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Cosmopolitanism as the appropriate way to think about the mode of being in a global world is debated. Contemporary cosmopolitanists claim to distinguish themselves from earlier moral universalists by their respect for cultural diversity, dialogue, & hybridization. It is argued that their claim that diverse cultures can be compared & integrated is implausible, because cultural practices are grounded in reasons that cannot always be shared. Reflection on reasons for cultural practices may open up evidence of cultural distance, so that a cosmopolitanism of distance may be more in order. Cosmopolitanists advocating hybridization need to confront the possibilities in reflection, but at the same time, the sociological forces at work in eroding cultural diversity may make the reflection dilemma less pressing. M. Pflum

Speed must be taken as an "ambiguous" medium in the late-modern condition. On the one hand, compressed time may lead to military action that preempts democratic deliberation (per Paul Virilio's Speed and Politics, 1986), while on the other hand, it can play a positive role in intrastate democracy & cross-state cosmopolitanism. Some nostalgics continue to argue for territorial nations, stable truths, nature as purposive & timeless, & the presence of thick universals. In particular, Martha Nussbaum's (1996) position on concentric culture & thick universals is contested & supplanted with a new matrix of cosmopolitanism that acknowledges the acceleration of time. This matrix posits creative tension between concentric & rhizomatic forces in culture, double entries to the universal, & contestability in regulative ideas. M. Pflum

A response to Kenneth Baynes's critique (2000) of the author's States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (1995) outlines the ways in which Baynes misread her work. In particular, she accuses Baynes of inattention to the specificity of her arguments. She also decries Baynes's interpretation of her work & his inability to discern the differences between her work & that of Marx. Brown then goes on to criticize Baynes's reading of Marx; she claims that Baynes fails to accurately understand Marx's discussion of the effect that rights have on the depoliticization of the powers that give rise to them. Brown utilizes the abortion issue to illustrate Baynes's misrepresentation of her arguments, contending that abortion highlights the rights that are subordinated & buried by social powers. Finally, Brown accuses Baynes of working on a different intellectual plane than herself. While Brown focuses on power & history, Baynes concentrates on the concepts of autonomy & awareness. Brown concludes by stating that, although Baynes's theories may form a more elegant model than her own, his theories are ineffectual in capturing the powers that mobilize & organize contemporary US society. K. A. Larsen

Introduces the author's version of the relationship between pragmatism & hermeneutics, where the meaning of pragmatism is reconsidered, arguing that hermeneutical social science's main commitments are immune from Richard Rorty's assault. It is further argued that hermeneutics rejects Rorty's linguistic pragmatism, & supports the idea that the differences that exist between the natural & social sciences are ontologically based. A consistently articulated pragmatism, in fact, serves to reject some of Rorty's own pragmatist claims. The author concludes that hermeneutic social science can & should be seen as being consistent with pragmatism. He further concludes that hermeneutic commitments to ontological & methodological distinctions between the social & natural sciences can be directly tied to pragmatism. Therefore, a conflict does not really exist between Rorty's pragmatism & the hermeneutical social science. The problem lies in this simple truth: that Rorty is just not pragmatic enough. K. A. Larsen