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The adoption of 4IR technology enables apparel manufacturers to cater to the rapidly evolving, demand driven global fashion market. The industry is shifting from a 'push' model, where customer demand was set by promotional campaigns of manufacturers and brands, to a 'pull' model where demand is being set by customers themselves. Today, customer demand is determined by exposure to fashion trends and customer insights through social media, while the industry has to respond rapidly to instant changes in customer demand through shorter production cycles. The automation of the apparel production process through 4IR technologies is crucial in responding to such shorter turnaround cycles. For instance, automated finishing technology cuts the finishing time of a pair of Levi's jeans made using manual processes from 20 minutes, to just 90 seconds.

The debate over work requirements for social programs is hot and heavy. I'll chime in there as I don't think even the Wall Street Journal Editorial pages have stated the issue clearly from an economic point of view.  As usual, it's getting obfuscated in a moral cloud by both sides: How could you be so heartless as to force unfortunate people to work, vs. how immoral it is to subsidize indolence, and value of the "culture" of self-sufficiency. Economics, as usual, offers a straightforward value-free way to think about the issue: Incentives. When you put all our social programs together, low income Americans face roughly 100% marginal tax rates. Earn an extra dollar, lose a dollar of benefits. It's not that simple, of course, with multiple cliffs of infinite tax rates (earn an extra cent, lose a program entirely), and depends on how many and which programs people sign up for. But the order of magnitude is right. The incentive effect is clear: don't work (legally). As Phil Gramm and Mike Solon report, Since 1967, average inflation-adjusted transfer payments to low-income households—the bottom 20%—have grown from $9,677 to $45,389. During that same period, the percentage of prime working-age adults in the bottom 20% of income earners who actually worked collapsed from 68% to 36%.36%. The latter number is my main point, we'll get to cost later. Similarly, the WSJ points to  a report by Jonathan Bain and Jonathan Ingram at the Foundation for Government Accountability thatthere are four million able-bodied adults without dependents on food stamps, and three in four don't work at all. Less than 3% work full-time.3%. Incentives are a budget constraint to government policy, hard and immutable. Your feelings about people one way or another do not move the incentives at all. A gift of money with an income phase-out leads people to work less, and to require more gifts of money.  That's just a fact. What to do? One answer is, remove the income phaseouts. Give food stamps, medicaid, housing subsidies,  earned income tax credits, and so forth, to everyone, and don't reduce them with income. Then the disincentive to work is much reduced. (There is still the "income effect," but in my judgement that's a lot smaller for most people in this category.) Rather obviously, that's impractical. Even the US, even if r<g or MMT are true, would run out of money quickly. That's the problem with Universal Basic Income. Even $20,000 x 331 million = $6.6 trillion, essentially the entire federal budget right there, and $20,000 of total support is a lot less than people with $0 income get right now. (Gramm, Ekelund and Early, and Casey Mulligan estimate about $60,000 is the right number here.)  Put another way, to eliminate the work disincentive in the social programs, we would have to jack up marginal tax rates on everyone to such stratospheric levels that nobody works. You can't escape disincentives. So, support for the unfortunate must be limited somehow. That's why we limit it to people below a certain income level. But even if each individual program maintains a reasonable marginal phaseout, they add up across programs, and next thing you know we're back to 100% phase out. Posit that work is still desirable,  to earn some money, to contribute to your fellow citizens, to reduce the need for income assistance, and to build human capital.  (Plus the more ephemeral goals all sides of the debate ascribe to work -- self reliance, life meaning, self-respect, participation in society, and so forth. I promised no moral or sociological arguments, but these values being shared by both sides of the debate, I can make a little exception. Nobody thinks that an entire lifetime of living on a government check, doing nothing but drink take drugs and play video games all day, makes for a desirable society, no matter who they vote for.)  If so, if the social safety net creates a 100% marginal tax rate on work, and if abandoning income phaseouts will bankrupt the state, then we have a problem. Work requirements are an imperfect method to try to replace the incentive to work that social programs eliminate. Our government does this sort of thing all over to transfer income but contain the disincentives: Subsidize gas, and then regulate against its use for example. It is inefficient, as you can tell from the brouhaha. It's much more efficient to get people to work by saying "if you earn a dollar, you can keep it," rather than "if you earn a dollar we'll take it away from you but we're going to force you to work." As the WSJ details here and often, the rules are complex, and people and governments game them. Just who should work? Progressives will quickly find a sick single mother taking care of elderly parents and commuting to some horrible fast food job who falls through the cracks, and they are right. Rules and bureaucracies are very rough substitutes for market incentives. More importantly, if you're working for money, you find the best job you can, you work hard, you look for better opportunities. If you're working to satisfy a bureaucratic work requirement in the face of a 100% tax rate, you find the easiest job you can, you don't care about the money and thereby the social productivity of the work, and you do as little as possible. So I'm not defending work requirements as a perfect offset to a 100% marginal tax rate. But they are there for a reason, as a very rough offset to some of the huge disincentives that means-tested programs pose. The point today is that we should start to understand and debate work requirements in this framework. If you're going to remove market incentives, you need some replacement. By the way, supposedly socialist Europe, after its experience with "the dole" in the early 1990s, is much more heard-hearted about these sorts of incentives than we are. Progressives who think we should both emulate nordic countries and also expand our safety net should go look at nordic countries. Is there a better way? I've long played with the idea of limiting help by time rather than by income. That's how unemployment insurance works. We understand that replacing people's paycheck forever if they lose their job has bad incentive effects. Unemployment is understood as a temporary misfortune, and understanding the incentives, you get unemployment checks for a limited amount of time. Could not many other programs aimed at misfortune also be limited by time -- but then allow you to keep each extra dollar of earnings? Perhaps even unemployment should be a fixed amount of time, and you can keep receiving it for the full (normally) 26 weeks even if you get a job. The trouble with that, of course, is that some people will not get their acts together in the required time, and then you have to be heartless. But is it not just as heartless to say to a person who had been on food stamps, earned income tax credit, social security disability and housing voucher, "well, congrats on getting  a job, and a good one, that pays $60,000 per year. Now we're taking away all your benefits. Enjoy the $1?" Also, the safety net does include a detailed bureaucracy to determine who is needy. Disability, unemployment, and so forth look hard at these issues. Replicating that with a different set of rules for each program seems mighty wasteful. Another wild idea: Good economists all understand that consumption, not income, is the right measure of well being. That's why consumption taxes are a good idea, and we should measure consumption diversity not income diversity. (I don't use the word "inequality" anymore as it prejudices the right answer.) One advantage of a consumption tax is that it would be easier to condition benefits on consumption rather than income. If you work and save the results, you can keep your benefits. One last point, which maybe should be the first point. It is a bit scandalous that income phase outs in social programs take away benefits based on market income, but not social program income. If you have food stamps and earn an extra $10,000 of income, you can lose your foods stamps. If you get housing worth $10,000, you don't lose anything. Ditto in the entire social program system. This is an immense distortion towards putting effort into obtaining more social programs rather than working. Phasing out based on consumption, including cash and non cash benefits, would make a lot more sense. But one could phase out benefits based on which other benefits you receive too. Disincentives come from the social program and tax system overall, and any hope of continuing disincentives and saving money must take a similar integrated system approach. The argument also is over how much money the programs cost. That leads to "how could you be so heartless" vs. "but the country will go broke," also going nowhere. A focus on incentives offers the way out. Fix the incentives, and we end up helping people who need it a lot better, we end up with a lot fewer people who need help, and spend a lot less money. Win win win. There is no clean answer. A main lesson of economics is that there is always a tradeoff between help and disincentives, between insurance and moral hazard. We can make this tradeoff a lot more efficient than it is, but we can't totally eliminate the tradeoff. The bottom line remains, this discussion would be a lot more productive discussion if we talked about the constraint posed by incentives, rather than the usual moral mudslinging.    Update:So work requirements are a little tightened, but not if you have Medicaid. WTF? Medicaid is limited by income. The incentive spaghetti here would be fun to unravel. Of course, we have an  additional reason to stay below the income cap for Medicaid. We have an additional incentive to sign up for Medicaid, which may be the idea here. "Get a job, lose your food stamps, or sign up for this free government program." Hmm. Feel free to riff on this one in the comments...   

