Suchergebnisse

Forming the maritime heart of SE Asia, the South China Sea has grown in recent years into one of the most important geopolitical areas in the world. The conflict over seemingly insignificant archipelagos has many aspects, and, like a lens, focuses the rivalry of modern powers. The territorial dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands is the primary level of conflict, with prestigious and economic meaning. Another aspect is the striving for control over the regional Sea Lanes of Communication. The point here is not only the transport of goods from east Asia to Europe and Africa, but also of oil and natural gas supply from the Persian Gulf. The next aspect is related to Sino-American relations and rivalry. An equally important facet is the internal politics of the PRC, which is one of the causes of an assertive foreign policy. The CPC has become hostage to its own nationalist rhetoric. There is also a broader international level of the dispute. Countries such as Australia, India and Japan have to a greater or lesser extent joined the conflict as an element of their China policy. The South China Sea unexpectedly found its place in Russian-Chinese relations, and interest in the situation in the region is also expressed by France and the United Kingdom. All these aspects form an image of a very complex and dynamic conflict of growing importance. ; Publication is a part of the project: Regional Center for International Debate in Lodz 2017–2018 Project co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

La letteratura accademica ha dedicato numerose ricerche sia alla sicurezza energetica che, separatamente, al potere marittimo. Diversi studi sono stati sviluppati sulla presenza navale americana nel Golfo Persico e, più recentemente, sulla sempre più assertiva politica militare cinese tesa alla protezione delle linee di comunicazione marittima. Non esistono, tuttavia, ricerche sistematiche su come la dipendenza energetica dalle importazioni via mare influisca su una delle categorie di stati più dibattuta all'interno delle Relazioni Internazionali: le medie potenze. Lo scopo della dissertazione, attraverso lo sviluppo di un modello quantitativo e la creazione dell'indice composito Navy Importance Index, è quello di evidenziare il legame alla base della relazione tra la sicurezza energetica e il potere marittimo. ; The academic literature has devoted a lot of attention to energy security and, separately, seapower. Several scholars and practitioners have written extensively in particular on the US naval policy and posture in the Persian Gulf and, more recently, on China's foreign policy that aims at the protection of the energy sea lines of communication that carry the lifeblood of Beijing's economy. However few have written on how the energy dependence on foreign supplies by sea affects the behaviour of a particular and very debatable category of states: the middle powers. The aim of the dissertation, through the formalization of a quantitative model and the development of a composite index defined as Navy Importance Index, is to highlight the theoretical link between energy security and seapower by this very questionable group of nations.

The UK is the most outvoted Member State in the EU Council. However, it has supported more than 97% of the EU laws adopted in the last 12 years, a new report published by VoteWatch Europe shows. The analysis looked at the role played by the UK's Government and its MEPs in shaping the EU policy over the past 12 years. According to the study, the UK seems to have diminished its influence in the European Parliament in recent years, as a result of self-distancing of some of its own party delegations from the EU's mainstream political families, as well as due to the results of the latest EU elections in the UK. Nevertheless, UK MEPs have captured many powerful agenda-setting positions, such as rapporteurships of key EU legislation and EP committee chairmanships Professor Simon Hix, chairman and co-founder of VoteWatch Europe, explained that "the British opposition to EU decisions occurred especially on budget, foreign policy and foreign aid. Nevertheless, the UK was not the most oppositional government on several important issue areas: internal market, legal affairs, transport, environment, and fisheries". The data shows that Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark are UK's closest allies in the EU Council and would lose an important ally if Brexit occurs. The study also argues that the main losers of Brexit among EU's stakeholders are those that promote less regulatory burden for EU businesses and stronger protection of copyright. Last but not least, a possible Brexit would also push the remaining EU governments to pay more to EU's coffer.

