ferrara - "If Foucault, why not Rawls? On enlarging the critical tent"Excerpt: "It is undeniably among the aims of critical theory to envisage a society in which diversity can exist in the absence of oppression. Now, it's all too easy to merely invoke the ideal of equals living together with their diversity (ethnic, ethical, religious, cultural, or of gender, lifestyle, sexual preference) and without oppression. Deconstructionists, post-colonial theorists, and theorists of recognition often emphatically do so. However, when it comes to specifying concretely which institutions should form the basic structure of such a society, how they should relate to one other, what rights and liberties (and how limited and balanced) citizens should have, and what democratic legitimacy means, it is a whole different story.On the nuts and bolts of an oppression-free society the entire first generation had little to offer, to say nothing of the cauldron of the "verwaltete Welt" (Adorno). Habermas has quite a lot to say, in Between Facts and Norms and in his exchange with Rawls. Among the younger critical theorists who long for reviving the earlier program of the Frankfurt School, few even attempt to say anything. This is the problem, instead, on which [John Rawls's] Political Liberalism, not A Theory of Justice, offers an elaborate theory unmatched by any other to date (....) Critical theory can only gain from enlarging its tent to include also some of Rawls's concepts - reasonability, civility, reciprocity - and from launching empirical research on the conditions of the possibility for them to maintain traction in the challenging decades ahead of us."* Maeve Cooke - "Social theory as critical theory: Horkheimer's program and its relevance today"Excerpt: "Since formalist models of politics abstain from critique of the prevailing deep-seated ethical-existential values and from recommendation of alternatives, they are conducive toward unquestioning acceptance of the ethical-existential values undergirding the established political procedures, facilitating the reproduction of the political status quo. Against this, I take the view that contemporary critical theory must engage with ethical-existential questions, not least if it is to meet the challenges posed by our disastrous ecological situation. This requires it, in turn, to engage with the question of ethical-existential validity. Given the challenge of value pluralism, therefore, a key task for contemporary critical theory is to elaborate a conception of ethical validity that is at once universalist and attentive to the plurality of ethical values and worldviews."* Samuel Moyn - "Critical theory's generational predicament" [Link]Excerpt: "(....) it seems clear that the principal cause of the lack of interest in critical theory for younger generations - the lack of zeal to perpetuate or even study it - is that the votaries of the tradition conformed unreflectively to "the end of history" in the 1990s. They had essentially nothing to say about American unipolarity and the militarism that has so clearly accompanied it. Worse, for one-time Marxists, they never formulated an analysis or critique of economic neoliberalism. Yet these are the causes at the center of the activism and theorizing of many who lived through the past decade and forging a critical perspective on their times."* Martin Saar - "Rethinking Critique and Theory" [open access]Excerpt: "Benjamin's partisanship for the perspective of the defeated in historiography, Adorno's and Horkheimer's insistence on the deep ambivalence of enlightenment ideals, and Marcuse's clear-sighted perception of the central role of the excluded and marginalized, whom the capitalist system cannot even properly exploit, are starting points for a radical self-critique of the Western liberation movements, which have yet to admit their own entanglement in domination elsewhere and thus should actually make way for an even more radical, decentered enlightenment and liberation."* Frank I. Michelman - "Totality, morality, and social philosophy"Excerpt: "We thus see the Institute for Social Research, at a signal moment in its early history, posing for itself the dialectic of human individual agency and environing social totality - with neither element placed at the other's disposal - as a main topic for pursuit by social philosophy and its connected program of social research. It is by pursuit of that topic that the Institute's engagements over the decades of my own academic career have figured, importantly for me, in my work (not generally classified as "Frankfurt School") on liberal constitutional theory. Most pointedly it has done so in undertakings by Jürgen Habermas to explicate a moral point of view from which citizens in a political society encounter one another as each a free and equal person commanding full respect as such - but to explicate that morality, as I have sought to explain, not as a view "that philosophy independently discovers," but rather as one that lies embedded in a historically particular social totality."* Cristina Lafont - "The return of the critique of ideologies" [open access]Excerpt: "(....) I shall focus on just one issue: the recent revival in critiques of ideology. In my view, this type of critique is an important task of critical theory and remains one of its most significant legacies. Yet, if one focuses on the work of critical theorists over the past decades, this statement is far from obvious. In fact, the second generation of the Frankfurt school,most notably Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action, explicitly rejects ideology critique as obsolete in the context of contemporary societies. Even though in the 1960s and 1970s, he had embraced the classicalMarxist approach to ideology critique, he ultimately rejected it. It was the explicit attempt to rebut objections that had plagued this approach that brought about the so-called "democratic turn" of critical theory characteristic of Habermas's work from the 1980s onward and in which the critique of ideologies no longer plays a role."* Christopher F. Zurn -  "We're not special: Congratulations!"Excerpt: "It is fine, then, to get right to work on current social movements - Occupy Wall Street and other Square movements, Black Lives Matter, the Sunrise and Third Act movements, MeToo, the Arab Spring, or the Mahsa Amini protests - and on pressing contemporary social problems - climate change and human adaptation, deepening material inequality, the erosion of constitutional democracy, artificial intelligence and human de-skilling, global migration and refugee waves, the transformation of the Westphalian international order, the resilience and resurgence of patriarchy, and so on - without worrying how to fit these movements and problems into the architectonic of Dialectic of Enlightenment or Theory of Communicative Action. To be sure, we need not ignore the conceptual resources and insights of our tradition when they are relevant and enlightening. But we need to take interdisciplinarity seriously by looking to the much broader currents of critical thought on social formations and the changing horizons of human emancipation."* Peter E. Gordon - "The animating impulses of critical theory"Excerpt: "For some readers, this generational shift - between the first and second generations of critical theory - is overdramatized into a stark contrast between totalizing negativism and restorationist optimism, both of which seem to hover at too great an altitude above social reality. Needless to say, this contrast does an injustice to both parties. Adorno and Horkheimer are far more committed to reason's self-reflective possibilities, while Habermas remains far more attentive to reason's systemic distortion. They converge at a point of dialectical mediation, whereas neither pure negativism nor pure idealism would serve as a viable groundwork for critical theory. In what follows I wish to suggest that Horkheimer's original model of social philosophy, as animated by a rational but materialist ideal of emancipation, still has enduring merit."* William E. Scheuerman - "Horkheimer's unrealized vision"Excerpt: "Horkheimer's idea of a mutually constructive exchange between philosophy and critical social science has too often been rare and ephemeral. And this should worry us if you believe, as this author does, that Horkheimer was right to see such an exchange as indispensable to critical theory. (....) Only in 1962 did Habermas, in an appropriately interdisciplinary study that relied heavily on research from legal scholars, political scientists, and sociologists, begin to revitalize Frankfurt critical theory. Not only did his landmark Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere take the social sciences seriously, but its young author seems to have implicitly grasped that critical theory could only flourish on the basis of an authentically cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship between philosophy and the social sciences. Horkheimer's original interdisciplinary vision clearly inspired the young Habermas. When properly reconstructed, it should inspire us today as well."