Since this is a post about class, family, and returnsI thought that I would illustrate it with pictures illustratingthe fact that I now live in the same neighborhood my mother lived in, but the neighborhood has changed except this old fishing/gun store I have often considered teaching to be a kind of translation and not just because much of the history of philosophy is written in different languages. Part of what one does in teaching is try to take the questions and concerns of a different time and figure out some way to bridge that gap, while at the same time being faithful to its original sense and meaning (just like translation). These thoughts occurred to me again when I decided to teach Didier Eribon's Returning to Reims.I first heard about Eribon's book when I read Chantal Jaquet's Les Transclasses, and was happy to learn that it was translated by Semiotext(e). After reading it I gave a copy to my father, and he loved it; as a first generation college student from a small mill town in Maine he could really relate to it. It was for that reason that I was excited to teach it in my seminar on Race, Class, and Gender. Many of the University of Southern Maine's students are first generation and higher education in part justifies itself by its ability to supposedly transform class belonging, so it seemed worthwhile to teach the book.With the first discussion it became immediately clear how much work would need to be done to translate the book to a different time and place. Eribon's trajectory, in which the transformation of his class position was made both possible and desirable by a transformation of his cultural coordinates, a transformation made possible by reading Proust, Sartre, and Marx. Such a trajectory seemed difficult to understand in the American context where class was not only disconnected from such cultural markers, but actively repudiated them. This might be what it means to be transclass in the post-bourgeois age, there is no longer a reading list, the accumulation of capital has become divorced from cultural capital. As one student put it, her uncles had all changed their financial situation, but rather than cast off the culture that they grew up with they had made that transformation maintaining their connection with NASCAR and pick-up trucks. However, it is possible to make these awkward elements of translation the basis for an engagement rather than a rejection of Eribon's book. It is through the difficulties of translation that it becomes possible to rethink the nature of class and its relation to individual and national identity. It is possible to delineate three levels of class in Eribon's analysis. The first is the one that describes one's position in the economic system. As Eribon writes, "In my case, I can say that I have always deeply had the feeling of belonging to a class, which does not mean that the class that I belonged to was conscious of itself as such. One can have the sense of belonging to a class without the class being aware of itself as such or being "a clearly defined group." This could be called the class in itself, if one wanted to use that language. It is the aspect of class that is written on the body, on the exhaustion of work and the effects of poverty. In contrast to this is Eribon's memories of what class meant for his family when they were members of the communist party. As Eribon writes describing this dimension of class for itself, or for itself through the party, "You became a political subject by putting yourself into the hands of the party spokespersons, through whom the workers, the 'working class,' came to exist as an organized group, as a class that was aware of itself as such." In between these two there is what could be called the class of itself, the way that class constitutes not just an economic position or a political subject, but a way of life or a habitus of a sort. As Eribon writes of these divisions of class, "These boundaries that divide these worlds help define within each of them radically different ways of perceiving what it is possible to be or become, of perceiving what it is possible to aspire to or not." This is class as it was lived in terms of the things one does and does not do, in terms of tastes, habits, and dress. Eribon's story is one of both his own personal transformation, his own non-reproduction, to use Jaquet's term in which the son of a factory worker becomes a journalist and then a famous academic. It is also a story of the larger disarticulation of class composition, of how the working class in the economic sense, shifted from being a class organized by and through the communist party, to a bastion of nationalist and racist sentiment. This disarticulation has two aspects, first there is the transformation of the communist and socialist parties after 1981. As Eribon writes,What actually occurred was a general and quite thoroughgoing metamorphosis of the ethos of the party as well as of its intellectual references. Gone was any talk of exploitation and resistance, replaced by talk of "necessary modernization" and of "radical social reform"; gone the references to relations between classes, replaced by talk of a "life in common": gone any mention of unequal social opportunities replaced by an emphasis on individual responsibility. At the same time that the party moved away from the class struggle, the terms of that struggle where changing for the workers, defined less in terms of revolution and more in terms of the hopes and dreams of a consumer society. The rhetoric of class struggle, of nothing to lose but chains, begins to sound hollow to a class that aspires to buy a car or a vacation. As Eribon writes, But what is the point of a political story that doesn't take into account what people are really like as it interprets their lives, a story whose result is that one ends up blaming the individuals in question for not conforming to the fiction one has constructed? It is clearly a story that needs to be rewritten in order to make it less unified and less simple, to build in more complexity and more contradictions. And to reintroduce historical time. The working class changes. It doesn't stay identical to itself. And clearly the working class of the 1960s and 1970s was no longer the same as that of the 1930s or the 1950s. The same position in the social field does not correspond to exactly the same realities, nor to the same aspirations.This disarticulation, the party moving away from class struggle, and the working class defining its struggle differently made possible a new articulation, not in terms of class but of nation. As Eribon writes,Whose fault if the meaning of a "we" sustained or reconstituted in this way undergoes a transformation such that it comes to mean the "French" as opposed to "foreigners," whereas it had used to mean "workers" as opposed to the "bourgeoisie"? Or, to put it more precisely, whose fault is it if the opposition between "worker" and "bourgeois," even if it continues to exist in the form of an opposition between the "have nots" and the "haves" (which is not exactly the same opposition—it carries different political consequences), takes on a national and racial dimension, with the "haves" being perceived as favorably inclined to immigration and the "have nots" as suffering on a daily basis because of this same immigration, one that is held to be responsible for all their difficulties?This story, which I have given here in terms of just a few key moments, is one of the disarticulation of class and revolution, class and party, and the rearticulation of class and reaction, class and nation. As we discussed in class, this story, the story of the disarticulation of the workers' party and the aspiration of workers' cannot be simply transposed onto the US, even if the ending is the same in terms of the similarity of the National Front and MAGA parties. It would be a massive mistranslation to simply replace the Communist Party with the Democratic Party. There is a much longer story to be told about the disarticulation and the disarray of class and party in the US, and it is told in W.E.B. Du Bois' Black Reconstruction and Mike Davis' Prisoners of the American Dream. (So basically if you want the TL:DR version it is the wages of whiteness and Ronald Reagan). However, it might be possible to use Eribon's categories to make a different disarticulation or rearticulation, not that of the class in itself becoming another for itself, the for itself of the French, of the nation, but the way in which what could be called the class of itself, the habitus of class, the taste, habits and customs have shifted from one class to another. The lack of an articulation between economic position of class and political party has made way for a different articulation in which class is defined in terms of the cultural signifiers of guns, trucks, and Carhart. It is a brand and not a politics. This is the way in which our modern politicians appear to be "of the people" in Machiavelli's sense. This in part accounts for the bizarro world version of class in the US.This difficulty in translation, the impossibility of neatly mapping Eribon's French story onto an American one made for interesting discussions, but I wonder if we were talking about something that went beyond the classroom. The devaluation of a certain kind of symbolic capital, that one no longer has to read a certain set of books or listen to the right kind of music, is part of the story of the decline of the university, or at least the humanities. The university, at least a state university, is no longer the same institution of transclass transformation. I think that things might be different at elite private colleges, but even there it is more about who one knows than what one knows, connections rather than cultural capital. At small state colleges people still seek to change their class status, but do so through trying to figure out how to accumulate capital in its more material and less symbolic form, they major in business or finance. Where does this leave Eribon's own story of transclass transformation, his desire to become someone different, to leave Reims, to leave a culture dominated by sports, restricted gender roles, and fishing, to go to Paris, to a culture dominated by books and ideas, where it is possible to become someone else, something else? I still think people come to the university to do that, to transform themselves, and become something different, but that transformation has been disarticulated from class transformation. 

This edited collection is a result of the scientific project Identities of Serbian Music Within the Local and Global Framework: Traditions, Changes, Challenges (No. 177004, 2011–2019), funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and implemented by the Institute of Musicology SASA (Belgrade, Serbia). It is also a result of work on the bilateral project carried out by the Center for International Relations (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana) and the Institute of Musicology SASA (Belgrade, Serbia) entitled Music as a Means of Cultural Diplomacy of Small Transition Countries: The Cases of Slovenia and Serbia (with financial support of ARRS). The process of its publishing was financially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. ; Culture and cultural artefacts have been an important instrument of establishing and maintaining political relations between different peoples and states since the emergence of diplomatic practice in the 17th century, and some authors date this practice as far back as the period of ancient civilizations. Despite the long history of using culture for different political purposes and interests, particularly in relation to bonding peoples and states or increasing their influence, it was not until the creation of nation-states and, above all, the development of modern mass media such as widespread newspapers and journals, and regional and national radio and TV stations that this practice flourished and gained prominence. Therefore, it is no coincidence that researchers of this topic mainly on the last two centuries, particularly the Cold War era as one of the peak moments when it comes to creatively employing cultural products to achieve an array of nationally and internationally oriented political goals. Apart from revealing how diverse cultural actions contributed to the promotion of the countries of both the Western and the Eastern Bloc, along with their dominant values and ideology, a large number of studies published in the recent decades have also served to indirectly point to the necessity of thorough examination of the cultural part of foreign policy making and international relations, to providing it a stronger theoretical foundation and to the importance of including in the analyses different cases from different periods. Academics active in this area emphasize the need for greater clarity in defining key concepts and classificatory schemes in the analysis of cultural segments of international relations. For instance, Ang, Isar Ray and Mar highlight the popularity and, at the same time, the obscurity of the concept of cultural diplomacy, which has been given a dominant place in debates starting from the beginning of the 21st century. As these authors observe, the semantic field of this term has "broadened considerably over the years," making it applicable to "pretty much any practice that is related to purposeful cultural cooperation between nations or group of nations." This tendency not only contributed to a blurring of the lines between the concept of cultural diplomacy and other concepts that evolved prior to its expansion, including international cultural relations, public diplomacy and soft power, but also undermined the efforts to create a more coherent approach to the research of cultural phenomena in the domain of international relations. The issue is exacerbated by the heterogeneous disciplinary framing of this topic. Although it is mainly explored in the areas of political sciences and history, interest in researching the phenomenon also appears in other fields, including sociology, art history, musicology, ethnomusicology, etc. Apart from the fact that uncritical use of the concept of cultural diplomacy has made it "a floating signifier," an even more challenging consequence, in our opinion, is the inability to properly link the research results to already produced knowledge on the one hand and on the other to systematically compare cases from different historical and geopolitical settings. Notwithstanding certain difficulties that manifest in exploring the cultural part of international relations in the recent decades, the abundant and steadily growing collection of studies created after the fall of the Berlin Wall indicates that researchers are recognizing the importance and relevance of this topic along with its multifaceted potential. It is the potential that this research area offers for a broader and more nuanced understanding of the sphere of international affairs, along with capturing the complexities of the process of constructing a national culture and national cultural policy-making, that served as the primary motive for the preparation of this collection. Another very important aspect was that cultural phenomena have been on the margin in the research of the foreign policies of countries of Southeast Europe—including the countries that belonged to the Eastern Bloc—and have not been given much attention in discussions. Moreover, the presence of music in the conducting of international relations of the peoples and states of this part of Europe in modern history is almost completely neglected in existing publications. Encouraged by the growing interest in the examination of the role of music in the sphere of international affairs from the 17th century on, which has become evident in the last decade, and intrigued by the possibilities it brings for gaining new insights into cultural and musical phenomena both in the national and international context, we decided to gather scholars from different fields (history, musicology) from Southeast and Central Europe who are familiar with different historical periods. The intended focus was the era of nation-states, particularly from the 18th to 20th century, but above all after World War I. In geographical terms, we focused on the peoples and countries of Southeast Europe, particularly those that were part of former Yugoslavia, together with parts of Central Europe that belonged to the Eastern Bloc (Czechoslovakia). The main aim was not to give final and axiomatic answers to issues concerning the employment of music and musical activities in international relations in the given period and geopolitical settings, but to point to the diversity of interconnections between the spheres of music, culture, international relations and politics as well as their outcomes. Our starting point was the assumption that culture serves as one of the sources for international relations, and that its relevance is determined by the historical circumstances and dominant tendencies in the national and international settings (development of states' cultural sphere, their economic and political power, power relations on the international scene, etc.). Apart from that, it is also important to create a clear conceptual distinction between the more general contexts of the use of culture and music in the sphere of international affairs, where not only the state and its bodies but also non-state actors have a crucial contribution (international cultural relations) through formal and informal occasions, and the more specific contexts where the primary role is statecraft (cultural diplomacy). As a result, fourteen studies were prepared and divided into three sections. The first part, entitled "Diplomacy Behind the Scenes: Musicians' Contact With the Diplomatic Sphere" comprises of three chapters focusing on different phenomena—the intensive political and intellectual networking of a circle of 18th-century Croatian diplomats, composers and polymaths (Luka and Miho Sorkočević, Julije Bajamonti and Ruđer Bošković) with their European fellows and the resulting intercultural exchanges (Ivana Tomić Ferić); the influence of the political and diplomatic engagement of the Serbian Metropolitan in the Habsburg Monarchy, Josif Rajačić, in creating the project of Serbian national music (Vesna Peno and Goran Vasin); the particularities of the diplomatic career of one of the most notable 20th-century Serbian and Yugoslav music scholars, Petar Bingulac (Ratomir Milikić). Besides revealing previously less known or completely unknown facts, these studies indicate the relevance of considering different types of international contacts of individuals and groups in the process of establishing national (and regional) policies, as well as highlight the role of cultural and social capital in the activities of state diplomats. The second part, entitled "Reflections of Foreign Policies in National Music Spheres," contains six chapters dedicated to discussing how the established foreign policies of selected states, including interwar Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and post-WWII Romania and Czechoslovakia, affected music production, distribution, consumption and research. Among other issues, attention was given to the power struggles between Great Britain and the Third Reich in the 1930s and the way they manifested in the musical life of Belgrade, at the time the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Ranka Gašić); the influence of Yugoslavia's political alliance with France between the two world wars on the cultural and music production of some of the most prestigious artistic circles in Belgrade (Srđan Atanasovski); the Yugoslav–Bulgarian diplomatic disputes after the Great War over the territory and peoples of Vardar Macedonia and their impact on the research of the folk music of that region (Ivana Vesić), as well as the outcomes of rapprochement between the two countries after 1937 in the domain of cultural exchange (Stefanka Georgieva). Moreover, this section presents the different stages of foreign policy of Communist Romania from 1948 to 1989 and how they marked music production and distribution in this country along with the reception of foreign musical works (Florinela Popa); the effects of the political turn in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and its adherence to the policies of the Eastern Bloc on the transforming the dominant views on music aesthetics, poetics and national music production (Lenka Křupková). These chapters convincingly point to the significance of power relations in the international arena in the shaping of (national) cultural and music spheres, as well as the existence of a correlation between activities in the national and international settings, and the resulting necessity of simultaneously observing two different levels—national and international—due to their close intertwining. The third part, entitled "Music as a Means of Cultural Diplomacy," consists of five chapters offering a detailed insight into the strategies and programming of cultural cooperation and exchange of socialist Yugoslavia in different phases of its existence. Among other issues, the chapters explore how cultural and musical activities abroad followed the efforts of Yugoslav authorities to establish closer ties with certain countries, to promote Yugoslavia's achievements, values and ideology, and to counter negative representations. Apart from the in-depth scrutiny of Yugoslav foreign policy towards France (Aleksandra Kolaković) and Finland (Maja Vasiljević), where the general tendencies and turns were brought to light through the extent and prestige of the cultural and musical undertakings prepared, another very comprehensive and illuminative study is the examination of how international tours of professional folk dance ensembles were employed for the purpose of realizing the country's various political goals in the international framework (Ivan Hofman), as well as the study on the tours of popular bands and folk music performers (Julijana Papazova). The Yugoslav political shift in the late 1940s and its ramifications particularly in connection to exporting its musical products and accomplishments to the Western Bloc were also thoroughly examined (Biljana Milanović).