Unlike many previous presidential elections, in 2004 foreign policy issues are at the forefront of the American policy and electoral agenda. Not since the Vietnam era has the United States entered an election year with the United States at such a heightened state of war, with ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as covert operations deployed around the world to wage the war on terrorism. After nearly one full term with George W. Bush as commander in chief, his views on constitutional war powers have been expressed on numerous occasions. Bush, like his post World War II predecessors, has exercised and claimed wide military authority as commander in chief. The American Democratic party's nominee for president, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) has similarly amassed a long record on war powers during his years in the United States Congress. This paper provides a broad examination of Kerry's positions on war powers, beginning with his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971 through his current views on the constitutionality of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The findings suggest that his rhetorical support for Congress's constitutional war powers has often not matched his backing of unilateral military actions by the president. If elected president, it is unlikely that Kerry's relationship with Congress would be markedly different from President Bush's. It seems probable that Kerry will continue the practice of a "strong" [if not omnipotent] commander in chief in his relations with the United States Congress when the president seeks to use military force abroad.

Cover -- Contents -- List of figures, tables and boxes -- List of abbreviations -- Preface -- Introduction: Analysing Germany and the EU -- Germany and the EU: the context -- Framing the subject -- Interpreting the subject -- Hegemony and domestic politics -- Structure of the book -- Chapter 1 Germany and European Integration: Before Reluctant Hegemony -- Introduction -- Immediate post-war period: pre-sovereignty -- Semi-sovereignty -- Towards German unity -- United Germany and its European vocation -- Conclusion -- Chapter 2 Sources of Germany's European Power -- Introduction -- The EU: a conducive setting for German hegemony? -- Resources for German hegemony -- Ideas and German hegemony -- Legitimacy and German hegemony -- Crisis politics: a new context? -- Conclusion -- Chapter 3 German Institutions and EU Policy-Making: Constraints or Enforcers? -- Introduction -- The federal government1 -- The Bundestag -- The Länder governments and the Bundesrat -- The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) -- The Bundesbank -- Conclusion -- Chapter 4 German Political Actors and European Policy: A New Politicisation? -- Introduction -- Public opinion -- Political parties -- Interest groups -- Conclusion -- Chapter 5 German European Policy in the Twenty-First Century -- Introduction -- Integration policy -- Internal policies -- External policies -- Conclusion -- Chapter 6 Monetary Policy and The Eurozone Crisis: The Emergence of German Hegemony? -- Introduction -- Economic and Monetary Union: the German approach -- Germany and the design of EMU -- Diagnosing the eurozone crisis -- Tackling the crisis -- Understanding German policy on the eurozone crisis -- Germany and the political economy of the eurozone -- Conclusion -- Chapter 7 From Political Dwarf to Potential Hegemon? German Foreign Policy in Transition -- Introduction -- Origins and evolution -- Hegemony?.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Original Title -- Original Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- I Introduction -- 1 Overview -- U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations -- Pursuit of Common Interests -- 2 The World Food Situation: Developments During the 1970s and Prospects for the 1980s -- Supply Keeps Pace With Demand -- Food Supply Changes During the 1970s -- Malnutrition-How Much? -- Price Instability -- Two Surprises -- The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe -- China -- Food Security, Poverty, and Malnutrition -- Prospects for the 1980s -- Implications for U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Relations -- Concluding Comments -- 3 Agreements and Policy in U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade -- Agricultural Trade -- Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Setting -- The Kennedy Round: 1963-67 -- The Tokyo Round 1973-79 -- A Bilateral Accord: The Butz-Abe Understanding -- Farm Exports and U.S. Foreign Policy in 1980 -- Concluding Comments -- Appendix 3-A. Method Used to Calculate New Trade Values Resulting from Tariff Changes -- II Agriculture and Agricultural Policy in Japan and the United States -- 4 The Present State of Agriculture in Japan -- Postwar Economic Growth and Changes in Food Consumption -- Postwar Economic Growth and Changes in Agricultural Production -- Increased Dependence on Food Imports -- Summary -- Appendix 4-A. Data on Japanese Agriculture in the Post-World War II Period -- 5 Japanese Agricultural Policy: Present Problems and Their Historical Background -- Historical Background -- Present Problems and Policy -- 6 The Economics of U.S. Agricultural Policy -- Scope and Context -- Economics and Politics of Current Programs -- Potential for Progress -- III The Making of Agricultural Policy in Two Democracies -- 7 Agriculture and Politics in Japan -- Agricultural Communities and the Liberal Democratic Party -- National Sentiments.

