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 Draft Translation: Not for CitationWhat follows is another attempt at a translation of an important text by André Tosel on the Marx/Spinoza relation. It is not a finished, or polished translation, but a rough sketch put forward to help people get a sense of this overlooked articulation of the relation between Marx and Spinoza.For a Systematic Study of the Relation of Marx to Spinoza: Remarks and Hypotheses

André Tosel Published in 2008 in the book Spinoza au XIXe Siècle  The question of relation of the thought of Marx to that of Spinoza has up until now been the subject of more of a hermeneutic investigation than a philology. It is easier to construct a history of the different interpretations of Spinoza at the center of different Marxisms then to have determined the precise function of the reference to Spinoza in the work of Marx and to define the use Marx made of the spinozist problematic and the elaboration of his thought.  More or less the Marxists that were first developed a relation to Spinoza were an important milestone on the way to developing what could be called a historical and materialist dialectic. The relation begins in the midst of the Second International. The singularity of Spinoza's thought has often been reduced to a stepping stone on the way to "monist" immanentism, which is supposed to be its philosophical structure at least in the reception of two thinkers, as Plekhanov has asserted in some preliminary texts working from some notes of Engels in manuscripts published in the USSR under the title of the Dialectic of Nature. In the dogmatic frame of the struggle between idealism and materialism, Spinoza anticipates materialism by his thesis of the unity of nature and by his doctrine of the equal dignity of the attribute of extension in relation to the attribute of thought. The doctrine of mode and substance causality, coupled with the critique of final causality and the illusions of superstition, signifies at the same time an overcoming of mechanistic thinking and the first form of the dialectic. Rare were those who, like Antonio Labriola, were careful not to oppose two conceptions of the world head-on and maintained a certain distance with polemical opposition, preferring instead to indicate that Marx did for mode of production what Spinoza had done for the world of the passions—a geometry of their production. In the Soviet Union before the Stalinist freeze, this interpretive tension is reproduced: Spinoza becomes the terrain through which the clarification of the dialectic takes place opposing mechanists and anti-mechanists, and original articulation of the thesis of liberty as the comprehension of necessity. These problems have been clarified somewhat. (Zapata, 1983; Seidel, 1984; Tosel, 1995)One would have to wait for the deconstructive enterprise of Louis Althusser for this movement to be reversed. Spinoza is no longer a moment in the teleology which is integrated and surpassed on the way to Marxism-Leninism. His work is the means of theoretical production for reformulating the philosophical and scientific revolution of Marx without recourse to only the Hegelian dialectic. Spinoza is the first to have elaborated a model of structural causality that makes it possible to think the efficacy of the structure as an absent cause over its effects. The theory of knowledge is not one that authorizes absolute knowledge, but it announces this infinite exigency of a break with ideology without the hope of arriving at transparent knowledge. It obliges one to renounce any idea of communism as a state of a final reconciliation in social relations which would be deprived of any contradictions. "We have always been spinozists,' Althusser announces in the Elements of Self-Criticism, and then proceed to the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect from the Hegelian dialectic. It is then only an epistemological obstacle which prevents Marx from realizing the full power of his critique of political economy and to explore the continent of history that he discovered. Spinoza for clarifying Marx himself. Everything has been clarified. (Cotten 1992; Raymond, Moreau, 1997).  In terms of historical research, the spinozist studies that have been made after the end of the nineteen sixties in France and Italy have often been made by researchers who have rubbed shoulders with Marxism. We find the same oscillation between a tendency to read Spinoza according to a pre-marxist perspective, in the sense of a dialectic of emancipation, or liberation from a theological political complex and disalienation, even constituent power, and another tendency insisting on the infinity of the struggle against all illusions, even those of total liberation, affirming the unsurpassable dimension of the imagination in the constitution of the conatus and in the production of the power of the multitude. This oscillation is manifest often in the same commentators, often itself a function of the change of the historical conjuncture. However, up until now, there has never been an attempt to study from Marx's works themselves the structural function of the spinozist reference in the constitution of Marxist theory, one which would permit us to better understand the understanding that Marx made of Spinozist work. The interpretations have anyway have developed from a certain exteriority to the letter of Marxists texts.  Several years ago, a German researcher, Fred E. Schrader, in a short text dedicated to the thematic of "substance and concept" chez Marx (Substanz und Funktion: zur Marxsrezeption Spinoza's) drew attention to this situation (1984). He rightly noted that it was necessary to distinguish two moments in the research to avoid any merely external confrontation: a) first, obviously, document the explicit and implicit mentions of Spinoza in Marx's text; 1) then, reconstruct the position of the reference to Spinoza in the process of the constitution of the critique of political economy which is the central Marxist work, alongside of the references to "Hegel" which one knows were constitutive in the years of 1857-1858. Only this philological and philosophical work can permit us to renew the state of the question.
Schrader's study must be considered. We propose to develop it and comment on it because up until now it has not received the attention that it merits. Before everything else, it is necessary to be precise. The work envisioned must be considerable, it includes taking into account the texts published by Marx, those published posthumously by Engels and by Kautsky, and all of those—collections of notes and thematic notebooks—which make up the incomplete nature of Capital, including Marx's correspondence. The MEGA 2, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, still incomplete, has not finished being scrutinized. This work could begin from the hypothesis that we can conceptualize two periods in Marx's work from which it is possible to reassemble occurrences that conceptualize the reference to Spinoza in order to determine their structural function. The first period corresponds to the years of his formation and the interlinking of the critique of politics and the early critique of political economy, it begins with the concept of history underlying the German Ideology and culminates in the Poverty of Philosophy and the Communist Manifesto. The second period begins with the research operating under the title of the critique of political economy beginning in 1857, interrupted provisionally in January of 1859 and beginning again in 1861. The reference to Spinoza is more explicit in the first period where it is a matter of an specifically political practice, articulating a materialism of practice. It is less explicit in the second period, it functions nonetheless as a fundamental operator in the essential theory of the substance of value in capital. The Philosophical Intensifier of Spinoza of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Destruction of the Theologico-Political Complex and Democratic Radicalism.  Marx encounters Spinoza in the beginning of his theoretical and political journey. In 1841 we know from the preface by Alexandre Matheron (Cahiers Spinoza), Marx, after his doctorate, reproduced the extracts he copied from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (MEGA 2 VI/I Berlin, 1977). He is curiously presented as the author of these texts and moreover they are reorganized in their own order which is not that of the Tractatus itself. The chapters containing the critique of the supernatural, of the miracle, and all of all forms of superstition are brought forward as essential and open on the properly political chapters dedicated to the freedom of thought (XX) and the foundation of the republic (XVI). The Ethics is not ignored but it is not reproduced, Letter XII takes the place of a speculative text and is accompanied with Letter LXXVI to Burgh. Everything takes place as if Marx considered as the most important question to be that of theological politics and is concentrated on the question of human freedom in its radical ethico-political dimension. What is important is that the revolutionary democratic state is realized according to this concept.  One could also consider that Spinoza is utilized here as one of the figures that a Doctorate of Philosophy considers along with Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as provocations, of that which puts knowledge in the service of a life liberated from the fear of authorities, which reappropriates humanity's power of thinking and acting confiscated in the service of gods and fetishes. In a certain manner Epicurus is the paradoxically the first of the thinkers who claims that "it is a misfortune to live in necessity, but it is not necessary to live under necessity." This truth finds a new application, after the French Revolution, in the age of a new ethics, where free individuals recognize themselves in a free state.  2. The explicit reference to Spinoza is displaced in the texts of the years 1841-1843—the Kreuznach manuscript dedicated to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, followed by the introduction and the Jewish Question. These constitute the Feuerbachian moment of Marx, at the heart of his theory of the alienation of the human essence. One must not make this critique of politics a simple transition towards the discovery of the alienation of social powers, nor understand it as an end of a politics understood as primarily statist. It is the ethico-political liberation which requires a transformation of social relations and which is a transvaluation or emancipation of social powers. Spinoza is not named, but certain passages from the TTP are repeated almost to the letter: Spinoza figures as the index of a new task , that is lacking in Hegel which is that of thinking beyond the dualism of civil society and the state. The name of this passage is democracy or true democracy. Marx returns to the letter of the Spinozist thesis according to which democracy is not only the name of a constituted political regime, but the essence of politics, the most natural regime, constituting the power of the people. The intensive force of Spinoza is that of democracy not as a mystical act or utopian ecstasy, but as a process of constitution that replaces actual void of the Hegelian state where the people lack themselves, in which the state becomes something separate, still theologico-political. Democracy is the active process by which the people is refigured as the negative instance of any separate political form and gives a political form to its social power. "Democracy is the truth of monarchy, monarchy is not the truth of democracy. Monarchy is necessarily democracy in contradiction with itself, whereas the monarchial moment is no contradiction within democracy. Monarchy cannot, while democracy can be understood in terms of itself In democracy none of the moments obtains a significance other than what befits it. Each is really only a moment of the whole Demos. In monarchy one part determines the character of the whole; the entire constitution must be modified according to the immutable head. Democracy is the generic constitution; monarchy is a species, and indeed a poor one. Democracy is content and form; monarchy should be only form, but it adulterates the content.
In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its modes of existence,. the political constitution; in democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determination, and indeed as the self-determination of the people. In monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the people. Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here the constitution not only in itself, according to essence, but according to existence and actuality is returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people, and established as its own work. The constitution appears as what it is, the free product of men." It is possible to remark that this constituent power of the demos tends to be presented as a sort of causa sui in the order of world of social relations. The naturalist dimension thematized in the Ethics is not posited here with the insistence of humanity as part of nature, with the thematization of the relations between internal and external causality. Necessity seems to have disappeared for an instant. It is notable that this in the same moment that Feuerbach defends Spinoza's naturalism against Hegelian idealism and makes the author of the Ethics the Moses of modern thought who has destroyed theology by his pantheism, while reproaching him, for not having arrived at a radical humanist affirmation, since he maintained an equivocal equivalence between the naturalization of god and the divinization of nature. The Marxist reference is primarily to the ethico-political Spinoza, one of the "intellectual heroes of morality" as he says in a text contemporary with it, "Comments on the Latest Russian Censorship—" along with Kant and Fichte he is one of the heroes that found and defend the principal of moral autonomy. Spinoza makes it possible to undertake a philosophical political of Hegel, the people would be the only ontological instance that constitutes the political constitution, which is to say democracy, of civil society. Spinoza makes it possible to introduce a new dialectic within the incomplete dialectic of The Principles of the Philosophy of Right. This dialectic is simultaneously a critique. The object of this critical dialectic is the self-constitution of political activity in the struggle to overcome the domination of abstract entities erected into speculative abstractions defining the latest avatars of the theological-political complex.  Schrader does not say more in the exposition of the reference to Spinoza in this first period. We could take a step beyond his analysis. A unpublished path seems to be presented. We could in fact explore it as Yovel has done (Spinoza and Other Heretics); also the first book of Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (1968) examines the double relation of the human conatus to other conatuses and objects that suit them or do not suit them the rudiments of a theory of objectification of the human essence that Marx elaborates in the texts of 1844 where he analyzes the people under the figure of the proletariat subject and object of alienated labor. The reading can shed light on Spinoza, but Marx has for his interlocuters Hegel, Adam Smith, and Feuerbach. Spinoza does not intervene here explicitly. It is preferable to follow the letter of his texts.  3. The text which follows, The Holy Family of 1845, indicates an unexamined reversal of perspective. Far from finding in Spinoza a radical thinker of liberty through the radicalization of the democratic process and developing Feuerbach's theses of the virtues of Spinoza's naturalization, far from continuing the anti-idealist elements of Spinoza, Marx for the first time distances himself from Spinoza placing him on the side of Descartes, of Malebranche, of Leibniz, of abstract rationalist metaphysics, in a paragraph before celebrating the materialists in which he inscribes himself. These are the materialists of the French Enlightenment, La Mettrie, Holbach, Helvétius, which are lauded for having operated outside of metaphysics. These are the authors that Plekhanov reinscribes as a defenders of monistic materialism in the thought of nature and in the theory of history. Certainly as Olivier Bloch in an important contribution has demonstrated ("Materialism, genesis of Marxism, 1981, reprinted in Matières à penser, Vrin, 1997), this chapter of the history of philosophy is a plagiarism by Marx who literally takes it from the Manuel d'histoire de la philosophie moderne by Charles Renouvier (1844). The soviet Diamat has been founded by a French critic… But the fact remains that Marx endorses this reconstruction which prefers Bacon, Hobbes and Locke to Spinoza, lauding them for the empiricism and nominalism: the English thinkers critique metaphysic speculation and open directly the way to materialism. Pierre Bayler in France can be considered the only fellow traveler of British empiricism by his scepticism he dissolves the metaphysics of Spinoza and Leibniz (The Holy Family, 171).  The Spinoza criticized here is that of the Ethics understood as a dogmatic treatise of metaphysics which has a "profane content" but it has lost its historical condition. This is no longer the antitheological political Spinoza but the speculative philosopher. Is it necessary to conclude that this is a contradiction on the part of Marx and to forget his previous theses? It is a surprising oversight because that which Marx and Renouvier give credit to Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke can be imputed to Spinoza as well. Everything takes place as if Marx, put off by the metaphysics of the Ethics forgets what he had found in the TTP—and this seems to be a permanent transformation. In fact the contradiction is not only apparent, or, more to the point, it concerns Spinoza himself. Marx does not have as his object an analysis of Spinozism. He uses the latter by breaking it down according to the needs of his task which is at this moment is to study the activity of real man and the possibility of his transformation by bringing together the theoretical humanism of Feuerbach, the French communism and socialism, and the English thinkers who represent this humanism in the domain of practice. "[Metaphysics] will be defeated for forever by materialism which has now been perfected by the work of speculation itself and coincides with humanism. As Feuerbach represented materialism in the theoretical domain, French and English socialism and communism represent materialism in the practical field which now coincides with humanism." (The Holy Family, pg. 168) One can detect in this passage the presence of a schematic of the history of modern philosophy which has echoes of Moses Hess and Ludwig Feuerbach, the two have confronted the problem of the critical comprehension of Hegel and have begun to present a reinterpretation of the grand moments of the history of philosophy after their master.  Marx deviates from the interpretation of Hess given in a text which had a particular impact: The Sacred History of Mankind by a Young Disciple of Spinoza (1838). Hess appropriates Spinoza's theory of knowledge and exploits his theory of the imagination to develop a positive sense of social utopia, and overall makes Spinoza the true alternative to Hegel's Christian philosophy. Far from being an acosmism, the theory of substance is the perfect incarnation of the Hebraic idea of the unconditional unity of all. It is paradoxical, the other part, of the interpretation by Renouvier followed by Marx recovers and conceals that of Feuerbach that one can find in the same period in Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy (1842) and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843). Marx brushes up against these theses of Feuerbach on Spinoza without reproducing them in their entirety. They make Spinoza an important moment in modern philosophy: at the heart of this movement they make this philosophy an important realization of the humanization of God, Spinoza remains still a speculative philosopher who is at once produces the realization and negation of God. Speculative metaphysics realizes with him its ultimate phase which is determined contradictorily as theism and atheism in the form of pantheism. "Spinoza is the originator of speculative philosophy, Schelling its restorer, Hegel its perfecter."(Thesis 102) Pantheism becomes the only consequential theology in that it anticipates the end of theology in atheism. The Spinozist substance transforms all independent beings into predicates, into attributes of a unique and independent being. God is no longer only a thing thought, it is equally an extended thing (Thesis 3). Spinoza does not make the self-activity of self-consciousness the attribute that unifies and transforms substance into subject. This was Hegel's tour de force but he paid for it with an absolute idealism of spirit since once again spirit prevails over extension and concrete man is subject to abstraction separated from reality of self-consciousness.
This inscription of Spinoza in metaphysics is all the more paradoxical because Marx finds in empiricism and British materialism the theses that Feuerbach attributes to Spinoza, and Marx accepts a definition in which materialism coincides with communism. As can be seen in this passage from Principles of the Philosophy of the Future  Pantheism is theological atheism or theological materialism; it is the negation of theology while itself confined to the standpoint of theology, for it turns matter, the negation of God, into a predicate or an attribute of the Divine Being. But he who turns matter into an attribute of God, declares matter to be a divine being. The realisation of God must in principle presuppose godliness, that is, the truth and essentiality of the real. The deification of the real, of that which exists materially – materialism, empiricism, realism, and humanism – or the negation of theology, is the essence of the modern era. Pantheism is therefore nothing more than the essence of the modern era elevated into the divine essence, into a religio-philosophical principle. Empiricism or realism – meaning thereby the so-called sciences of the real, but in particular the natural science – negates theology, albeit not theoretically but only practically, namely, through the actual deed in so far as the realist makes the negation of God, or at least that which is not God, into the essential business of his life and the essential object of his activity. However, he who devotes his mind and heart exclusively to that which is material and sensuous actually denies the trans-sensuous its reality; for only that which constitutes an object of the real and concrete activity is real, at least for man. "What I don't know doesn't affect me." To say that it is not possible to know anything of the supersensuous is only an excuse. One ceases to know anything about God and divine things only when one does not want to know anything about them. How much did one know about God, about the devils or angels as long as these supersensuous beings were still objects of a real faith? To be interested in something is to have the talent for it. The medieval mystics and scholastics had no talent and aptitude for natural science only because they had no interest in nature. Where the sense for something is not lacking, there also the senses and organs do not lack. If the heart is open to something, the mind will not be closed to it. Thus, the reason why mankind in the modern era lost the organs for the supersensuous world and its secrets is because it also lost the sense for them together with the belief in them; because its essential tendency was anti-Christian and anti-theological; that is, anthropological, cosmic, realistic, and materialistic. [In the context of the present work, the differences between materialism, empiricism, realism, and humanism are, of course, irrelevant.] Spinoza hit the nail on the head with his paradoxical proposition: God is an extended, that is, material being. He found, at least for his time, the true philosophical expression for the materialistic tendency of the modern era; he legitimated and sanctioned it: God himself is a materialist. Spinoza's philosophy was religion; he himself was an amazing man. Unlike so many others, Spinoza's materialism did not stand in contradiction to the notion of a non-material and anti-materialistic God who also quite consistently imposes on man the duty to give himself up only to anti-materialistic, heavenly tendencies and concerns, for God is nothing other than the archetypal and ideal image of man; what God is and how he is, is what man ought to be or wants to be, or at least hopes to be in the future. But only where theory does not belie practice, and practice theory, is there character, truth, and religion. Spinoza is the Moses of modern free-thinkers and materialists. 4. The anti-metaphysical fury of Marx, the blind submission to Renouvier, limits him in developing an interpretation of the Ethics more nuanced and sensitive to the historical contradictions. This situation is even more strange because it is in The Holy Family that Marx interprets materialist philosophers such that they are a Feuerbachian Spinoza. On can find then three theses that Marx distributes to different representatives of materialism and that can also be imputed to Spinoza. --Thesis 1. Nature is a primary reality, it can be explained by itself without recourse to the principle of a creator. Nothing comes from nothing. One can then have recourse to Bacon for who "the primitive forms of matter are essentially living forms, individuals, and it is they that produce specific differences." He follows, as does Hobbes, in adding that "one cannot separate thought from the matter which thinks." Thought cannot be separated from matter capable of thought.  --Thesis 2. The human order is inscribed in a specific manner in nature. This specificity does not specify anything extra-worldly of human activity. Hobbes has demonstrated the sensible nature of activity. "Man is subordinate to the same laws that nature. Power and liberty are identical." The Holy Family) This order is known to promote the art of forming ideas, the human species is fundamentally educatable. ---Thesis 3. What is important is to think the constitution of this human order according to radical possibilities of the ways of transforming these necessary conditions of experience of liberty-power. "If man is unfree in the materialist sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality,
crime must not be punished in the individual, but the anti-social source of crime must be destroyed, and each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his being. If man is shaped by his surroundings, his surroundings must be made human. If man is social by
nature, he will develop his true nature only in society, and the power of his nature must be measured not by the power of separate individuals but by the power of society." (The Holy Family 176).  It is not necessary to give the history of philosophy presented in The Holy Family a structural importance. It acts as a provisionally constructed polemical text where Marx has given the means for his own philosophical conception in broad strokes in order to better understand the intersection of humanism, materialism, and communism. The incongruence of the treatment of Spinoza, reinterpreted to be behind Feuerbach's position, was not overlooked by Marx's comrades in combat since H. Krieg (himself denounces by Marx in a virulent circular as a confused partisan of religious socialism), he wrote in a letter of June 6, 1845 in order to restore Spinoza's battle against metaphysics overlooked by Marx, "you're probably right about what it says in the English Hobbes and Locke [i.e. that they vacillate contradictorily between materialism and theism], the same for Voltaire and his direct partisans; but Holbach is practically Spinozist, and it is with and Diderot that the Enlightenment reaches its summit and becomes revolutionary." (cited by Maximilien Rubel and his edition of the philosophical texts of Marx titled Philosophie) 5. The instrumental and fluctuating character of the reference to Spinoza as a metaphysician is confirmed precisely by The German Ideology. Marx returns in passing to the place of Spinoza in modern philosophy. Spinoza has developed the principle of substantial immanence but he has not integrated the principle with self-consciousness. Hegel would be the unity of Spinoza and Fichte (The German Ideology, 107). But for Marx this representation consigns him to a partial aspect of the Hegelian synthesis. Self-consciousness is at once a hypostasis of the real activity of human beings in the process of their self-production and the "the real consciousness of the social relations in which they appear to exists and to which they appear to be autonomous." In a similar manner substance is "an ideal hypostatized expression of the world as it exists" that is take as the foundation of the world "existing for itself." Marx returns to Feuerbach for clarification of substance and it anthropological resolution. We do not know much more, but the text seems to distinguish the Hegelian critique of substance and its possible materialist significance as "the existing world." We would have expected considerations on the immanence of modes in natura naturans and of their dynamic interdetermination.
In any case, Marx refuses the young Hegelain opposition between self-consciousness and substance, and proposes to maintain the category of substance as an inseparable unity of the existing mode and the beings which constitute the world in the play of their relations. Marx's criticism has as its target the mystification of self-consciousness and its anti-substantial phobia. Everything takes place as if the ontological categories of Spinoza up until now rejected as conservative metaphysics have an intensive force irreducible to the critique of the young Hegelians. However, it remains that in this complex itinerary the use value of the reference to Spinoza is concentrated in the theological political constellation and the political constitution of the political force of social force. This reference becomes the presupposition of the materialist conception of history, but it does not intervene in the texture of these concepts.  The Spinoza Reference in the Critique of Political Economy, Substance and Concept Returning to Schrader and his propositions for the study of the second moment of the reference to Spinoza, that of the Marxist use of Spinozist concepts from the Ethics in the development of the critique of political economy in the development of Capital. Schrader pays particular attention to the reappearance in the margins of the reference to Spinoza in the period of the creation and exposition of the critique of political economy which is developed from 1851 to 1863. An important letter from Marx to Lassale from May 31, 1858 which was published in an obscure book on Heraclitus, gives to Spinoza's metaphysics the same status that he gave to Hegel in a famous letter to Engels a few months before.  Even among philosophers who give a systematic form to the works, as for example Spinoza, the true inner structure of the system is quite unlike the form in which it was consciously presented. The true system is only present in itself. (Marx MEW, 29, Berlin, 1963, 561).

