Suchergebnisse

The Army goes to great lengths to capture lessons learned and preserve these lessons for current practitioners and future generations. Though the Army is one of the most self-critical organizations found in American society, a well-deserved reputation has also been earned for failing to inculcate those lessons by transforming the institutional Army. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. In Iraq, out of necessity while in contact with a dynamic enemy, the Army transformed on the battlefield with radical changes in doctrine, organization, training, and materiel, which significantly enabled battlefield success. As a result of the withdrawal of troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, this paper analyzes the success of the military's counterinsurgency strategy and nation-building efforts, examines the future of combat which the Army may face in order to recommend a suitable force posture, and makes recommendations for future competencies and capabilities utilizing the problem-solving construct of DOTMLPF in order to ensure future victories in this relevant component of the full spectrum of conflict. ; "November 2012." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 54-75). ; Army adaptation -- The four schools of thought on posturing the future force -- The turning point in Iraq -- The instruments of national power -- DOTMLPF recommendations -- Conclusion. ; The Army goes to great lengths to capture lessons learned and preserve these lessons for current practitioners and future generations. Though the Army is one of the most self-critical organizations found in American society, a well-deserved reputation has also been earned for failing to inculcate those lessons by transforming the institutional Army. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. In Iraq, out of necessity while in contact with a dynamic enemy, the Army transformed on the battlefield with radical changes in doctrine, organization, training, and materiel, which significantly enabled battlefield success. As a result of the withdrawal of troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, this paper analyzes the success of the military's counterinsurgency strategy and nation-building efforts, examines the future of combat which the Army may face in order to recommend a suitable force posture, and makes recommendations for future competencies and capabilities utilizing the problem-solving construct of DOTMLPF in order to ensure future victories in this relevant component of the full spectrum of conflict. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Until the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they usually abided by informal rules of conduct hammered out between several capos and representatives of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country until the 1990s. Relying on bribes, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities. In return for the legal authorities turning a blind eye, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned high-tech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their children's weddings. Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico's barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could clinch the desired arrangement. Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed the "live and let live" ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often hid cocaine and other drugs among the merchandise that moved northward through Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits for cocaine traffickers--a phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge of electoral victories. Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are vigilante activities. With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of justice that enjoys a groundswell of support. ; "External Research Associate Program." ; "September 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 46-51). ; Introduction -- Overview of the violence sweeping Mexico -- Changing the rules of the game -- Inability of citizens to influence elected officials -- Vigilante eruptions -- Trends in vigilantism -- Organized vigilante groups -- Addressing "community justice." ; Until the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they usually abided by informal rules of conduct hammered out between several capos and representatives of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country until the 1990s. Relying on bribes, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities. In return for the legal authorities turning a blind eye, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned high-tech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their children's weddings. Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico's barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could clinch the desired arrangement. Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed the "live and let live" ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often hid cocaine and other drugs among the merchandise that moved northward through Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits for cocaine traffickers--a phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge of electoral victories. Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are vigilante activities. With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of justice that enjoys a groundswell of support. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Many national security analyst have viewed oil-exporting countries with some trepidation. Although these exporting nations supply a vital energy source to the United States and her allies, it comes at a price. A great wealth transfer occurs in this process from oil importers to exporters. In some cases, oil importers face economic woes if energy prices rise sharply. Additionally, some critics might argue that oil exporters now have the financial wherewithal to acquire a military capability that could threaten neighbors or create intra-regional instability with global implications. This monograph explores the impact that oil revenue had on the national defense spending of five oil exporting countries. Despite periods of falling oil revenues, these countries typically did not lower defense spending. ; "February 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-50). ; Rentier economies and oil -- Measuring oil's effect on defense spending -- How do oil revenues affect defense spending? -- Saudi Arabia -- Iran -- Kuwait -- Venezuela -- Nigeria -- Conclusion and policy implications. ; Many national security analyst have viewed oil-exporting countries with some trepidation. Although these exporting nations supply a vital energy source to the United States and her allies, it comes at a price. A great wealth transfer occurs in this process from oil importers to exporters. In some cases, oil importers face economic woes if energy prices rise sharply. Additionally, some critics might argue that oil exporters now have the financial wherewithal to acquire a military capability that could threaten neighbors or create intra-regional instability with global implications. This monograph explores the impact that oil revenue had on the national defense spending of five oil exporting countries. Despite periods of falling oil revenues, these countries typically did not lower defense spending. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The author explores the centrality of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in meeting the needs of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, and the whole of government. Such intelligence is essential to create a national security strategy, to define whole of government policies, to acquire the right capabilities at the right price in time to be useful, and to conduct local and global operations. He outlines 15 distinct types of HUMINT, four of which are classified (defensive and offensive counterintelligence, clandestine operations, and covert action), with the other 11 being predominantly unclassified. The author offers the U.S. Army an orientation to a world in which thinkers displace shooters as the center of gravity for planning, programming, and budgeting, as well as the proper structuring of mission mandates, force structures, and tactics and techniques to be used in any given mission area. ; "May 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-91). ; Preface -- From base force to core force and beyond -- The U.S. Army, the DoD, and the Republic -- Digital natives -- Introduction -- Threats, strategy, force structure, and action-spending plans -- A nation's best defense -- HUMINT for the President -- HUMINT for the Secretary -- The failure of HUMINT part I (stovepipes, segregation, and secrecy) -- The future of HUMINT (broadly and properly defined) -- HUMINT : defining and managing the fifteen slices -- Citizen as sensor and sense-maker -- Soldier as sensor (overt/open signals) -- Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) -- Inspector-General (Organizational, USG, International) -- Security observation/remote webcams/floating periscopes -- Document exploitation/imagery -- All-source analysts & global experts -- Defense attachés, technical liaison -- Human terrain teams -- Interrogator-translator teams -- Soldier as sensor (patrolling, force reconnaissance, covert "hides") -- Defensive counterintelligence -- Offensive counterintelligence -- Covert action HUMINT -- Clandestine HUMINT -- HUMINT requirements and collection management -- HUMINT interdisciplinary support -- Conclusion : the HUMINT playing field -- HUMINT and whole of government force structure -- HUMINT technologies : enabling not defining HUMINT -- HUMAN : the essence of the Republic, of Defense, of the U.S. Army -- What has changed? -- Recommendations. ; The author explores the centrality of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in meeting the needs of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, and the whole of government. Such intelligence is essential to create a national security strategy, to define whole of government policies, to acquire the right capabilities at the right price in time to be useful, and to conduct local and global operations. He outlines 15 distinct types of HUMINT, four of which are classified (defensive and offensive counterintelligence, clandestine operations, and covert action), with the other 11 being predominantly unclassified. The author offers the U.S. Army an orientation to a world in which thinkers displace shooters as the center of gravity for planning, programming, and budgeting, as well as the proper structuring of mission mandates, force structures, and tactics and techniques to be used in any given mission area. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The purpose of the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is to provide military and civilian researchers a ready reference for issues of special interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD). Unlike other lists that generally reflect issues which are operational or tactical in nature, the focus of the KSIL is strategic. It highlights topics that senior Army and DoD leaders should consider in providing military advice and formulating military strategy. At present, the U.S. military is engaged in a changing situation in Iraq and an increasing presence in Afghanistan, as well as efforts to restore balance in force sizing and structure. With the publication of the 2009 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute to informing America's leaders of current and emerging challenges. ; Editor from SSI web site. ; "2009." ; Functional Strategic Issues / POC, Dallas Owens -- Overseas contingency operations -- Homeland security/homeland defense/civil support -- Military change -- National security strategy/national military strategy -- Landpower employment -- Landpower generation and sustainment -- Leadership, personnel management, and culture -- Regional Strategic Issues / POC, Steven Metz -- Evolving regional security matters in Africa -- Evolving regional security matters in the Middle East and the Islamic world -- Evolving regional security matters in the Asia-Pacific -- Evolving regional security matters in Europe -- Evolving regional security matters in South Asia -- Evolving regional security matters in Central Asia -- Evolving regional security matters in the western hemisphere -- Other. ; The purpose of the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is to provide military and civilian researchers a ready reference for issues of special interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD). Unlike other lists that generally reflect issues which are operational or tactical in nature, the focus of the KSIL is strategic. It highlights topics that senior Army and DoD leaders should consider in providing military advice and formulating military strategy. At present, the U.S. military is engaged in a changing situation in Iraq and an increasing presence in Afghanistan, as well as efforts to restore balance in force sizing and structure. With the publication of the 2009 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute to informing America's leaders of current and emerging challenges. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"From January 1991 through March 1995, the United States conducted numerous incursions into Somalia, undertaking a variety of missions and objectives. All of the actions had humanitarian elements, yet the operations that made up this mosaic of American involvement ranged from benign to aggressive, from purely humanitarian to clearly combative. Somalia . . . From the Sea is an account that attempts to explain and analyze these actions and place them within the overarching strategic and operational concepts developing in the first years following the end of the Cold War."--Introduction ; "July 2009"--T.p. verso. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Introduction -- 1. Operational and strategic context -- 2. Operation Eastern Exit -- 3. Operation Provide Relief -- 4. Operation Restore Hope : prelude and lodgment -- 5. Operation Restore Hope : operations and transition -- 6. Operation Continue Hope : operations and conflict -- 7. Operation Continue Hope : reinforcement and withdrawal -- 8. Operation United Shield -- 9. Operational and strategic observations -- Appendix A. The Weinberger doctrine -- Appendix B. The Powell doctrine -- Appendix C. UNITAF component commanders -- Appendix D. UN Security Council resolutions -- Appendix E. Seven-point agreement -- Appendix F. Somali clans and political factions -- Appendix G. Participating nations -- Appendix H. General Zinni's considerations for humanitarian and peace operations -- Appendix I. Major events chronology -- Appendix J. Acronyms and abbreviations. ; "From January 1991 through March 1995, the United States conducted numerous incursions into Somalia, undertaking a variety of missions and objectives. All of the actions had humanitarian elements, yet the operations that made up this mosaic of American involvement ranged from benign to aggressive, from purely humanitarian to clearly combative. Somalia . . . From the Sea is an account that attempts to explain and analyze these actions and place them within the overarching strategic and operational concepts developing in the first years following the end of the Cold War."--Introduction ; Mode of access: Internet.

Previously published by the US Army War College as a Personal Experience Monograph. ; "September 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 13) ; The China Dragons of the 28th Combat Support Hospital deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from September 2006 until November 2007. This combat tour was historic in many regards, and a good team became a great team while challenged with unprecedented casualty numbers and indirect fire attacks. Not only did they save thousands of lives; they helped advanced trauma medicine as leading hospitals worldwide have benefited from military initiatives in the areas of bleeding control and hemostatic resuscitation. Their service epitomizes the strides that have been made in military combat medicine, and their challenges highlight the areas in which our medical system can improve further. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a comprehensive approach to improve U.S. SFA. At the heart of the recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to institutionalize SFA activities effectively and to facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc approach and implement a single DoD-level integrating organization. ; "September 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 34-37). ; Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a comprehensive approach to improve U.S. SFA. At the heart of the recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to institutionalize SFA activities effectively and to facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc approach and implement a single DoD-level integrating organization. ; Mode of access: Internet.