The life path, scientific-pedagogical and public activity of Volodymyr Sokurenko – a prominent Ukrainian jurist, doctor of law, professor, talented teacher of the Lviv Law School of Franko University are analyzed.It is found out that after graduating from a seven-year school in Zaporizhia, V. Sokurenko entered the Zaporizhia Aviation Technical School, where he studied two courses until 1937. 1/10/1937 he was enrolled as a cadet of the 2nd school of aircraft technicians named after All-Union Lenin Komsomol. In 1938, this school was renamed the Volga Military Aviation School, which he graduated on September 4, 1939 with the military rank of military technician of the 2nd category. As a junior aircraft technician, V. Sokurenko was sent to the military unit no. 8690 in Baku, and later to Maradnyany for further military service in the USSR Air Force. From September 4, 1939 to March 16, 1940, he was a junior aircraft technician of the 50th Fighter Regiment, 60th Air Brigade of the ZAK VO in Baku. The certificate issued by the Railway District Commissariat of Lviv on January 4, 1954 no. 3132 states that V. Sokurenko actually served in the staff of the Soviet Army from October 1937 to May 1946. The same certificate states that from 10/12/1941 to 20/09/1942 and from 12/07/1943 to 08/03/1945, he took part in the Soviet-German war, in particular in the second fighter aviation corps of the Reserve of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army. In 1943 he joined the CPSU. He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree and the Order of the Red Star (1943) as well as 9 medals «For Merit in Battle» during the Soviet-German war.With the start of the Soviet-German war, the Sokurenko family, like many other families, was evacuated to the town of Kamensk-Uralsky in the Sverdlovsk region, where their father worked at a metallurgical plant. After the war, the Sokurenko family moved to Lviv. In 1946, V. Sokurenko entered the Faculty of Law of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University, graduating with honors in 1950, and entered the graduate school of the Lviv State University at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law. V. Sokurenko successfully passed the candidate examinations and on December 25, 1953 in Moscow at the Institute of Law of the USSR he defended his thesis on the topic: «Socialist legal consciousness and its relationship with Soviet law». The supervisor of V. Sokurenko's candidate's thesis was N. Karieva. The Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR, by its decision of March 31, 1954, awarded V. Sokurenko the degree of Candidate of Law. In addition, it is necessary to explain the place of defense of the candidate's thesis by V. Sokurenko. As it is known, the Institute of State and Law of the USSR has its history since 1925, when, in accordance with the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of March 25, 1925, the Institute of Soviet Construction was established at the Communist Academy. In 1936, the Institute became part of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in 1938 it was reorganized into the Institute of Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1941–1943 it was evacuated to Tashkent. In 1960-1991 it was called the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In Ukraine, there is the Institute of State and Law named after V. Koretsky of the NAS of Ukraine – a leading research institution in Ukraine of legal profile, founded in 1949.It is noted that, as a graduate student, V. Sokurenko read a course on the history of political doctrines, conducted special seminars on the theory of state and law. After graduating from graduate school and defending his thesis, from October 1, 1953 he was enrolled as a senior lecturer and then associate professor at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv State University named after Ivan Franko.By the decision of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR of December 18, 1957, V. Sokurenko was awarded the academic title of associate professor of the «Department of Theory and History of State and Law».V. Sokurenko took an active part in public life. During 1947-1951 he was a member of the party bureau of the party organization of LSU, worked as a chairman of the trade union committee of the university, from 1955 to 1957 he was a secretary of the party committee of the university. He delivered lectures for the population of Lviv region. Particularly, he lectured in Turka, Chervonohrad, and Yavoriv. He made reports to the party leaders, Soviet workers as well as business leaders. He led a philosophical seminar at the Faculty of Law. He was a deputy of the Lviv City Council of People's Deputies in 1955-1957 and 1975-1978.In December 1967, he defended his doctoral thesis on the topic: «Development of progressive political thought in Ukraine (until the early twentieth century)». The defense of the doctoral thesis was approved by the Higher Attestation Commission on June 14, 1968.During 1960-1990 he headed the Department of Theory and History of State and Law; in 1962-68 and 1972-77 he was the dean of the Law Faculty of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University. In connection with the criticism of the published literature, on September 10, 1977, V. Sokurenko wrote a statement requesting his dismissal from the post of Dean of the Faculty of Law due to deteriorating health. During 1955-1965 he was on research trips to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, and Bulgaria. From August 1966 to March 1967, in particular, he spent seven months in the United States, England and Canada as a UN Fellow in the Department of Human Rights. From April to May 1968, he was a member of the government delegation to the International Conference on Human Rights in Iran for one month. He spoke, in addition to Ukrainian, English, Polish and Russian. V. Sokurenko played an important role in initiating the study of an important discipline at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv University – History of Political and Legal Studies, which has been studying the history of the emergence and development of theoretical knowledge about politics, state, law, ie the process of cognition by people of the phenomena of politics, state and law at different stages of history in different nations, from early statehood and modernity.Professor V. Sokurenko actively researched the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of Ukrainian legal and political thought. He was one of the first legal scholars in the USSR to begin research on the basics of legal deontology. V. Sokurenko conducted extensive research on the development of basic requirements for the professional and legal responsibilities of a lawyer, similar to the requirements for a doctor. In further research, the scholar analyzed the legal responsibilities, prospects for the development of the basics of professional deontology. In addition, he considered medical deontology from the standpoint of a lawyer, law and morality, focusing on internal (spiritual) processes, calling them «the spirit of law.» The main direction of V. Sokurenko's research was the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of legal and political studies. The main scientific works of professor V. Sokurenko include: «The main directions in the development of progressive state and legal thought in Ukraine: 16th – 19th centuries» (1958) (Russian), «Democratic doctrines about the state and law in Ukraine in the second half of the 19th century (M. Drahomanov, S. Podolynskyi, A. Terletskyi)» (1966), «Law. Freedom. Equality» (1981, co-authored) (in Russian), «State and legal views of Ivan Franko» (1966), «Socio-political views of Taras Shevchenko (to the 170th anniversary of his birth)» (1984); «Political and legal views of Ivan Franko (to the 130th anniversary of his birth)» (1986) (in Russian) and others.V. Sokurenko died on November 22, 1994 and was buried in Holoskivskyi Cemetery in Lviv.Volodymyr Sokurenko left a bright memory in the hearts of a wide range of scholars, colleagues and grateful students. The 100th anniversary of the Scholar is a splendid opportunity to once again draw attention to the rich scientific heritage of the lawyer, which is an integral part of the golden fund of Ukrainian legal science and education. It needs to be studied, taken into account and further developed. ; Проаналізовано життєвий шлях, науково-педагогічну та громадську діяльність Воло-димира Гавриловича Сокуренка – видатного українського правознавця, доктора юридичних наук, професора, талановитого педагога Львівської правничої школи Франкового універ-ситету.З'ясовано, що В. Г. Сокуренко навчався у Запорізькому авіаційному технікумі та Вольському військовому авіаційному училищі, яке закінчив у 1939 р. У 1939‒1946 рр. служив у радянській армії. Після закінчення у 1950 р. юридичного факультету Львівського університету пройшов шлях від аспіранта до професора, завідувача кафедри, декана юридичного факультету. Упродовж 1960‒1990 рр. завідував кафедрою теорії та історії держави і права; в 1962‒1968 та 1972‒1977 рр. був деканом юридичного факультету Львівського державного університету імені Івана Франка. Протягом 1955‒1965 рр. перебував у наукових відрядженнях у Польщі, Чехословаччині, Румунії, Австрії, Болгарії. Зі серпня 1966 до березня 1967 рр., зокрема сім місяців перебував у США, Англії та Канаді як стипендіат ООН по департаменту прав людини. У квітні-травні 1968 р. був членом у складі урядової делегації на міжнародній конференції по правах людини в Ірані упродовж одного місяця. Володів, окрім української, англійською, польською та російською мовами. В. Г. Сокуренко відіграв важливу роль у започаткуванні на юридичному факультеті Львівсь-кого університету вивчення важливої навчальної дисципліни – Історії політичних і правових учень, яка висвітлювала і до сьогодні продовжує висвітлювати історію виникнення та розвитку теоретичних знань про політику, державу, право, тобто вивчає процес пізнання людьми явищ політики, держави і права на різних етапах історії у різних народів, почи-наючи з ранньої державності і сучасності.Професор В. Г. Сокуренко активно досліджував проблеми теорії держави і права, історії української правової та політичної думки. Він був одним із перших учених-правників у СРСР, хто почав наукові студії основ юридичної деонтології. Велику наукову дослід-ницьку діяльність проводив В. Г. Сокуренко щодо розробки основних вимог до професійно-правових обов'язків юриста, аналогічно до вимог, що стосуються лікаря. У подальших наукових дослідженнях учений аналізував юридичні обов'язки, перспективи розвитку основ професійної деонтології. Крім того, правознавець розглядав медичну деонтологію з позиції юриста, права і моралі, приділивши основну увагу внутрішнім (духовним) процесам, назвавши їх «духом права». Основним напрямом наукових досліджень В. Г. Сокуренка були проблеми теорії держави і права, історії правових та політичних учень.Володимир Гаврилович Сокуренко залишив по собі світлу пам'ять у серцях широкого загалу науковців, колег та вдячних учнів. 100-річний ювілей Вченого – добра нагода для того, щоб ще раз привернути увагу до багатої наукової спадщини правознавця, яка є невід'ємною складовою золотого фонду української юридичної науки і освіти. Вона потребує вивчення, врахування та подальшого розвитку.