What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken another look by mere accident... If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified. (Correspondence Marx-Engels)  Marx makes it clear that the elaboration of the critique passes through the utilization of elements of philosophical works which others appear to have completely bypassed. The presence of Hegel is the center of the interpretation of Capital. It would appear certain to this period that Marx no longer takes inspiration from the Feuerbachian critique of abstract speculation. In this case, the Idea separated from its contents generates the latter in a mystified way by legitimizing the crudest aspects, losing the benefit of seizing the real as a contradictory process, as is explained in The Holy Family or The Poverty of Philosophy. Hegel is from now on solicited for his dialectical discoveries: he elaborates the dialectic as an immanent process of thought and his discoveries serve Marx in developing his proper critique. The presence of Hegel in the period up to the publication of the first volume of Capital in 1867, in passing through diverse manuscripts of 1857-1858 (The Grundrisse) and the manuscripts from 1861-1863, has been attested to and demonstrated by works, either to reaffirm the heretical Hegelianism of Marx, (Rosdolsky, Reichelt, Zelenyi, all dedicated to research the logic of Capital, all following one of the most famous injunctions of all times, Lenin in the Notes on Dialectics) or to combat it in order to argue that Marx was Hegelian or anti-Hegelian (Althusser, and Bidet in his famous study, The Making of Marx's Capital).
This usage of Hegel consists essentially in using the categories of logic to expose the theoretical structure of the passages which operate from the commodity to value, from money as the measure of value to money as the means of exchange and as the universal means of payment, from money to capital. Schrader proposes the following recovery of the Marxist exposition of Hegelian categories: --Exchange value and the form of value correspond to the pure quantity of Hegel: this value and its measure is realized as money. The Marxist measure of value adopts the Hegelian determinations of the quantitative relations and their measure. --The circulation of commodities and money is described by the concepts of an infinite qualitative and quantitative process.  --Finally the passage from money to capital transposes the passage from being to essence. Marx has thus read and reused these conceptual determinations for the diverse functions of commodity, value, money and circulation.  And what about Spinoza? According to Schrader, he intervenes to resolve a logical problem that is at this point unresolved, that of the determination of the concept of capital supposed to integrate the logically preceding determinations. In good Hegelianism, Marx has made the movement of capital that of the essence of the concept. When Marx maintains that exchange value is realized in the circulation of other substances, in an indefinite totality, without losing the determination of its form, always remaining money and commodities, he makes capital the totality of substances. However, it thus impossible to maintain the internal connection between capital and labor, and more precisely abstract labor. Spinoza intervenes to make possible another use of the category of substance: that would not have its function to subsume the plurality of all substances, but to determine the quality of the fluent quantity that defines abstract labor.  One can see this in the text of Volume One of Capital, revised by Marx in 1873 for the French translation of J. Roy. The category of substance is introduce in the passage from the commodity to its determination as the contradictory unity of use value and exchange value. The exchange of commodities is only possible if the their values are "expressed in terms of something common to them all, of which thing they represent a greater or less quantities." This something is a substance specific to all commodities. "This common "something" cannot be either a geometrical, a chemical, or any other natural property of commodities…[] it is evident that one makes an abstraction from use value when one exchanges, and that the relation of exchange is characterized by this abstraction (Capital). Exchange and the production process which supports it operate this real abstraction from the useful qualities of the objects to be exchanged. This utility, although necessary, does not render possible the exchange of objects of value insofar as they products of labor. Exchange concerns the objects considered as products of labor.  If then we leave out of consideration the use value of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labour. But even the product of labour itself has undergone a change in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use value, we make abstraction at the same time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use value; we see in it no longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put out of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labour of the joiner, the mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labour. Along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the various kinds of labour embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labour; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labour, human labour in the abstract.  Capitalism cannot be grasped as a subject enveloping the totality of the process of the development. It is no longer a simple quantity in indefinite expansion. It is thought as the "social substance of as exchange values." This substance can be determined as capital, but it goes beyond this process of determination by constituting a remainder, a "residue" that constantly reappears. "Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the same unsubstantial reality in each, a mere congelation of homogeneous human labour, of labour power expended without regard to the mode of its expenditure. All that these things now tell us is, that human labour power has been expended in their production, that human labour is embodied in them. When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they are – Values." The concept of Capital is not that of the concept of substance becoming subject., it returns to the concept of social substance defined as abstract labor creator of value, substance of value, and substance which increases value: purely progressive quantity reduced to its infinity which is a true infinity irreducible to the logic of bad infinity, that of capital which nonetheless subsumes it.  However it is said that this reconstruction does not rest on an explicit reference to Spinoza. The objection is well founded. Schrader responds that it is Marx who reread Hegel and saw that the formal system of Spinoza could be used against Hegel critique of the concept of substance in the Logic. It is a matter of the problem of determination. Omnis determination negatio, Marx keeps reminding everyone of this. If it is Hegel who validates Spinoza's judgement by demonstrating its insufficiency which for Marx transforms into a sufficient truth to permit him to avoid identifying capital with the Hegelian concept. Capital can increase its reality only by determining this social substance of abstract labor, by negating it. The tendency of capital, its ideal, is the absolute negation of this substance. Marx makes the insufficiency of Spinoza's substance according to Hegel into a virtue.  In the Logic the principle according to which determination is negation is recognized as essential. But Spinoza, according to Hegel, remains with determination as limit which is founded on an other being. The mode is in another from which it derives its being but this other is in itself. It is the integral concept of all realities. But its immanence is only apparent. Each mode negates each other, determination of each is the result of the determined negation of all of the others. Far from determining itself in these negations, substance is negated in its absolute indifference. It does not reflect itself in these negations no more than they reflect it. The Spinozist principle does not arrive at absolute negation that it anticipates contradictorily. The substance is posed by an external reflection which compromises the otherwise affirmed subsistence of the determinations which become an effervescent moment (attributes and modes). This can be read in the texts from The Science of Logic dedicated to Spinoza.  "Of this proposition that determinateness is negation, the unity of Spinoza's substance — or that there is only one substance — is the necessary consequence. Thought and being or extension, the two attributes, namely, which Spinoza had before him, he had of necessity to posit as one in this unity; for as determinate realities they are negations whose infinity is their unity. According to Spinoza's definition, of which we say more more subsequently, the infinity of anything is its affirmation. He grasped them therefore as attributes, that is, as not having a separate existence, a self-subsistent being of their own, but only as sublated, as moments; or rather, since substance in its own self lacks any determination whatever, they are for him not even moments, and the attributes like the modes are distinctions made by an external intellect. Similarly, the substantiality of individuals cannot persist in the face of that proposition."Hegel, Science of Logic  "Since absolute indifference may seem to be the fundamental determination of Spinoza's substance, we may add that this is indeed the case in so far as in both every determination of being, like every further concrete differentiation of thought and extension and so forth, is posited as vanished. If we stop short at the abstraction [of substance] then it is a matter of complete indifference what something looked like in reality before it was swallowed up in this abyss. But when substance is conceived as indifference, it is tied up with the need for determining it and for taking this determination into consideration; it is not to remain Spinoza's substance, the sole determination of which is the negative one that everything is absorbed in it. With Spinoza, the moment of difference — attributes, thought and extension, then the modes too, the affections, and every other determination — is introduced empirically; it is intellect, itself a mode, which is the source of the differentiation." Hegel, Science of Logic  3. It is capital which fails to realize its ideal determinations of essence and which falls back into the residue of the social substance, of the abstract labor which it masks. Capital as a mode of production is ruled by the real abstractions of exchange value which are not comprehended by social agents. Value is a social abstraction that is produced from the base of multiple dispersed evaluations, that the understanding of the economist produces only after the fact, but can be known as a real abstraction operated by society and which is determined as a social substance of abstract time. The determination of the common substance as abstract labor makes it possible to dissipate the mystification produced by the appearance of capital as the self moving essence of value. All of the people, who are modes of this substance, cannot immediately represent to themselves the internal determinations of this substance in which they appear other than as representation of theological-political complex, the same as the agents of capital who cannot represent to themselves the determinations of capital (commodity-value-money-forms of capital) without fetishizing them as autonomous movements of the value form. Theoretical knowledge, the Wissenschaft, does not dissolve this fetishism because the mechanisms of its social reproduction are founded on the constitution of these forms of representation and their real efficacy. Capital cannot arrive at self-identity in terms of an absolute reflection. The determination that Hegel imputes to Spinoza negatively of substance as exterior reflection can better convey the determinations of moments of its critique. This places within the development of initial economic forms this sort of equivalent of the attribute of extension that is human labor, this common social substance comprising the forms of modal representations which capture it, that is to say that the forms of consciousness and their functional relations in the material process of reproduction. It is therefore the relationship between the substances of abstract human labor and mystified or adequate forms of social representations of this substance that Marx finds in in the hidden Spinozian system and that he utilizes in order to escape the limits of Hegel's categories, which tend to sublimate substance into the concept and therefore annul the contradictions of capital in the passage from substance to the essence and the concept. From this point of view, Hegel and Spinoza would both be utilized without reservations by Marx as the complimentary and constitutive means of production of the critique of political economy. Spinoza would thus be primarily critical to the extent that the process of the development of the determination of capital cannot be ruled by the teleological order of being-essence-concept. The theory of the substance of abstract labor interrupts the movement of the idealization of capital from the mimesis of the Hegelian order that has been opposed. Spinoza is a moment of the emendation of the intellect internal to the Marxist critique, not an external instance that would be opposed in the confrontation with exteriority.  On an Incomplete Analysis  1. Schrader goes no further. The outline of his work remains open. In particular this analysis
Postulates as evidence a substantial theory of abstract labor, one that has come under criticism from multiple non-marxist thinkers (Croce, Pareto, Menger) and also, more recently, by Marxists (Althusser and Bidet). In this case the relation to Spinoza would lose its fecundity. But if one leaves to the side the labor theory of value and its supposed foundational role, on the internal level the analysis still remains allusive, because it would have been necessary to exceed the level of Volume One of Capital in order to demonstrate the decisive character of Spinoza's conceptuality in the Marxist conception.  Despite these uncertainties, the perspective opened by Schrader is stimulating in that can necessitate a more rigorous study, tempering the contradictory interpretations by the rigors of philology.  2. Schrader's final remarks seem to us be more provocative. Starting from the idea that
Spinoza and Marx begin from two different historical moments—that of manufacturing capital limited by the desire of hoarding and that of capitalism fully developed—the logical and ethico-political thesis of the submission of needs to absolute monetary enrichment, and that therefore the refusal of money as an end in itself, he begins to construct a shocking analogy between the third type of knowledge in Spinoza and the knowledge of the capitalist which exposes its money to circulation in order to multiply it. The determination of particular things sub specie aeternitas, as deepening the knowledge of their essence would symbolize with the effort of capitalists to insert money to measure things in their circulation sub specie capitalis. The reference to Marx attests to the irony of Marx: if the movement of true knowledge is infinite, this infinity cannot be confused with that of monetary accumulation which becomes a bad infinity because the means of accumulation are reversed and perverted to be posited as an end in itself.  3. It is more correct, as Schrader makes apparent, to find a space more effective for the
forma mentis common to Marx and Spinoza: the two both diagnosis the pathology of the understanding and that of a form of life proper to a given historical world. Both understand the irreversible character of modern passions and set to understand and eventually cure these pathologies.
Spinoza, son of a merchant enriched by international trade and a merchant himself in his youth, does not have contempt for money and the new wealth of nations promoted by capitalist economy. He does not dream of a return to oikos of finite needs in a household setting, he is not an aristoltean who condemns bad infinity of the circulation of merchandise which has as its object money and not the use value of merchandise. He registers the emergence of exchange value, he sees, as Aristotle did, that it is the subordination of true value.
Remember the famous text from Ethics IV Appendix, consecrated to the function of money.  XXVIII. Now to achieve these things the powers of each man would hardly be sufficient if men did not help one another. But money has provided a convenient instrument for acquiring all these aids. That is why its image usually occupies the mind of the multitude more than anything else. For they can imagine hardly any species of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause.  XXlX. But this is a vice only in those who seek money neither from need nor on account of necessities, but because they have learned the art of making money and pride themselves on it very much. As for the body, they feed it according to custom, but sparingly, because they believe they lose as much of their goods as they devote to the preservation
of their body. Those, however, who know the true use of money, and set
bounds to their wealth according to need, live contentedly with little. The realization of money as a concept, the accumulation of money for accumulation, is unrealized. Marx adds that this goal is inaccessible because the character of use value of commodities contradicts the universal sociality of value. The common social substance in so far as it is measured in abstract labor time is measured according to quantitatively determined portions. Money is supposed to represent value in its infinite becoming of an end in itself, but it can only effectively represent a determined part. This contradiction is resolved in the deplacement that money makes in becoming capital, exchange value multiplied in profit. Spinoza's therapeutic of desire also concern the intellect of calculation: the latter is not condemned, it is superior to the intellect of avarice which theorizes by avarita and does not develop the capacity to act and think. This understanding, however, is called upon to better understand the monetary economy by subordinating it to immanent true utility, that which is inscribed in the republic of free citizens. It is only in this sense that the accumulation of wealth under the monetary form can enter into the correct perspective of knowledge of the third kind. Marx in his own way wants to understand the action of human beings without deploring or flattering them. Capital cannot be understood going from substance to the essence of the concept, but it has its basis in substance, the social substance of abstract labor, and can be rethought and regrouped in the forms of economic understanding. Capital also has as its goal a particular therapeutic manner, the health and well-being of a social body that cannot be subsumed under capital but must encompass the increase of the capacities of acting and thinking that capital subordinates to itself.  4. This anti-teleological function of the concept of substance/abstract labor is not
maintained by Marx for long in his dialectic. Certainly the function of the subject cannot be attributed to capital, but it is displaced and given a different support, not that of abstract labor with its internal multiplicity and impersonality, but its bearer, that of the working class, the proletariat, the people of the people. The substance of abstract labor becomes subject in the determination that Marx always uses with the English term general intellect. One could thus see a final return of Hegel which interrupts Marx's return to Spinoza. The communism developed by the general intellect is the practical substitute of the Hegelian concept and imposes an anthropological version and anthropocentric teleology that Spinoza would not accept. What does the general intellect represent? It represents the capacity of the proletariat to organize the ensemble of forces defining the collective worker and the cooperation associated with it, under the direction of formation of the factory in the constitution of the unqualified worker, all representing the advance front of the progressive socialization of the social productive forces. Communism is not something that is imposed as a simple moral ideal, it is a product of the real historical process.  However, Marx does not escape here the teleologism that he shares with majority of
German idealism. The socialization of productive forces—that for Marx leads the process of the self-production of humanity realizing its immanent end and to which he attributes the function of the concept—is not realized at the level of society. It cannot in any way constitute itself as a causa sui. The human world remains a world of world of modal relations and interactions: if the effects of liberation can realize themselves at the level of the individual (by the knowledge of singular things) or at the level of collectivity ( by the democratic constitution of the multitude), these effects would not be made from a mode as a complete cause of itself under all points of view. The capacity of a mode to act and think, human individual or society, can be more or less adequate, but this adequation does not annul the difference that separates the mode which is produced by and in another which it requires to subsist and which is produced in and by itself and becomes a cause of itself. The identity of natura naturata and natura naturans cannot grant a mode the capacity to be cause of itself under all points of view: it permits it to do so under certain points of view and certain conditions which are sufficient for an ethical realization. Communism to the extent that Marx thinks in terms of the becoming concept of the collective worker exceeds the conditions and possibilities of action predicated on modes.  To this structural impossibility we can add the consideration of an analytical one: modern society is not immense and singular enterprise under the order of the collective worker, it is, to say the least, a network of antagonistic enterprises in which on the contrary the process of work is fragmented to the point where it loses all material and ideal unity, a fragmentation that has been imposed by the imperative of capitalist society. Exploitation is not only maintained but it is generalized, it is only in compensation that the recomposition of labor process itself as something collective, cooperative, and associated that Marx believes leads the dialectic of the process of capitalist production. Spinozist realism is here irreducible. It does not limited us in taking the measure of the problem posed generally by Marx, it excludes, however, the solution envisioned from speculative teleology and it compels us to attempt to comprehend the modal form in which exploitation is reproduced. How can we form a new theory of the capacity for insurrection of the multitude subordinated to capital while they also resist it. What effects of liberation can still be manifested by producing new subjectivities which are embedded in real productive activities, not prisoners of unproductive ghettos ravaged by self-destructive violence, nor recluse themselves in the powerless rumination of a moral salvation? How can we escape forms of historical impotence? How can we avoid being reduced to the status of spectators of this impotence? Such are the questions posed by Marx and which are posed again today along with Spinoza and his critique of the teleological illusions of the general intellect, questions which have not arrived at the end of their road. But it is historically vain to ask Marx these questions: they are ours and it is up to us to answer them.