In the four decades since Pakistan launched its nuclear weapons program, and especially in the fifteen years since the nuclear tests of 1998, a way of thinking and a related set of feelings about the bomb have taken hold among policy-makers and the public in Pakistan. These include the ideas that the bomb can ensure Pakistan's security; resolve the long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir in Pakistan's favour; help create a new national spirit; establish Pakistan as a leader among Islamic countries; and usher in a new stage in Pakistan's economic development. None of these hopes has come to pass, and in many ways Pakistan is much worse off than before it went nuclear. Yet the feelings about the bomb remain strong and it is these feelings that will have to be examined critically and be set aside if Pakistan is to move towards nuclear restraint and nuclear disarmament. This will require a measure of stability in a country beset by multiple insurgencies, the emergence of a peace movement able to launch a national debate on foreign policy and nuclear weapons, and greater international concern regarding the outcomes of nuclear arms racing in South Asia. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

The Brookings Institution has long produced an analysis of America's defense budgets and policies. The war on terror and the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced upon this country soaring defense budgets and unprecedented challenges in policymaking. In the newest installment in this tradition, leading foreign policy expert Michael O'Hanlon offers policy recommendations for strengthening the ability of America's military to respond to international crises in a tumultuous world. The United States can, for the foreseeable future, be confident that its armed forces will remain engaged in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan and other theaters in the war on terror. It will also need to remain involved in deterrence missions in the western Pacific, most notably in Korea and the Taiwan Strait. It will wish to remain engaged in European security, since the capabilities and cohesion of the NATO alliance have important implications for the United States globally. O'Hanlon reviews these priorities, asking tough questions and developing frameworks for answering them: • What military will the United States need in the future? • How much will it cost? • How can the U.S. increase the size of its ground forces without increasing the size of the defense budget? • In an era of apocalyptic terror threats, and at a time of 400 billion defense budgets and 400 billion federal budget deficits, how can this country protect its citizens while maintaining fiscal responsibility?.

Für die Mitgliedstaaten der EU ist die Frage, in welche Richtung sich die EU-Politik Deutschlands, des größten Mitgliedslandes, bewegt, ein Gegenstand, der nicht nur Forschung, sondern auch politische Akteure beschäftigt. Außerdem ist die Problematik des neuen Politikfeldes »Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik« ein vorherrschendes Thema der wissenschaftlichen Debatte. (Autorenreferat)

Deutschland steht in der Pflicht, eine führende Klimanation zu werden. Daran gibt es keinen Zweifel, das hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht mit seiner Entscheidung vom 29. April 2021 deutlich gemacht. Das Gericht hat nicht nur die Beachtung der Generationengerechtigkeit im begutachteten Klimagesetz angemahnt, sondern auch betont, dass sich Deutschland als führende Industrienation mit dem Unterzeichnen des Pariser Abkommens verpflichtet hat, in Bezug auf Klimaschutz mehr zu leisten als Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer.

In 2013, China's growing economic capacities motivated Beijing to launch a multilateral bank to advance its diplomatic agenda. Scholars are still debating precisely what Beijing seeks to accomplish through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This article surveys the key literature on the AIIB, identifying twenty scholarly interpretations of Beijing's strategic goals. The purpose of this research is to understand Beijing's initial design for this bank and evaluate whether this new multilateral development bank can function as an effective instrument for Beijing's economic statecraft. Over its first five years, as an economic tool for Beijing, the AIIB has performed quite remarkably well. The bank not only operates smoothly, generating a reasonable amount in net income for its shareholders, but also serves Beijing's strategic purposes in expanding China's regional influence, enhancing its international status, and ascending toward global leadership. (JCCA/GIGA)

In den letzten 10 Jahren haben Ägypten und die Region umfassende Veränderungen erlebt. Seit 2013 hat sich das Land am Nil zusehends in einen repressiven Militärstaat verwandelt. Opposition und Zivilgesellschaft haben kaum mehr Chancen sich Gehör zu verschaffen. Die Kurzanalyse untersucht wie sich die innenpolitischen Entwicklungen und die regionalen Machtverschiebungen auf die Rolle Ägyptens in der Region und der Welt ausgewirkt haben.

