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It is a widespread view that democracy and the advanced nation-state are in crisis, weakened by globalization and undermined by global capitalism, in turn explaining rising inequality and mounting populism. This book, written by two of the world's leading political economists, argues this view is wrong: advanced democracies are resilient, and their enduring historical relationship with capitalism has been mutually beneficial. For all the chaos and upheaval over the past century--major wars, economic crises, massive social change, and technological revolutions--Torben Iversen and David Soskice show how democratic states continuously reinvent their economies through massive public investment in research and education, by imposing competitive product markets and cooperation in the workplace, and by securing macroeconomic discipline as the preconditions for innovation and the promotion of the advanced sectors of the economy. Critically, this investment has generated vast numbers of well-paying jobs for the middle classes and their children, focusing the aims of aspirational families, and in turn providing electoral support for parties. Gains at the top have also been shared with the middle (though not the bottom) through a large welfare state. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom on globalization, advanced capitalism is neither footloose nor unconstrained: it thrives under democracy precisely because it cannot subvert it. Populism, inequality, and poverty are indeed great scourges of our time, but these are failures of democracy and must be solved by democracy.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of illustrations -- List of contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Foreword -- Introduction -- PART I Good governance -- 1. Multiple modernities and good governance -- Modernization theory refuted -- Two new approaches: Multiple modernities and good governance -- Eisenstadt's generative idea -- Varieties of modernity -- The logic and dynamics of modernization -- Sequencing in the process of modernization -- Basic rights, multiple modernities, and good governance -- Human agency rather than institutional determinism -- Different types of authoritarian states -- Strategies for postponing crucial elements of good governance or realizing them only in certain sectors -- Summary -- 2. Good governance in a world of multiple modernities: Whose modernity? -- Kantian rationalism and modernity -- Whose modernity? -- Populism, social atomization, and the emergence of strongmen: Populism and liberal vs. illiberal governance -- The consequences of social atomization for major national societies, their governance, and global governance -- PART II: Development -- 3. Alternative modernities on the road to nowhere -- The logic of modernity -- Populist nationalism under globalization -- Populist nationalism in emerging powers undergoing social transition -- International causes of failure and success -- 4. Variegated capitalism and varieties of modernity -- Introduction -- Varieties of modernity or multiple modernities? -- Capitalism and modernity -- Post-socialist neo-capitalism in China -- Conclusion -- PART III: Human security -- 5. Multiple modernities in a multiplex world -- A global idea-shift -- The human security challenge -- The end of liberal modernity? -- 6 Enhanced human security: A modernity to be available to all -- Introduction

Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- List of Acronyms -- Introduction -- Gezi in Retrospect -- Isabel David and Kumru F. Toktamış -- Bibliography -- Section I - Gezi Protests and Democratisation -- 1. Evoking and Invoking Nationhood as Contentious Democratisation -- Kumru F. Toktamış -- 2007 - Nation-Evoking Demonstrations -- Gezi - Summer 2013 -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 2. 'Everyday I'm Çapulling!' -- Global Flows and Local Frictions of Gezi -- Jeremy F. Walton -- Introduction: Gezi and Rumi's Elephant in the Dark -- The Politics of Public Space in Urban Turkey: Taksim Square, Proscenium of the Nation -- The Carnivalesque Citizenship of the Çapulcu -- Gezi and the Discontents of Neoliberal Globalisation -- Conclusion: Gezi and the Decoupling of Liberalism and Democracy in Turkey -- Bibliography -- 3. The Incentives and Actors of Protests in Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2013 -- Ana Dević and Marija Krstić -- Introduction -- Turkish Case: Political Change and Gezi Park Protests -- The Common Denominator of the Protests in Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Section II - The Political Economy of Protests -- 4. AKP Rule in the Aftermath of the Gezi Protests -- From Expanded to Limited Hegemony? -- Umut Bozkurt -- Understanding the AKP's Hegemony -- Neoliberal Populism and the AKP Rule -- The Explosion of Social Assistance Programmes -- The Symbolic/Ideological Sources of the Party's Hegemony -- The AKP's Hegemony after the Gezi Protests -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 5. Rebelling against Neoliberal Populist Regimes -- Barış Alp Özden and Ahmet Bekmen -- Neoliberal Populism, AKP and PT -- Depoliticising the Question of Poverty -- Deradicalising Labour -- Preliminary Reflections on the Protests -- Bibliography -- 6. Enough is Enough