Issue 26.1 of the Review for Religious, 1967. ; impl~m~ntation of. Vaticaffllf~ '~- Monastic Pr~opbsal for Canon Law~, ~ by Monasticum Consilium Iuris Canonici 19 " Interview With Abbot Butldr ~' ~ e~tri~ ~fi~1~ '~ ~6 '. _POverty ~n Rehg~ous Life 4, by Ladiilqk. M. ~0~, S.J. . 60 Sanctificati~p t~oug~he Apostolate ~ ' b~ C~rles ~. Schleck, O,S.C. 83" Religious Life and the Christian Life 7' , by Sist~ Elaine Marie,~ S.'L.~ 1~37 ;? Complementarity by ~vid B. Burrell, C.S.C. ~ 149, Bibliography f6r R~enewal " by: Damien ~Isabell, O.F.M., . and Brot~r . Joach(m, O.F.M.~ 16~ Survey of Roman Documents 174 Views, News, PreVie"ws 180 Questions and Answers 183 Book Reviews 191 VOLUM~ 26 NUMBER 1 January 1967 Volume 26 1967 EDITORIAL OFFICE St. Mary's College St. Marys, Kansas 66536 BUSINESS OFFICE 428 East Preston Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202 ASSOCIATE EDITORS Everett' A. Diederich, S.J. Augustine G. Ellard, S.$. ASSISTANT EDITORS Ralph F. Taylor, S.J. William J. Weiler, S.J. DEPARTMENTAL EDITORS Questions and Answers Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. St. Joseph's Church 321 Willings Alley Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 Book Reviews William J. Mountain, S.J. Bellarmine School of Theology of Loyola University 230 South Lincoln Way North Aurora, Illinois 60542 Published in January, March, May, July, September, Novem. her on the fifteenth of the month. REVIEW FOR RELI. GIOUS is indexed in the CATHOLIC PERIODICAL IN-DEX and in BOOK REVIEW INDEX Notice to Subscribers Because of constantly increasing costs, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS finds it necessary to increase the cost of its individual issues as well as of its sub-scriptions. The new rates, effective in' 1967, are the following: (1) Individual issues of the REWEW now cost one dollar; this price applies not only to all issues beginning with 1967 but also to all previously published issues. (2) Subscriptions in the United States, Canada, and Mexico now cost $5.00 per year; $9.00 for two years. (3) Subscriptions to other countries now cost ,$5.50 per year; $10.00 for two years. (4) All the above prices are in terms of U.S.A. dollars; accordingly all payments must be made in U.S.A. funds. These prices affect all individual issues sold on or after January 1, 1967. The new subscription prices are applicable to all subscriptions--new and renewed--beginning with the January, 1967, issue of the REVIEW. JOSEPH F. GALLEN, S.J. Implementation of Vatican II on Religious Life The postconciliar motu proprio of August 6, effective October 11, 1966, obliges all Latin and Oriental religious institutes to put into effect the pertinent norms of Vati-can Council II. The institutes are to promote primarily a newness of spirit and through this effect a renewal and adaptation of life and discipline. Renewal is not accom-plished once for all time. It is a continuous process that is to be maintained by the fervor of the members and the care of chapters and superiors. The documents of the Council that are principally to be studied are the Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious Life and Chapters V and VI of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, but all other conciliar documents should also be considered. The principal part in renewal and adaptation apper-tains to the religious institutes themselves, especially through their general chapters. The chapter is not merely to legislate but should also further the spiritual and apostolic activity of the institute. To promote renewal and adaptation, a special general chapter, ordinary or extraordinary, is to be assembled within two or at the most three years in all institutes, whether pontifical or diocesan. This special chapter may be divided into two distinct periods of sessions, if the chapter itself so decrees in'a secret vote. The interval between the periods should not generally extend beyond a year. The general chapter has the authority to change cer-tain norms of the constitutions experimentally, provided the purpose, nature, and character of the institute are preserved. Prudent experiments contrary to the common law of the Church, if judged profitable, will be freely permitted by the Holy See. These experiments may be Joseph F. Gal-len, s.J., resides at Saint Joseph's Church; 321 Wil-lings Alley; Phila-delphia, Pennsyl-vania 19106. VOLUME 26, 1967 5 4. 4. 4. Joseph F. Gallen, S.1. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 6 extended to the next ordinary general chapter, which also has the power to extend them but not beyond the following ordinary general chapter. The general council possesses the same authority of experimentation accord-ing to the conditions determined by the chapters in the intervals between these chapters. The definitive approba-tion of the constitutions is reserved to the Holy See for pontifical congregations and to the unanimous consent of all the local ordinaries in whose dioceses the congrega-tion has houses, in the case of a diocesan congregation. ,The cooperation of all superiors and members is necessary for the renewal of the religious life in them-selves, to prepare the spirit of the chapters, for accom-plishing the work of the chapters, and for the faithful observance of the norms enacted by the chapters. In preparing the special general chapter, the general council shall make provision for a wide and free consultation of the members and shall suitably collate and arrange the ideas received in this consultation to help and direct the work of the chapter. This can be accomplished through reports of community and provincial chapter discussions, appointment of commissions, sending out questionnaires, and so forth. The constitutions should contain the evangelical and theological principles on the religious life and on its union with the Church, as also the spirit and purposes of the founder and the sound traditions which constitute the spiritual patrimony of an institute. They should also include adequate but not superfluous juridical norms. The constitutions are to be imbued with the true spirit and be a vital rule. They must therefore contain both the spiritual and juridical norms and avoid a text that is merely exhortatory or merely juridical. The general chapters of institutes of simple vows should decree whether the constitutions are to permit or oblige to the renunciation of personal patrimonial property, whether already acquired or to be acquired, and whether the renunciation is to be made before perpetual profession or some years afterward. Superiors of all levels should have sufficient authority and be freed of the necessity of useless and too frequent recourse to higher authorities. Chapters and councils, each in their own way, should manifest the participation and care of all the members for the entire community, which will be verified especially if the members have a truly efficacious part in choosing those who constitute the chapters and councils. The study and meditation of the gospel and of all of Sacred Scripture is to be more intensely fostered in all the members from the noviceship, as also participation by more apt means in the life and mystery of the Church. For a closer participation in the liturgy, it is recom-mended that the entire or part of the Divine Office be substituted for a Little Office. A wider place is to be given to mental prayer instead of a multitude of vocal prayers, but the pious exercises commonly received in the Church are to be maintained. Religious more than the rest of the faithful should be devoted to penance and mortification. Penitential practices of an institute, if necessary, should be suitably adapted. In the present practice of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, an ordinary general chapter is one that takes place at the expiration of the term of office of the su-perior general, and on his or her death, resignation, or deposition; when convoked for any other reason, the chapter is extraordinary. The term of office of a superior general is ordinarily six years. The general chapter to be assembled within the next three years is special because its purpose is to promote renewal and adaptation. It may coincide with an ordinary general chapter; otherwise, it will be an extraordinary chapter of affairs, but no per-mission of the Holy See or of local ordinaries will be necessary to convoke it. The particular law of a lay religious congregation commonly consists of a Rule, if the congregation follows one, constitutions, directory, custom book, ordinances of the general chapter, regulations of higher superiors, book of common prayers, and a ceremonial. The congregation has had and still possesses the authority to change all of these except the Rule and constitutions. Any change in the Rule, e.g., of St. Augustine or St. Francis of Assisi, still demands the same authorization from the Holy See. Number six of the new norms of August 6 states: This general chapter has the right to change experimentally some norms of the constitutions . Prudent experiments contrary to the common law, if suitable, will be freely per-mitted by the Holy See. The expression, "some norms," is evidently vague. How-ever, the norms explicitly require the permission of the Holy See only for a change contrary to the common law, i.e., canon law. If permission were required for an ex-perimental change in any other type of article or with regard to any individual article, the necessity of such permission should have been stated; otherwise, the re-ligious institutes would be left with a highly obscure and sufficiently impractical power of experimentation, which would be contrary to the explicit purpose of the document. Obviously a congregation may not change any law of God that may be repeated in its constitutions, but it may experimentally change on its own authority any other norms of the constitutions, whether spiritual, ÷ ÷ ÷ Implementation o~ Vatican 11 VOLUME 26, 1967 7 ÷ ÷ ÷ 1oseph F~ Gallen, $.1. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 8 merely disciplinary, or juridical or legal, with the ex-ception of changes that would be contrary to canon law. A list is appended of changes that would or would not be contrary to canon law. The new document also gives permission for one sus-pension and reconvening of the special general chapter. This matter was quite fully treated in the RzviEw FOg P, ZLICIOtJS, 2'1 (1965), 476-7. The doctrine there given was that an institute may have that number of distinct periods of sessions that is required for the proper carry-mg out of its work. The treatment of the question in the. RzwEw concluded as follows: A chapter should ordinarily be completed in the one session or series of sittings, simply because this is the usual practice and understanding. A suspension and reconvening of a chap-ter is permissible for a proportionate reason. This is forbidden neither by canon law nor, at least generally speaking, by the constitutions. It is also at times necessary or very useful for the satisfactory completion of the work of the chapter and there-fore in accord with the very nature of a chapter. Finally, canon law and the practice of .the Holy See in a.pproving, constitu-tions admit the suspension of a chapter in particular cases without any indication whatever thatsuspension is confined to these cases. C. before a paragraph means that the matter is con-trar. y to canon law and thus demands the permission of the Holy See for the experimental change. If there is no G. before the paragraph, the particular matter is not contrary to canon law and may therefore be changed experimentally without the permission of the Holy See in the case of pontifical institutes or that of the local ordinaries in the case of diocesan congregations. C. Change of the name of the institute or of its spe-cial purpose. Addition of new works. C. Changing a Rule, e.g., of St. Augustine or St. Francis. C. Subjection, care, and direction of a congregation of sisters by a~n institute of men. C. Elimination of the class of lay sisters and their transfer to the one class of sisters. Change in the rights and obligations of a class of sis-ters, e.g., of lay sisters. Change in active and passive voice for the election of delegates to the general or provincial chapter. C. To give less suffrages to the professed of temporary vows or to the novices. Giving, changing, or eliminating greater suffrages to those who have died in office or held office. Change or elimination, except in voting in a chapter, of precedence among members of the same institute. C. Elimination of precedence in voting in a chapter. Change in titles or names of sisters, e.g., with regard to title of mother and change from the name of a saint or mystery to the baptismal and family names of the in-dividual. Change in the habit and in the dress of the postulants provided the latter remains different from the habit of the novices. C. Change in the obligation of the professed and novices of wearing the religious habit. To exact or not exact a dowry, to exact it only condi-tionally, i.e., that the superior who admits should de-mand a dowry if and as far as this is possible; to exact it only from choir and not from lay sisters; to leave the determination of the amotmt of the dowry to the general chapter, mother general, mother provincial, or to the superior who admits; to determine when the dowry is to be given to the institute; to admit the candidate without a dowry when a just reason exists for doing so; to estab-lish that the candidate who was dispensed from the dowry or admitted without it must establish a dowry !ater if she receives any substantial gift or bequest. Establishment, change, elimination oL and dispensa-tion from the wardrobe and the sum to be paid for the expenses of the postulancy. Establishment, change, or elimination of the record o~ property that a candidate brings with her as also of witnesses for this record. Establishment, change, or elimination of the civilly valid document signed on admission to the postulancy in which the candidate declares that she will not seek compensation for services given to the institute before or after profession, if she leaves or is dismissed, as also with regard to the renewal of the document at the time of perpetual profession. Establishing or changing higher superiors competent to admit to the postulancy. Establishing, changing, or eliminating a vote of a council required for this admis-sion. C. Changing or eliminating any o~ the invalidating or merely prohibiting impediments to the noviceship established by canon 542, i.e., membership in a non- Catholic sect, and so forth. Change or elimination of any or all of the impediments to the noviceship established by the particular constitu-tions, e.g., the illegitimate who have not been legiti-mated, those over thirty years of age, widows, those who were postulants or novices in another religious institute, converts, and so forth. Establishing or changing the higher superiors com-petent to dispense from the impediments of the particu-÷ ÷ ÷ Implementation Vatican II VOLUME 26, 1967 9~ ]oseph F. Gallen, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 10 ]ar constitutions as also the vote of a council for such dispensations. . C. Ghange or elimination of the testimonial letters required for a professed religious who passes from one to another institute, and for those who have been in an ec-clesiastical college, postulancy, or noviceship of another institute. G. Ghange or elimination of certificates of baptism and confirmation required for admission to the novice-ship. Ghange or elimination of certificates of character and of good health as also of other testimonials required by the constitutions, e.g., parents' marriage certificate, cel'- tificates of studies and academic degrees, consent of parents or guardians, and so forth. C. To eliminate, shorten to less than six months, or dispense from the postulancy prescribed by canon law. To eliminate, abbreviate, or extend a postulancy or a duration o~ postulancy commanded only by the particu-lar constitutions, e.g., to extend a postulancy of nine months to a year. To give higher superiors the power of dispensing from such a postulancy or duration. Establishing or changing higher superiors competent to dismiss postulants. Establishing, changing, or elimi-nating a vote of a council required for this dismissal. Giving a local superior the right of dismissing a postu-lant, e.g., in an urgent case. Changing the discipline and formation, study, and occupation in external works during the postulancy, and the separation or association of the postulants with the novices and]or the professed. Establishing or changing the frequency and content of the reports to higher superiors on the postulants, novices, and professed of temporary vows. C. Prolongation of the postulancy for a period longer than six months. Establishment, change, or elimination of request to higher superiors ~or admission to the noviceship and the professions. To change the vote for admission to the noviceship from deliberative to consultative or vice versa. To establish or change a prescription that the mother provincial admits to the noviceship with the deliberative or consultative vote of her council but that this must be. supplemented by the confirmation, approval, or consent of the mother general either alone or with the delibera-tive or consultative vote of the general council, or a prescription that the mother provincial with the deliber-ative or consultative vote of her council merely proposes the admission to the noviceship to the mother general, who admits with the deliberative or consultative vote of her council. C. To change the norms on the canonical examina-tion by the local ordinary or his delegate before entrance into the noviceship, first profession, and perpetual pro-fession. C. To change the duration of the eight-day retreat and the norms for general confession before the noviceship. To change the higher superior competent to establish or transfer a novitiate and the vote of the council for these acts. C. To change the prescription that the permission of the Holy See is necessary for the valid establishment or transfer of a novitiate in a pontifical institute or the pro-hibition of establishing more than one novitiate in the same province without a serious reason and a special apostolic indult. To change a prescription that the permission of the local ordinary is necessary for the valid establishment or transfer of a novitiate in a diocesan congregation. To establish, change, or eliminate the prescription that each province must have its own novitiate. C. To change the separation of the novices and pro-fessed and the prohibition of communication between them. C. To change the prescription that superiors are to assign only exemplary professed to the novitiate house. C. To enact the canonical year as valid before the completion of the fifteenth year, or when made for a period less than an entire and continuous year, or made in a house not legitimately designated as a novitiate house. To permit the canonical year of noviceship to be made other than in the first year, e.g., in a noviceship of two years or eighteen months. To change the manner of beginning the noviceship. C. To change the manner of computing the canoni-cal year. C. To change the norms for the interruption of the canonical year, i.e., (1) if a novice is dismissed by the superior and leaves the house; (2) if a novice, without the permission of the superior, leaves the house with the in-tention of not returning; (3) if a novice has remained outside the house for more than thirty days; or the norm for the suspension of the canonical year, i.e., if a novice has been absent from the novitiate house for more than fifteen but not beyond thirty days. To change the manner of computing a noviceship that is longer than a year, e.g., to change the profession day to the second anniversary of the beginning of the novice-ship from the day after this second anniversay. C. To change the norm that absence from the noviti. ate house during the canonical year is to be permitted only for a just and grave reason. Implementation Vatican H VOLUME 26, 1967 ÷ ÷ 4. Joseph F. Gallen, S.l. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS C. To change the norm that a noviceship made for one class is not valid for another. C. To change the norms that during the canonical year novices (1) must not be employed in external works of the congregation; (2) nor should they apply them-selves intensively to the study of letters, sciences, or the arts; or that during the second year (3) the novices should not be employed in the external works beyond that per-mitted in the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of Religious of November 3, 1921. C. To change the norm that the noviceship is not to be prolonged for more than six months. To change the vote of the council that the higher su-perior may need for a prolongation of the noviceship, e.g., from consultative to deliberative or vice versa. To change the higher superior competent for the dis-missal of a novice as also the vote for this dismissal. C. To change the duration of the eight-day retreat before first profession. To change the prescription that each novice is to be given a complete copy of the constitutions from the be-ginning of the noviceship. To establish or change those competent to admit a novice in danger of death to profession. C. To change the vote of the council for first pro-fession from deliberative to consultative or to no vote. C. To abbreviate or eliminate the three full years of temporary vows required before perpetual profession or to establish a period of temporary vows longer than six years. To prolong temporary profession in such a way that the total time in temporary vows is longer than six years. To change the manner of computing temporary profession (August 15, 1966-August 15, 1969). To establish or change the duration of the various temporary professions, e,g., five annual professions, three annual and one of two years, two annual and one of three years, one of two years and one of three, one of three and one of two years. To establish, abbreviate, extend, or abrogate a period of temporary vows longer than three but not longer than six years before perpetual profession. To dispense in whole or in part from a period of tem-porary vows beyond three years. C. To enact or permit that the first temporary pro-fession be made outside the novitiate house. To establish or change the place for renewals and pro-longation of temporary vows and for perpetual profes-sion. To establish or change the superior competent to de-cree a prolongation of temporary profession. C. To permit the anticipation of the renewal of temporary profession by more than a month or to permit the anticipation of perpetual profession. To change the formula and rite of profession. C. To change the prescription that there is to be no interval without vows between temporary professions or between temporary and perpetual profession. C. To change the prescription that the written decla-ration of a profession must be signed by the professed and the one who received the profession. To establish, change, or abrogate a prescription that the written declaration of a profession must be signed by other witnesses. C. To abrogate or change the canonical requisites for the validity of any juridical religious profession of canons 572-3, e.g., the sixteen and twenty-one full years necessary for the validity of temporary and perpetual profession. C. To change the norm that an invalid noviceship in-validates any subsequent religious profession. To establish or change the higher superior competent for admission to profession, the norms on the consent or confirmation of the mother general of an admission by the mother provincial, or on requests to the mother gen-eral by the mother provincial for admission, to enact a deliberative or consultative vote for perpetual profession and for renewal of temporary w)ws; and to establish or change to no vote a deliberative or consultative vote for the prolongation of temporary vows. To establish or change the higher superiors competent for the reception of various professions; to change this superior from the local ordinary to a higher superior of the institute; to delegate others also by the law of the constitutions for reception, e.g., provincial, regional, and local superiors, and their legitimate substitutes. C. To change the canonical norms on the convalida-tion and sanation of an invalid religious profession. C. To change the definition of the religious vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. C. To eliminate or restrict the right of professed of simple vows to retain or acquire property for themselves (c. 101, § l, 2o). , C. To abrogate or change th~ prescription that a pro-fessed of simple vows must ced~ the administration and dispose of the use and nsufruct o! property already owned or acquired. | C. To abrogate or change the prescription that the permission of the Holy See is r ecessary for a change in favor of the congregation of a m~table part of this cession and disposition. C. To abrogate or change the prescription that a + 4. Implementation Vatican 11 VOLUME 26, 1967 13 ÷ ÷ ÷ Joseph F. Gallen, $.1. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 14 novice in religious congregations, before profession of temporary vows, is to make a civilly valid will concern-ing all the property she actually possesses or may subse-quently acquire. C. To abrogate or change the permission demanded by canon law for a change in this will. C. To permit a peculium, to change or abrogate the norm that the material necessities are at least ordinarily and habitually to be requested from and supplied by the institute, or to eliminate the obligation of avoiding superfluities. To change the formula required for the imposition of a precept in virtue of the vow of obedience, to change the superiors competent to give such a precept, e.g., to give this power or take it away from local superiors. To change the prescribed frequency of confession. C. "To change the canonical norms on the place for the confessions of women. C. To eliminate or change the necessity of special jurisdiction for the confessions of professed religiou,s women and novices. C. To have more than one ordinary confessor for reasons beyond those stated in canon law. C. To change the canonical norms on the special or-dinary confessor, the extraordinary, supplementary, and occasional confessors, the confessor of a seriously sick sister, and the confessor of anyone in danger of death. G. To change the canonical norms on the duration of the term and the reappointment of the ordinary confes-sor. C. To change the prohibition of interference into the internal and external government of the community by ordinary and extraordinary confessors. To change the canonical norms on manifestation of conscience. G. To change the prescriptions concerning daily at-tendance at Mass, or the promotion of frequent and daily Communion, or the power of a superior to forbid a subject to receive Holy Communion in the case of grave scandal or of a serious external fault until she has ap-proached the sacrament of penance. To adopt the Divine Office, e.g., Lauds, Vespers, and Compline, and in the vernacular. To determine the part of the Office that is to be said in common. To legislate on the duration, hour, and place of mental prayer; on vocal prayer, e.g., on the quantity and the specific vocal prayers to be said; on the preparation for mental prayer; the particular and general examen; spiri. tual reading; the number and duration of prescribed visits to the Blessed Sacrament; duration of the annual retreat and duration of other retreats; on tridua; deter- mination of the precise day, d~ making the monthly recollectiox and devotional practices; and t tional renewal of vows and to ~ rite of this renewal. To eliminate, lessen, or chang. the chapter of faults. To chanf mortification and penance impo~ constitutions. C. To change the canonic~ cloister. To extend the prohibition of tered sections also to those of tl the same prohibition. To change the law of compan approved by the Sacred Congr the approval of constitntions, e. to. leave the house without a judgment of the superior, there so." "No sister shall go out with~ superior, who should if possibl trustworthy person as her comF To legislate on silence. To change the norms on th, for correspondence. To change tion of correspondence. To change the norms on or table. To change the suffrages [or tl~ C. To change the canonica ofa professed religious to anoth~ C. To change the canonical the expiration of temporary and secularization, dismissal, professed to secular life, and t] To enact that a canonical d: [essed of perpetual vows from ai To establish or change the d~ the general chapter, e.g., three, sembly. To change the place or dat~ specified in the constitutions. To establish or change the let deferring of the general chapter, To change the date of the ass ter after the death, resignatio: mother general, e.g., three or si To establish or change ex ot general chapter given to [orm~ establish or change a system of ration, and manner of t; on seasonal devotions ) legislate on the devo- :hange the formula and the manner of holding or adapt practices of ed or encouraged in the prescriptions on the entrance into the clois- ~e same sex; to abrogate ion to one of the norms .-'.gation of Religious in ,,., "Sisters are permitted ::ompanion when, in the is a just cause for doing .ut the permission of her '.: send, a sister or some lnion. ' necessity of permission or eliminate the inspec-to eliminate reading at deceased. norms on the transfer .~ institute. norms on departure at .rofession, exclaustration :,rovisional return of a ~ charitable subsidy. smissal frees also a pro- 1 her religious vows. ~te of the convocation of six months before its as-of the general chapter th of an anticipation or e.g., three or six months. ~mbly of a general chap- 1, or deposition of the ¢ months. ficio membership in the .r superiors general. To ~lelegates for the general ÷ + ÷ Irat~lementation ol Vatican 11 VOLUME 26, 1967 ]5 ÷ ÷ ÷ .~oseph F. Gailen, $.1. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 16 or provincial chapter. To give ex officio membership in the general chapter to regional superiors. To establish that the mother general may summon others sisters who are not capitulars to assist in the clerical and similar work of the chapter, also to invite such sisters and externs to present and discuss questions with the chapter. To establish more than two tellers. To establish or change the number of capitulars who must be present for the validity of the acts of a general, provincial, or local chapter, e.g., two-thirds. To establish that a vote may be given by letter or proxy. C. To eliminate the presidency of the local ordinary at the election of the mother general or his right of con-firming this election in diocesan congregations. To enact or change a prescription that all sisters are obliged to accept any office to which they were elected. To enact or change, according to the system, a norm of the following tenor; from the date of the letter of convocation until the completion of the election of delegates, no vocal shall be transferred from one house to another; neither shall local superiors be changed until after the general or provincial chapter. In congregations divided into provinces, to establish or change the delegates to the general chapter from houses immediately subject to the mother general. To establish or change the number of de.legates to the general chapter from each province, e.g., two, three, four, five. To enact such delegates according to the number of sisters in a province. To give the provincial chapter authority to make proposals to the general chapter; to give it also the authority to make enactments for the province, which, however~ are not effective until approved by the mother general with the consent of her council. To eliminate the provincial chapter, i.e., to have the delegates elected merely by mailing in the votes from the houses to the mother provincial. To establish a norm on prudent consultation regard-ing the qualities of those eligible for office. To establish that the ballots are to be burned only after each session. To enact that before the election of the mother gen-eral, each and every capitular shall promise by oath to elect the one who, before God, she judges should be chosen. To forbid postulation in elections. To establish or change a retreat before the general or provincial chapter as also its duration and exposition of the Blessed Sacrament during it. C. To change the canonical mother general, i.e., ten years and forty years of age. To change the duration in off the length of her term; to estalz tion of her immediate reelectio: To enact that the secretary I eral are to be elected in the appointed by the mother gene, council and with or without a ~ ¯ To change the qualities reqt e.g., the age. To establish or change the n c6uncilor elected is also the assi a special election for this afv have been elected. To establish or change the n eral councilors except the assis secretary or treasurer general. To establish that the voting the chapter of affairs. To establish who have the to the general or provincial which the proposals must be p To establish that committee~, be appointed before the chapte lars by the mother general or 1 To establish that all ordina~ are to be confirmed, modified, chapter or that they remain i: abrogated by a subsequent cha[ To establish the norms on tt one province to another. C. To change the canonica nial report to the Holy See. To establish or change th~ visitation by higher superiors. To establish or exclude the for the higher superior in canor To establish or change the n another sister to make the car To enact that three general side the motherhouse. To enact the frequency of provincial, regional, and local ~ To determine the matters th a council by the law of the co~ To enact or abrogate an adx To enact the frequency of treasurer general to the mothe from the provincial and regior qualities required for a ff profession, legitimacy, ce of the mother general; lish or change a prohibi- ~.:neral and treasurer gen- 'eneral chapter or to be with the consent of her 'etermined term of office. !ired in a general official, :,rm that the first general stant general and to have ~r all general councilors orm that any of the gen- :ant general may also be ;~to be public or secret in ght of making, proposals :hapter and the time at ~sented. for the proposals are to v from among the capitu-aother provincial. ices of a general chapter or abrogated in the next ~ force until modified or transfer of a sister from norms on the quinquen-frequency of canonical aecessity of a companion ~ical visitations. wms for the delegation of 0nical visitation. councilors may live out-meetings of the general, :ouncils. at require a secret vote of ~stitutions. aonitor for superiors. tnancial reports from the general and her council, al superior to the mother ÷ ÷ Impleraentation o] Vatican II VOLUME 26, 1967 17 ÷ ÷ ÷ lo~eph F. Gallen, $.1. general; and from local superiors to the mother general, provincial, or regional superior. To establish norms for the investment of money. To establish the tax on houses, regions, and provinces for regional, provincial, and general expenses. To es-tablish norms for extraordinary taxes. C. To change the canonical norms on alienation, con-tracting of debts and obligations, or business and trade. To establish whether each province is to have its own house of studies. C. To change the canonical norms on the establish-ment, union, and suppression of provinces. C. To change the thirty years of age, legitimacy, and ten years of profession required by canon law for a mother provincial. To enact or change a higher age for the mother provin-cial, e.g., thirty-five years. To enact or change the number of provincial coun-cilors, i.e., two or four. To determine the duration in office and the norms for immediate reelection or reappointment of the mother provincial, provincial councilors, secretary, and treasurer. To enact whether all or some of these are to be appointed by the mother general with the consent of her council or elected in the provincial chapter. To determine the authority of a regional superior, the number of her councilors, frequency of council meetings, and the qualities necessary in a regional superior and officials. C. To change the canonical norms on the erection and suppression of houses. To enact that a local superior in office for sever~il suc-cessive years, e.g., six or twelve, may not again be ap-pointed local superior in any house, outside of a case of serious necessity, before the lapse of a certain number of years, e.g., one, two, three, six. To determine the number of local councilors. To establish or change a term of office for the mistress of novices; to forbid her continuation in office beyond a certain number of years, e.g., twelve. To establish that the mother general may authentically interpret the ordinances of the general chapter. To establish or change a two-thirds vote of the general chapter required for a change in the constitutions. To legislate on the juniorate, the education, and for-mation of the members of the congregation. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 18 CONSILIU~ MONASTICIM CANONICI A Monastic P Introductory Remarks [These introductory remarks wet meeting of the Canon Law Society 1966.] "The Monastic Proposal for Law" had its origin in early 1964 Canon Law Society, Monsignor Spencer Abbey. Monsignor tol~ board had decided to sponsor "in problematic areas in canonical ] which is almost wholly lacking il is such a problematic area. Mon., in the work of the Society in thi: After consulting with variot with Monsignor Harrington, it ~ the active collaboration of all the United States and Canada who enter into the project. This C( we came to call this gathering o to elaborate a proposal for mon: discussed in some general way i~ national convention and present mission for the Revision of the In the months following I vi teries and came into contact canonists. With the help of the~ tionnaire .was prepared and set periors of the United States and The whole question of mona~ into twelve topical sections. Tw( took to prepare background stm IURIS :oposal for Revision of anon Law given at the twenty-eighth ,f America, October ! 1-13, the Revision of Canon ~vhen the president of the Paul Harrington, visited me that the executive depth studies" of various .~gislation. Monastic law, the present codification, gnor invited me to assist area. ; abbots and at length as decided we would seek monastic canonists of the were willing and able to ,nsilium Monasticum, as [ monastic canonists, was ~stic law which would be a workshop of the 1965 ~.