Suchergebnisse

The top quark mass is measured using a template method in the t ¯t → lepton + jets channel (lepton is e or μ) using ATLAS data recorded in 2012 at the LHC. The data were taken at a proton–proton centre-of-mass energy of √ s = 8 TeV and correspond to an integrated luminosity of 20.2 fb−1. The t ¯t → lepton + jets channel is characterized by the presence of a charged lepton, a neutrino and four jets, two of which originate from bottom quarks (b). Exploiting a three-dimensional template technique, the top quark mass is determined together with a global jet energy scale factor and a relative b-to-light-jet energy scale factor. The mass of the top quark is measured to be mtop = 172.08 ± 0.39 (stat) ± 0.82 (syst) GeV. A combinationwith previousATLASmtop measurements gives mtop = 172.69 ± 0.25 (stat) ± 0.41 (syst) GeV. ; We acknowledge the support of ANPCyT, Argentina; YerPhI, Armenia; ARC, Australia; BMWFW and FWF, Austria; ANAS, Azerbaijan; SSTC, Belarus; CNPq and FAPESP, Brazil; NSERC, NRC and CFI, Canada; CERN; CONICYT, Chile; CAS, MOST and NSFC, China; COLCIENCIAS, Colombia; MSMT CR, MPO CR and VSC CR, Czech Republic; DNRF and DNSRC, Denmark; IN2P3-CNRS, CEA-DRF/IRFU, France; SRNSFG, Georgia; BMBF, HGF, and MPG, Germany; GSRT, Greece; RGC, Hong Kong SAR, China; ISF and Benoziyo Center, Israel; INFN, Italy; MEXT and JSPS, Japan; CNRST, Morocco; NWO, Netherlands; RCN, Norway; MNiSW and NCN, Poland; FCT, Portugal; MNE/IFA, Romania; MES of Russia and NRC KI, Russian Federation; JINR; MESTD, Serbia; MSSR, Slovakia; ARRS andMIZŠ, Slovenia; DST/NRF, South Africa; MINECO, Spain; SRC and Wallenberg Foundation, Sweden; SERI, SNSF and Cantons of Bern and Geneva, Switzerland; MOST, Taiwan; TAEK, Turkey; STFC, United Kingdom; DOE and NSF, United States of America. In addition, individual groups and members have received support from BCKDF, CANARIE, CRC and Compute Canada, Canada; COST, ERC, ERDF, Horizon 2020, andMarie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, European Union; Investissements d' Avenir Labex and Idex, ANR, France; DFG and AvH Foundation, Germany; Herakleitos, Thales and Aristeia programmes co-financed by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF, Greece; BSFNSF and GIF, Israel; CERCA Programme Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain; The Royal Society and Leverhulme Trust, United Kingdom.

AbstractIn emerging countries, deposits play an important role in banks' total funding; hence, depositor discipline may significantly impact banking performance and financial system stability. This paper investigates depositor discipline before and after Vietnam's 2008–2011 banking crisis when depositors had little experience regarding bank bailouts and the amount of deposit insurance was limited to a low cap. The study points out that before the crisis, the level of deposit financing in banks depended on both the interest rates offered and on measures of banks' risk‐taking. After the crisis, given that the Vietnamese government prevented all bank failures to ensure economic, political, and social stability, depositors still react to interest rate changes, but substantially less to risk. This suggests that they have learned that their deposits are safe regardless of the risk the bank is taking.

The current Chinese leadership that assumed power in late 2012 has launched an anti-corruption campaign that is unprecedented in magnitude. The sheer number of high-level officials cracked down by the Communist Party's disciplinary body prompts a much speculated question in China studies: how do the dynamics of informal networks affect the Party's disciplinary punishment of senior cadres? This article initiates the answering of this question with systematic evidence. The authors highlight the threat of rectification campaigns hanging over the bureaucratic system and thus inducing officials to attach themselves to powerful patrons whose protection offers pivotal career security for lower-level clients. Based on the authors' findings from a sample of over 500 provincial officials in office when the current campaign started, those tied to incumbent members of the Politburo Standing Committee were less likely to be investigated for corruption than those without such ties. Factional ties with retired members of the same body, however, did not provide similar protection. The authors' analysis helps explain the pervasiveness of personal dependence and factional activities in China's political system and also sheds light on the complex interaction of informal rules and formal institutions in authoritarian regimes. (China/GIGA)

Undoubtedly, the technological revolution in information and communications causing major changes in citizens' social interactions. The new reticular rationality offers the possibility of shaping, developing, and strengthening social networks and virtual communities. All of them facilitate the creation of new interactive spaces, new social collectives promoting citizenship and that, from different social fields and levels of experience, articulate and streamline processes of production, circulation and appropriation of new symbolic products. Such products contribute not only to generating new sources of knowledge but, above all, to strengthening processes of citizen interaction. In such processes, the field of media, religiosities and socio-cultural processes are strategically intertwined. In this context, experiences of civic religiosity find in the potential generated by the global network, new possibilities of interaction and religious recognition. Also new forms and spaces to share plural options of faith and socio-religious practices that make sense of the existence of cybernauts. This text is divided into three parts: First, critically contextualizes the global phenomenon of social networks. Second, it makes an approximation to some experiences of digital networks of religious recognition from Latin America. Finally, raises some questions that arise from such virtual practices.

In this work, we investigate which countries have been more central during Phases I and II of the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) with respect to the different types of accounts operating in the system. We borrow a set of centrality measures from Network Theory's tools to describe how the structure of the system has evolved over time and to identify which countries have been in the core or in the periphery of the network. In doing this, we investigate by means of extensive partitions on the different types of accounts and transactions characterizing the EU ETS whether the role of intermediaries (approximated by Person Holding Accounts - PHAs) has affected the overall structure of the system. Preliminary findings over the period 2005-2012 suggest that PHAs have played a prominent role in the transaction of permits, heavily influencing the configuration of the system. This motivates further research on the impact of non-regulated entities in the EU ETS design.

Biodiversity offsetting (BDO) is presented as capable of mitigating development-related harm to populations of species while simultaneously enhancing economic development. The technique involves constructing such harm as a result of market failures, which can be resolved through market solutions. BDO is contentious, attracting outspoken proponents and opponents in equal measure. We examine competing perspectives of interested non-governmental actors through a structured discourse analysis, using qualitative data coding, of 24 written evidence submissions to the UK Parliament׳s Environmental Audit Committee׳s 2013 Inquiry into Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Nuanced positions and areas of agreement notwithstanding, we find that there is a discernible oppositional pattern producing core polarities between organisations favouring and resisting BDO. In interpreting these oppositional dynamics we observe that it is unlikely that this impasse can be resolved since although the debate is framed in terms of differences of view regarding the effectiveness or desirability of specific technical aspects of BDO policy, these differences arise from fundamentally divergent value framings. Struggles over offsetting involve irresolvable value struggles, and negotiations over the assumed (ir)rationality of biodiversity offsetting are thus located firmly within political and ideological arenas.