Book Review: Popper, Objectivity, and the Growth of Knowledge
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 3, p. 397-400
ISSN: 1552-7441
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In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 3, p. 397-400
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 3, p. 283-300
ISSN: 1552-7441
The common assumption is that if a group comprising moral agents can act intentionally, as a group, then the group itself can also be properly regarded as a moral agent with respect to that action. I argue, however, that this common assumption is the result of a problematic line of reasoning I refer to as "the collective fallacy." Recognizing the collective fallacy as a fallacy allows us to see that if there are, in fact, irreducibly joint actors, then some of them will lack the full-fledged moral agency of their members. The descriptivist question of whether a group can perform irreducibly joint intentional action need not rise and fall with the normative question of whether a group can be a moral agent.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 3, p. 358-372
ISSN: 1552-7441
This paper discusses the so-called non-interference assumption (NIA) grounding causal inference in trials in both medicine and the social sciences. It states that for each participant in the experiment, the value of the potential outcome depends only upon whether she or he gets the treatment. Drawing on methodological discussion in clinical trials and laboratory experiments in economics, I defend the necessity of partial forms of blinding as a warrant of the NIA, to control the participants' expectations and their strategic interactions with the experimenter.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 3, p. 323-340
ISSN: 1552-7441
Social scientists associate agent-based simulation (ABS) models with three ideas about explanation: they provide generative explanations, they are models of mechanisms, and they implement methodological individualism. In light of a philosophical account of explanation, we show that these ideas are not necessarily related and offer an account of the explanatory import of ABS models. We also argue that their bottom-up research strategy should be distinguished from methodological individualism.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 3, p. 301-322
ISSN: 1552-7441
The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition perspective combined with organization studies could provide us with explanatory understanding of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 3, p. 341-357
ISSN: 1552-7441
This article explores the characteristics of research sites that scientists have called "natural experiments" to understand and develop usable distinctions for the social sciences between "Nature's or Society's experiments" and "natural experiments." In this analysis, natural experiments emerge as the retro-fitting by social scientists of events that have happened in the social world into the traditional forms of field or randomized trial experiments. By contrast, "Society's experiments" figure as events in the world that happen in circumstances that are already sufficiently "controlled" to be open for direct analysis without reconstruction work.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 44, Issue 3, p. 365-374
ISSN: 1552-7441
Recently, Dollimore criticized our claim that Organizational Ecology is not a Darwinian research program. She argued that Organizational Ecology is merely an incomplete Darwinian program and provided a suggestion as to how this incompleteness could be remedied. Here, we argue that Dollimore's suggestion fails to remedy the principal problem that Organizational Ecology faces and that there are good reasons to think of the program as deeply incompatible with Darwinian thinking.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 2, p. 246-256
ISSN: 1552-7441
R. Keith Sawyer rightly claimed that the formulation of several cross-level regularities does not disprove the "autonomy" of sciences. Nevertheless, first, this autonomy becomes gradual because cross-level regularities narrow the scope for strong emergence and, second, these examples do not disprove the metaphysical premises of Kim's critique. Sawyer and I concur on the thesis according to which the proof of strong emergence is in part an empirical question. However, it also depends on the concept of individualism applied whether a description or explanation can count as reducible or not. Even if some of the examples given might leave open the possibility of strong emergence, to generalize, to consider relations or to point to the unpredictability of social processes do not prove the existence of irreducible multiple realization.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 2, p. 272-274
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 2, p. 275-279
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 43, Issue 2, p. 268-272
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 44, Issue 3, p. 349-364
ISSN: 1552-7441
In the 1980s, there was a significant upsurge in diagnoses of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Ian Hacking suggests that the roots of this tendency lie in the excessive willingness of psychologists past and present to engage in the "psychologization of trauma." I argue that Hacking makes some philosophically problematic assumptions about the putative threat to human autonomy that is posed by the increasing availability, attractiveness, and plausibility of various forms of simulated experience. I also suggest how a different set of axiological and historical assumptions might have led to a less dismissive and possibly more plausible account of this diagnostic trend.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 44, Issue 4, p. 407-423
ISSN: 1552-7441
By taking the collective character of scientific research seriously, some philosophers have claimed that scientific knowledge is indeed collective knowledge. However, there is little clarity on what exactly is meant by collective knowledge. In this article, I argue that there are two notions of collective knowledge that have not been well distinguished: irreducibly collective knowledge (ICK) and jointly committed knowledge (JCK). The two notions provide different conditions under which it is justified to ascribe knowledge to a group. It is argued that ICK and JCK need to be approached independently, each of which can shed light on different aspects of science, knowledge production, and acceptance.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 44, Issue 3, p. 282-315
ISSN: 1552-7441
Reydon and Scholz raise doubts about the Darwinian status of organizational ecology by arguing that Darwinian principles are not applicable to organizational populations. Although their critique of organizational ecology's typological essentialism is correct, they go on to reject the Darwinian status of organizational populations. This paper claims that the replicator-interactor distinction raised in modern philosophy of biology but overlooked for discussion by Reydon and Scholz provides a way forward. It is possible to conceptualize evolving Darwinian populations providing that the inheritance mechanism is appropriately specified. By this approach, adaptation and selection are no longer dichotomized, and the evolutionary significance of knowledge transmission is highlighted.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 44, Issue 1, p. 102-111
ISSN: 1552-7441
For almost half a century, the person most responsible for fomenting brouhahas regarding degrees of plasticity in the writing of histories has been Hayden White. Yet, despite the voluminous responses provoked by White's work, almost no effort has been made to treat White's writings in a systematic yet sympathetic way as a philosophy of history. Herman Paul's book begins to remedy that lack and does so in a carefully considered and extremely scholarly fashion. In his relatively brief six chapters (plus an introduction), Paul packs a wealth of information. He convincingly demonstrates that a guiding theme of White's work from earliest times has been that historians have no choice but to impose a structure on historical data and thus bear responsibility for structures so imposed. As such, a key philosophical question concerns on what bases White contends that a freedom of choice exists regarding forms given to recorded histories. This essay focuses on how Paul argues for a unified vision that answers this question, as well as how he offers an original and comprehensive conception of White's writings.