One of the central difficulties to a right understanding of American civil-military relations is the nature of the U.S. military. Are our armed forces just obedient bureaucracies like most of the Executive branch, or are they vocational professions granted significant autonomy and a unique role in these relationships because of their expert knowledge and their expertise to apply it in the defense of America? To large measure, the answer to this question should determine the behavior of the strategic leaders of these professions, including the uncommon behavior of public dissent. Using the "Revolt of the Generals" in 2006 as stimulus, the author develops from the study of military professions the critical trust relationships that should have informed their individual decisions to dissent. After doing so, he makes recommendations for the restoration of the professions' ethic in this critical area of behavior by the senior officers who are the professions' strategic leaders. ; "February 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-38). ; Introduction -- Part I: A framework for throught -- Part II: What are the characteristics of military professions and their ethic of trust; what are the factors within dissent that can strengthen or weaken critical trust relationships? -- Part III: Conclusions - Should there be further limitations on military dissent by the strategic leaders of Americ'as military professions, particularly those in retired status, or is the current ethic, which strongly discourages such acts, still sufficient? ; One of the central difficulties to a right understanding of American civil-military relations is the nature of the U.S. military. Are our armed forces just obedient bureaucracies like most of the Executive branch, or are they vocational professions granted significant autonomy and a unique role in these relationships because of their expert knowledge and their expertise to apply it in the defense of America? To large measure, the answer to this question should determine the behavior of the strategic leaders of these professions, including the uncommon behavior of public dissent. Using the "Revolt of the Generals" in 2006 as stimulus, the author develops from the study of military professions the critical trust relationships that should have informed their individual decisions to dissent. After doing so, he makes recommendations for the restoration of the professions' ethic in this critical area of behavior by the senior officers who are the professions' strategic leaders. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The author examines the extent to which the United Kingdom (UK) has transitioned to effects-based operations to ascertain: (1) Areas where the U.S. Army could draw lessons from UK policies; (2) Areas where the U.S. Army and the British Ministry of Defence could develop integrated or complementary approaches and doctrines towards transformation for future alliance/coalition operations; and (3) Implications for the U.S. Army for working with the UK. This monograph is subdivided into four parts. Section 1 is a review of the evolution of British defence policy since the end of the Cold War and evaluates the degree to which it has adopted an effects based approach. Section 2 examines the British operational experience since the end of the Cold War including an analysis of the lessons learned and its experiences of working with allies. Section 3 analyses the UK's capability development through its doctrine and acquisition strategies. Section 4 evaluates the implications of these findings for the U.S. Army and makes 17 main recommendations. ; "January 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-63). ; The author examines the extent to which the United Kingdom (UK) has transitioned to effects-based operations to ascertain: (1) Areas where the U.S. Army could draw lessons from UK policies; (2) Areas where the U.S. Army and the British Ministry of Defence could develop integrated or complementary approaches and doctrines towards transformation for future alliance/coalition operations; and (3) Implications for the U.S. Army for working with the UK. This monograph is subdivided into four parts. Section 1 is a review of the evolution of British defence policy since the end of the Cold War and evaluates the degree to which it has adopted an effects based approach. Section 2 examines the British operational experience since the end of the Cold War including an analysis of the lessons learned and its experiences of working with allies. Section 3 analyses the UK's capability development through its doctrine and acquisition strategies. Section 4 evaluates the implications of these findings for the U.S. Army and makes 17 main recommendations. ; Mode of access: Internet.

American Ambassador to Colombia, 1994-97, Myles R. R. Frechette provides authoritative, eloquent, and impassioned perspectives on both the achievements and failures of American and Colombian efforts. He argues that American policy made analytical errors that need to be rectified, including underestimating the long-term complexity and interrelated nature of the problem, while both nations overestimated the amount of support that Colombia would receive from the international community. Moreover, nation-building and the rule of law are strategic imperatives which American policy must take seriously. Finally, it is critical to appreciate that Colombian cultural characteristics sharply influence what Colombians will do on their own behalf. ; "February 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 36-40) ; Milestones in the partnership -- Culture matters -- Changing perceptions in the partnership -- Strengthening the partnership: Plan Colombia -- The Uribe administration -- Plan Colombia: results at the end of 2005 -- Plan Colombia: the sequel -- Reports to Congress on Plan Colombia and on what assistance will follow -- Lessons learned from Plan Colombia -- A stronger regional approach is needed -- It is time to change the mix of counterdrug measures in Colombia -- A double standard for democracy in Colombia. ; American Ambassador to Colombia, 1994-97, Myles R. R. Frechette provides authoritative, eloquent, and impassioned perspectives on both the achievements and failures of American and Colombian efforts. He argues that American policy made analytical errors that need to be rectified, including underestimating the long-term complexity and interrelated nature of the problem, while both nations overestimated the amount of support that Colombia would receive from the international community. Moreover, nation-building and the rule of law are strategic imperatives which American policy must take seriously. Finally, it is critical to appreciate that Colombian cultural characteristics sharply influence what Colombians will do on their own behalf. ; Mode of access: Internet.