Abstract
This article advances a novel theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of international and domestic conflicts, especially in the twenty-first century. I argue that nationalism plays a major role in the rise of these conflicts. Yet, nationalism is not monolithic. I distinguish among five types of nationalism (satisfied; stateless; consolidating; irredentist; populist). The variations in the type of nationalism explain variations in peace and conflict in different parts of the world. The explanation of the variations of types of nationalism, in turn, is based on the combined effect of variations in state capacity (i.e., the functioning of state institutions) and national congruence (i.e., the congruence between national identities and state borders). Variations in these two independent variables account for both civil and international wars as well as for peaceful states and for domestic polarization. Thus, national congruence and high capacity produce satisfied nationalism and a peaceful state. In contrast, national incongruence and low capacity lead to stateless nationalism and, thus, to civil wars in failed states. High capacity and national incongruence, especially external incongruence, produce irredentist nationalism of revisionist states, leading to war-prone interstate conflicts. High capacity and declining congruence generate nationalist populism and societal polarization. Thus, the theory developed here explains the recent rise of nationalist populism (and the related domestic polarization) in quite a few democracies in comparison with other types of nationalism and the conflicts they generate.

AbstractThis article argues that the tokenistic appropriation of categories such as gender and race have deprived them of their radical and transformative political and practical roots while facilitating their commodification as a luxury product that is consumed by the depoliticized and privileged. Such (ab)use of gender, as an analytical tool, similar to race and class, has been on the rise within progressive circles. However, with the rise of alt-right populism claiming to know and fight 'feminism', as well as the commodification of feminism by progressives, now more than ever a decolonial social reproductive theory is needed to help understand and delineate how women are oppressed in a plethora of intersectional ways based on race, class and ability among other traits, while engaging the specific material historical-constitutive structures, judicial-political and socio-economic dimensions of the world order, as well as the emergence of right-wing populism as white heteronormative backlash. This article argues for a feminist decolonial social reproductive theory that sees gender and racial hierarchy as part of capital's dynamism (a product), which transforms the natural, social and material world, restructuring and evolving for the ordered extraction of surplus. Although this process may differ temporally and geographically, it nonetheless results in a constellation of class exploitation, governance and struggle that facilitates right-wing backlash and undermines the left's response, thus obviating the need for decolonial social reproductive theory.

Abstract
The French philosopher Bernard Stiegler published Pharmacologie du Front national in 2013. It is above all a response to the 2012 French presidential election, which, despite the election of François Hollande, gave evidence of the rising influence of the far-right National Front, and thus of a growing regressive tendency in the politics of the Western representative democracies. But Stiegler's concern in this regard can be traced back to his first book and is present throughout his work, which has always been concerned with the positive technical (default of) origin of the conjunction of desire and knowledge, and the irreducibility of the tendency for these to be undermined by what he will call the negative pharmacological side of technics. In Pharmacologie du Front national, he draws attention to a third dimension of the pharmakon: its tendency to lead to the designation of the pharmakos, or the scapegoat, as that negative side takes hold. For Stiegler, the industrial populism characteristic of today's consumerist economico-technological model inevitably and dangerously leads to political populism. He thus calls for a new critique of ideology, one that returns to its starting point in Marx and Engels, overcomes the limitations of Marxist and Althusserian materialisms that ultimately remain grounded in an oppositional metaphysics, and provides new practical and conceptual weapons in the struggle against contemporary ideology, whose essential motto is that "there is no alternative."

