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"Although political scientists and their students tended, prior to the seventies, to approach political theory as the history of political ideas, a rapid growth of interest in political theory as the analysis of political concepts led to the publication of this book. The approach outlined here remains significant today not only for its contribution to normative analysis, but also because it shows how political scientists can view their subject matter with a more profound understanding of the concepts they deal with in their work. De Crespigny and Wertheimer selected fourteen essays on seven fundamental political concepts for this volume: power, authority, liberty, equality, justice, rights, and political obligation. These essays explore the basic ideas and values of politics, and are the works of scholars with considerable reputations as theorists among their contemporaries. They continue to represent some of the best Anglo-American thinking of the century. The editors discuss the nature and possibilities of political theory and, in particular, they examine the adequacy of the criticisms that have commonly been directed at the main works of "traditional" political thought. They provide an incisive introduction to each chapter. These explanatory materials result in a volume that can be used as the primary text in courses in political theory and political philosophy, in a course in the history of political thought, or as a guide to basic issues underlying political thought irrespective of its historical context."--Provided by publisher.

We argue that multiple levels of trauma were present in Egypt before, during and after the 2011 revolution. Individual, social and political trauma constitute a triangle of traumatisation which was strategically employed by the Egyptian counter-revolutionary forces – primarily the army and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood – to maintain their political and economic power over and above the social, economic and political interests of others. Through the destruction of physical bodies, the fragmentation and polarisation of social relations and the violent closure of the newly emerged political public sphere, these actors actively repressed the potential for creative and revolutionary transformation. To better understand this multi-layered notion of trauma, we turn to Habermas' 'colonisation of the lifeworld' thesis which offers a critical lens through which to examine the wider political and economic structures and context in which trauma occurred as well as its effects on the personal, social and political realms. In doing so, we develop a novel conception of trauma that acknowledges individual, social and political dimensions. We apply this conceptual framing to empirical narratives of trauma in Egypt's pre- and post-revolutionary phases, thus both developing a non-Western application of Habermas' framework and revealing ethnographic accounts of the revolution by activists in Cairo.

Democracy and the state are two political notions that have come under considerable duress in late modernity. This paper considers a prominent critic of both, Sheldon Wolin. The paper examines three elements that figure in Wolin's analyses of democracy and the modern state in a central way: community, memory, and the culture of history. A theorisation of these elements can illuminate what is at stake in the articulation of political conceptions that yield communal forms through the constitution of political space. Wolin's analyses of democracy, the state, and modern power can be of help, first, in elucidating the political valences of the three elements themselves; second, in specifying relationships of mutuality among them; and third, in theorising what is at issue in the transposition of these elements from the domestic sphere to the international. The paper speaks mainly to the first and second concerns. A path is explored for thinking what is at stake in the third, namely, locating in and then transposing from the domestic sphere a 'we' which does not enjoy a precise ontology, but which is nonetheless capable of giving collaborative efforts in world-political spheres another political ground.

The aim of this article is to contribute to the elaboration of a deliberative approach to global institutional design. A deliberative approach aims to embed processes of mutual reason-giving at the heart of international relations and global decision-making. The theoretical framework that orientates this discussion is the liberal approach to international law developed by John Rawls. It may seem strange to invoke this model: after all, Rawls does not specifically discuss the issue of global institutional design and indeed has been widely criticized for neglecting this topic. In fact, in its account of global public reason, Rawls's approach can be shown to contain important and surprisingly neglected resources for constructing a dynamic and inclusive theory of global deliberative politics.

In double columns. ; Date from text. ; Caption title. ; At head of title: Motto : educate and organize. ; "Reprinted from The Toronto investigator, October 21st, 1911." ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

We examine the recent debates about governance, focusing particularly on the World Bank and identify certain factors which have in recent years moved the Bank's thinking beyond narrowly economic notions of development. Our account is tentative and we suggest further avenues of research. We try to connect the Bank's thinking systematically with key features of liberal discourse and suggest that this can do much to illuminate practice. We illustrate this with a discussion of the growing relationship between the Bank and NGOs, to contribute to forms of analysis which go beyond the ideas vs. interests polarities that still inform so much of contemporary social and political theory. There ought not to be two histories, one of political and moral action and one of political and moral theorizing, because there were not two pasts, one populated only by actions, the other only by theories. Every action is the bearer and expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorizing and every expression of belief is a political and moral action. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.61

Johann Arnason's work combines the most erudite historical-comparative sociology, discussing highly knowledgeably enormous stretches of world-history, with the most subtle social and political philosophy, drawing creatively on the traditions of hermeneutics and phenomenology. Invariably, his works introduce more nuance and sophistication into the analysis of even very well studied socio-historical phenomena. At the same time, he addresses such major phenomena in terms of modernity, democracy and capitalism, agreeing that there often – maybe always – is a combination of empirical, conceptual and normative issues at work when analysing human history. Nevertheless, readers of his work may at the same time be impressed by the nuance and sophistication and at a loss with regard to what such further refinement of our socio-historical knowledge entails in terms of understanding our own time in its historical context. Searching through Johann Arnason's work, this article identifies unexplored questions in the conceptual and historical relation between civilization, modernity, and equality and tries to understand why they have been left open.

This paper shows that while there seems to be more or less a general acceptance for plurality as a condition of world politics and at least a vague commitment to a pluralist ideal, the challenge remains to formulate a fruitful account of international pluralism. While dominating approaches to international theory present international pluralism as essentially a by-product and instrumental, this paper suggest an alternative way to conceive of international pluralism when defending the ancient concept variety as a better guide to approach both the understanding of plurality as the human condition and the notion of international pluralism. The paper concludes that it is preferable to accept a variety of pluralist conceptions rather than go on searching for a theoretical conception standing above the controversy; accepting pluralism in a sense involves rejecting just one version of pluralism.