~d to the Pontifical Cora-l: ode of Canon Law. Jted over twenty monas-vith thirty-five monastic men an extensive ques-to all the monastic su- Canada in January, 1965. tic provision was divided , or three canonists under-lies in each of these areas. ÷ ÷ ÷ Monastic Proposal VOLUME 26, !.967 19 MoCnoanstsii~lluumm REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 2O As replies to the questionnaire were received, the pertinent matter was forwarded to the respective canonists. In April, 1965, twenty-five monastic canonists and scholars assem-bled for a week's meeting at New Melleray Abbey near Dubuque. Father Paul Boyle, C.P., president of the Canon Law Society, took an active part in the discussions, as did Father James Richardson, C.M., chairman of the canon law committee of the Conference of Major Superiors of Men, and Abbot Lawrence Vohs, O.S.B., chairman of the Benedictine Canon Law Committee. After the twelve topical areas had been discussed at length, the canonists voted on some sixty-four conclusions, all of which were passed by a sizable majority. In a number of cases they were unanimously adopted by all. These conclusions were then sent to the responding superiors and participating canonists, and further comment and elaboration were in-vited. In the course of the following summer a workshop took place at St. Joseph's Abbey; Spencer, Massachusetts. Since it was thought that a" concrete proposal would receive more serious attention, this workshop undertook to pre-pare a schema of such a proposal entitled "Propositum Monasticum de Codice Iuris Canonici Recognoscendo." At this time the project began to elicit international atten-tion in monastic circles. Written communications were received from all parts of the world. The summer work-shop, which was a rather informal affair, received visits from such men as the abbot general of the Olivetans, com-ing from Italy; a Benedictine Abbot from the pontifical abbey in Jerusalem; and a representative of the abbots of France, who met in Paris in July to discuss the conclusions of our meeting at New Melleray. In September, 1965, a schema of the "Propositum" was sent out to the superiors and canonists, suggestions and recommendations being again invited. In October, a meet-ing of monastic canonists was held in Chicago to consider the schema, canon by canon. At this meeting we were privi-leged to have the foremost scholar of monasticism of our times, Dom Jean Leclercq, O.S.B., a professor of the Bene-dictine International College in Rome and a peritus of the Council. While all the conclusions incorporated into the schema had bee.n adopted by a large majority of the participating canonists, unanimity had not been obtained on a number of points. In view of this the Chicago monastic meeting voted that two spokesmen should prepare a statement of the minority positions to accompany our proposals. Un-fortunately, they decided after two months of deliberation not to present their views with the "Propositum Monastio cum." As a result of this delay it was only at: their January meeting that most of the members of the Society's execu-tive board received copies of the "Proposit,um." However, i after due deliberation, the exect mously that the president of th, the "Propositum" to the chairm mission as the contribution of a the Canon Law Society of Ame president of the Society for~ Monasticum" to His Eminence, The "Propositum Monasticurr Copies were sent to all the memh mission and to the consultors co the revision. Many of them hav~ their appreciation of the work nasticum," continues to be stm throughout the world. In gener~ its contents. However, some find In conclusion I would like throughout the world are grat Society of America for the opp! nasticism to make its needs knc sion of canon law. M. Ba Chairman Spen PREFA( Under* the guidance of the S sembled at the Second Ecumenic has so enkindled the spirit of rer no matter what his rank or statu: toward the fullness of Christian ing to all men the witness of a tr This renewal of the Spirit ha,. the People of God. The Churcl~ removing the obsolete, adding both new things and old to pro, the Lord. Since the compilation and pr Code, monasticism in God's p~ all exceptionally vigorous ex[ Council gives eminent witness t~ in the Church today, when in it of religious life, it acknowledge~, importance of monasticism fox Praising the ancient monastic Council requires their adaptatk ent, "so that the monasteries wi] building up the Christian pe~ The new forms of cenobitic * This is an English translation pre[ ticum from the original Latin text wh v. 26 0966), pp. 331-357. tive board voted unani- Society should forward tn of the Revision Corn- ]committee sponsored by !ica. On February 2, the arded the "Propositum Pietro Cardinal Ciriaci. ." has been well received. ~.rs of the Pontifical Com-acerned with this area of written to us expressing The "Propositum Mo-lied by monastic groups d most have agreed with it too extensive. to say that the monks eful to the Canon Law ~rtunity it has given mo- ~n in regard to the revi-il Pennington, O.C.S.O. Consilium Monasticum St. Joseph's Abbey :er, Massachusetts 01562 :E pirit, Christ's Church, as-al Council of the Vatican, ewal that every Christian, ~, can more surely advance life and perfect love, giv-ae follower of Christ. not neglected the law of desires to revise her law, the pertinent, presenting ide for all in the house of ~mulgation of the present )vidence has experienced !ansion. The Ecumenical the value of monastic life proposals on the renewal both the past and present the Church and society. traditions of service, the ,n to the needs of the pres- 1 be, as it were, sources for ple." ~nd eremitic life rising in ared by the Consilium Monas-ich was published in the Jurist, ÷ ÷ ÷ Monastic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 21 Consillum Monosticum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS many parts of the world today are further indications of monastic vitality. The eremitical life, a ,~ery special ex-pression of monasticism, is to be highly esteemed; for, by God's grace, it engendered men of great h61iness through-out the Christian centuries. The revised Code must neces-sarily provide some legislation to foster and strengthen this way of life. It is fitting that monks take part in the renewal of the law they are to live by. Living in a monastic milieu, follow-ing a rule hallowed by centuries, they more aptly know by experience the authentic needs and desires of this partic-ular way of life. Through this "Proposal" monastic canon-ists from various institutes and countries wish to humbly offer their collaboration, so that the new, corpus of law will be such that all monks may pursue a more faithful and fruitful monastic life before the People of God and all mankind. A concrete proposal of a Titulus:for the revised Code is presented, to obtain, in a complete and orderly way, more satisfactory norms for monks. Since the promulgation of the present Code deeper his-torical and theolo'gical studies of monasticism have been made in various monastic orders and congregations, grad-ually restoring authentic spirit and meaning. Scientific investigations of the ordo monasticus (order of monks) and monastic law have been very fruitful. The Sacred Congre-gation for Religious has issued many documents in our day pertaining to monasticism, e,g., the Law Proper to the Confederation of Monastic Congregations o~ the Order of Saint Benedict, confirmed by Pope Pius XII, and the legis-lation for nuns which has practically revised their entire law. Pius XII's radio addresses to cloistered nuns concern-ing the contemplative life should also be cited. Further-more,: ample provision for monks has been made in the Oriental Code. From these various documents it is evident that the Holy See is vitally concerned about the needs of monasticism. References can be inserted in the monastic title to those laws for religious which may be proportionately applied to monks--in a manner exemplified in Title XVII of Book II of the present Code. The sources given in this Proposal for each canon are not exhaustive. Only those texts issued by the Holy See since the promulgation of the present Code are cited. How-ever, because of its authority, discretion, and paramount influence on Western monasticism we frequently cite the Rule of Saint Benedict, that father and legislator of monks, under whose patronage we humbly offer this "Proposal." Consilium Monasticum Iuris Canonici Office of the Moderator Saint Joseph's Abbey Spencer, Massachusetts 01562 MONASTIC LIFE or THE Section 1. Monastic life. Chapter 1. Monasteries an Article I. Monasteries] Article 2. Federation. Chapter 2. Internal mona Article 1. Admission. Article 2. Studies. Article 3. Obligations Article 4. Transfer. Article 5. Egress. ORDER OF MONKS federation. tic law. Section 2. Specific forms of rc 3nastic life. Chapter 1. Cenobitic life. Article 1. Government. Article 2. Apostolate. Chapter 2. Eremitical life Chapter 3. Integral conte aplative life. 1-22 4-10 4-6 7-10 11-22 11-14 15-16 17-18 19-20 21-22 23--42 23-30 24-28 29-30 31-38 39-42 Monmtic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 23 MONASTIC LIFE or THE ORDER OF MONKS SECTION 1 MONASTIC LIFE .÷ ÷ ÷ C~onsilium Monasticum REVIEW FOR REL]GIdU~; 24 Canon 1 It is of great importance to the Church that the conse-crated life, lived according to :the monastic traditions preserved through the centuries, should continuously be adapted to time and place, that there might always be men of prayer unceasingly imploring divine mercy, draw-ing down every heavenly blessing upon the People of God. NOTE: Monastic life is distinguished" from other forms of religious life because of its proper characteristics, which are expressed in the various monastic rules, among which, in the West, the Rule of Saint Benedict ~holds a special place. In this form of life "the principal occupation is to pray to God" (John XXIII, Allocution, Vos paterno animo). The apostolic significance of this has in our days become more evident. Solitude and separation from the world pertain to every religious: "Every vocation dedi-cated to God requires them, each in its own proper way" (cf. Pius XII, Allocution, Haud mediocri, Feb. 11, 1958). However in the monastic life they have a very special meaning, both for the Church and for civil society, as Paul VI has clearly taught (cf. Allocution, Quale salute, Oct. 24, 1964). Stability in this state is confirmed "by vows, or by other sacred bonds (e.g., promise, oath, con-secration: c[. Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Provida Mater Ecclesia, Feb. 2, 1947, art. III, par. 2, no. 1) which are like vows in their purpose." (Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Const. on the Church, chap. 6; no. 44). The order of monks, then, "though it is not of the hierarchical structure of the Church, nevertheless undeniably belongs to its life and holiness" (ibid.). SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 4, 43, 50, 66, 73; Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Renewal of Re-ligious Life, nos. 2, 5, 9; Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church, nos. 18, 40; Benedict XV, Encyclical Letter, Principi Apostolorum, Oct. 5, 1920; Plus X'I, Epistle, Non sine animi, Male 28, 1923; Apostolic Const., Umbratilem remotamque wtam, July 8, 1924; Apostolic Letter, Monachorum vita, Jan. 26, 1925; Encyclical Letter, Rerum Ecclesiae, Feb. 28, 1926; Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Fulgens radiatur, Mar. 21, 1947; Epistle, Sedecim ante saeculis, Mar. 25, 1948; Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 31M par. 3; Allocution, Omnibus probe, Sept. 24, 1953; Encyclical Letter, Ecclesiae fastos, June 5, 1954; E.pistle, Sexto decimo revoIuto, May 31, 1956; Allocution, Nous sommes heureux, Apr. 11, 1958; John XXIII, Allocutions, Vos paterno animo, Sept. 25, 1959; Allocution, Notre joie, Oct. 20, 1960; Epistle, Recens a te, Oct. 20, 1960; Paul VI, Allocution, Quale salute, Oct. 24, 1964; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Instruc-tion, Inter praeclara, Nov. 23, 1950. Canon 2 The dispositions concerning monks, even when ex-pressed in the masculine gender, apply equally to nuns, unless it appears otherwise from the context or from the nature of the case. NOTE: Everyone is well aware that women have entered more fruitfully into public affairs. They are becoming continuously more conscious of. their full human dignity. It is wholly undesirable then that they should find them-selves treated as inferiors or minors in the law of the Church. It seems that the law for nuns regarding regular superi-ors should be so revised as to exempt both them and their monasteries, making them solely dependent on the regular superiors of their own order. The principal rea-son for this is to safeguard the spirit proper to theorder. But no one can fail to see the difficulties in having two superiors and having to seek direction from both in many matters. The local ordinary should retain the right and duty to supply for deficiencies if the regular superior is seriously neglectful. But in general, the abbess should rule her own monastery without masculine intervention. To obtain a suitable renewal of the legislation for nuns, their desires and recommendations can be ascer-tained from meetings of federations or from other legiti-mately convoked assemblies. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canon 490; John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Pacem in terris, Apr. I 1, 1963; Paul VI, Allocution, E motivo, Sept. 8, 1965; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Decree Ior the Order o[ Re[ormed Cister-clans, Dec. 27, 1965, no. 5. Canon 3 Monastic institutes by their nature are neither clerical nor lay. ~qthout prejudice to their constitutions and par-ticular laws, they are subject to the canons that follow. NOTE: Monastic life is not an intermediate state be-tween the clerical and lay states in the divine hierarchical structure of the Church. Rather, the faithful are called by God from both these states of life to enjoy this particu-lar gift in the life of the Church and thus each in his own way to assist in her salvific mission. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canon 488, no. 4; Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Const. on the Church, no. 43; Plus XII, Allocution, Annus sacer, Dec. 8, 1950, part I; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 314, par. 3. CHAPTER 1 MONASTERIES AND FEDERATION Article 1--Monasteries Canon 4 1. A monastery, a dwelling in which monastic life is lived, is designated autonomous if the community, in re- Monastic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 25 ÷ Consillum M onasticura REVIEW FOR REI'IGIOUS gard to the ordinary monastic regimen, rules itseff through an abbot, over whom in the internal government there is no other ordinary superior. 2. In law, the term monastery includes also a laura; and the term abbot, any superior of a monastery, without prej-udice to the particular prescriptions in the constitutions of each institute. NOTE: 1. For the sake of clarity the term monastery is here canonically determined as "a dwelling in which monastic life is lived." In law nothing is so dangerous as to call things by the same name, or include them under a single term, when they are to be guided by different norms. It is expedient that things which are to be subject to di-verse laws be distinguished by different names. The concept of an autonomous monastery, already found in the Code, is defined here following the thought common to the authors. Cf. A. Larraona in Commentar,um pro religiosis, III (1922), pp. 133 ff.; A. Vermeersch in Periodica, X (1922), pp. (7) ff.; J. Konrad, The Transfer of Religious to Anott~er Community (Catholic University Press: Washington, 1949), pp. 94 ft.; U. Beste, Introductio in Codicem, ed. 5 (D'Auria: Naples, 1956), p. 331. 2. A laura, the union of several hermitages under one moderator or spiritual father, can be autonomous like a monastery. It belongs to the constitutions of each monastic institute to determine which superiors are to re-ceive the name of abbot or the equivalent office. SOURCES: Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Fulgens radiatur, Mar. 21, 1947; Homily, Exultent hodie, Sept. 18, 1947; Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21~ 1950: General Statutes, art. VI; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons 8; 313, par. 2. Canon 5 1. For the erection of an exempt monastery, in addi-tion to the requirements of the statutes of each institute, the approval of the Apostolic See and the written con-sent of the local ordinary are necessary. 2. The local ordinary may establish a monastery, even an autonomous one, in which the members will seek evan-gelical perfection according to the rules and traditions of monasticism; but he must first consult the Apostolic See or at least the national Conference of Bishops. 3. In the case of nuns who pertain to an order, it is fur-ther required that they be affiliated by an abbot of the first order, at least in regard to spiritual care. 4. The erection of a monastery or the permission to es-tablish a new monastery includes authorization to have a church or public oratory and to carry out sacred func-tions there; it also includes, without prejudice to condi-tions laid down in the decree of erection or the permission, authorization for all the devout works proper to the mon-astery according to its statutes. NOTE: 1. This is the present law. 2. Under the present law a bishop may establish a religious congregation (canon 492, par. 1). Why may he not also establish a monastery? It is certainly desirable that monasteries be formed in federations (i.e., congregations) and confederations, which provide mutual aid both spiritual and temporal. Neverthe-less, each monastic institute has its own proper rule and constitutions which to some extent limit the expressions of monasticism possible within the institute. Provision is needed, especially today, for the expressions evolving from fruitful monastic traditions. The diocesan setting seems most suitable for these experiments, as it has been for new religious congregations and, in an earlier tradition, for the foundation of new monasteries. Ordinarily at the present time when a monk, led by the Spirit, undertakes an experiment in monasticisrn under episcopal auspices, he must seek an indult of exclaustration, or even of secularization, relinquishing his canonical status as a monk. This is not canonical equity. 3. This provision, in force already for tertiaries tcanon 492, par. 1), is advocated so that nuns may receive a ormation according to the true spirit of their own in-stitute (cf. Pius XII, Radio Message. Cddant volontiers, luly 19, 1958), and also other assistance according to the particular form of affiliation. 4. This is the present law. SOURCES: 1. Code of Canon Law, canon 497, par. 1; Pius XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 8, par. 3. 2. Code of Canon Law, canon 492, par. I; Second Vatican Council, Deo'ee on the Renewal of Re-ligious LiJe, no. 19; Pius XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 8, par. 1. 3. Code of Canon Law, canon 492, par. 1; Plus XII, Radio Message, Cddant volontiers, July 19, 1958; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Epistle to the Apostolic Nuncios, Mar. 7, 1951. 4. Code of Canon Law, canon 497, par. 1; Pius XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquara apostollcls, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 9, par. 1. Canon 6 I. Preserving always the spirit of evangelical poverty, every monastery can acquire and possess temporalities with stable revenues. 2. The temporalities are to be administered according to the norms of the constitutions and the prescriptions of canons 532, 536, and 537. NOTE: According to monastic tradition and the common law of the Church, each monastery, as a moral person, has the right to acquire, retain, "and administer temporal goods, and the obligation to provide a suitable home and sustenance for its monks. The value and need of a spirit of poverty, which is an essential of the Christian message and a first principle of monasticism, does not exempt monks from having a proper esteem for the economic order and from using material goods in conformity with Monastic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 + ÷ ÷ Consilium M onasticum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS their state. They should be most eager and generous in coming to the aid of the poor. In a true spirit of poverty, they should keep only what is useful to the community, lest their wealth become an occasion of discord, envy, or pride. The faculties concerning administration which are found in the Rescript, Gum admotae, of Nov. 6, 1964, should be incorporated into the common law and be extended to all abbots. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 31-34, 66; Code of Canon Law, canons 496; 531-532; 1495, par. 2; Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Renewal of Religious Lqe, no. 13; Pius XII, Radio Message, Oggi al compiersi, Sept. 1, 1944; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons 63-64; John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Mater et Magistra, May 15, 1961; Paul VI, Encyclical Letter, Ecclesiam Suam, Aug. 6, 1964. Article 2---Federation Canon 7 Federations of monasteries, unions of several autono-mous monasteries under one superior, while maintaining the principle of autonomy, are highly recommended, to promote true monastic life and to foster the full develop-ment of each monk in his vocation. NOTE: Because monastic congregations have the nature of federated unions, the term "federation," which is found in the Apostolic Constitution, Sponsa Christi (General Statutes, article VII), seems preferable. In a federation each monastery retains its own proper independence and juridic personality. The superior of the union can use the title of Abbot President, Abbot General, or Archabbot. His powers within the federation, which are determined by the constitutions, are ordinarily to be quite restricted. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canon 488, no. 2; Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, no. 22; Pius XII, Homily, Exsultent hodie, Sept. 18, 1947; Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. VII; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons 11; 313, par. 1, no. 1; Allocution, Omnibus probe, Sept. 24, 1953; Radio Message, Lorsque Nous. Aug. 2, 1958; John XXIII, Allocution, Notre joie, Oct. 20, 1960; Epistle, II tempio massimo, July 2, 1962; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Instruction, Inter praeclara, Nov. 23, 1950, no. XVII; Epistle to the Apostolic Nuncios, Mar. 7, 1951. Canon 8 Confederations, fraternal associations of several mo-nastic federations under one primate, are also strongly recommended. NOTE: Confederations of monastic federations are to be set up that through the fraternal unity and cooperation of the federations, according to the norms and within the limits defincd by the Holy See, monastic life will be faith- fully upheld. Adapted to the needs of our days, it will be sustained by the fraternal assistance in personnel, posses-sions, and activities shared among the federations. SOURCES: Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Re-newal of Religious Life, no. 22; Pius XII, Homily, Ex-sultent hodie, Sept. 18, 1947; Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. VII; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 313, par. 1, no. 1; Brief, Pacis vinculum, Mar. 21, 1952; Allocution, Omnibus probe, Sept. 24, 1953; Radio Message, Lorsque Nous, Aug. 2, 1958; John XXI/I, Allocution, Vos paterno animo, Sept. 25, 1959; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Decree of Mar. 21, 1952, "Lex propria," nos. 4, 21, 22. Canon 9 The establishment of a federation or confederation with its own proper laws is reserved to the Apostolic See. Such unions exercise only an office of service toward the monasteries and the monks, especially through visitation, appellate judicature, and fraternal assistance. NOTE: Federation and confederation presuppose some general laws accepted by all the monasteries but do not exclude particular norms and customs in each monastery. The list of functions of a federation or confederation in the canon is not exhaustive. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canons 488, no. 8; 501, par. 3; Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931; Plus XII, Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. VII; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons 11; 28; 41, par. 2; Brief, Pacis vinculum, Mar. 21, 1952; John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Mater et Magistra, May 15, 1961; En-cyclical Letter, Pacem in terris, Apr. 11, 1963; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Instruction, Inter praeclara, Nov. 23, 1950, nos. XXIII-XXIV; Decree of Mar. 21, 1952, "Lex propria," Ratio institutionis praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd.; nos. 25 ft. CHAPTER 2 INTERNAL MONASTIC LAW Article 1--Admission Canon I0 1. Each autonomous monastery has an inherent right to have its own novitiate. 2. If a monastery is incapable of fulfilling the prescrip- ÷ tions concerning the formation of novices, the abbot has a + serious obligation to send them to another monastery. + NOTE: Monastic formation implies that monks in the service of Christ the Lord, the true King, are instructed, trained, and formed as integral men to Christian perfec-tion through prayer, contemplation of divine realities, and legitimate apostolic activity. Monastic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 ~9 + ÷ ÷ onsillum Monasticum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS According to Saint Benedict and other monastic fathers, a monk lives in a permanent family under a rule and abbot, who holds the place of Christ. Therefore novices and professed, in so far as possible, should be formed in their own monastery. SOURCES: Rule o[ St. Benedict, Prologue, chs. 1, 58; Pius XI, Apostolic Letter, Monachorura vitae, Jan. 26, 1925; Plus xII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 86; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Ratio institutionis praesertira studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, nos. 11-12. Canon 11 The abbot may train all his novices without distinc-tion in one novitiate under one director. NOTE: In view of the gradual development that has taken place among those who under theP aternal authority of .th.e abbot make up the monastic family, a single novxuate is required, returning to a unity and simplicity which is more consonant with monastic traditions: This is true even if different members take a greater or lesser part in the celebration of the Divine Office. SOURCES: Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Re-newal o[ Religious Li[e, no. 15; Sacred Congregation for Religious. Decree for the French (Solesmes) Congregation O.S.B., Apr. 8, 1965; Decree [or the Order o[ Re[ormed Cistercians, Dec. 27, 1965, no. 1. Canon 12 In admitting candidates the constitutions are to be fol-lowed, sa[eguarding canons 538, 541-546, 581, and 582. NOTE: It should be noted that the impediments to the novitiate need to be clarified. The text of canon 542 places in grave doubt the validity of many professions which per-haps are never questioned. For example, how would one determine "fraud" in the case of a candidate who did not properly represent his true character? Canon 544, also, needs to be simplified. Canon 13 The whole o[ monastic formation pertains properly to the father of the monastery. However it is ordinarily ex-pedient that a novice master be named, following can-ons 559-560. Under the direction of the abbot, he will guide the formation of the novices according to the pro-gram proper to the institute. NOTE: This is the present law. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 2, 58; Code of Canon Law, canons 559-562; Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Sedes Sapientiae, May 31, 1956; Sacred Congregation for Re-ligious, General Statutes, July 7, 1956, art. 19, par. I; Ratio institutionis praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Introd., par. 20; nos. 2-5. Canon 14. After a novitiate of at least one year, and another pro-longed probation with some form of commitment, of at least three years according to the constitutions, profes-sion is made with the consent of the chapter and the mo-nastic blessing is received from the father of the monas-tery; and thus the monk becomes a member of the com-munity forever. NOTE: The profession of a monk is fundamentally a lifelong commitment before God to the monastic way of life. Therefore, the distinction between simple and solemn profession or temporary and perpetual vows is not suit-able for monks. During the prolon.ged probation, which certainly should precede a monasuc consecration which is perpetual and inviolable, it is fitting that some sort of bond exist--a promise, an oath, but preferably not a vow properly so called (so that the full significance of the monastic consecration through monastic vows is not ob-scured: "The Church not only raises the religious profes-sion to the dignity of a canonical state by her approval, but even manifests that this profession is a state conse-crated to God by the liturgical setting of that profes-sion."-- Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constztution on the Church, no. 45). Through this bond the candidate, in a way which is proportionate to the nature of the bond and the time involved, commits himself to the community and is dedicated to God. This bond could be perpetual on ¯ the part of the subject (e.g., first vows in the Society of Jesus). The obligation it places on the community in-creases with time (cf. below, canon 21). SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict. chs. 3, 58; Code of Canon Law, canons 572, par. 2; 574-575; Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Const. on the Church, no. 44; Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: Gen-eral Statutes, art. III, par. 2; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons 108-109; 112, par. 2; Apostolic Const., Sedes Sapienliae, May 31, 1956; Sacred Congregation for Religious, General Statutes, July 7, 1956, art. 7-8. Article 2--Studies Canon 15 1. Every autonomous monastery may have its own scho-lasticate. 2. If a monastery is not able to have a properly qnalified scholasticate, the monks shall be sent for studies to the scholasticate of another monastery or of a religious insti-tute which does meet the necessary requirements, or to the courses at a diocesan seminary. NOTE: Cf. the note under canon 10 above. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canon 587; Pius XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 123: Sacred Congregation for Religious, Ratio institutionis + ÷ Monastic Proposal VOLUME~ 26, 1967 ÷ ÷ ÷ Consilium M onastivum REVIEW FOR REklGIOUS prae'sertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd., par: 9~ no. 31. Canon 16 In regard to the program of studies, each institute should follow its own particular statutes, approved by the Apostolic See, providing an integral monastic formation, and also a full priestly training for those who are destined. to the priesthood. This formation should be inspired by the gospels, in harmony with tradition, drawing from the font of the liturgy, adapted to the present day, and inti. mately united with the celebration of the sacred liturgy and the contemplation of divine realities. NOTE: In the Apostolic Constitution, Sedes Sapientiae, and the accompanying General Statutes, Plus XII in-structed each institute to have its own program of forma-tion, especially for studies, adapted to the particular needs and circumstances of the institute. The monastic pro-gram ought to provide not only for the clerics, but for all the members of the monastic family, including the lay brothers, if there be such. "The primary, if not the sole purpose of those who have consecrated themselves to God is to pray to Him and to contemplate or meditate on divine realities; now how can they fulfill this important duty unless they have a profound and thorough knowledge of the teachings of our faith?"--Pius XI, Apostolic Epistle, Unigenitus Dei Filius, Mar. 19, 1924, no. 5. SOURCES: Second Vatican Council, Const. on the Sacred Liturgy, nos. 16-17; Decree on the Renewal of Religious Lqe, no. 18; Decree on Priestly Formation; Pius XI, Apostolic Epistle, Unigenitus Dei Filius, Mar. 19, 1924; Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Sedes Sapientiae, May 31, 1956; Sacred Congregation . for Religious, General Statutes, July 7, 1956, art. 19; Ratzo ~nstztutmn,s praesert~m stu&orum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, no. 32; Decree for the French (Solesmes) Congregation O.S.B., Apr. 8, 1965; Decree the Order of Reformed Cistercians, Dec. 27, 1965; Sacred Congregation of Rites, Instruction, Inter Oecumenici Concilii, Sept. 26, 1964, nos. 11-12, 18. Article 3.--Obligations Canon 17 All monks are bound to offer daily the prayer of the Church in a form approved by the Church, according to the norms of their statutes. NOTE: Tradition has always assigned to monks the duty of prayer. In some monastic institutes, due to the develop-ment among the various members of the monastic family, recognized by the Second Vatican Council (Decree on the Renewal of Religious LiIe, no. 15), all are now acknowl-edged to be truly monks. They have diverse duties and functions, even in regard to the Divine Office or some other public prayer of the Church, their participation being determined by the abbot, weighing individual ob- ¯ ligations and talents. Therefore it is necessary for common law to allow the constitutions of each monastic institute to specify the personal and choral obligations of its mem-bers. Moreover, it Should be noted that hermits, true monks, have their own proper traditions in this matter. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 18, 43, 50; Second Vatican Council, Const. on the Sacred Liturgy, nos. 95, 98; Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, nos. 9, 15; Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Fulgens radiatur, Mar. 21, 1947; Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. V; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apos-tolio's, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 157; John XXIII, Allocution, Vos paterno anirao, Sept. 25,.1959; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Decree for the French (Solesmes) Congre-gation O.S.B., Apr. 8,' 1965; Decree for the Order of Re. formed Cistercians, Dec. 27, 1965; Sacred Congregation of Rites, Instruction, Inter Oecumenici Concilii, Sept. 26, 1964, no. 82. Canon 18 Monastic work should be in keeping with the rule, constitutions, and traditions of each institute, assuring, with the aid of divine providence, appropriate support for the community. NOTE: All monks, including contemplatives, are obliged to manual or intellectual work by the natural law and by their duty of penance and reparation. Moreover, labor is a standard means of withdrawing the soul from dangers and guiding it toward spiritual horizons; it tenders part-nership with divine providence in the natural and super-natural orders; in labor charity matures. As the axiom, "ora et labora," proclaims, work has always been a basic norm and law of monastic life. However work is only one of the traditional triad: labor, liturgy, and lectio (sacred reading). A harmonious equilibrium must be maintained among these three. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 4, 48; Second Vati-can Council, Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, no. 13; Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Fulgens radmtur, Mar. 21, 1947; Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. VIII; Radio Message, Si Nous avons, July 26, 1958; Radio Message, Lorsque Nous, Aug. 2, 1958; John XXIII, Allocution, Notre joie, Oct. 20, 1960; Epistle, Recens a te, Oct. 20, 1960; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Instruction, Inter praeclara, Nov. 23, 1950; nos, XXVI-XXVII; Epistle to the Apostolic Nun-cios, Mar. 7, 1951. Article 4.--Trans[er Canon 19 A monk may transfer from one autonomous monastery to another with the permission of both abbots and the consent of the chapter of the recipient monastery. NOTE: Here transfer is limited to within the order of monks, where monastic status will remain intact. A transfer to another form of consecrated life requires the. authorizati6n of the Apostolic See. ÷ ÷ ÷ Mmfastic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 To require and accept, without requiring further re-course, the judgment of the abbots, who are close to the situation and know the monk better, is fully consonant with monastic tradition and the "principle of subsidi-arity." (Cf. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931; John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Mater et Magistra, May 15, 1961.) SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chap. 61; Code o{ Canon Law, canon 632; Plus XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 182, par. 1; Sacred Con-gregation for Religious, Decree of Mar. 21, 1952, "Lex propria," nos. 77, 96. Canon 20 A monk transferring to another institute must make a new novitiate or profession according to the require-ments of its constitutions. If the constitutions enjoin no obligation, novitiate is omitted and, after a trial period, the monk is definitively incorporated or returns to his original monastery. NOTE: Because the fundamental principles of the mo-nastic life are common to all monastic institutes, the repetition of the novitiate is not necessary; but because each institute has its own customs and traditions, some period of probation in the new institute is called for. However, if the probation is unduly prolonged this would be contrary to equity toward the monk and the other institute. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 1, 61; Code of Canon Law, canons 633-634; Plus XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 183, par. 2. Article 5.--Egress Consilium Monasticum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS Canon 21 In regard to the departure of members the constitu-tions of each institute and, with due proportion, canons 638-641, 646, and 668 are to be observed, as well as the following: 1. The abbot of an autonomous monastery with his council's consent, manifested by secret voting, can dis-miss or dispense a member from the commitment under-taken during the probation period. 2. In the case of a dismissal, there is a grave obligation in conscience to have truly proportionate causes and to give the member full liberty to make his response. 3. For the dismissal of a professed monk, the confirma-tion of the Sacred Congregation is required; therefore the abbot must immediately forward to it the decree of dismissal, the evidence, and the monk's responses. 4. The subject has the right, during ten days on which he can act, to appeal to the Apostolic See against the decree of dismissal. While this appeal is pending, a dis-missal has no juridic effect. NOTE: In restoring a member to secular life, a simplifi-cation of processes and the application of the "principle of subsidiarity" are very desirable. The local abbot and his counselors can better judge a case than a superior who is far removed. Such a procedure is more in accord with the concept of an autonomous monastery. The rights of the members are properly safeguarded by the power of appeal to the Holy See and, in the case of the professed monk, by the required confirmation of the Sacred Congre-gation. Note well that "professed monk" here means a member definitively incorporated into the community by monastic profession which is of its nature perpetual (cf. canon 14.). SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chap. 28; Code of Canon Law, canons 646-648, 656-662, 666, 668; Secretary of State, Rescript, Cure admotae, Nov. 4, no. 14. Canon 22 Dismissal frees the subject from all his commitments, including monastic vows, except those connected with major orders, safeguarding the prescriptions of canon 641, paragraph 1. NOTE: It seems more profitable to his spiritual well-being to free one dismissed from all his commitments to monastic life, as is ordinarily done in present practice. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canons 640, par. 1; 648. SECTION 2 SPECIFIC FORMS OF MONASTIC LIFE CENOBITIC LIFE Canon 23 The cenobitic life is one lived in community under a rule and an abbot, following Christ together in fraternal love, radiating in the Church a witness of generous, vigi-lant apostolic life. NOTE: Rule here is not limited to some rule already ap-proved by the Apostolic See, but extends to any rule, based on the ancient traditions, which may be approved in the future. That the abbot govern his community under the guidance of a rule is essential to maintain a stable and peaceful community life under an extensive personal authority. "Together" (in communi) is the element which distinguishes the cenobite from the hermit. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, Prologue, chap. 1; Sec-ond Vatican Council, Decree on the Renewal o[ Religious Li[e, no. 15; Pius XI, Apostolic Letter, Monachorum vita, Jan. 26, 1925; Plus xII Encyclical Letter, Fulgens radi- + + + Monastic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 35 ÷ ÷ ~on~ilium Monasticum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS atur, Mar. 21, 1947; Epistle, Sedecim ante saecula, Mar. 25, 1948; Epistle, Sexto decimo revoluto, May 31, 1956; Allocution, Nous sommes heureux, Apr. 11, 1958; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Ratio institutionis praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd., par. 5; nos. I, 6, 11. Article 1.--Government Canon 24 I. The abbot, father and shepherd of his monks in the spiritual and temporal orders, should have a long, even life-tenure of office, as long as he remains capable of ful-filling his duties, unless the constitutions provide other-wise. 2. The importance and gravity of the abbatial office requires of abbots and equivalent superiors that they tender their resignation, on their own initiative or at the invitation of competent authority, when the pressure advanced age or another serious cause undermines the proper execution of their office. NOTE: Although the abbot's spiritual paternity of its nature does not require perpetuxty in office, but only a rather extended term, nevertheless through the centuries life-tenure has almost always prevailed. (Cf. P. Salmon, L'abbd clans la tradition monastique [Paris, Sirey, 1962].) Such tenure is more desirable where more rests on the discretion and judgment of the superior lest there be incessant change, a cause of instability in men and organizations. Nevertheless common law should respect particular traditions which favor temporary abbots. But what is most important is that the constitutions of each institute provide very practical means whereby an incapable abbot can be released from office. An example can be drawn from the Declarations of the Subiaco Con-gregation of the Order of Saint Benedict: If it happens that an abbot through infirmity, age, or some other just cause becomes incapable of governing his monastery and tend-ers his resignation, it is sent to the Abbot General, who examines and decides the matter with the consent of his council. ; if however the abbot does not offer his resignation, ,the Abbot Visitor, with the greatest charity, should firmly admonish fiim to resign or request a co-adjutor before the monastery suffers from a lack of proper government. If the admonition fails, the Visitor is obliged to inform the chapter. ; when the chapter is not in session, the Visitor, with the counsel of other superiors in the province, examines and decides the case according to his own conscience. However the Abbot General's confirmation of the decision is required for validity. (No. 197) SOURCES: Rule o~ St. Benedict, chs. 2, 31, 49, 64, 65; Code of Canon Law, canons 505, 530; Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Pastoral O0~ce of Bishops in the Church, no. 21; Pius XII, Apostolic Letter, Fulgens radiatur, Mar. 21, 1947; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apos-tolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 32, par. 1; Allocution, Nous sommes heureux, Apr. 11, 1958; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Ratio institutionis praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd., par. 20; nos. 2, 20, 23, 30, 35; Decree Ior the French (Solesmes) Congregation O.S.B., Apr. 8, 1965. Canon 25 From the day of his installation the abbot, besides the other rights of major superiors, has jurisdiction in both forums, according to the norms of the constitutions. NOTE: Jurisdiction is essential for an abbot to fulfill his oblig.ations as spiritual father and shepherd of his community. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 2, 3, 60, 62, 64, 65; Code of Canon Law, canons 488, no. 8; 501, par. 1; 503; 514, par. 1; 647; 896; 1395, par. 3; 1579, par. 1; 2385; 2386; Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. VI, no. 2; Apostolic Letter, Post-quam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons 26; 46, par. 1. Canon 26 Abbots, legitimately elected, should within three months of their election receive the abbatial blessing; and then they may use the abbatial insignia. NOTE: This is in accord with canon 625 oE the present law. The insignia which traditionally belong to the ab-batial office signify the autonomy of the monastery. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canon 625; Pius XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 174. Canon 27 1. The abbot may call his monks to the priesthood or diaconate, providing them with dimissorial letters in conformity with the norms of common law and the con-stitutions of the institute. 2. The canonical title for the ordination of a monk is that of the monastery of his stability. NOTE: This is the present law. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chap. 62; Code of Canon Law, canons 964, no. 2; 982, par. 1; Pius XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 132; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Instruction, Quantum religiones omnes, Dec. 1, 1931, no. 16; Ratio institutionis praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, nos. 26, 33. Canon 28 1. The abbot should summon the community for counsel on all important matters, as determined by the constitutions; for lesser matters he need only consult the council of seniors. ÷ ÷ ÷ Monastic Proposal VOLUME. 26, "1967 Consiliura Monastieum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 2. All who have been definitively received into the monastic family have voice in chapter, unless the con-stitutions expressly provide otherwise. NOTE: Because of its discretion and authority the Rule of St. Benedict in a relatively short time became known throughout Europe and became almost the exclusive rule for monks. Because of this authority and the experience of centuries, it seems good to introduce into the common law, even though it may be something proper to the mind of St. Benedict, that the abbot consult the seniors in lesser matters and the whole community or chapter in more weighty ones. Concerning the equality of voice, cf. the notes under canons 11 and 14. "However, monasteries of men., ac-cording to their nature and constitutions, may admit clerics and laymen. . on an equal footing and with. equal rights and obhgatlons, apart from those flowing from sacred orders."--Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, no. 15. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chap. 3; Code of Canon Law, canons 516; 578, no. 3; Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, no. 15; Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Fulgens radiatur, Mar. 21, 1947; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Decree for ihe French (Solesmes) Congregation O.S.B., Apr. 8, 1965; Decree for the Order of Reformed Cistercians, Dec. 27, 1965, no. 1. Article 2.--Apostolate Canon 29 The cenobitic vocation can express itself in some apos-tolate or work of Christian charity legitimately under-taken in harmony with the spirit and authentic nature of the institute. NOTE: This historical fact, which has merited the praise of the Church and society through the centuries, responds to the needs of souls today, making monasteries sources o[ life for the Christian people. SOURCES: Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Re-newal of Religious Life, nos. 9, 20; Pius XI, Apostolic Const., Umbratilem remotamque vitam, July 8, 1924; En-cyclical Letter, Quinquagesimo ante anno, Dec. 23, 1929; Allocution, Tous les Ordres, Mar. 12, 1931; Plus XII, Encyclical Letter, Fulgens radiatur, Mar. 21, 1947; Apos-tolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apOstolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 154; Allocution, Omnibus probe, Sept' 24, 1953; Encyclical Letter, Ecclesiae fastos, June 5, 1954; Apostolic Const., Series Sapientiae, May 31, 1956; Epistle, Sexto decirao revoluto, May 31, 1956; Epistle, Iam quintum expletur saeculum, Aug. 4, 1956; Radio Message, Lorsque Nous, Aug. 2, 1958; John XXIII, Allocution, Vos paterno animo, Sept. 25, 1959; Paul VI, Allocution, Quale salute, Oct. 24, 1964; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Ratio institu. tionis praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd., par. 15-17: nos. 24, 76. Canon 30 Monks engaged in extending Christ's dominion through the apostolate must endeavor to maintain a solitude and silence in harmony with their vocation. NOTE: Here it is not a question of maintaining papal enclosure for monks who by their institute are dedicated to the external apostolate, but of keeping their monas-teries, according to the mind of Pope Paul VI (cf. Sources), as sanctuaries of prayer. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chs. 4, 43, 66-67; Code of Canon Law, canons 597, 599, 605-606; Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Const., on the Church, no. 44; Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, nos. 16, 20; Pius XI, Epistle, Equidem verba, Mar. 21, 1924; Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950; Apostolic .Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons .140-142; En-cyclical Letter, Ecclesiae fastos, June 5, 1954; John XXIII, Allocution, Vos paterno animo, Sept. 25, 1959; Paul VI, Quale salute, Oct. 24, 1964. CHAPTER 2 EREMITI~AL LIFE Canon 31 Canonically a hermit is a monk withdrawn from the world, pursuing the anchoritic life, to attain complete openness to God in solitude, repose, and silence. Seeking the perfection of love through joyful, ready penance, and assiduous reading and prayer, he must not fail to have solicitude for the whole Church. NOTE: It is evident from tradition and clearly recognized in the Rule of St. Benedict that there are two kinds of monks: cenobites and anchorites or hermits. As there is a renaissance of eremitical life in the Western Church today, the revised Code must provide for it. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chap. I; Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Const. on the Church, no. 43; Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, nos. 1, 5-7, 9; Pius XI, Apostolic Const., Umbratilem remotamque vitam, July 8, 1924; Encyclical Letter, Rerum Ecclesiae, Feb. 28, 1926; Epistle, Compertum est, June 5, 1927; Apostolic Const., Inter religiosos coetus, July 2, 1935; Pius xII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 313, par. 4; Allocutlon, Nous sommes heureux, Apr. 11, 1958. Canon 32 Four kinds of hermits are to be distinguished: 1. Monks who belong to an eremitical order. 2. Monks or religious who live in solitude while actu-ally remaining under their own superiors. 3. Those who are united in a certain manner in a ÷ + + Mona,tie Proposal VOLUMI: 23, 1967 39 ondlium Mona~ti~um REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS fraternity or laura, without forming a community or federation properly so called. 4. Finally,° those who,live a completely solitary life. NOTE: Because of their differing relationships with ec.~ clesiastical superiors, these four expressions of eremitical life ought to be distinguished. They each require a differ-ent canonical provision. An eremitical order would be almost totally ruled by its own proper constitutions ap-proved by the Apostolic See. SOURCES: Pius XI, Apostolic Const., Umbratilem re-motamque vitam, July 8, 1924; Epistle, Compertum est, June 5, 1927; Apostolic Const., Inter religiosos coetus, July 2, 1935. Canon 33 A monk or religious must obtain the permission of his immediate major superior to enter upon the eremitical life as it is defined in number 2 of the preceding canon. This superior may establish certain,no~rms to be observed by the hermit. After he has been duly tried, the superior may not recall him to community life without a serious cause. In the event of such a summons, the monk or re-ligious may appeal to the Apostolic See, his eremitical status remaining intact while the appeal is pending. NOTE: In conformity with the "principle of subsidiarity" the immediate :superior should and can better judge the suitability of his subject's withdrawing into solitude. After an adequate probation, the hermit should justly have some assurance that he may remain in his chbsen state. SOURCES: Rule of St. Benedict, chap. 1; Pius XI, Apos-tolic Const., Inter religiosos coetus, July 2, 1935. Canon 34 I. The canonical establishment of a fraternity or an association of hermits is reserved to the Apostolic See or the local ordinary. 2. Each member in such an association retains his own proper canonical status. Nevertheless all are subject to the local ordina~ry, ev~en by their vow of obedience if they have one, but the ordinary will habitually delegate his jurisdiction over them to a moderator" or spiritual father elected from the association. NOTE: It is highly recommended that hermits be united in a fraternity that they may give each other spiritual and material assistance. Such an association would require that someone function as moderator or father, and it is he who would be responsible before the Church for the good order of the fraternity . Canon 35 One who wishes ,to live a completely solitary life will not be considered canonically a hermit unless he receives the permission of the local ordinary. In this case the bishop, either personally or through another, must watch that the hermit faithfully lives the life he professes. NOTE: In order that a person be established in a canoni-cal state it is necessary that ecclesiastical authority act. This would ordinarily be the bishop, to whom the hermit, by reason of his status, would subject himself in a special manner. In this way false hermits can be distinguished from true ones. Canon 36 1. A professed monk or religious must have the per-mission of his immediate major superior to transfer to an eremitical association or undertake the solitary life. 2. Having obtained such permission, the monk or re-ligious remains bound by his vows and other obligations of his profession which are compatible with his new state, and though deprived of active and passive voice, he en-joys the spiritual privileges of his institute and may wear the habit. After a reasonable period of probation he can-not be recalled to the cloister against his will, nor may he return there without the superior's permission. 3. The preceding, with appropriate changes, is ap-plicable to members of societies without vows and secular institutes. NOTE: 1. Cf. note under canon 33. 2. This norm is almost identical with canon 639 of the present Code with the significant exception of re-taining the habit, because a life publicly consecrated to God is still being pursued. However, he can assume the habit of the eremitical association if it has one. 3. This is an application of canon 681 to a re-stored eremitic state. SOURCES: 1. Rule of St, Benedict, chap. 1; Pius XI, Apostolic Const., Inter religiosos coetus, July 2, 1935. 2. Code of Canon Law, canon 639; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Indults: Protocol Number 15112/65, Mar. 18, 1965; Protocol Number 1755/64, Afig. 8, 1966. 3. Code of Canon Law, canon 681; Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life, no. 1. Canon 37 The ordinary may not require a hermit, priest or dea-con, to exercise the sacred ministry except in a particular case because of a serious, urgent need. NOTE: When the Church canonically approves the eremitic life, it should also secure its integrity. SOURCES: Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Re-newal o[ Religious Life, nos. 7, 9, 20; Decree on the Pas-toral Office oI Bishops in the Chu.rch, no. 35. Monast~ Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 41 + ÷ Consilium M onasticum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS Canon 58 1. For serious, external reasons, the ordinary can send a hermit who is a monk or religious to some religious house, or even, if the situation calls for it, reduce him to secular status. In this latter case the hermit must im-mediately put off the religious habit. The ordinary, how-ever, must immediately submit the matter to the judg-ment of the Holy See. 2. For the same reasons, a hermit who is neither a monk or religious can be evicted from his hermitage by the ordinary. He must then lay aside any distinctive garb. For serious offenses proportionate penalties can be imposed according tO t'he norms of law. NOTE: This provision applies the norms of canons 653 and 668 of the present Code to the eremitical state. SOURCES: Code of Canon Law, canons 653, 668. CHAPTER INTEGRAL CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE Canon 39 However pressing the needs of the active apostolate may be, institutes of men and women which are wholly ordered to contemplation always retain their role in the Mystical Body of Christ. Their members should occnpy themselves with God alone, in solitude and silence, in constant, devoted prayer and joyful, ready penitence. NOTE: All monks live a contemplative life, but according to particular traditions, in varying degrees many also en-gage in an active apostolate. The approved constitutions of individual monastic institutes determine the external apostolate or specify the institute as wholly ordered to the integral contemplative life. SOURCES: Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Const. on the Church, nos. 44, 46; Decree on the Renewal of Re-ligious Life, nos. 7, 9; Decree on the Mission Activity of the Church, nos. 18, 40; Plus XI, Epistle, Non sine animi, May 28, 1923; Apostolic Const., Umbratilem remotamque vitam, July 8, 1924; Apostolic Letter, Monachorum vita, Jan. 26, 1925; Encyclical Letter, Rerum Ecc.lesiae, Feb. 28, 1926; Epistle, Compertum est, June 5, 1927; Pius XII, Epistle, Quemadmodum Decessor Noster, Nov. 4, 1941; Encyclical Letter, Mystici Corporis, June 29, 1943; Apos-tolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Stat-utes, art. II, par. 2; Allocution, Annus sacer, Dec. 8, 1950; Encyclical Letter, Sacra virginitas, Mar. 25, 1954; Epistle, Iam quintum' expletur saeculum, Aug. 4, 1956; Allocution, Nous sommes heureux, Apr. 11, 1958; Radio Message, Cddant volontiers, July 19, 1958; Radio Message, Si Nous avons, July 26, 1958; Radio Message, Lorsque Nous, Aug. 2, 1958; John XXIII, Allocution, Notre joie, Oct. 20, 1960; Epistle, Recens ate, Oct. 20, 1960; Allocution, Gli innumerevoli ceri, Feb. 2, 1961; Epistle, Il tempio massimo, July 2, 1962; nos. I, III; Epistle, Causa praeclara, July 16, 1962; Allocution, C'est ti Rome, Sept. 1, 1962; Paul VI, Allocution, Quale salute, Oct. 24, 1964; Sacred Congrega-tion for Religious, Ratio institutionis praesertim studi-orum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, no. 74; Secred Congrega-tion of Rites, Decree of Feb. 18, 1934; Decree of Apr. 20, 1943; Secretary of State, Epistle of June 5, 1952. Canon 40 1. The contemplative life excludes participation in the external apostolate outside the strict limits of the monas-tery, except in cases where it is truly necessary, and then for a limited time only, concerning which things the abbot is to be the prudent judge. 2. Nevertheless, priests of the order can fittingly fulfill the office of confessor or chaplain among their own nuns. 3. Outside these cases the ordinary of the place may not call upon them to exercise external ministry, so that they might easily be able to effectively fulfill their proper mission toward the whole Church. NOTE: 1. Some ministry is necessary within the monas-tery, some monks being appointed to serve their brethren, others to satisfy the need~ of ~uests and visitors. But it must always and everywhere be evident that the contem-plative life is the first and principal end of the monastery. Therefore the ~ninistry of contemplatives must be of such a nature and so tempered as to place, time, mode, and manner, that a truly and solidly contemplative life, both for the community as a whole and for the individual monks, is preserved and.constant!y nourished and strength-ened. 2. This is necessary so that the nuns can receive a formation truly in harmony with the spirit of the institute. This duty of engendering and nourishing the spirit of the order should not impede but rather enkindle the contemplative life of the chaplain and confessor. 3. Because members of exclusively contemplative institutes are to participate in the pastoral office of the bishops in the Church by their witness of an evangelical life of prayer and penance, they need to be exempted from the active works of the diocese. SOURCES: Second Vatican Council, Decree on the Re-newal of Religious Life, nos. 7, 9, 20; Decree on the Pas-toral Office of Bishops in the Church, nos. 35; Plus XI, Apostolic Const., Umbratilem remotamque vitam, July 8, 1924; Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. IX, par. 2, no. 2; Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canon 154, par. 1; Radio Message, Lorsque Nous, Aug. 2, 1958; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Epistle to the Apostolic Nuncios, Mar. 7, 1951; Decree for the Order of Reformed Cistercians, June 27, 1956; Ratio institutionis praesertim studiorum O.S.C.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd., pa~. 17; no. 76, par. 2. 2. Pius XII, Radio Message, Cddant volon-tiers, July 19, 1958; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Epistle to the Apostolic Nuncios, Mar. 7, 1951; Ratio ÷ ÷ ÷ Monasti~ Prtr'posal VOLUME 26, 1967 4. 4. 4. Consilium Monasticum REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS institutionis praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd., par. 24; no. 76, par. 2. 3. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Const. on the Church, no. 46; Decree on the Renewal o[ Religious Li[e, nos. 7, 9; Decree on the Pastoral Office o[ Bishops in the Church, no. 35; Decree on the Mission Activity o] the Church, nos. 18, 40; Pius XI, Apostolic Const., Umbratilem remotamque vitam, July 8, 1924; Apostolic Letter, Monachorum vita, Jan. 26, 1925; Encyclical Letter, Rerum Ecclesiae, Feb. 28, 1926; Pius XII, Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes, art. IX, par. 2, no, 2; Radio Message, Lorsque Nous, Aug. 2, 1958; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Decree [or the Order o[ Re[ormed Cistercians, June 27, 1956. Canon 41 1. To preserve recollection and monastic peace, a stricter enclosure should be carefully maintained in all monasteries which profess the integral contemplative life. 2. Abbots must see to the faithful observance of the constitutions in regard to travel and visits. NOTE: 1. In exclusively contemplative monasteries of monks and nuns, papal enclosure should be maintained but, with the consultation of the monasteries, it should be adapted to time and place, abrogating the obsolete and the automatic censures ~[or a breach of enclosure. 2. This is the present law; but fittingly broadened so that an abbot, and by equal right an abbess, for serious reasons may admit visitors of both sexes into the enclosure. SOURCES: 1. Code of Canon Law, canon 1291; Second Vatican Council; Decree on the Renewal o[ Religious Life, nos. 7, 16; Plus XI, Apostolic Const., Umbratilem remotamque vitam, July 8, 1924; Apostolic Letter, Mona-chorum vita, Jan. 26, 1925; Plus xII, Apostolic Const., Sponsa Christi, Nov. 21, 1950: General Statutes~ art. IV, par. 2; Sacred Congregation for Religious, Instruction, nter praeclara, Nov. 23, 1950; Decree [or the Order of Re[ormed Cistercians, June 27, 1956; Ratio institutionis praesertim stt~diorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, no. 73. 2. Code of Canon Law, canon 606, par. 1; Plus XII, Apostolic Letter, Postquam apostolicis, Feb. 9, 1952, canons 141, 144. Canon 42 l. In institutes of the integral contemplative life, priestly training ought to conform to the norms of com-mon law as adapted to the contemplative life by their own approved programs of study. 2. If a monk-priest transfers from the contemplative life to the active ministry he should.undergo a period of practical pastoral training. NOTE: Pastoral formation should prepare priests to worthily fulfill their various apostolic duties as the Church desires and their institute requires by its nature and end. For this reason students in exclusively contemplative monasteries ordinarily are not trained in parochial prac-tices but in those duties to which the abbot might assign them. Hence it is good to require additional practical pastoral formation for one transferring. SOURCES: 1. Pius XlI, Apostolic Const., Sedes Sapien-tiae, May 31, 1956; Sacred Congregation for Religious, General Statutes, July 7, 1956, art. 19; Ratio institutioni~ praesertim studiorum O.C.S.O., Nov. 27, 1959, Introd., par. 14-17; no. 76. 2. Second Vatican Council, Decree on Priestly Formation, no. 19; Plus X!I, Apostolic Const., Sedes Sapientiae, May 31, 1956; Paul VI, Allocution, Magno gaudio, May 23, 1964. + + + Monastic Proposal VOLUME 26, 1967 45 PATRICK GRANFIELD An Interview with Abbot Butler Patrick Granfield is professor of the-ology at Catholic University and a monk of St. An-selm's Abbey; 19th and South Dakota Ave. N.E.; Wash-ington, D.C. 20017. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 46 Interviewer:* In Rome, at the end of the Council, you said in a public address that the Decree on the Adaptation and Renewal of the Religious Life was a summons to revolution. What did you mean by that? Abbot Butler: The Decree, of course, considers the religious life in the light of the aggiornamento in gen-eral. It spells out the meaning of the word aggiorna-. mento by talking about adapted renovation of religious life. It takes the criteria for adaptation, I think, from the notion of renovation. When it gets back to what it means by renovation, it appears that this means re-covering the spirit in which the founder of your re-ligious institute created the body to which you belong. There is stated, or could very easily be evoked from the document, the distinction between the spirit and pur-poses of the founder's creation and the actual contingent form into which he put it. As I see the meaning of the document, religious are entitled to regard as contingent and expendable not only all the accretions which have been added to the founder's original institution, but even the contingent forms in which he expressed his spirit. Religious are to try to reexpress that spirit in forms which 'are relevant and contemporary. Interviewer: Is that revolution? /lbbot Butler: Technically, it's not revolution, be-cause it's a question of going back to primal sources. But the practical consequences will look very much like revolution, if we. take this seriously, and accept with both hands the invitation that has been offered us by the Church. Interviewer: Perhaps a more fundamental question deals with the desirability of religious life. Do you ¯ This interview will form one chapter in a book of interviews called Theologians at Wor~ to be published by Macmillan during 1967. think that there is any place for religious life in the changing Church? Abbot Butler: It is a little difficult for me to give a revolutionary answer to that question since I was one, in a general way at least as a Council father, who passed the constitution, De Ecclesia. As you know De Ecclesia has consecrated a chapter to the religious life and seemed to give a kind of rationale of it. I feel that that limits one a little here. However, I can say that since religious life has been such a featnre of the life of the Church virtually speaking throughout the ages~ certainly you get that idea from St. Cyprian in the third century writing his treatise on virgins and the virgins of that time were the forerunners of religious life as we know it--that I think it would be very difficult to say that the religious life has no more than a merely transi-tory and passing value in the Church for a particular age. What I think is much more difficult, even after having decided that one has to find room for the re-ligious life in the Church, even in the aggiornamento Church, is to find a rationale for it. In recent discus-sions these difficulties have been accentuated. I had always thought that I knew more or less what the re-ligious life was, although I was rather doubtful how I would give a definition of monasticism as a species of religious life. However, after these discussions I came away feeling completely agnostic about the definition of religious life altogether. Interviewer: What of the suggestion placing religious life between the lay state and the clerical state? Abbot Butler: You cannot locate it in this way. You are applying the wrong criteria if you try to find a place for it between sacred orders and the lay state. Obviously, the vocation to religious life appears to come to men whether they are lay or sacerdotal. Or supposing that they are laymen at the time, it may come along with a vocation to the sacerdotal state. It seems to me that it has to be seen more in the charismatic order than in the sacramental order. There is a sacramental distinction between the clergy and the laity. But the religious life, although it sounds rather paradoxical to put it like this, is a kind of institutionalized charism. Interviewer: Who, then, is a religious? Abbot Butler: A religious is a person who has become aware of and has responded to a more special invitation from God to take Christianity at its maximal signifi-cance, instead of trying to get past with the minimal interpretation. Then, having seen and responding to it, he has wished to safeguard himself against future temp-tations to relapse on the minimizing basis of things by + + Abbot Butler VOLU~E 26, ].967 ÷ ÷ ÷ Patrick Granfield REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 48 committing himself for the future, as well as for the moment, by vows. Interviewer: It seems that you are implying that the lay person is not committed to the maximal exercise of Christianity. Abbot Butler: I think all Christians are called to it, but what makes a bit of difference with religious is that he has become in some special way conscious of that vocation. He has apprehended it as something that appertains to him personally. He has wished to make a response to it and he has desired to commit himself to it by an engagement, which helps keep him from any failure. Interviewer: How is the religious any different from the dedicated Christian who, conscious of his baptismal character, makes every effort to grow in the love of God? Abbot Butler: Leaving aside the question of the pub-lic nature of the religious vocations in the Church, I agree that both have become conscious.of the call to holiness and both of them have willed to make apposite responses. But the religious has added the feature of dedication, 'by which he commits himself for the future. Now~ if anybody does that, whether or not he plays a role in the public life of the Church as a religious, he is dedicated basically in. the same way as a religious pro-vided he has committed himself to the future. ,Interviewer: What do you think about the traditional way of speaking of the religious life as a state of per-fection? Abbot B~ttler: The term comes out of a world of discourse that is so 'alien to us these days that it is more misleading than helpful. Interviewer: Do you think it is theologically inac-curate? Abbot Butler: I suspect that if you take it in its full theological depth, it meant for the medieval people who invented this way of talking much the same sort of thing that I mean by the engagement of oneself for the future in a maximal practice of Christianity. This is what the status pkrfectionis means. Interviewer: How do you relate this to the monastic state? Abbot Btttler: It is difficult enough to settle on what one means by a religious, but it's more difficult to decide what one means by a monk. If you look the world over yo.u.find an extraordinary variety of interpretations of Wtiat monasticism means. This is not merely a modern phenomenon; other ages had a similar problem. This is partly due to the fact that monasticism grew up almost spontaneously in an age which had not developed a con-ceptualized theology. If is rhther like--if I may use an analogy---comparing the British Constitution with the American Constitution. The British Constitution is, practically speaking, undefinable because it is the result of gradual growth. It goes back to periods long before men reflected scientifically on their experiences and their intentions. Whereas the American Constitution came from a highly sophisticated age and was a written con-stitution from the first. Therefore you might compare the Society of Jesus with the American Constitution, since both came from a sophisticated, time and were able to define themselves at the moment they came into origin. But monasticism just grew in the Church. It is extremely difficult to look back and to decide what was the basic and not merely the accidental structure. I was talking about this p,roblem very recently with Canon Charles Moeller. He said that one of his theology professors, who had spent a lifetime studying the fathers of the desert and early monasticism, told him that noth-ing is more difficult than to elucidate the historical origins and theological basis of monasticism. Interviewer: What are your own observations on the nature of monasticism? Abbot Butler: Yes, to return to your question. In Rome, I think it was at the end of the second session, a group of us got together to discuss this question. Some were already a bit frightened about certain proposed changes in canon law that applied to monks. Someone suggested that the formal object of the monastic voca-tion was simple vacate Deo--to have time for God, to be open to God. Other orders and congregations in the Church have specific work, particular ways in which they serve God. But the whole point about monasticism is that there is no special way. It is just vacate Deo-- dedication to God in and for Himself. Interviewer: Do you agree with that explanation? Abbot Butler: Well, I thought it was rather good until the abbot president of a missionary monastic group said: "Well, if that is monasticism, then we are not monks." Another view was given by the Abbot of Montserrat who said that the thing that really makes a monk is the special place he gives to lectio divina--prayer in the wide sense. He explained that while the monk does work like anybody else, what makes him a monk is the "Work of God," the Opus Dei, the official public recitation of the Divine Office. The Rule of St. Benedict supports this and gives great emphasis to lectio divina. It is this dedication to a kind of meditative absorption of the whole Christian spiritual tradition in lectio divina which constitutes the specificity of the monk. Whether that's the case or not, I don't know, but it's the latest suggestions that I've heard of a positive kind. 4- 4- 4- Abbot Butler VOLUME 26, 1967 ,t9 ÷ ÷ ÷ Patrick Granfield REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 50 Interviewer: One frequently hears the criticism that the monastic state is a great waste of talent, time, and effort, a kind of religious escapism from the needs and responsibilities of the world. Abbot Bulter: Yes, this is often heard. One answer can be found in the Constitution of the Church which says that the religious life is a witness to the transcen-dental claims of Christianity, It says that the religious life "not only witnesses to the fact of a new and eternal life acquired by the redemption of Christ," but it "foretells the resurrected state and the glory of the heavenly kingdom." The same document insists that the religious life can be of great advantage to the salvific mission of the Church. Interviewer: Hasn't the time come for immediate re-newal of the religious life? Abbot Butler: I think it is a time for drastic measures. I think that most certainly. One of the things that really rather upset me at the Council was that when-ever the question of religious came up, there was an extreme supersensitiveness on the part of some religious superiors of whom of course I am one. They seemed to have an esprit de corps that was almost neurotic. I felt that they were consistently refusing even to make the effort to get down to the theological depths of the problem. They were continually taking refuge behind canon law. One of the first things we have to do is to delegalize the whole thing. We have to get down to the theological view and leave aside the legalistic view. Interviewer: How do you explain this sheltering be-hind canon law? Abbot Butler: I am not sure how to explain it. I suspect that it indicates a fear of the action of the local hierarchy or the local bishop. For the older orders, of course, the obvious defense against the bishop is ex-emption. But exemption is a pure invention of canon law. The bias that some religious show to canon law distorts the true picture of things. We also have to get behind some of the second-rate theologizing of what we used to call the scholastic tradi-tion. I am becoming extremely skeptical about the old divisions that we've been used to, the distinctions be-tween the active and contemplative life and the mixed life. I don't believe that that has any deep roots in tradition. If you study the fathers, you will discover that they meant something different by the active and contemplative life than the scholastic theologians. Interviewer: Do you have any practical suggestions on how monastic life might be renewed? Abbott Butler: There is a tremendous amount of "clearing of the decks" to be done. To get down to particulars, we should begin with the Divine Office which plays such a prominent part in our lives. For nearly all monks today the articulation of the daily Office into eight separate hours is no longer authentic. It no longer corresponds to a vital need. It was done in St. Benedict's time when they followed the seasons of the year and the hours of the sun and lived in a rural community. A much more meaningful way of dividing up the Office for us would be to take a leaf out of the Constitution on the Liturgy and to see Lauds and Vespers as the two hinges on which the whole Office revolves. That way you have a morning and an evening Office and you can add something in the way of a "Little Hour" at mid-day. Besides that I think that we need a solid block of prayer with the Psalms and lectio divina which could be put at any'convenient hour. This type of articulation rings much truer. Interviewer: The younger .generation would agree with that. Abbot Butler: I am very interested in the younger generation, although I don't pretend to understand it. It would be absurd for anybody of my age to pretend to. I do seem to glimpse certain ~ things about, them and I think that they have a horror, which I can respect as I understand it, for anything .that is phony--anything that is hypocritical, unauthentic. They feel that we are preserving the present structure of 'the monastic Office just for the sake of preserving: For them the present articulation of the Office doesn't make sense. They almost shriek with repulsion when~ for instance, we say Sext and None in one full swoop and start off twice in the course of ten minutes with Deus in adiutorium meum intende, which is obviously, the 'beginning of,a new time of prayer. It's like bad music to them. Some-thing should be done about this, Interviewer: Do you think that the. Psalms are still authentic vehicles of prayer? Abbot Butler: The Psalms, I feel (and perhaps I'm a bit old-fashioned about it), are the inspired prayer-book of the Church and they have a permanent value. They are so remote that they are easier to universalize and to apply to new situations than some modern prayers would prove to be. Interviewer: What of the readings from the fathers? Abbot Butler: This is something else. I agree that 'the fathers for the most part are not helpful. Perhaps better selections could be found. Let us take, for example, the Homilies in our Office ~hich are supposed to be the exegesis for the Scripture of the day. Now if there is one thing that is quite clear about the fathers, it is that their exegesis was nearly always wrongly,It's one of the 4. 4. 4. Abbot Butler VOLUME 26, !967 ÷ ÷ Patrick Granfield REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 52 most remarkable things about the fathers, I don't know why the strict conservative who thinks that tradition is an independent channel of preserving revelation hasn't insisted more on this point. The early fathers always get the right results by the wrong exegetical method. Interviewer: The vow of stability, that unique Bene-dictine vow whereby one promises to live in a particular monastery, is being reexamined by the monks them-selves. I recently met a monk who justified his nearly two hundred days of absence from the monastery in one year' by the argument that the essential part of the vow of stability is the stability of the heart or loyalty and not merely the geographic stability of place. What are your thoughts on stability? Abbot Butler: Lord Walsingham, foreign diplomat in the reign of Elizabeth I, used to describe his job as being to lie abroad in the service of her majesty. I think that the formal element in stability is the sta-bilitas cordis stability of the heart. Now we are get-ting down very near the basic roots of the monastic problem. Monasticism had its genesis in an entirely different cultural background from what we are grow-ing into at the present day. Stability meant a great deal more and had a great deal more positive value in those days than it has today. It meant that you grew into a total 'local environment which was only doing rather better and more deliberately what everybody tended to do in those days. There wasn't much instability in the life of the ordinary person. Today we live in a world where the horizons are so widened and the socialization has become such, that the old idea of local stability does not have the same role to play in monasticism as it used to. I say this with great.hesitation, because I am con-vinced that local stability has an obvious value. It makes the stabilitas cordis not merely a kind of pious velleity but a positive incarnational thing. As men, we do form a concrete, human family in our local monas-tery and we interact on one another directly in a very obvious way. It could be that because the world is going so socialized and so universalized that it needs a counter-poise that monasticism offers. Interviewer: You don:t feel that the uniqueness of Benedictine monasticism is in jeopardy if a liberal view of stability is adapted?. Abbot Butler: What is most specific in monasticism, compared with other forms of religious life in the Church, is allegiance to the local abbot. In orders like the Dominicans or Franciscans°your allegiance would be to a superior who rules thousands of people all over the world. He is a remote figure and few of his subjects have any contact with him. Even if a Benedictine spends half a year outside the monastery he does know his abbot personally and has a personal link with the other brethren in the monastery. This does make a great difference. Interviewer: On the other hand, the Dominicans, Franciscans, or Jesuits also have their local superior and they live in a community structure. While it's true that monasticism insists more on the communitarian aspect of life, can it still do so if it accepts a very wide view of stability which does not stress the local aspect--the permanence in a particular place? Abbot Butler: It is very difficult to conceptualize such things. But in my own abbey, for instance, we have a certain number of parishes where the monks are in charge and they spend years outside the monastery. I feel that the relationships between the monks on the distant parishes and his abbot are of a different human quality from the relations .between a friar and his local superior. Apart from the pope there is no higher supe-rior for a monk than his abbot. Interviewer: Declericalization is a primary goal in the present religious renewal. How does this apply practi-cally to monasticism? Abbot Butler: The separation in monastic life be-tween the clerical family and the lay brotherhood is in itself an absolutely outrageous thingl Here we must get back to the spirit of the founder. If there is one thing about which I am absolutely certain it is that St. Benedict conceived of monastic life as a way of being a Christian, not a way of being a priest. You might be a priest as well, but it is accidental to your monastic vocation. The present state of things in monasticism in the West is a bit of a scandal. It almost amounts to a dictation to the Holy Ghost. You tell the Holy Ghost that He may not give a full monastic vocation to any-body unless he couples it with a quite different thing, which is a sacerdotal vocation. Interviewer: Historically the tendency to clericalize goes back to the eighth or ninth century. Abbot Butler: It did begin as early as that, but I think that the monstrosity of the lay brother probably came in about the end of the eleventh century or the beginning of the twelfth. In a legalized form it was a Cistercian invention. It is helpful to remember that we do belong to the Catholic Church and that Eastern monasticism has never fallen into this awful abyss. Interviewer: Let us change the subject to theology. As an Englishman and a theologian, do you think that modern theology has successfully answered the challenge put forth by linguistic analysis? Abbot Butler: No. ÷ + ÷ Abbot Butler VOLUME 26, 1967 53 ÷ ÷ ÷ REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 54 Interviewer: Do you think theology has a duty to answer? 'Abbot Butler: Yes, there is a duty. I would like to preface my remarks by saying that I am not a pro-fessional philosopher. I am inclined to think that lin-guistic analysis is a rather provincial phenomenon and a rather transitory stage in the total history of philosophy. It will probably have done some good in much the same way as the Greek Sophists, in forc.ing men to be careful in their use of language and to reflect upon their use of language. In toto, linguistic analysis is not too impor-tant, but in the actual situation it happens to be im-portant because it controls a great deal of the higher culture of the West in its more sophisticated side. I don't think that we hav