La presente tesi verte sul ruolo del teatro sociale come strumento di mediazione e trasformazione dei conflitti nei contesti di post-guerra. A tal fine il primo passo (Capitolo 1) è stato costruire un quadro interpretativo interdisciplinare, con cui analizzare le caratteristiche ricorrenti e le differenze nelle esperienze già esistenti in questo ambito, e da cui poter trarre indicazioni circa il disegno progettuale. Per il raggiungimento di questi obiettivi, sono stati esaminati criticamente i lavori sul campo e le osservazioni teoriche di Hannah Reich, Guglielmo Schininà e John Paul Lederach, unitamente alle teorie di Johan Galtung e Pat Patfoort. Il secondo passo (Capitolo 2) è stato individuare alcuni casi di studio che consentissero di validare il modello interpretativo elaborato. Ho dunque innanzitutto censito le esperienze già realizzate recentemente o in corso d'opera, per poi applicare ad esse dei criteri di selezione desunti dall'analisi teorica, specie dal lavoro di Hannah Reich. Tali criteri si sono rivelati molto restrittivi al punto che ho potuto selezionare solo due dei molti casi di studio individuati, il progetto Let's see… Let's choose… Let's change… della armena ONG Peace Dialogue e il progetto di teatro partecipativo promosso dalla americana ONG Search for Common Ground. I due casi di studio (Capitolo 3) sono stati analizzati criticamente al fine di verificare e di proporre un'ipotesi di concezione, pianificazione e implementazione sul medio/lungo periodo di progetti di teatro sociale con sessioni di formazione in mediazione e trasformazione dei conflitti in processi di peacebuilding. Il quadro teorico (Capitolo 1) comprende un ampio panorama che esamina non solo il peacebuilding e il teatro sociale, ma anche i cosiddetti approcci di peacebuilding basati sull'arte (art-based peacebuilding). Il concetto di peacebuilding viene presentato nella elaborazione data da Galtung negli anni '70 e nelle più recenti definizioni a cura delle Nazioni Unite. In particolare viene dato risalto al contributo del UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee del 2007 in comparazione con le Strategie Europee riguardo la 'Gestione del Ciclo del Progetto in Cooperazione e Sviluppo'. Infatti in entrambi i documenti, emerge il ruolo cruciale svolto - nel peacebuilding come nella cooperazione allo sviluppo – dalla partecipazione, intesa come appropriazione da parte delle comunità locali del processo di cambiamento, e dall'equità, intesa come parità di accesso ai diritti e imparzialità nella trasformazione dei conflitti. A seguire vengono esposte la teoria di trasformazione dei conflitti di Johan Galtung (2004) e quella sulla comunicazione nonviolenta di Pat Patfoort (2011). Successivamente si chiariscono la definizione e la genesi del teatro sociale. La terminologia anglosassone che si utilizza nella tesi, diversamente da quella italiana, lo definisce applied theatre. Grazie alle rivoluzioni teatrali del Novecento e al contributo della pedagogia contemporanea, si sviluppa una nuova forma di teatro, collocata fuori dal mainstream teatrale e dallo show business. Tra i pionieri e fondatori del teatro sociale, Augusto Boal è considerato uno dei maggiori esponenti. Il metodo inventato da Boal, Il Teatro dell'Oppresso, è un'organizzazione sistematica di tecniche e strumenti teatrali per comprendere e contrastare le oppressioni sociali ed economiche dell'individuo e della società. Infine, nell'ultima parte del capitolo, vengono riassunte le posizioni di John Paul Lederach, ideatore della Moral Imagination, di Hannah Reich e la sua teoria the Art of Seeing, e di Guglielmo Schininà con la sua proposta del Complex Circle. Il capitolo successivo (Capitolo 2) verte sull'approccio metodologico, basato sulla combinazione del contributo di Hannah Reich e del modello empirico di Guglielmo Schininà. Partendo dalla distinzione che Hannah Reich fa tra la struttura del 'Classic' Forum Theatre e del Forum Theatre for Conflict Transformation, e in particolare nelle diverse fasi – workshop phase, performance phase e follow-up phase - vengono utilizzati gli elementi che per la ricercatrice tedesca sono a fondamento del Forum Theatre for Conflict Transformation: prima e durante la workshop phase - la scelta consapevole e accurata dei partecipanti e dei luoghi in cui si svolgerà il training; - l'inserimento di moduli di gestione dei conflitti e spazi condivisi di tempo libero; - lo sviluppo di una attenta scrittura collettiva del copione - chiamata art of telling; per la performance phase - la scelta consapevole e accurata dei luoghi per le presentazioni pubbliche; - la competenza del joker nella trasformazione dei conflitti; per la follow-up phase - l'inserimento di altre attività che rendano sostenibili le relazioni tra i membri del gruppo. Sono questi elementi i principali fattori attraverso i quali è stata analizzata la struttura dei due casi di studio. Dal modello del Complex Circle di Schininà sono stati desunti i parametri per leggere criticamente l'implementazione dei progetti: interdisciplinarietà, gestione delle differenze nel rispetto delle stesse, prospettive multiple, sistema di comunicazione multilayer. Grazie al censimento dei progetti realizzati o in corso di teatro sociale con sessioni di gestione e trasformazione dei conflitti in contesti di post-guerra che coinvolgessero giovani/adulti su un periodo di medio/lungo termine (minimo di due anni), è stato costruito un database. Esso si trova in appendice alla tesi. Le fonti di reperimento dei casi sono state soprattutto i networks In place of war a cura della Manchester University (www.inplaceofwar.com) e Acting Together a cura della Brandeis University (www.actingtogether.org), oltre a vari journals di Applied Theatre e Peace & Conflict Studies, disponibili on line. Attraverso la consultazione puntuale dei siti web dei vari casi presenti in database, è stata verificata la possibilità di accedere a dati aggiornati e/o di contattare direttamente i referenti dei progetti. Attraverso questo lavoro, sono stati selezionati i due casi di studio della Peace Dialogue e Search for Common Ground utilizzando come framework critico il lavoro di Hannah Reich e quello di Guglielmo Schininà. Nel terzo capitolo, vengono presentati ed esaminati i due casi di studio. Essi sono: - il progetto Let's see… Let's choose… Let's change… della armena ONG Peace Dialogue, relativo alla situazione conflittuale del Nagorno-Karabakh, - il progetto di teatro partecipativo promosso dalla americana ONG Search for Common Ground, per affrontare la questione delle terre in Rwanda. Queste due esperienze, molto diverse tra loro, sono accomunate dal fatto che, in un ampio disegno di peacebuilding, il teatro sociale venga esplicitamente rafforzato da sessioni di formazione alla gestione e trasformazione dei conflitti, attraverso il coinvolgimento delle comunità locali. Per ogni caso viene presentato un excursus storico mediante il quale si evidenziano il contesto in cui le esperienze si inseriscono e le caratteristiche specifiche dei conflitti in questione. Il conflitto in Nagorno-Karabakh, incancrenito sin dagli inizi del Novecento, è scoppiato prepotentemente dopo la disgregazione dell'Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche, in una guerra che ufficialmente si è conclusa il 5 maggio del 1994 con la firma dell'armistizio di pace tra Azerbaijan e Armenia. Ma le questioni etniche e territoriali che colpiscono la regione del Nagorno-Karabakh sono ancora oggi motivo di tensioni tra i due paesi. La regione è fortemente militarizzata, e questo incide soprattutto sulla società civile e la popolazione più giovane che da sempre vive in questa condizione, senza aver conosciuto alternative. Il conflitto in Ruanda, invece, è legato alla riforma agraria (1999), promossa per affrontare la questione dei diritti di eredità delle terre da parte di donne e bambini. Tale riforma infatti, a detta di Sydney Smith e Elise Webb, ha incontrato una crescente resistenza dovuta ad un atteggiamento culturale contrario all'eredità femminile. Inoltre le leggi promulgate in tale direzione sono ignorate da gran parte della popolazione, che per di più è composta – dati World Bank 2011 - per il 43% da giovani sotto i quattordici anni. Il progetto di Search for Common Ground ha l'obiettivo di creare un dibattito costruttivo sulla questione dell'eredità delle terre, implementando anche un confronto diretto tra comunità e autorità locali. Segue poi l'analisi puntuale dei due progetti, con riferimento al framework metodologico ideato, e una analisi comparata degli stessi. La proposta che viene elaborata nella discussione dei risultati è articolata sui vari criteri di analisi suggeriti da Hannah Reich. Per quanto riguarda la scelta dei partecipanti, essa riflette le diversità intrinseche che i due casi presentano nelle caratteristiche stesse di conflitto: nel progetto della Peace Dialogue vengono coinvolti giovani provenienti da diverse regioni caucasiche per il ruolo chiave che essi potranno assumere nella costruzione della pace circa la questione del Nagorno-Karabakh; in Ruanda la Search for Common Ground coinvolge attori professionisti che, attraverso le tecniche di teatro partecipativo, sono in grado di coinvolgere in modo neutro ed imparziale la comunità in scene che rispecchiano conflitti e questioni locali. Inoltre, gli obiettivi specifici dei due casi sono diversi. Nel caso del Ruanda, obiettivo specifico è ridurre l'incidenza di conflitti interpersonali intorno alla questione eredità terra, e aumentare il ricorso imparziale e super partes alle autorità locali, comprese le figure degli abunzi, mediatori tradizionali. Per Peace Dialogue obiettivo è incoraggiare il coinvolgimento dei giovani nella discussione di questioni civili e di formarli nella gestione nonviolenta dei conflitti. A partire dal confronto dei due casi e dalla letteratura disponibile sull'argomento, viene proposta una struttura di Forum Theatre for Conflict Transformation che coinvolga un team interdisciplinare di formatori, in grado di accompagnare il processo di apprendimento/insegnamento con una modalità interattiva e interdisciplinare. In questo modo si propone la costruzione di un framework misto che combini, allo stesso tempo e nella stessa sede formativa, gli strumenti di teatro sociale e di mediazione. Sulla stessa linea di pensiero si situa l'approccio dialogico suggerito da Guglielmo Schininà, e l'implementazione condivisa realizzata dalla Peace Dialogue in Armenia/Nagorno-Karabakh. I partecipanti infatti sono stati coinvolti in un processo partecipativo tra pari, che li ha portati a definire in itinere sia le tematiche da affrontare durante il progetto sia il processo di realizzazione, sotto la supervisione di un gruppo internazionale di facilitatori. Nelle conclusioni riassumo il lavoro svolto e avanzo alcune riflessioni, domande, dilemmi e prospettive per ulteriori ricerche in questo campo. Sinteticamente, i nodi più critici mi sembrano riguardare la valutazione e il ruolo degli esperti esterni. Quanto al primo aspetto occorre rilevare che il ruolo dei finanziatori del progetto ha il suo peso e la sua influenza. Come affrontare tale criticità quando il materiale a disposizione è affetto da uno stile propagandistico teso a sottolineare i punti di forza e i risultati positivi a scapito delle debolezze e delle difficoltà? Quanto al ruolo degli esterni, esso può incidere in maniera significativa sulle comunità locali. Che tipo di processi vengono attivati durante la pratica di apprendimento/insegnamento? Quali sono i punti di forza e di debolezza durante il trasferimento di competenze? Come misurare e valutare tale problematicità? Infine il ruolo degli abunzi (mediatori tradizionali locali del Ruanda) nella società ruandese dà lo spunto per riflettere sulle dinamiche di giustizia locale. Come conciliare, nel rispetto dei ruoli e delle culture, la mediazione "formale" con quella tradizionale senza cercare di imporre un approccio unidirezionale?