America entered the Global War on Terrorism with little understanding of the enemy it faced. AI-Qaeda plays a leading role in the larger movement of global jihad, a splinter faction of militant Islamism intent on establishing its vision of strict Islamic rule in the Muslim world through armed action. Global jihadis have spent more than 40 years refining their philosophy, gaining experience, building their organization, and developing plans to reestablish what they see as the only true Islamic state on earth. The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks set this plan in motion. In the years leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks, global jihadis have written copiously on their military strategy for creating an Islamic state. This paper draws on those writings to examine and explain the mechanisms by which they plan to neutralize the superpower guardian of world order, claim land and peoples for Islamic emirates out of the resulting chaos, and bring these emirates together to become a true Islamic state. Their writings also expose weaknesses in their strategy, and this paper explores some of those potential vulnerabilities as well. ; "October 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 11-18). ; What is a global jihad? -- Democracy vs. God's sovereignty -- History of global jihad -- Global jihad political goad -- Global jihad strategy -- A historical perspective -- Conclusion. ; America entered the Global War on Terrorism with little understanding of the enemy it faced. AI-Qaeda plays a leading role in the larger movement of global jihad, a splinter faction of militant Islamism intent on establishing its vision of strict Islamic rule in the Muslim world through armed action. Global jihadis have spent more than 40 years refining their philosophy, gaining experience, building their organization, and developing plans to reestablish what they see as the only true Islamic state on earth. The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks set this plan in motion. In the years leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks, global jihadis have written copiously on their military strategy for creating an Islamic state. This paper draws on those writings to examine and explain the mechanisms by which they plan to neutralize the superpower guardian of world order, claim land and peoples for Islamic emirates out of the resulting chaos, and bring these emirates together to become a true Islamic state. Their writings also expose weaknesses in their strategy, and this paper explores some of those potential vulnerabilities as well. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Prior to World War II, the Army had a deeply ingrained facility with and acceptance of what we now term unconventional warfare -- raising, training, advising and cooperating with tribal militias, local paramilitaries, and other non-state armed groups. This culture of irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier. These traditions of unconventional war reached maturity in the years of fighting on the western plains after the Civil War, and were given ultimate expression in the creation of the Philippine Scouts at the beginning of the 20th century. Since World War II, the wider military has lost this expertise in and comfortable familiarity with unconventional operations, with the Special Operations community taking on the sole proprietorship of this role. Given the variety of political environments in which today's conventional soldiers may find themselves, and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new old realities of irregular war. ; "October 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-29) ; Introduction -- Scouts -- "Bullets and bolos": scouts and constabulary in the Philippines -- Training for advisors -- Conclusion. ; Prior to World War II, the Army had a deeply ingrained facility with and acceptance of what we now term unconventional warfare -- raising, training, advising and cooperating with tribal militias, local paramilitaries, and other non-state armed groups. This culture of irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier. These traditions of unconventional war reached maturity in the years of fighting on the western plains after the Civil War, and were given ultimate expression in the creation of the Philippine Scouts at the beginning of the 20th century. Since World War II, the wider military has lost this expertise in and comfortable familiarity with unconventional operations, with the Special Operations community taking on the sole proprietorship of this role. Given the variety of political environments in which today's conventional soldiers may find themselves, and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new old realities of irregular war. ; Mode of access: Internet.