Suchergebnisse

The European security architecture inherited from the period of the Cold War encompasses a few most important international organisations – first of all, NATO, EU and OSCE, members of which are most European countries – and institutional rules as well as numerous informal patterns of state behaviour and status. 2019 is to see the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, which is one of the key institutional "axes" of the European security architecture. This will potentially have an impact on the future of the entire organisation, hence – on the security on the old continent. This article aims at compiling a set of alternative scenarios of the evolution of the European security through the use of the scenario building technique which is still bizarre in political science. To this end, interaction of four "driving forces", namely, 1) USA involvement, 2) threats of regional scope, 3) leadership of Germany (and France) in the promotion of the European integration, and 4) stability of the UK government, in the next seven years, is analysed. Various combinations of these variables lead to the crystallisation of three alternative plots of scenarios: 1) closer European security and defence union, 2) new Cold War, and 3) revival of the global "Anglosphere". Still, as seen from the practice of application of the scenario building technique, in the medium term, a parallel and only partial mate-rialisation of all three scenarios is most likely.

The European security architecture inherited from the period of the Cold War encompasses a few most important international organisations – first of all, NATO, EU and OSCE, members of which are most European countries – and institutional rules as well as numerous informal patterns of state behaviour and status. 2019 is to see the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, which is one of the key institutional "axes" of the European security architecture. This will potentially have an impact on the future of the entire organisation, hence – on the security on the old continent. This article aims at compiling a set of alternative scenarios of the evolution of the European security through the use of the scenario building technique which is still bizarre in political science. To this end, interaction of four "driving forces", namely, 1) USA involvement, 2) threats of regional scope, 3) leadership of Germany (and France) in the promotion of the European integration, and 4) stability of the UK government, in the next seven years, is analysed. Various combinations of these variables lead to the crystallisation of three alternative plots of scenarios: 1) closer European security and defence union, 2) new Cold War, and 3) revival of the global "Anglosphere". Still, as seen from the practice of application of the scenario building technique, in the medium term, a parallel and only partial mate-rialisation of all three scenarios is most likely.

The European security architecture inherited from the period of the Cold War encompasses a few most important international organisations – first of all, NATO, EU and OSCE, members of which are most European countries – and institutional rules as well as numerous informal patterns of state behaviour and status. 2019 is to see the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, which is one of the key institutional "axes" of the European security architecture. This will potentially have an impact on the future of the entire organisation, hence – on the security on the old continent. This article aims at compiling a set of alternative scenarios of the evolution of the European security through the use of the scenario building technique which is still bizarre in political science. To this end, interaction of four "driving forces", namely, 1) USA involvement, 2) threats of regional scope, 3) leadership of Germany (and France) in the promotion of the European integration, and 4) stability of the UK government, in the next seven years, is analysed. Various combinations of these variables lead to the crystallisation of three alternative plots of scenarios: 1) closer European security and defence union, 2) new Cold War, and 3) revival of the global "Anglosphere". Still, as seen from the practice of application of the scenario building technique, in the medium term, a parallel and only partial mate-rialisation of all three scenarios is most likely.

The European security architecture inherited from the period of the Cold War encompasses a few most important international organisations – first of all, NATO, EU and OSCE, members of which are most European countries – and institutional rules as well as numerous informal patterns of state behaviour and status. 2019 is to see the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, which is one of the key institutional "axes" of the European security architecture. This will potentially have an impact on the future of the entire organisation, hence – on the security on the old continent. This article aims at compiling a set of alternative scenarios of the evolution of the European security through the use of the scenario building technique which is still bizarre in political science. To this end, interaction of four "driving forces", namely, 1) USA involvement, 2) threats of regional scope, 3) leadership of Germany (and France) in the promotion of the European integration, and 4) stability of the UK government, in the next seven years, is analysed. Various combinations of these variables lead to the crystallisation of three alternative plots of scenarios: 1) closer European security and defence union, 2) new Cold War, and 3) revival of the global "Anglosphere". Still, as seen from the practice of application of the scenario building technique, in the medium term, a parallel and only partial mate-rialisation of all three scenarios is most likely.

Statewatch is constantly investigating the closed, secretive and unaccountable decision making procedures of the EU as these make inroads into democracy. Over the past 3 yrs Statewatch has been pressing the Council for the European Union for access to documents and reports on which EU policy is based. Argues the right to be informed of new policy proposals and the practices that flow from them. These policy areas pose the biggest threat to civil liberties within the EU. Illustrates the type of obstructionism practised by the EU.

The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union has had profound economic and political effects. Here, we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Using the Shapley-Shubik power index, we calculate the member states' powers with and without the United Kingdom and update earlier power forecasts using the Eurostat's latest population projections. There is a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases the largest members' powers while decreasing the smallest ones' powers.

This study computes the Discomfort Index, also known as the Misery Index, for 276 European Union NUTS2 regions to determine how "suffering" a region is or not before and after the global crisis. The geographical distribution of European Union regions according to their discomfort has deeply changed in the post-financial crisis years.

We analyse the global effects from the austerity policies recently implemented in the EU, by developing an extension of the GTAP general equilibrium model. The extended model incorporates a new specification of the trade balance (i.e. endogenous), the labour market (i.e. unemployment under a wage curve framework) and the public sector (i.e. split from the representative national agent, with endogenous expenditure and savings). Three alternative policies aimed to get a one percentage point reduction in the EU's government deficit to GDP ratio are simulated, and their effects on the main macroeconomic variables of seven regions of the world economy are examined. The three policy measures led to contractionary effects on the EU's activity levels, together with changes in income distribution, always detrimental to labour. The effects on the rest of the world, driven by changes in trade flows, were, however, mostly negligible. ; University of Castilla-La Mancha and European Regional Development Fund, Grant/Award Number: 2019-GRIN-26952; Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, Grant/Award Number: ECO2016-78422-R and ECO2017-86054-C3-2-R