While the scholarly consensus is that VOX is a far-right political party in European terms, questions remain regarding whether or not its politics contain elements of populism. This research paper explores the Twitter and Instagram strategy deployed by Santiago Abascal, leader of VOX, during the 10 November 2019 general election campaign to assess whether his messaging includes characteristic features of populist rhetoric, to analyze the uses to which he puts social media, and to understand the features of the leadership he projects via social networks. The research methodology is content analysis applied to the 136 and 26 posts on Abascal's Twitter and Instagram accounts, respectively, during the election campaign. The findings suggest that Abascal's discourse is marked by a conservative and nativist form of Spanish nationalism; however, it is also shaped by an anti-establishment rhetoric and antagonistic message that pits la España Viva ['Living Spain'] against la dictadura progre ['the progressive dictatorship'], reflecting the inclusion of some features of populism. A further conclusion is that these social media platforms are the preferred propaganda tools used to communicate the candidate's agenda, although each network evinces certain distinctive characteristics: Twitter channels a polarizing message via aggressive and critical rhetoric, whereas Instagram posts are designed to show the human side of the candidate's profile. Thus, it would seem that the aim is to articulate a populist-inflected form of charismatic leadership.

While the scholarly consensus is that VOX is a far-right political party in European terms, questions remain regarding whether or not its politics contain elements of populism. This research paper explores the Twitter and Instagram strategy deployed by Santiago Abascal, leader of VOX, during the 10 November 2019 general election campaign to assess whether his messaging includes characteristic features of populist rhetoric, to analyze the uses to which he puts social media, and to understand the features of the leadership he projects via social networks. The research methodology is content analysis applied to the 136 and 26 posts on Abascal's Twitter and Instagram accounts, respectively, during the election campaign. The findings suggest that Abascal's discourse is marked by a conservative and nativist form of Spanish nationalism; however, it is also shaped by an anti-establishment rhetoric and antagonistic message that pits la España Viva 'Living Spain'] against la dictadura progre 'the progressive dictatorship'], reflecting the inclusion of some features of populism. A further conclusion is that these social media platforms are the preferred propaganda tools used to communicate the candidate's agenda, although each network evinces certain distinctive characteristics: Twitter channels a polarizing message via aggressive and critical rhetoric, whereas Instagram posts are designed to show the human side of the candidate's profile. Thus, it would seem that the aim is to articulate a populist-inflected form of charismatic leadership. © 2022 Communication & Society.

While the scholarly consensus is that VOX is a far-right political party in European terms, questions remain regarding whether or not its politics contain elements of populism. This research paper explores the Twitter and Instagram strategy deployed by Santiago Abascal, leader of VOX, during the 10 November 2019 general election campaign to assess whether his messaging includes characteristic features of populist rhetoric, to analyze the uses to which he puts social media, and to understand the features of the leadership he projects via social networks. The research methodology is content analysis applied to the 136 and 26 posts on Abascal's Twitter and Instagram accounts, respectively, during the election campaign. The findings suggest that Abascal's discourse is marked by a conservative and nativist form of Spanish nationalism; however, it is also shaped by an anti-establishment rhetoric and antagonistic message that pits la España Viva ['Living Spain'] against la dictadura progre ['the progressive dictatorship'], reflecting the inclusion of some features of populism. A further conclusion is that these social media platforms are the preferred propaganda tools used to communicate the candidate's agenda, although each network evinces certain distinctive characteristics: Twitter channels a polarizing message via aggressive and critical rhetoric, whereas Instagram posts are designed to show the human side of the candidate's profile. Thus, it would seem that the aim is to articulate a populist-inflected form of charismatic leadership.