Ein blutiger Putschversuch, das Schleifen des Rechtsstaats als Reaktion der Regierung darauf und eine nicht abreißende Folge von Terroranschlägen haben aus der Türkei ein anderes Land gemacht. Außenpolitisch provoziert Ankaras Annäherung an Moskau die Frage, ob das Land noch verlässlicher Partner des Westens ist. Offiziell ist die Türkei nach wie vor Kandidat für die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union. Doch längst ist mehr von den Gefahren die Rede, die eine instabile und antiwestlich ausgerichtete Türkei für die EU mit sich bringt, als dass man darüber spräche, wie Brüssel auf die türkische Politik einwirken kann. Auch der Nato macht die Türkei Sorgen. Bleibt das Land im westlichen Lager? Kann es sich innenpolitisch wieder fangen? Auf welche Zukunft der Türkei deuten jüngere Entwicklungen in der Außen- und Innenpolitik hin? (Autorenreferat)

"Deutschlands Ostpolitik ist traditionell stark auf Russland ausgerichtet, weshalb die Beziehungen zu Moskau auch die deutschen Strategien gegenüber den Staaten der Östlichen Partnerschaft (ÖP) beeinflussen. Diese Politik schwächt alternative Ansätze in der EU gegenüber den postsowjetischen Staaten und eine Nachbarschaftspolitik, die die Transformation in den ÖP-Ländern unterstützen möchte. Deutsche Ostpolitik sollte sich stärker an die ÖP-Staaten wenden, denn der Einfluss von »bad governance« in diesen Ländern, ihre Wichtigkeit für den Öl- und Gastransit sowie die Bedeutung von erfolgreicher EU-Politik in der Nachbarschaft für deren Glaubwürdigkeit auf der internationalen Bühne sind für die gesamte EU wichtig. Deutschland hat zwar in der Vergangenheit eine aktive Rolle bei der Entwicklung von Konzepten für postsowjetische Staaten gespielt (z. B. ENPplus, Zentralasien-Strategie, Black Sea Synergy). Doch die Dominanz Russlands in der deutschen Ostpolitik und die eingeschränkte Kooperation mit anderen Mitgliedstaaten hinsichtlich der ÖP-Länder behindern den Erfolg der östlichen EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik." [Autorenreferat]

"Die EU kommt bei der Sicherung ihrer Energieversorgung nicht an Russland vorbei; und auch Russland ist auf die EU als Absatzmarkt Nr. 1 angewiesen. Da dies in absehbarer Zukunft so bleiben wird, sollten beide Seiten von Anfang an miteinander kooperieren und aufhören, Projekte im Alleingang zu entwickeln. Diese sind zum Scheitern verurteilt, denn es gelingt weder der EU noch Russland, die andere Seite später mit ins Boot zu holen. Deutliche Beispiele sind der von der EU seit Jahren vergeblich propagierte Energiechartavertrag, der jüngste russische Gegenvorschlag eines »neuen rechtlichen Rahmendokumentes« oder das Modernisierungsabkommen für das ukrainische Pipelinesystem. Nötig sind zudem mehr Projekte, die der EU und Russland gleichermaßen konkreten Nutzen bringen, etwa im Bereich Energieeffizienz.
Gerade Deutschland als Vorreiter in der Umwelttechnik kann von einer solchen Zusammenarbeit profitieren, denn in Russland gibt es einen immensen Bedarf an Energiespar- und Klimaschutzmaßnahmen. Die bevorstehende Gründung einer Russisch-Deutschen Energie-Agentur wird ein wichtiges Signal geben für weitere gemeinsame Projekte zwischen der EU und Russland." [Autorenreferat]