Elecciones municipales en Venezuela El pasado Domingo 23 de noviembre se llevaron a cabo las elecciones municipales en Venezuela. Se eligieron los gobernadores, alcaldes y legisladores regionales en una jornada con una participación histórica. Hugo Chávez, obtuvo una victoria agridulce: aunque el oficialismo se impuso en 17 de las 22 gobernaciones, perdió en cinco distritos, dos de ellos considerados claves, como el estado Miranda y la alcaldía mayor de Caracas. Varios medios informan al respecto:"El País" de Madrid:"Venezuela vota para elegir a gobernadores, alcaldes y legisladores regionales: Hay una asistencia masiva a los centros electorales.- Para Hugo Chávez, está en juego el futuro de la "revolución bolivariana"": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Venezuela/vota/elegir/gobernadores/alcaldes/legisladores/regionales/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_10/Tes"La oposición intenta arrebatar a Chávez el monopolio de la lucha por los pobres: Las elecciones de hoy en Venezuela despejarán el control de algunos Estados y municipios clave": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/oposicion/intenta/arrebatar/Chavez/monopolio/lucha/pobres/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_2/Tes"New York Times":"Venezuelan Opposition Gains in Vote": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/world/americas/25venezuela.html?_r=1&ref=world "Le Monde":"Elections au Venezuela : les pro-Chavez en tête, mais l'opposition se renforce": http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2008/11/24/elections-au-venezuela-les-pro-chavez-en-tete-mais-l-opposition-se-renforce_1122170_3222.html#ens_id=1120093"CNN":"Chavez passes Venezuela election test":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/24/venezuela.elections/index.html "BBC": "Victoria agridulce para Chávez": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7745000/7745164.stm "Venezuela: todos ganan": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7745000/7745263.stm "Todos celebran en Venezuela": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/multimedia/video/newsid_7745000/7745721.stm "MSNBC":"Chavez allies win majority in Venezuelan vote: Opposition makes gains, winning two of most populous states": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27873573/"La Nación":"Fuerte tensión y demoras en Venezuela: extendieron el horario de votación por la masiva afluencia; la oposición acusó al gobierno de obstaculizar el recuento de votos": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1073631"Afirman que las elecciones dejan a Chávez en un rol de negociación: Analistas políticos señalaron a lanacion.com que la oposición está logrando imponer la idea de que hay que frenar al presidente venezolano": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1073725"A pesar del triunfo chavista, avanza la oposición en Venezuela":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1073662 "Los Ángeles Times":"Chavez foes claim symbolic victories in Venezuela": http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-venez25-2008nov25,0,7748341.story"El Tiempo" de Colombia:""Avance de la oposición complica idea de reelección indefinida de Chávez":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/avance-de-la-oposicion-complica-idea-de-reeleccion-indefinida-de-chavez_4684645-1"Miami Herald":"Chávez allies score big wins in Venezuela elections": http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/785055.html"El Universal" de México:"Mitad de venezolanos votó por la oposición: El gobierno de Chávez insiste en que la revolución salió fortalecida": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/59724.html "EL Mercurio" de Chile: "Elecciones en Venezuela" http://www.elmercurio.com/editorial/2008/11/25/elecciones-en-venezuela.asp AMERICA LATINA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Siete muertos en un motín en una prisión de Guatemala: Cinco de las víctimas fueron decapitadas": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/muertos/motin/prision/Guatemala/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_6/Tes"MSNBC" anuncia: "Gunmen open fire in Tijuana bar, 6 killed: The bar, popular with students, is located near three university campuses": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27862527"New York Times" publica: "Sandinista Fervor Turns Sour for Former Comrades of Nicaragua's President": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/world/americas/24nicaragua.html?ref=world"MSNBC" plantea: "Leftist Sandinistas win Nicaragua vote: Ruling party triumphs in most municipal races amid claims of fraud":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27833050/"El País" de Madrid informa: "Más avalanchas y las lluvias dificultan el rescate de los atrapados tras la erupción del Nevado del Huila: La Cruz Roja ha advertido de otro alud, de mayores proporciones.- Toneladas de lodo con troncos arrasan con viviendas en Belalcázar, en el suroeste colombiano": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/avalanchas/lluvias/dificultan/rescate/atrapados/erupcion/Nevado/Huila/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_13/Tes"El Universal" de México analiza: "Llegan a 34 los muertos por las lluvias en Colombia: La fuerte época de lluvias, la segunda del año, y que empezó a mediados de septiembre, ha afectado a 255 municipios de 26 de los 32 departamentos colombianos": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/558188.html"El País" de Madrid publica: "Bolivia levanta el estado de sitio en el departamento de Pando: El ex prefecto de ese distrito seguirá detenido a la espera de un juicio por una masacre de campesinos afines al Gobierno de Evo Morales": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Bolivia/levanta/estado/sitio/departamento/Pando/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_12/Tes"BBC" plantea: "Brasil: 20 muertos por inundaciones": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7745000/7745139.stm"CNN" informa: "Deadly flooding leaves thousands homeless in Brazil":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/24/brazil.deaths/index.html"MSNBC" plantea: "Floods, mudslides kill 45 in southern Brazil :Heavy rains also forced 22,000 to flee, cut off access to four towns": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27889608/-"Los Angles Times" publica: "59 dead in floods, landslides in Brazil: Some are missing and at least 43,000 people have left their homes as heavy rains wreak havoc in the south.":http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-floods25-2008nov25,0,1385608.story"The Economist" analiza: "The Amazon's indigenous people: The other Brazil.The mixed blessings of the simple life led by indigenous people deep in the forest": http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12641796"CNN" : "Chile strike ends with 10 percent raise": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/21/chile.strike/index.html"La Nación" anuncia: "Dentro de unas horas llegarán los barcos rusos: Chávez prepara las maniobras con Rusia":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1073633"El Tiempo" de Colombia plantea: "Flota rusa de cuatro buques llegó a Venezuela para realizar maniobras militares conjuntas":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/flota-rusa-de-cuatro-buques-llego-a-venezuela-para-realizar-maniobras-militares-conjuntas_4685947-1 ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"New York Times" anuncia: " Report Calls for Fresh Approach to Latin America": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/washington/24latin.html?ref=world"La Nación" informa: "Brasil y México, las prioridades de Obama en América latina: Lo afirman sus asesores para la región; el presidente electo todavía no habló con Chávez": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1073495"CNN" analiza: "Obama's economic team takes shape": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/24/transition.wrap/index.html"China Daily": "Obama focuses on job creation": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/24/content_7231583.htm"La Nación" informa: "Obama presenta hoy a todo su equipo económico: Timothy Geithner será secretario del Tesoro; Lawrence Summers, consejero económico": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1073580"Times" plantea: "Bin Laden's driver to leave GuantanamoBay": http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5227621.ece EUROPA"CNN" publica: "Magnitude 7.0 quake rocks Russia's far east": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/24/russia.earthquake/index.html"New York Times" anuncia: "French Socialists Face Division and Derision After Vote for Leader": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/world/europe/24france.html?ref=world"CNN" informa: "German business confidence hits 15-year low": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/11/24/germany.business.confidence.ap/index.html"La Nación" plantea: "Ofensiva del gobierno británico por la crisis: Lanzan hoy un paquete de medidas":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1073585"CNN" informa: "Britain to raise tax on high earners": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/11/24/britain.income.tax.ap/index.html"BBC" analiza: "R. Unido: estímulos. e impuestos": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/newsid_7745000/7745913.stm"Le Monde" analiza: "Silvio Berlusconi évoque de nouveau le bronzage d'Obama": http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2008/11/23/silvio-berlusconi-evoque-de-nouveau-le-bronzage-d-obama_1122080_3222.html#ens_id=1108513"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "Una protesta contra la crisis en Islandia acaba en enfrentamientos entre la policía y los manifestantes: Miles de islandeses realizan desde hace seis sábados concentraciones para protestar contra la actuación del Gobierno en la crisis que ha situado al país al borde del colapso financiero": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/protesta/crisis/Islandia/acaba/enfrentamientos/policia/manifestantes/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_9/Tes Asia – Pacífico /Medio Oriente"El País" de Madrid informa: "El Dalai Lama asegura que luchará "hasta la muerte" por un Tíbet libre: El líder espiritual ha salido fortalecido en la reunión de los tibetanos exiliados en India": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Dalai/Lama/asegura/luchara/muerte/Tibet/libre/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_5/Tes"CNN" publica: "Protests cancel Thai parliament session": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/24/thailand.unrest/index.html"China Daily" anuncia: "Thai protesters vow to topple government by Wednesday": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/25/content_7237152.htm"El Tiempo" de Colombia plantea: "Manifestantes sitian sede temporal del Gobierno de Tailandia":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/otrasregiones/home/manifestantes-sitian-sede-temporal-del-gobierno-de-tailandia_4685920-1"New York Times" informa: "N. Korea Stiffens Reconciliation Stance": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/world/asia/25korea.html?ref=world"Times" publica: "Latest pictures of Kim Jong Il released": http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5227959.ece"El Tiempo" de Colombia analiza: "Fosas comunes fueron descubiertas en prisión militar de Estados Unidos en Vietnam": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/otrasregiones/home/fosas-comunes-fueron-descubiertas-en-prision-militar-de-estados-unidos-en-vietnam_4685928-1"CNN" plantea: "Bombings kill at least 19 in Baghdad":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/11/24/iraq.blast/index.html"Times" anuncia: "Iraqi parliament prepares to vote on status of US troops": http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article5233145.ece"The Economist" analiza situación política en Iran: "The party's over: Iran's President Ahmadinejad has had a good run. For how much longer?": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12650281 AFRICA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Ataque al palacio presidencial de Guinea Bissau: El presidente del país africano pide ayuda a Senegal y considera el ataque como parte de un pronunciamiento militar": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ataque/palacio/presidencial/Guinea/Bissau/elpepuint/20081123elpepuint_8/Tes"China Daily" publica: "Shippers urge naval blockade of Somali coast": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/25/content_7237887.htm"Los Angeles Times" plantea: "Jimmy Carter says Zimbabwe crisis is 'much worse' than imagined": http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mugabe25-2008nov25,0,7756381.story"Le Monde" anuncia: "Le choléra a tué 300 personnes au Zimbabwe": http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2008/11/24/le-cholera-a-tue-300-personnes-au-zimbabwe_1122334_3244.html#ens_id=1105701"El Tiempo" de Colombia analiza: "500 opositores habrían sido asesinados en el Congo desde hace dos años, según Human Rights Watch": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/otrasregiones/home/500-opositores-habrian-sido-asesinados-en-el-congo-desde-hace-dos-anos-segun-human-rights-watch_4685926-1 ECONOMÍA"CNN" informa: "Citigroup secures $20 billion U.S. government lifeline": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/11/24/citi.rescue/index.html "BBC" anuncia: "Plan de emergencia para Citigroup: El Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos anunció a última hora del domingo un plan de rescate de US$20.000 millones para Citigroup uno de los principales bancos del mundo.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/newsid_7745000/7745166.stm"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: " Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12652488"BBC" plantea: "La economía británica decreció": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/newsid_7688000/7688795.stm

