In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization: the international journal of public health = Bulletin de l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, Band 87, Heft 7
In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization: the international journal of public health = Bulletin de l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, Band 87, Heft 12, S. 940-949
The inauguration of President Barack Obama offers a historic opportunity to reshape America's interface with the world at large and to undo errors of commission, omission, and neglect of the past decade. US assets undervalued and underused in recent years will be rediscovered, including the network of accredited American colleges and universities around the globe: the Association of American International Colleges and Universities. This essay outlines the potential role of these institutions in shaping how the United States is seen in critical areas of the world and in serving as a beacon of American, private, nonprofit higher education. It also contains specific recommendations for how the Obama administration can strengthen, at minimal cost, the network of American institutions abroad without co-opting or using them as vehicles for US propaganda.
One of the challenges awaiting health care systems around the world is the containment of expenses in the face of exploding costs for new drugs and treatments. In most countries, the allocation of health care has not been politicized so far and the problem is still treated as a purely regulative one. However, there is increasing interest in the procedures used for priority‐setting. The paper argues that while normative standards for their evaluation are desirable, more attention should be paid to institutional factors and their effects. I identify two demands on decision‐making—discursiveness and coordinativeness—from which I derive four ideal‐typical procedures. By way of international comparison, corresponding empirical cases are analysed. I conclude with considerations on whether efficient and publicly accepted decisions over the allocation of health care are possible and, if yes, by means of what type of procedures and in what forum(s) they can be taken.
Objective. This article uses Cox proportional hazards models to explain departures from the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1954–2004. I argue that reforms to pension eligibility and financial incentives in 1984 extended opportunities for voluntary departures and strategic behavior, and that reasons for quitting (whether political, personal, or institutional) differed among types of departures and over time.Methods. The data represent all judge‐years from 1954–2004. Both the full period and 1954–1983 and 1984–2004 subperiods are examined.Results. The effects of political factors are limited to partial retirements and suggest judges' recognition of contentious confirmation politics since the 1980s. Personal and institutional variables dominate outright departures.Conclusions. Explanations for departures from the circuit bench differ both by type and over time. Scholars and policymakers should refine arguments regarding judicial turnover and its causes.
Argues that the US government's bank bailout is a failure in that lending remains down while bonuses are up &, more importantly, the successful stimulus program cannot be expanded easily. That said, to spur growth & job creation, another stimulus is advocated despite worries about the deficit. Adapted from the source document.