This paper analyzes the socio-cognitive and emotional processes related to collective action in the context of the 2019 populist social movement in Chile. It proposes an integrative explanation of populism as social movements and collective gatherings along with their relation with creativity and social representations of mass movements. A comprehensive online survey was used (n = 262) that included measures of participation in demonstrations, identification with protesters or the government, agreement with social movement grievances, collective efficacy, perceived emotional synchrony, collective action, self-reported cognitive creativity, and individuals' proposals for improvement of society and ideas associated with stimuli (e.g., the concepts of majority or minority). Our results revealed that identification with demonstrators, agreement with protesters' grievances, a high perceived emotional synchrony or collective effervescence, and higher creativity responses were associated with an active participation in the social movement. Higher participation and factors conducive to participation were associated with lexical clusters of responses to stimuli that include words such as rights, justice, injustice, bravery, dignity, or hope, which were conceived of as positive social representations of the populist social movement. These findings are discussed within the neo-Durkheimian framework of collective gatherings and the perspective of populism as a social movement that seeks to renew and expand democracy. Copyright © 2021 Castro-Abril, Da Costa, Navarro-Carrillo, Caicedo-Moreno, Gracia-Leiva, Bouchat, Cordero, Méndez and Paez.

Is populist politics a threat to ambitious climate action and decarbonisation of energy systems? With the coinciding challenges of an alleged global 'populist wave,' and the growing visibility of a planetary climate crisis, this issue has gained relevance. While theoretical literature on the links between populism and climate action is growing, there is still little empirical evidence regarding the ways in which the thin ideology of populism can interact with climate policy in practice (particularly in the context of Eastern Europe). We look into this black box, by analyzing the Polish right-wing populist media discourses on energy and climate. Poland is widely perceived as a laggard in European climate policy and energy transition, seeking to safeguard domestic coal as a major energy source and opposing ambitious decarbonisation goals. At the same time, since 2015 it has seen a right-wing populist government in power, making it a very interesting case for an analysis of the interaction of populist politics and climate action. Using four key elements of populist political rhetoric as a framework (a populist episteme, Manichean good and evil connotations and internal enemies) we organize the arguments distilled from a wide reading of pro-governmental right-wing Polish media, to illustrate the content of populist climate and energy discourse, seeing some of the tropes found in our case as generalizable to other national contexts.

After being dormant for decades, in the last two decades, right-wing populism resurfaced strongly in Europe and the US channeling a reaction against globalization. This resurgence has prompted economists to pay increasing attention to populist economics. Current versions of right wing populism share many elements with early fascism, particularly the type that developed by the British Union of Fascists (BUF) in the UK under the leadership of Sir Oswald Mosley. Less aggressive and racist than its continental counterparts, one of its pillars was isolationism, which figures prominently in the platforms of modern populist parties in Europe and North America. Although more sophisticated in his economic thinking than Hitler and Mussolini, Mosley's was less successful politically. His stubborn obnoxiousness and inability to acknowledge his mistakes cemented his status as a political pariah and contributed to the academic neglect of his 1930 program of radical economic reform which he later incorporated into the BUF's platform. The study of Mosleynomics also has historical value. Mosley's proposals not only contributed to the interwar policy debate but also anticipated many key elements of the economic policies of fascist and non-fascist regimes on both sides of the Atlantic, not only in the US, Germany and Italy in the 1930s but also in the UK under the Labor Party and Argentina under Perón in the immediate postwar. This essay seeks to contribute to fill a gap in the literature, by tracing the intellectual roots and evolution of Mosley's economic policy proposals.