As elsewhere in the ex-communist/socialist countries, the former planning system in Yugoslavia has been dismantled as from the beginning of 1990s, and the planning practice has from then onwards been steered by an apart mixture of old habits, few institutional innovations and the social, economic and political turbulence of the transition period. The previous system and practice of socioeconomic planning collapsed, so far not to be substituted for by new arrangements, to match the impact of the key factors of the transition period, i.e., political pluralization, privatization and marketisation. On the other hand, albeit the system of spatial/urban and environmental planning has been 're-touched' in the 1990s, the adjustments undertaken have not either been harmonized with the factors mentioned. What can now be recognized as the existing 'planning system' is, however, an strange mix of heterogeneous elements from a number of disparate modes, i.e., 'crisis-management-planning', 'planning-supported-wild-marketisation-and-privatisation', 'project-based-planning', etc. In effect, there is no overall professional and political consensus on the direction and content of reform in this field (which also applies to other key issues). In sum, the existing situation in the planning system and practice reads as follows: (1) The system has almost lost its legitimacy, partly because the majority of the former public interests collapsed, and new, indisputable public interests still not being established. Under such circumstances, new roles of planning are hardly known to the public at large, in part as a consequence of an overall anti-planning stance among the majority of political, economic and expert elites. (2) The inertia rules the professional landscape, since there has been a lack of new approaches and methodologies, to match the impact of new dominant factors and the miserable social and economic conditions in the country. Regarding the approaches and methodologies applied, the traditional ex ante planning evaluation still prevails, and more ex post and ex continuo evaluation is still missing. (3) The planning system is too centralized (within the two republics), since the radical recentralization of Serbia was undertaken in 1990, and subsequently the sub-national tiers were deprived of almost any effective planning instruments. In addition to this, the majority of regional entities ('districts') and communes lack a competent administrative machinery and expertise, as well as other support (e.g., research, planning information support etc.) for effecting autonomous planning policies. (4) There has been no more ambitious strategic planning (which is, however, somehow understandable vis-à-vis only now ended international sanctions and isolation of the country). On the other hand, the majority of the development documents that have been passed in the meantime, grossly lack elaborated implementation devices (policies and instruments). Especially in the field of urban planning, the detailed ('land use') schemes prevail over the more strategic development schemes for larger urban and regional areas. Specific development projects (and, only sometimes, more harmonized programmes) by far outnumber other planning schemes. (5) The integration and harmonization of various aspects of planning and policy, i.e., social, economic, spatial/urban, environmental, is very poor. In effect, physicalism still dominates the scene in spatial and urban planning, and the elements of socioeconomic development and environmental policy are scarce within this block. (6) The stipulated legal propositions pertaining to the openness, participativeness and transparency of the planning/policy procedures fall easily frail in the planning practice, resulting in the very poor content in this regard. (7) There has been a lack of planners and other experts experienced and knowledgeable in practicing planning under the new circumstance of political pluralism and radically changed structure of stakeholders and concomitant institutional arrangements. This also applies to 'educators' in general, because the prolonged international isolation of the FR Yugoslavia has caused the gross of their knowledge and capabilities irrelevant. In sum, it seems that many planners would not be able to assume new roles that they are expected to on the part of the society at large. (8)The planning/policy information, research, institutional and other support provided by the state and other agents often does not satisfy even the most basic needs in this fields, partly for a general scarcity of resources concomitant to the overall and deep social, economic and political crisis the society found itself in the 1990s. (9) Most frightfully, manipulation, paternalism and clientelism still represent dominant forms of power, which is a problem by itself in Yugoslavia being one of the most corruptive countries in the world. What is now most missing is a non-manipulative persuasion, as well as the authority of professional values, as the communication and interaction forms that seem only promising for and supportive to developing of a democratic, emancipatory and transformative planning mode. A number of attempts during the last decade to embark upon the preparation of the new 'Master Plan of the City Belgrade' (in the sequel: MP) came into realization not before the democratic political changes of October 2000 took place in Serbia. However, the so far undertaken steps do not seem promising, as they failed to satisfy a number of methodological and other standards, as well as to introduce necessary innovations. Unfortunately, the MP was commissioned to the Bureau of Urban Planning of the City of Belgrade (otherwise a 'faithful ally' of all non-democratic regimes in the City's urban planning and related matters over the last more than ten years now, during which there has been a so far unrecorded squandering and illegal privatization of public urban assets, mostly uncontrolled and not paid-for). Similarly, vested are to lead and complete the work mostly the experts/planners who 'controlled' and still 'control' the academic and professional scene in the same period (notwithstanding that were compromised and their abilities proved passé on many occasions), now recycled to perform new mission. Albeit the entire project had not been adequately prepared, already two interim documents have been elaborated now, viz., 'A Hypothesis of the Master Plan of Belgrade 2021', and 'A Concept of the Master Plan of Belgrade 2021'. In what follows, a brief review of the work done so far is presented: (1) The role of the MP is poorly defined, which is strange vis-à-vis the pronounced thesis on the 'insuperable role of market', which one renders puzzle about the veritable role of the MP. In addition to this, physicalism features as the key characteristic of this document: social and economic aspects of development are insufficiently present and poorly integrated into the MP, and so are the environmental aspects. The MP will however have to assume a part of socioeconomic development planning and policy as well, because the latter is predictably not likely to get recuperated in some time to come. Furthermore, the social, economic and environmental problems of Belgrade are so tremendous (e.g., extremely high rate of unemployment, probably around 40% of the total work force, obsolete technological, market and other structure of the larger part of Belgrade economy, prolonged crisis of economic growth, overall pauperization of the overwhelming majority of people, many hundred thousand refugees, few hundred thousand of young and educated people who left the country, disproportionate environmental pollution as compared to the level of economic development, etc.), that they must not be ignored in the development documents like the MP. (2) There is no sound conception on the public interests, particularly under the circumstances of a large number of legitimate individual interests fast emerging on the political scene, some of which also persisting to impose themselves as new and legitimate public interests. This results in a feeble notion on the existing and predictable future conflicts, as well as on the planning mechanisms and instruments that will be used in their control and management. (3) The concept of sustainable development has been only 'flirted with' in the MP, whereby a sound doctrine upon which development is to be directed and articulated is also missing (i.e., that which is of relevance for a territorial entity with the GDP of not more than some USD 1 500 per capita). (4) No efforts have been made to introduce more relevant methodological approach, i.e., those which would contrast the miserable socioeconomic and environmental fixities, viz.: (i) A more rigorous ex post evaluation of past decisions has not been performed, implying that future steps will be undertaken upon rather anecdotal insights in the existing power structure, institutional and organizational arrangements and dominant communication and interaction modes in planning. In the same context, the most significant problem of Belgrade area, i.e., how to approach the economic and ecological renewal and rehabilitation of its economy, has been hardly paid sufficient attention to. (This also applies to the position of Belgrade in the broader regional Euro-Asian context, which has terribly eroded over the last decade). (ii) Although the intention of the whole exercise is to work out a 'hard product', i.e., a urban development plan, no ex ante evaluation scheme has been produced so far, implying that the job is not being performed lege artis. Apart from other implications, this failure is particularly handicapping regarding the criteria of ex ante evaluation, leaving the professional audience and the public at large without the sound answers on key questions: What are the criteria upon which the evaluation has been undertaken? Whose are they? What interests stand behind them? Who decides on the criteria that will be applied? Apart from softening the rigour of the expertise, this flaw also allows for too ample 'maneuvering space' for the subsequent arbitrating to be performed by the politicians. (5) A trend-based extrapolation has been used as the key prognostic technique, which is absolutely unacceptable, keeping in mind the poor predictive power (I) and unstable institutional arrangements in planning and elsewhere (II). Instead, the political community would necessitate a number of veritable alternative scenarios of possible/desirable future development elaborated and presented for discussion, deliberation and decision-making in expert arenas and public forums. (6) Perhaps the weakest part of the MP goes to the issue of implementation of planning decisions, giving way to 'visioning' (in effect, to another planning 'phantasmagory'), which is again unacceptable vis-à-vis the pressing and burning realities of Belgrade and its broader surroundings. (7) Finally, an open, transparent and publicly verified 'offer to strategic partners' would also be needed, as the City does not have enough internal resources to cope with the problems of its economic, social, physical and environmental renewal. To conclude, major improvements are needed regarding the planning approach and methodology applied in the preparation of the Master Plan of the City of Belgrade 2021. As this project is likely to carry considerable demonstrational effects throughout the planning scene in Yugoslavia, its highly professional execution is of necessity, so that a major damage is avoided, i.e., that of a further loss of the legitimacy of planning and erosion of the planning profession.

