Suchergebnisse

The book deals with confidentiality as one of the most controversial issues in international commercial arbitration. On the one hand, it is widely recognized that confidentiality is an important advantage of arbitration which contributes to its attractiveness. On the other hand, there is no uniform regulation in national legislations, arbitration rules, and other relevant sources as to the scope or even to the existence of a duty of confidentiality. A uniform approach to confidentiality of international commercial arbitration is possible. The best way to achieve it would be through harmonization of national arbitration laws which should impose a confidentiality obligation subject to certain exceptions. The purpose of maintaining confidentiality would be to protect primarily the parties from undesirable leaks that can be avoided and to protect arbitration as an institution. As to a systematic publication of arbitral awards without identifying the parties' identity, it is desirable and should be the goal.

Arbitration has become an increasingly important mechanism for dispute resolution, both in the domestic and international setting. Despite its importance as a form of state-sanctioned dispute resolution, it has largely remained outside the spotlight of constitutional law. This landmark work represents one of the first attempts to synthesize the fields of arbitration law and constitutional law. Drawing on the author's extensive experience as a scholar in arbitration law who has lectured and studied around the world, the book offers unique insights into how arbitration law implicates issues such as separation of powers, federalism and individual liberties.

A lecturer on theAlabamaclaims and the Geneva Tribunal of 1871–2, like a director ofHamlet, has to accept one inescapable fact: that everyone knows, broadly at least, how the story ends. There can be no reliance on suspense to sustain interest in the narrative. So I shall begin at the end.

"Science often entails connotations of 'objectivity', 'certainty', and the capability to discover the 'factual truth'. Judicial decisions, in turn, are routinely associated with resolving disputes in a 'final', 'neutral', and 'authoritative' way. Yet international environmental adjudication, where scientific and legal authority get entangled with each other, suggests that neither science nor law can fully live up to these idealized expectations. What happens if science and law yield competing narratives as to the factual basis of a dispute? Who could and should resolve their conflict and how, based on what benchmarks? Would the uncertain, probabilistic nature of scientific input diminish the authority of a legal judgment based upon it?"