Zusammenfassung Die reaktionären Bewegungen der Vergangenheit verteufelten das vermeintlich sündhafte, wurzellose und degenerierte Leben in der Großstadt und glorifizierten die Genügsamkeit und Fruchtbarkeit des 'Bauernstandes'. Zwar waren städtische Räume immer auch der Ort rechter Hegemoniebestrebungen, die von der Monumentalarchitektur der Nazis bis hin zu den 'national befreiten Zonen' der NPD reichten. Die Stadt war aber in der Regel nicht ihr Thema. Mit der Krise der liberalen Demokratie droht sich das Politikfeld Stadt für die Rechte zu öffnen. Der Aufsatz illustriert anhand der Wohnungsfrage und der Sicherheitspolitik, wie Stadtentwicklung eine populistische Lücke hinterlässt, in die rechte Parteien und Bewegungen hineindrängen (können). Anhand eines Falls aus der empirischen Forschung wird darüber hinaus diskutiert, wie sich politische Nachfrage und rechtspopulistisches Angebot zueinander verhalten. Abstract: From Anti-Urbanism to Urban Populism? The Upcoming Danger of an Urban-Based Radical Right Reactionary movements of the past demonized city life for nurturing dissolute, rootless and degenerated habits. On the contrary, they praised the frugality and fertility of rural people. The city has always been a site of hegemonic politics by the radical right, ranging from National-Socialist architecture to no-go areas established by neo-Nazis in East German towns after the reunification. It has, however, usually not been a matter of rightist politics. The crisis of liberal democracy, that came about the last years, runs the risk of providing the radical right with access to urban development. By analyzing issues on the housing market and in urban security politics the paper points out a 'populist gap' in urban development that could be filled by the right. Furthermore, an empirical case study reveals tensions between the demand site and supply side of urban populism.

Artículos en revistas ; En las últimas décadas hemos asistido a una crisis del islamismo y a diversas respuestas para superar la mencionada crisis. Así, hemos visto como mediante la inclusión de estas organizaciones en el juego político, sus pociones se han ido moderando considerablemente. La realidad es que buena parte de estos movimientos han derivado hacia un nuevo modelo de organización que puede ser denominada como populismo islámico cuyas características son propias y singulares, aunque algunas son compartidas con otros movimientos populistas de otra índole. Este trabajo trata de mostrar usando el caso de los Hermanos Musulmanes en Egipto como los movimientos islamistas pueden, bajo determinadas circunstancias, derivar hace un populismo con características islámicas. ; In the last decades we have witnessed a crisis of Islamism and various responses to overcome the aforementioned crisis. Thus, we have seen how through the inclusion of these organizations in the political game, their potions have been moderated considerably. The reality is that a good part of these movements have led to a new organizational model that can be called Islamic populism whose characteristics are their own and unique, although some are shared with other populist movements of another nature. This work tries to show using the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as the Islamist movements can, under certain circumstances, derive a populism with Islamic characteristics. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : Die Entscheidung der afrikanischen Staats- und Regierungschefs zur Schaffung einer Pan-Afrikanischen Freihandelszone (AfCFTA) im Jahr 2018 war nicht nur eine politische Entscheidung mit wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen. Sie hat auch bedeutende ethische Dimensionen. Dies betrifft nicht nur einen möglichen Kompromiß zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum und Wohlergehen, Beschäftigung, Erschöpfung der natürlichen Ressourcen und damit verbundenen ökologischen und geschlechtsspezifischen Problemen. Die AfCFTA wird sich auch auf die Ausbreitung von Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Nationalismus und Populismus auswirken, die sich wahrscheinlich aus der Zunahme der Kapital- und Arbeitskräftemobilität ergibt. ABSTRACT : The decision of African leaders on the creation of an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2018 was not merely a political decision with economic implications. It has significant and complex ethical dimensions too. This, not only concerning a possible trade-off between economic growth and well-being, employment, the depletion of natural resources and related ecological and gender problems. AfCFTA will also impact on growing xenophobia, nationalism and populism, the likely outcome of growing capital and labour mobility. RÉSUMÉ : La décision des dirigeants africains de créer une zone de libre-échange continentale africaine (ZLECA) en 2018 n'était pas simplement une décision politique ayant des implications économiques. Il comporte également des dimensions éthiques importantes et complexes. Cela ne concerne pas seulement un éventuel compromis entre croissance économique et bien-être, emploi, envois de fonds, corruption, épuisement des ressources naturelles et problèmes écologiques et de genre connexes. Le ZLECA aura également un impact sur la xénophobie croissante, le nationalisme et le populisme, le résultat probable de la mobilité croissante du capital et de la main-d'oeuvre. ; Short version, in German, of : Kohnert, Dirk (2019): The ethics of African regional and continental integration. MPRA WP, ...