Suchergebnisse

Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of illustrations; List of principal abbreviations; List of contributors; Acknowledgement; Foreword; The democratic legitimacy of EU international relations: an introduction; 1 Are EU international relations democratic? A question worth asking; 2 Democracy and legitimacy in the European Union; 3 The EU in international relations: more democratic but less efficient?; 4 The democratic legitimacy of EU international relations: an overview; Notes

Preliminary Material /L'Affaire du Juno Trader -- Demande Soumise au Nom de Saint-Vincent-et-Les Grenadines /L'Affaire du Juno Trader -- Statement in Response of Guinea-Bissau /L'Affaire du Juno Trader -- Minutes — Procès-Verbal /L'Affaire du Juno Trader -- Documents /L'Affaire du Juno Trader.

Die Dissertation zur politischen Macht von transnationalen Unternehmen entwickelt eine neue mikroökonomische Machttheorie. Mit einer politökonomischen Interpretation des Capability-Ansatzes von Amartya Sen entsteht ein Modell, um die politische Macht von transnationalen Unternehmen auf internationale Organisationen zu erfassen, wobei auf die soziologische Kapitaltheorie von Pierre Bourdieu zurückgegriffen wird. Macht wird als Reduktion von Handlungsmöglichkeit definiert und mathematisch mit Machtressourcen und Machtinstrumente abgeleitet. Die politische Macht transnationaler Unternehmen wurde durch einen Empirieüberblick an zahlreichen Einzelfällen dokumentiert. Die volkswirtschaftliche Literatur kann in der spezialisierten Neuen Politischen Ökonomik oder Public Choice Literatur oder in der allgemeinen volkswirtschaftlichen Theorie diese Machtverhältnisse nur begrenzt abbilden. Die Ideengeschichte der Kategorie Macht im Vergleich zu Wirtschafts- und anderen Sozialwissenschaften hat die wachsende Spaltung zwischen beiden Disziplinen sichtbar werden lassen. Anwendungsmöglichkeiten werden mit dem M.A.I. (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) und einer Operationalisierung vorgestellt. Ausblicke zu Public Choice (Harsanyi), Alternativkosten (Weise) oder Sprachökonomie werden aufgezeigt.

Abstract
There is a dissonance between principled consensus and operational dissensus in the emerging regulatory framework for autonomous military capabilities (AMCs). This framework is based on the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the maintenance of human control and responsibility, but it remains unclear whether and how IHL might apply to AMCs and how human control and responsibility can be maintained. The emergence of a regulatory framework in the face of this dissonance raises questions about how alternative regulatory possibilities have been excluded and how the possibility of regulation has been assumed. This article explores the mechanics of this exclusion and assumption. It sheds light on the conditions of possibilities and trajectories of development of the regulatory regime for AMCs, and also provides insights into international regulatory frameworks more broadly, especially in relation to new technologies. Using the example of the everywhere-forever war on terror, this article points to the role of a failure of politics and a consequently amorphous and expanding ideal of security in excluding the possibility of prohibition or restrictive regulation of the military promise of AMCs. The article then turns to four discursive strategies that sustain the assumption that AMCs are amenable to regulation. Through conflation, different types of AMCs are subsumed within an imaginary that is more easily accommodated within the regulatory consensus. Deferral creates a façade of consensus while shifting contentious issues to the national sphere. Normalization operates to de-emphasize the novelty of AMCs, while valorization pulls in the opposite direction by exaggerating the virtues of AMCs.

This article contributes to the understanding of inter‐agency coordination among international organizations, conceived as international public administrations (IPAs). We adopt a practice‐based approach to study the dilemmas of coordination across levels of government in the empirical setting of United Nations agencies involved in field‐level development activities. Based on elite interviews in both pilot countries and agency headquarters, complemented by extensive archival analysis, we track the emergence of a specific type of coordination dilemma that has been understudied, that is, the dilemma of inter‐ and intra‐agency coordination. We identify two sets of coordinating practices that aided in balancing the dilemma, that is, 'systemic thinking' and 'jointly mobilizing resources and consensus', and we discuss the organizational factors mediating the perception of each set of practices.

Law in the setting of international relations is a curious institution. Idealists proclaim it to be the potential savior of the planet; cynics thumb their noses at it and direct attention to the difficulty of enforcing its rules. Even in the more regularized setting of international economic relations there is considerable ambiguity and conflict as to the role which law or rules should play, and much worry that recent economic stresses are creating a breakdown in the compliance with those few rules that do exist. Such breakdown can, it is alleged, lead at worst to trends similar to corresponding breakdowns in the 1930's, or at least to the loss of one otherwise effective implement of diplomacy (rulemaking). Why negotiate new treaty rules if there is little chance they will be observed?

The intervention of international lawyers in public debate in the US, UK and Australia regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq spotlighted the political agency of international lawyers in according or withholding legitimacy from major foreign policy decisions and raised the question of how to delimit the scope of international lawyers' political agency. Rejecting the close fit of either the transnational advocacy network or epistemic community concepts to the role played by the collectivity of international lawyers, this article identifies factors that both permit international lawyers to function as the grantors or withholders of foreign policy legitimacy and serve to define the limits on their fulfilling that role.