Die Erinnerung an den Nationalsozialismus und den Holocaust ist in stetiger Transformation begriffen. Dieser Wandel gewinnt ebenso an Bedeutung wie die Entwicklung der digitalen Holocaust Education. Dies zeigt sich nicht zuletzt an immer neuen digitalen Vermittlungsangeboten und georeferenzierten Webapplikationen, in denen Erinnerungsorte auf digitalen Landkarten markiert und im Sinne des Deep Mappings mit weiterführenden Informationen versehen werden. Die Beiträger*innen diskutieren diese Entwicklungen kritisch und stellen die unterschiedlichen Aspekte von digitalen georeferenzierten Dokumentations-, Erinnerungs- und Vermittlungsprojekten vor.

"In this absorbing transnational history, Alex Lubin reveals the vital connections between African American political thought and the people and nations of the Middle East. Spanning the 1850s through the present, and set against a backdrop of major political and cultural shifts around the world, the book demonstrates how international geopolitics, including the ascendance of liberal internationalism, established the conditions within which blacks imagined their freedom and, conversely, the ways in which various Middle Eastern groups have understood and used the African American freedom struggle to shape their own political movements. Lubin extends the framework of the black freedom struggle beyond the familiar geographies of the Atlantic world and sheds new light on the linked political, social, and intellectual imaginings of African Americans, Palestinians, Arabs, and Israeli Jews. This history of intellectual exchange, Lubin argues, has forged political connections that extend beyond national and racial boundaries."--

