Suchergebnisse

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.

The way in which China is selecting its top leaders is perhaps changing, reflecting some new socio-cultural trends in current Chinese elite politics. Xi Jinping has at least three things going for him: his princeling background, his clean reputation and his pro-business performance. However, before 2012 he has yet to pass several other tests before possibly stepping into Hu Jintao's shoes, especially those concerned with diplomatic affairs. (CIJ/GIGA)

A igreja de Goa é uma filha da expansão portuguesa. Nasceu e cresceu no âmbito do Padroado português do Oriente. Essa ligação beneficiou e prejudicou a sua missão espiritual. Desde 1961 a igreja de Goa enfrenta os desafios da democracia. Apesar da demonstração de progresso visível, há muito caminho para percorrer, particularmente no que diz respeito à administração dos bens temporais da igreja e com maior participação leiga nessa área.

This article contributes to the development of a positive theory of the interaction between institutional checks and balances and public accountability. In particular, the authors are interested in how various institutional separation-of-powers rules affect voter behavior, and in how these rational voter responses may affect our positive and normative assessment of different separation-of-powers regimes. The authors compare three stylized institutional arrangements: The first is a "Unilateral Authority". The second regime is a "Mandatory Checks and Balances" regime. The third and final regime they consider is an "Opt-In Checks and Balances" system. These are obviously only three of a much larger number of possible institutional arrangements, but their simple structure is useful in generating comparative insights that might then be transposed to more complex and realistic institutional settings.