In a world of turmoil, the strongest military alliance faces an uncertain future, too. After the elections in the US, former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer even predicts a disintegration of the West. One should have no illusions - without the US in the lead the West will not survive in its current shape, Fischer argues, referring to a reluctant new president Donald Trump to fully support NATO and her role to safeguard the integrity of her member states. While NATO has demonstrated a surprisingly strong resolve during the Warsaw summit towards Russia's expansion in Ukraine, the alliance is not willing to really engage herself in the Middle East with a robust mission with combat troops on the ground leaving the embattled area to Moscow's ambitious military intervention and the creation of a massive sphere of influence. The Western alliance will have to adjust to the new realities in which Europe is required to do more for its defense. The year 2017 will be crucial as a test case for the willingness of NATO's members to face the new challenges. Will it withstand these obstacles, or will, as Fischer is fearing, "the Western world, as we have known it, sink down in front of our eyes"? (S+F/Pll)

Coronavirus or COVID-19 pandemic, which broke out in late 2019 in the Wuhan city of China has directly and indirectly affected each and every sphere of life across the world. Till date it has affected more than 3.9 million people with a death toll of 270,740 the world over. Coping with a pandemic medically is hard, but more difficult is to come out of the fear and panic it has causes and can cause to the victims. However, the fear caused by potentially falling victims to the disease can itself be an overwhelming experience as it stirs up people's emotions and sensitivities. Women are mostly the victims of such sensitivities. According to the Lancet report (2020), there has not been any gender analysis of the pandemic by any government of health organization or any estimates of potential victims in preparedness phases. Plan International (2020) highlights that the COVID-19 has interrupted our way of life and has further disrupted individuals, families and communities putting them under stress of health and economic burdens. However, there are other reasons of stress caused by the COVID-19. In times when social isolation and distancing practices are being applied, there are increased risks of violence against women, their abuse, exploitation and neglect. Past evidences inform us that diseases outbreak affected men and women differently in their day-to-day activities.

Today marks the 50th anniversary of the military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Chilean President Salvador Allende and ushered in a particularly brutal and bloody dictatorship under Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, which lasted until 1990.
The role of the CIA in preparing the conditions for the coup, as well as subsequent U.S. support for the dictatorship, contributed heavily to the perception in Latin America and beyond that Washington, despite its claims to champion democracy, preferred "friendly" authoritarian regimes over the possibility that non-aligned or democratically elected left-leaning governments could take power in regions that it considered to be within its sphere of influence.
Investigations in the mid-1970s into the U.S. role in Chile also led to unprecedented legislation — sometimes enforced, sometimes not – designed to ensure greater Congressional oversight of U.S. covert operations and to curb U.S. military and other assistance to governments and armies that abuse fundamental human rights.
To note the 50th anniversary, RS spoke with Peter Kornbluh, the veteran director of the Chilean Documentation Project of the non-governmental National Security Archive, whose work has resulted in the declassification of thousands of previously secret government documents related to U.S. relations with Chile from the 1960's through the Pinochet dictatorship.
A prize-winning author, Kornbluh published "The Pinochet Files: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability," which the Los Angeles Times selected as a "best book" of 2003. As director of the NSA's Cuba Documentation Project, Kornbluh has also written several books on U.S.-Cuban relations.
Kornbluh spoke with RS from Chile, where he is participating in the country's observance of today's anniversary. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
RS: You are the most distinguished researcher on the coup and, in particular, the U.S. role. Briefly, can you say what support the U.S. lent to the coup both before and after?
Kornbluh: You know, it doesn't have to be me saying it. We can just simply quote Henry Kissinger briefing Richard Nixon five days after the coup. He [said], "The Chilean thing was getting consolidated." And Nixon expresses his slight preoccupation about whether the U.S. role is going to be exposed. Nixon says, "Our hand doesn't show on this, does it though?" Kissinger's response is a three-sentence summary of what the U.S. role was. First, he says, "We didn't do it." And he's referring to the fact that the United States was not on the ground 50 years ago today, with agents driving the tanks, supplying the intelligence, piloting the planes that bombed the [presidential] Moneda Palace. The United States did not stand side by side that day with the Chilean military as they destroyed Chile's long democratic tradition.
And then Kissinger continues, "I mean, we helped them. Blank" — a word that is omitted, which you can fill in — "created the conditions as best as possible." And that's an accurate summary of what the U.S. role was. Starting almost the day after Allende's election [in 1970] but weeks before he actually was inaugurated as President of Chile, it was the U.S. goal and mission to foment a coup in Chile, to create what the CIA referred to as a "coup climate" and maximize the likelihood that Allende's model would be a model of failure. And if that also, at the same time, created the conditions, "as best as possible for a military coup," so be it. It was the political goal of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon to assure that Allende did not have a successful model of electoral socialist change that other countries in the world might want to emulate, and the United States [intervened] through both an invisible economic blockade, a cut off of multilateral credits, and a five-pronged covert operations effort that targeted the military. The U.S. funneled a bunch of money into El Mercurio, which was kind of, in those days, the Fox News of Chile, openly pushing for a coup against the Allende government. Those were the operations that helped, as the CIA itself put it, set the stage for the September 11,1973, coup.
So it wasn't that the United States had a direct role on the ground here. It wasn't that the Chilean military were puppets of the United States of America. It was that the United States contributed to a set of conditions that would enhance the likelihood that there would be social pressure for the military to move, and the military did move.
RS: What was the reaction by the Nixon-Kissinger government, if we can put it that way, in the years that followed the coup?
Kornbluh: You can start with the hours that followed. Tomorrow will be September 12th, the 50th anniversary of Kissinger calling what was known as the Washington Special Action Group together and mobilizing everybody to help the Pinochet military regime consolidate. It's quite explicit. And as part of this gathering, one US. official says to Kissinger, "I guess our policy on Allende worked pretty well." And Kissinger jokes to everybody, "President Nixon is worried that we might want to send somebody to Allende's funeral." Kissinger says, "I told him we didn't plan to do that." And then another official in the meeting pipes up and says, "Only, of course, if you want to go, Secretary Kissinger." So they're joking around literally 24 hours after the coup about how successful they were.
Nixon and Kissinger just after the coup are commiserating. They want the credit for having overthrown Allende, and they're commiserating about what Nixon calls the "liberal crap" in the U.S. newspapers, and Kissinger says the newspapers are "bleating" because Allende has been overthrown and has died. Nixon says, "isn't that something?" And Kissinger basically says they should be celebrating. And he tells Nixon, "In the Eisenhower period, we would be heroes." That conversation took place five days after the coup. By then, Kissinger had reconfigured U.S. policy almost overnight.
It had been a policy to destabilize Allende's ability to govern. Almost overnight after the coup, the policy had a complete reversal. It's now a policy to help the new military regime consolidate, and that policy continues all the way through the first three years of the Pinochet regime. It was that first year when the spigots of economic aid and military support to Pinochet [began] opening, including helping Pinochet build what became the most sinister and repressive secret police agency in all of Latin America, the DINA [Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional].
That policy starts to change after the September 1976 act of terrorism in Washington DC that took the lives of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. By the second term of the Reagan administration, the United States has had enough of Pinochet's megalomania, his terrorism. The United States eventually abandons him, but it's a long and incredible history.
RS: You had congressional committees in the mid 1970s that expressed considerable shock about U.S. covert operations, and Chile was among the most important. Do you see Congress as assuming its responsibilities or failing to do so in regard to Pinochet's Chile? And how much of a precedent, if any at all, did that create or help create?
Kornbluh: The scandal of Chile broke in September of 1974 in an article done by that intrepid reporter, Seymour Hersh, where he had gotten hold of secret testimony that CIA Director William Colby had given to the House Armed Services Committee in which he had discussed the whole destabilization program. The scandal was immediate.
After the Hersh story ran, the U.S. Senate reconvenes. Frank Church was named head of another special committee, which became the famous Church committee, and Congress did its very first investigation of the CIA covert operations in general and a case study of Chile in particular. The House Committee under Congressman Otis Pike also started to look at Chile. That whole process was a lot less organized and a lot more chaotic. The Church committee reports really shook the foundations of Americans' perception of their own government. It became quite clear that their own government — in their name and without their knowledge — was intervening to overthrow a democratically elected government and bolstering a murderous, ruthless military regime.
Congress moved very quickly, not just because of the Church Committee investigation but because of a moral reaction of disbelief that our government didn't give a damn about human rights violations and was continuing to embrace this murderous regime. It was because of Chile that heroic senators and congressmen — Edward Kennedy in the Senate, Congressman Tom Harkin from Iowa — got together and drafted the first human rights amendments to U.S. laws governing military and economic aid abroad. Those laws were inspired by and directed initially at Henry Kissinger, who was just basically — can I say kissing Pinochet's ass? Kissinger was telling his own staff not to say anything to him anymore about human rights. These laws were passed, and, for the first time, human rights became an institutionalized criterion of U.S. foreign policy. Congress stepped up and represented the values of the American people in pushing those laws forward.Some people here in Chile at the time of the coup, including a Methodist minister named Joe Eldridge, luckily got out. He returned to Washington so outraged that the United States was supporting the atrocities that were taking place that he founded the Washington Office on Latin America, and, with Amnesty International, almost single handedly created the modern human rights movement in Washington as we know it today. He sought to create a different U.S. foreign policy, one that better reflected the values of the American people.RS: As you look back, this was Congress's high point, and it drew certain lessons from there, some of which have stuck, not necessarily all. But how has this affected long-term U.S.-Latin American relations? The U.S. intervention covert intervention there and its support for Pinochet, what kind of effect do you think it's had on U.S.-Latin American relations over the past 50 years?
Kornbluh: The U.S. role in Chile became a horrendous stain on any credible argument that the United States supported democracy, opposed military dictatorships, opposed human rights violations — all the things that the United States supposedly wanted to claim that it stood for. And even though presidents later, starting with Carter, have stood for those things, and the United States still is supposed to stand for those things, the history of the U.S. role in Chile has made it very difficult for that argument, even 50 years later, to be credibly presented.