Demokratische Verfassungsordnungen sind fragil und voraussetzungsreich. Worauf beruht ihre Gründung und ihr Bestand? Welche Ressourcen werden für ihre Konstituierung und Stabilisierung in Anspruch genommen? Der Band gibt eine neue Antwort auf diese alten Fragen: Obwohl demokratische Ordnungen in ihrer eigenen Wahrnehmung auf Autonomie und Selbstgesetzgebung beruhen, greifen sie zu ihrer Rechtfertigung auf Geltungsressourcen zurück, über die sie nicht oder nur bedingt verfügen. Sie leben demnach von Transzendenz, wie an ausgewählten Diskursen und Praktiken der Ordnungsbegründung vom 15. Jahrhundert bis hin zur Gegenwart gezeigt wird.

Mit diesem Buch will der Autor, wie das auch im Untertitel schon zum Ausdruck kommt, zwei Zielsetzungen verwirklichen: einerseits einen komprimierten Überblick über sozialwissenschaftlich relevante Analysen und Ergebnisse der Wissenschaftstheorie geben, andererseits den programmatischen Entwurf einer Forschungsstruktur umreißen und begründen, die eine Integration von Hermeneutik und Empirismus, von Verstehen und Erklären leistet und damit die eingefahrende Dichotomie von Dualismus und Monismus überwindet.

