Suchergebnisse

Currently the surveillance of infectious disease in the European Union (EU) is supported by the Basic Surveillance Network (BSN) and other disease specific surveillance networks (DSNs). Each network has its own website. The objective of the current study was to describe the information presented with public access on each website from the perspective of its usefulness for the surveillance of an EU member state. The BSN and the DSNs cited in Decision 2003/542/CE were included. Each website was reviewed and assessed on the inclusion of characteristics from three broad categories: 1) general information, 2) procedures for data collection and 3) data presentation. Ten surveillance network websites were reviewed during the week of 5 December 2005. At least 80% of the 10 networks included a list of participating countries, the contact addresses for the coordinator of the network and the participating country gatekeepers and the network's objectives. Only one network specified the source and coverage of the data of each country on its website, and seven presented the disease case definition. Raw data were shown on eight websites and only two networks included presentation of elaborated data for the whole of the EU. Four networks included no reports on their websites. The periodicity of presentation for both raw data and elaborated data varied greatly between networks. The publicly available information on the 10 network websites studied was not homogeneous. We recommend that all networks present a basic set of characteristics on their websites, including case definitions, procedures used for data collection and periodic reports covering elaborated data for the entire EU.

The effective operation of national innovation systems can be a source of many opportunities, but it cannot be forgotten that innovation in itself may mean limiting but also generating various types of risks for the functioning of the local market. The main aim of the article is to present the concept and classification of national innovation systems in the world and to try to answer whether the type of NIS determines the level of innovation of the economies of the European Union countries. The following research thesis was formulated in the study: the type of National Innovation System determines a certain level of innovation in the economy of an European Union country, i.e., in countries belonging to a developed NIS, the level of innovation of the economy is higher than in countries belonging to developing systems. The results of the analysis confirm the research thesis. In the empirical part, the level of innovation in the European Union countries was assessed using the synthetic measure of development (SMD) by Z. Hellwig. Based on the obtained values of the synthetic measure of development (innovation), a ranking of the innovation of the economies of the EU countries was compiled and groups of countries with a similar degree of innovation in the economy were distinguished. The developed ranking of the European Union countries was compared with the NSI classification presented in the theoretical part of the article. The study covered 2010 and 2019.

Economic and political issues on adhesion of Central and Eastern European countries; view that a "multi-speed" Europe is inevitable. Internal EU policies, heterogeneous membership, the EU budget and northern and eastern enlargement, capacity and control, and the small European nucleus.

AbstractThis article responds to Michael Blauberger and Berthold Rittberger's article "Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks," published in Regulation & Governance in 2015. Blauberger and Rittberger challenged our previous work on the politics of Eurocracy, disputing our argument that political considerations, not functional ones, explain the choice of bureaucratic structure in the European Union (EU). Blauberger and Rittberger suggest that functional considerations do indeed explain why policymakers sometimes prefer governance through European Regulatory Networks rather than through more centralized EU agencies, and argue that we have misunderstood the preferences of EU legislative principals. In this article, we argue that there are significant flaws in Blauberger and Rittberger's analysis on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We show that a proper interpretation of developments in both telecoms and competition lends support to our theoretical claims and not those offered by Blauberger and Rittberger.

Institution building is crucial for successful integration into the European Union (EU). Through the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), Croatia bound itself to strengthen institutions at all levels in the area of the administration, priority areas being protection of competition and state aid. According to the demands that the EU has made on the public administrations of the accession countries in the pre-accession period, we shall identify the criteria for membership. We shall define the level of the fulfilment of conditions for membership and the measures that should be carried out during the process of the reform in Croatia by a comparative analysis of the state of affairs in Croatia, the candidates and the EU members. The main conclusion is that institutional weakness in Croatia is the outcome of failure to define the priorities and the timetable for the implementation of given reforms.

The EU plays a significant role in public policy aspects of Internet governance, having created in the late 1990s the dot eu Internet Top Level Domain (TLD). This enables users to register names under a European online address label. This paper explores key public policy issues in the emergent governance system for dot eu, because it provides an interesting case of new European transnational private governance. Specifically, dot eu governance is a reconciliation resulting from a governance cultural clash between the European regulatory state and what can be described broadly as the Internet community. The EU has customised the governance of dot eu towards a public-private dispersed agencification model. The paper extends the evidence base on agencification within trans-European regulatory networks and the emergence of private transnational network governance characterised by self-regulation.