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This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments' decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort.

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Brown argues that internal barriers to trade and competition in these countries were significant obstacles to competition in the global economy and shows that the old market rules were rooted in longstanding political and regional compromises. He describes the process of detailed and difficult intergovernmental collaboration required for the EU, and now Canada and Australia, to produce new market rules. The resulting reforms created new regimes that provide deeper and broader national economic integration in Canada and Australia than in the EU. The new rules entrench neo-liberal values, retaining some room for diversity and flexibility for equity goals. Built on a careful analysis of the differences and similarities in political economy, constitutional design, federal culture, and history of intergovernmental relations in Canada and Australia, Market Rules provides fresh evidence that federal states can be strong and autonomous in the global society, while underscoring the conditions for effective collaboration that make this sustainable. Rich in detail, broad in scope, Market Rules makes a significant contribution to knowledge about federalism and economic policy-making in the era of globalization

The aim of this paper is to discuss the main tenets of industrial policy. Industrial policy, as a conscious effort on the part of government to encourage and promote activities specific, industry or sector with an array of policies, through the process of cooperation and coordination with the private sector, is an indispensable tool for steering economic development. It is needed both for developing and developed countries. Due to the information and coordination externalities, the productive forces cannot be developed through the market mechanism itself and the intervention on the part of government is needed. The programmes of an industrial policy need to be tailor made and country specific. However, some of the programmes have been historically shown as effective. Those programmes are: Subsidizing costs of "self-discovery", Developing mechanisms for higher risk finance, Internalizing coordination externalities, Public R&D, Subsidizing general technical training, Taking advantage of nationals abroad (Rodrik 2004). Serbia as a country that has experienced the process of deindustrialisation needs an industrial policy that will take into account the main tenets of the concept of industrial policy.

Written in January 1978 for Communisme the bulk of this article analyses the theoretical foundations of the economic policy of the new leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, following the upheavals which marked the end of 1976. In unraveling the apologetic and mystificatory discourse of the new rulers, this text shows that the line adopted is resolutely productivist and marks a deep break with maoist politics. Following the great debate excited by the cultural revolution, we witness in China the rehabilitation of a certain "official marxism", which has more than a little in common with the soviet ideological system. The economic and political event of 1978, briefly analysed in the post-script, have fully confirmed the substance of the analysis in spite of considerable resistance, the present direction clearly commits China to a path of development closely related to that of state capitalism.

One of Ronald Coase's insights was to extend the economic theory of choice to include the policy choice among institutional arrangements, which had to be analyzed with the same framework as the producer's choice. Both choices, he argued, are amenable to an opportunity-cost approach. The similarity he points to, however, is somewhat limited: while some of his articles from the 1930s stressed the subjectivity of producers' decisions, his later criticisms of standard policies, as well as the method he suggests for the design of policy, are based on the idea that costs are objective and measurable. Are the subjective aspects of the production decision reconcilable with the objective aspects of the policy decision in Coase's analysis? I shall argue that the framework he adopts is objectivist or subjectivist depending on the nature of the criticism he is leveling against standard theory and on the type of decision he is studying. Eventually he did propose a univocal analysis—an objectivist one—of the producer's decision between making and buying and the policy decision among institutional arrangements. This essay initiates a study of Coase's theory of decision. It returns to his subjectivist account of choice and contributes to solving the apparent contradiction between the subjectivist young Coase and the more mature objectivist scholar. It thereby sets out the diversity of the criticisms that Coase levels against standard theory and shows the evolution of his strategy. Ultimately, the problem of the difference between Coase's analyses of production decisions and policy decisions is more subtle than simply being an apparent contradiction: it turns on the subjectivity of individual decisions having no consequence for his analysis of policy.

Studies of EU trade policy-making often suggest that delegation of trade authority from the national to the European level strengthened the autonomy of public actors in formulating trade policies. Little empirical research, however, has been undertaken to corroborate this contention. To improve on this situation, I carry out two case studies of the EU's participation in the multilateral trade negotiations known as the Kennedy Round (1964 -67) and the Doha Development Agenda (2001 onwards). The analysis reveals that in both cases the EU's negotiating position was largely in line with the demands voiced by economic interests. Although this finding is no proof of economic interests actually determining EU trade policies, it casts some doubt on the autonomy thesis. I also discuss some factors that indicate that interest group influence may be the most plausible explanation for the finding. Adapted from the source document.