One way to understand what the United States did in Chile is to compare it today to what Russia is doing to Ukraine. The Russian intervention in Ukraine was essentially inspired by the same issues that Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon feared with the election of Allende. [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky had been popularly elected. Ukraine was turning to the West. [Russian President Vladimir] Putin saw that as an affront to his hegemony in the region. In the case of Chile, it's not an open war, but it was a similar type of effort to control the region, to undermine a model that might change the broader influence of the United States if other countries emulated Allende's electoral model of change.
We're not really talking about the past. So many countries, including the United States of America, are facing the deterioration of democratic institutions and the onslaught and threat of authoritarian rule not just in the United States and Chile, but also in Spain, Sweden, Italy, etc. You have a situation where democracy and its meaning are slipping, and the forces of dictatorial rule are growing. Chile is a reminder of the extreme dangers to all of us if that process continues. Chileans have already lived through it once. They don't want to live through it again. That's why the resounding slogan at the official ceremony today from Chilean President Gabriel Boric was "nunca mas." Never again.

The majority of Croats in Montenegro are the native population traditionally living in the Bay of Kotor, the town of Budva and Bar and its surroundings. A minority of them are immigrants or their descendants. As early as during the Austro–Hungarian rule over the Montenegrin coast, and especially during the Yugoslav period, they inhabited the area of today's Montenegro, mostly its inland towns. This paper primarily aims to present and analyse the size of the Croatian population in Montenegro in general and at the level of its administrative units. To do so, it uses data from the censuses conducted from 1948 to 2011, which recorded national affiliation, among other things. In the context of those censuses, one can argue that, during their conduct, it was possible to declare oneself as a Croat, and that a major share of the population avoided declaring themselves as such although they could, based on their ethnic characteristics. Accordingly, the second aim of the paper was to attempt to determine, in the context of the 2011 census, which is a source of plenty of relevant data, not only the number of declared Croats but also those who were undeclared as such, but could certainly be considered to belong to the same linguistic, religious and cultural community as Croats. For this paper, that wider unit was termed the Slavic Catholic community (Slavic–Catholic), which is already recognised in language as the Central South Slavic area (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro), among other things as a certain "opposite" of the Slavic–Orthodox and Slavic–Muslim communities of the same spatial scope. To better understand the position of Croats in Montenegro, and especially their reluctance to declare Croatian national affiliation, which is more and more evident over time, an integral part of the paper is an appropriate presentation of historical circumstances that have framed their past and present identity positioning. The first data on the presence of Croats in today's Montenegrin area refers to the period of Slavic settlement of South-east Europe, which took place until the beginning of the 7th century. According to the work of the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (945–959), "On the Governance of the Empire", during their settlement, Croats occupied the former Roman province of Dalmatia (which, according to the author, "started from the surroundings of Durrës and Bar and stretched to the Istrian mountains and to the river Danube in width"), as well as Pannonia and Illyricum. According to the Chronicle of the Priest of Duklja, probably written by the (Arch)Bishop of Bar Gregory in the period 1177–1189, upon settlement the Slavs had founded a state, the backbone of which was on the coast, between Istria and today's northern Albania. According to the Chronicle, that coastal belt was divided into White and Red Croatia, which stretched from Duvanjsko Polje further south. Besides, Byzantine 11th- and 12th-century writers mention Croats and Croatia in the context of the area of today's Montenegro. However, from the beginning of the 9th century, that is, the point in time from which one can continuously follow the political development in the Adriatic–Dinaric belt, or the area of the former Roman Dalmatia, it is certain that four smaller Slavic principalities existed between the rivers Cetina and Bojana: Neretva, Zahumlje, Travunia and Duklja. In the mid 11th century, Duklja, Travunia and Zahumlje were united into a state at the initiative of the rulers of Duklja. The expanded state of Duklja, ruled by the Vojislavljević dynasty, gained international acknowledgement since the papacy recognised it as a separate kingdom and a strong lever for maintaining its own identity, manifested in the existence of a state religious centre in the form of the Catholic metropolis of Bar. Such circumstances could have suggested the emergence of a much wider state unit, located approximately between the rivers Neretva and Drim on the one side and the Adriatic and the river Tara on the other, which would have implied the formation of an ethnic body. However, events unfolded in a different direction. Since the mid 12th century the state of Duklja had been losing ever more power, completely falling under the ruler of neighbouring Orthodox Serbia at the end of the same century. During that time the Schism of 1054 acquired full significance. The 1204 establishment of the Latin Empire, with its seat in Constantinople, led to a strong polarisation between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. In such conditions, upon establishment of its own church in 1219, the Serbian dynasty of Nemanjić began to carry out mass Orthodoxisation of the Zahumlje and Duklja areas to ensure their loyalty. Primarily exposed to religious conversion were Slavic Catholic people, who, at that time, shared many similarities with the neighbouring Orthodox in the entire area of the Adriatic–Dinaric belt in terms of external manifestations of their Christian identity, significantly marked by the tradition of Cyril and Methodius. Coastal, communal centres in the area of today's Montenegro, Kotor, Budva and Bar, at the time still largely Romanesque, but eventually Slavicised, and their "belonging" or gravitating Slavic population, as well as the Albanian population located next to gradually Albanianised Ulcinj, along the river Bojana and in Malesia, were left Catholics. The territorial relations between Catholics and Orthodox established at the time have largely remained relevant until modern times. In the area of today's Montenegro, the Slavic Catholic population was in principle reduced to a distinct minority concentrated in and around the coastal communes. As the Serbian state weakened from the mid 14th century, those communes gradually merged with the western states, and ultimately with the Venetian Republic. They remained under its rule until the end of the 18th century. After that, they were mainly part of the Austrian Kingdom of Dalmatia until 1918. Under those conditions, sharing the social climate with the population of the eastern Adriatic coast, who spoke the same language and shared the same religion, from the mid 19th century the Slavic Catholic population of today's Montenegrin coast became involved in the processes leading to the constitution of the Croatian nation. The political and social development of the Orthodox population in Montenegro took a different course. By integrating into the de facto Serbian Orthodox Church, they began acquiring Serbian ethnic characteristics. However, given the disintegration of the Serbian state on a part of today's Montenegrin territory, a new state emerged in the form of Zeta, centred in sub-Lovćen Montenegro and ruled by the Balšić dynasty and the Crnojević dynasty. During the Ottoman rule, which began in the late 15th century, sub-Lovćen Montenegro retained a certain autonomy, which became the basis for the formation of the Montenegrin state close to its current borders in the late 17th century. While the Montenegrin population "remained" in the identity sphere of proto-national Serbs due to Orthodoxy, imbued with the cult of the Nemanjić dynasty, its peculiar development enabled them to acquire own ethnic consciousness. The dichotomy between the Montenegrin and Serbian sense of identity has not been overcome to this day, which is becoming increasingly clear in the division of the Orthodox population between the national Montenegrins and the national Serbs. With the disintegration of Austro–Hungary and the emergence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that is, Yugoslavia, the Slavic Catholic population in the area of today's Montenegro found itself permanently separated from the political, or at least administrative framework defined by the Catholic majority, after almost five hundred years. Instead, it became a distinct minority group in an environment that was continuously exposed to strong Serbian influences, even after Montenegro gained independence. Over time, following the processes of migration towards the coast, it also became a minority in settlements where it once represented the only or majority population. Under those conditions, strongly marked by latent or real contradictions in the relations between Croats and Serbs and often radical manifestations of Serbian identity in their environment, for the Slavic Catholic population in Montenegro, the declaration of Croatian identity became a kind of burden that not everyone was ready or able to bear. In that context, among other things, it is worth looking at the data presented, which points to a decline in the share of Croats in Montenegro. Equally, attention should be paid to the data from the 2011 census, which indicates a kind of mass declaration of "alternative" forms of ethnicity on the part of the Slavic–Catholic population. According to the first census, the one of 1921, which covered the population of all parts of today's Montenegro, 313,432 inhabitants lived on its soil, of which between 11,380 and 12,145 were Croats and other members of the Slavic–Catholic community. According to that census, which took no account of the national determinant, but recorded the religious and linguistic ones, the share of members of that community in the total population inhabiting the area of today's Montenegro was between 3.6% and 3.9%. The censuses after 1945, which, as pointed out, covered the national determinant and were conducted in socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1991), Federal Republic of Yugoslavia / the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (1991–2006) and in independent Montenegro (since 2006) recorded the following shares of Croats in Montenegro: 6,808 (in 1948), 9,814 (in 1953), 10,664 (in 1961), 9,192 (in 1971), 6,904 (in 1981), 6,244 (in 1991), 6,811 (in 2003), and 6,021 (in 2011). It is evident from the first censuses that part of the Slavic–Catholics in Montenegro did not declare themselves as Croats. This is primarily the case in Bar and its surroundings, where the declaration of Montenegrin nationality has permanently prevailed. Since 1971, a large number of people formerly declared as Croats began to declare themselves as "Yugoslavs". Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in the 2003 and 2011 censuses, that type of declaration lost significance. However, no "return" to the declaration of Croatian national affiliation occurred, but rather the adoption of Montenegrin identity, rejection of the declaration of nationality, declaration of regional affiliation, etc. The analysis conducted in the context of the 2011 census shows that only a small part of the total Slavic–Catholic community in Montenegro declared themselves as Croats. Basically, only 5,931 people did so, if the total share of Croats (6,021) is reduced by 90 Orthodox who are probably registered as Croats for family reasons. At the same time, 29 Bosnians, 5,667 Montenegrins, 68 Yugoslavs, three Muslims, 569 nationally undeclared persons, 376 regionally declared persons, 112 Serbs and one Serb Montenegrin declared their affiliation with Catholicism. According to the insight into the share of the native Slavic Catholic population in Montenegro in 1921 and the share of Croats in the 1953–1971 censuses, it can be stated with a high level of certainty that those 6,825 respondents belonged to the Slavic Catholic population. The total share of the Slavic Catholic population in Montenegro in 2011 was larger than the sum of Croats (5,931) and the mentioned 6,825 persons, which amounted to 12,756, given that it should be increased by a certain number of respondents, primarily among Bosnians, Montenegrins, Yugoslavs, nationally undeclared and regionally declared who declared themselves as agnostics, atheists, unidentified Christians or refused to declare their religion. Primarily based on a comparison of the share of such persons within the municipalities of Boka Kotorska (Herceg Novi, Kotor, Tivat), where it is extremely high, with their shares in other Montenegrin municipalities, it could be argued that in 2011, the total share of Croats and other members of the Slavic–Catholic community amounted to approximately 15,000 or 2.4% of the population of Montenegro.