In the anthology presented here, the research ethics code adopted by the German Society for Social Work in 2020 is placed at the center of debate. The code is regarded as an ethical guideline, oriented towards United Nations conventions, to guide researchers to reflect on their own work in self-commitment and responsibility, and to apply for a clearance report from an ethics committee. The authors discuss the ethical principles of the code and the dilemmas arising from contradictions in a multi-faceted, practical, and solution-oriented way. An overview of different field approaches is provided and orientation for the realization of a research process is given. Universal, step-by-step guidance for specific fields is not given in this text. Instead, with a wealth of illustrative practical examples, possibilities and needs for further development are pointed out and guidance is given for finding an ethical implementation in the respective concrete projects.

RESUMEN This article addresses cultural transfers and political ownership of visual culture in the territories of the Hispanic monarchy. For this purpose, the documentary sources resulting from the celebrations on the occasion of the birth of Prince Baltazar Carlos (1631) and Carlos II (1663), which took place in Quito, an important urban centre in the Andean north, and Pamplona, in the north-eastern part of the New Kingdom of Granada respectively, are used. Although these sources are textual and lack graphic representations, we consider that the main feature of these chronic festivals is that they are generator of visuality based on textuality, which is why they function as a visual narrative also known as Ecfrasis. In this specific case 1, this is a visual narrative built by the service providers with the intention of claiming their role in a context of particular conflict with the imperial authorities. ; RESUMEN Este artículo aborda las transferencias culturales y la apropiación política de la cultura visual en los territorios de la monarquía hispánica. Para tal fin, se utilizan las fuentes documentales emanadas de las celebraciones con ocasión del nacimiento de los príncipes Baltazar Carlos (1631) y Carlos II (1663), celebraciones que tuvieron lugar en Quito, importante centro urbano del norte andino, y Pamplona, en el nororiente del Nuevo Reino de Granada, respectivamente. Si bien estas fuentes son textuales y carecen de representaciones gráficas, consideramos que la característica principal de estas crónicas festivas es que son generadoras de visualidad a partir de la textualidad, razón por la cual funcionan como un relato visual también conocido como écfrasis. En este caso en concreto1, se trata de un relato visualconstruido por los encomenderos con la intención de reivindicar su rol en un contexto de especial conflicto con las autoridades imperiales.

In the context of a political reading of physiocracy, this article aims to highlight the economic matrices of the narrative on rights developed in France in the xviiy century, and their implications for the gender developed in particular by Condorcet, one of the revolutionary protagonists close to physiocracy. With this in mind, we propose a review of the contribution of the political rationalism of physiocracy to the Declaration of Human Rights, conceived in its universalism, which leads, in Condorcet's democratic thinking, to the rejection of the political difference between men and women. ; According to a political investigation of the Physiocracy, this article aims at highlighting the economic foundations of the 18th century French discourse on rights and its gender implications, developed particularly by Condorcet, one of the French revolutionary leaders close to the Physiocracy. By this perspective, the author offers a new reading of Physiocratic political rationalism and of its contribution to the Déclaration des droits de l'homme. Combining this approach with his democratic faith, Condorcet attained to reject any political difference among men and women. ; In the context of a political reading of physiocracy, this article aims to highlight the economic matrices of the narrative on rights developed in France in the xviiy century, and their implications for the gender developed in particular by Condorcet, one of the revolutionary protagonists close to physiocracy. With this in mind, we propose a review of the contribution of the political rationalism of physiocracy to the Declaration of Human Rights, conceived in its universalism, which leads, in Condorcet's democratic thinking, to the rejection of the political difference between men and women. ; Dans le cadre d'une lecture politique de la physiocratie, cet article a pour objet de mettre en relief les matrices économiques du discours sur les droits élaboré en France au xviiie siècle, ainsi que leurs implications sur le genre élaborées en particulier par ...

Summary: This article focuses on readings by three generations of viewers of the fictional television series broadcast on open television as part of the commemoration of the 40-year coup in Chile. Based on the analysis of 24 interviews and 6 focal groups carried out on men and women from three different generations — those who experienced the coup d'état; those who grew up in dictatorship and; those that grew up in democracy — we ask us: What memories of political violence in Chile's recent past are the viewers of these three generations built on their readings from the fictional series produced in the context of the commemoration of the 40 years of the military coup? The results show that the experience experienced with the impactful dictatorship differs in its readings of the political violence of the period represented in the fictional series. ; Resumen: Este artículo se centra en las lecturas que realizan tres generaciones de telespectadores de las series televisivas ficcionales emitidas en televisión abierta en el marco de la conmemoración de los 40 años del golpe de estado en Chile. A partir del análisis de 24 entrevistas y de 6 grupos focales realizados a hombres y mujeres de tres generaciones distintas -los que vivieron el golpe de Estado; los que crecieron en dictadura y; los que crecieron en democracia-, nos preguntamos: ¿Qué memorias sobre la violencia política del pasado reciente de Chile construyen los telespectadores de estas tres generaciones a partir de sus lecturas de las series ficcionales producidas en el contexto de la conmemoración de los 40 años del golpe militar? Los resultados obtenidos señalan que la experiencia vivida en relación con la dictadura impacta diferenciadamente en sus lecturas acerca de la violencia política del periodo representado en las series ficcionales.

Video games as a consumer product have changed significantly with the advent of in-game purchasing systems (e.g., microtransactions, 'loot boxes'). This review examines consumer protections related to in-game purchasing by anticipating some of the potential design strategies that might contribute to higher risk consumer behavior. Attention was directed towards the analysis of patents for potential in-game purchasing systems, with 13 identified on Google Patents. The design features were analysed in relation to the consumer rights and guarantees described in the terms of use agreements of the patent assignees. The analysis revealed that some in-game purchasing systems could be characterized as unfair or exploitative. These systems describe tactics that capitalize on informational advantages (e.g., behavioral tracking) and data manipulation (e.g., price manipulation) to optimize offers to incentivize continuous spending, while offering limited or no guarantees or protections (e.g., refund entitlement), with the potential to exploit vulnerable players (e.g., adolescents, problematic gamers). These findings are critically discussed in relation to behavioral economics, addiction psychology, and the clinical conceptualization of gaming disorder. Appropriate policy and consumer protection measures, psychologically informed interventions, and ethical game design guidelines are needed in order to protect the interests and wellbeing of consumers.

The topic at issue today is a particularly topical topic on both sides of the Pyrenees: in France, the contested law of 16 December 2010, known as the territorial reform law, introduced the cessation of national policy, systematised and simplified inter-municipal grouping, required the extension of EPCI perimeters and introduced new inter-municipal structures, the metropolitan areas. In Spain, territorial organisation is the subject of lively debate. In the context of the recent election campaign (parliamentary elections of 20 November 2011), the PSOE proposed the abolition of the provinces, established in 1833, while in the regions the question of 'good' splitting remains. In Aragon, the controversy rises over the cost of running the comarcas; in Catalonia, the revision of the Statute of Self-Government adopted in 2006 calls into question both the existence of the provinces (assimilated to central government taxation) and that of the 41 comarcas introduced by the Generality, which would eventually be replaced by 7 veguards 1. I propose that you put all this into perspective and give some feedback on the recent history of the territorial divisions in France and Spain, which should help to better understand today's debates. To this end, I will present you here with some results of a research carried out a few years ago as part of a research programme on the emergence of new areas of inter-municipal cooperation. This programme had received a grant from the Aragon/Aquitaine Joint Cooperation Funds (2003) and was carried out in collaboration with geographers of the University of Zaragoza. The reflection was then extended through a research contract funded by the MEDD/PUCA (2003-2006) on tourism and inter-municipal cooperation in the Pyrenees in 2. ; International audience ; The topic at issue today is a particularly topical topic on both sides of the Pyrenees: in France, the contested law of 16 December 2010, known as the territorial reform law, introduced the cessation of national policy, systematised and ...

The term 'parenthood' has a significant expansion in the political, sociological and psychological fields. If it is now accepted that being a parent involves symbolic, legal, psychological and practical dimensions, and can therefore take several forms, what is the case for children? How do they define what is the family, and what adults they consider to be their parents? In particular, in complex situations, what dimensions do children use to define themselves as the child of an adult or group? Just as parenthood is concerned not only with biological parenthood, but also by representations, a shared daily life, a legal framework, etc. In the context of research into the future of children who have benefited from socio-educational interventions, we have met 23 children between seven and twelve years old. Because of their specific background, they experience a variety of family situations: some live with their two biological parents, others live in a single-parent family, reconstituted, in the extended family, in a foster family. Their speech highlights the challenges associated with belonging to several families and the appointment of the various protagonists (the child, his parents, parent-in-law, grandparents, foster parents, etc.), and makes it possible to sketch a model of childbirth. In some cases, one could simultaneously be the child of several parents or families, in different ways. ; The term "parenthood" has taken on a wider sense within the political, sociological and psychological fields. If it is now agreed that the very fact of being a parent has acquired symbolic, legal, psychological and practical dimensions and can, thus, take several forms, what does this signify with regard to children? How do they define what they see as a family, and which adults do they consider to be their parents? More specifically, in complex situations, what factors do they draw upon in order to define themselves as the child of an adult or of a group? Like parenthood, infanthood is not based simply on biological ...

National hearing On 5 July 2011, a new law on the rights and protection of persons subject to psychiatric care and the arrangements for their care was enacted. In particular, it organises care without the consent of the person. It is heavily criticised for its security dimension and gives the judge a predominant position and paves the way for an obligation to provide outpatient care. However, it does not resolve all the issues raised by the obligation to provide care outside hospital and there are concerns about difficulties of application due to the general context in the field of psychiatric care and in the judicial field. ; National audience Le 5 juillet 2011, une nouvelle loi relative aux droits et à la protection des personnes faisant l'objet de soins psychiatriques et aux modalités de leur prise en charge a été promulguée . Elle organise notamment les prises en charge réalisées sans le consentement de la personne. Très critiquée pour sa dimension sécuritaire, elle accorde au juge une position prédominante et ouvre la voie à une obligation de soins ambulatoires. Elle ne résout pas cependant toutes les questions que soulève l'obligation de soins hors hôpital et l'on peut craindre des difficultés d'application en raison du contexte général dans le domaine de la prise en charge psychiatrique et dans le domaine judiciaire.

Vaccination campaigns to prevent the spread of epidemics are successful only if the targeted populations subscribe to the recommendations of health authorities. However, because compulsory vaccination is hardly conceivable in modern democracies, governments need to convince their populations through efficient and persuasive information campaigns. In the context of the swine-origin A (H1N1) 2009 pandemic, we use an interactive study among the general public in the South of France, with 175 participants, to explore what type of information can induce change in vaccination intentions at both aggregate and individual levels. We find that individual attitudes to vaccination are based on rational appraisal of the situation, and that it is information of a purely scientific nature that has the only significant positive effect on intention to vaccinate.