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Biotic factors such as pests create biodiversity effects that increase food production risks and decrease productivity when agriculture specializes. Under free trade, they reduce the specialization in food production that otherwise prevails in a Ricardian two-country setup. Pesticides allow farmers to reduce biodiversity effects , but they are damaging for the environment and for human health. When regulating farming practices under free trade, governments face a trade-off: they are tempted to restrict the use of pesticides compared to under autarky because domestic consumption partly relies on imports and thus depends less on them, but they also want to preserve the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Contrary to the environmental race-to-the-bottom tenet, we show that at the symmetric equilibrium under free trade restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky. As a result, trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries, and, depending on the intensity of the biodiversity effects, of some or all of the crops that are country-specific.

Biotic factors such as pests create biodiversity effects that increase food production risks and decrease productivity when agriculture specializes. Under free trade, they reduce the specialization in food production that otherwise prevails in a Ricardian two-country setup. Pesticides allow farmers to reduce biodiversity effects , but they are damaging for the environment and for human health. When regulating farming practices under free trade, governments face a trade-off: they are tempted to restrict the use of pesticides compared to under autarky because domestic consumption partly relies on imports and thus depends less on them, but they also want to preserve the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Contrary to the environmental race-to-the-bottom tenet, we show that at the symmetric equilibrium under free trade restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky. As a result, trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries, and, depending on the intensity of the biodiversity effects, of some or all of the crops that are country-specific.

Biotic factors such as pests create biodiversity effects that increase food production risks and decrease productivity when agriculture specializes. Under free trade, they reduce the specialization in food production that otherwise prevails in a Ricardian two-country setup. Pesticides allow farmers to reduce biodiversity effects , but they are damaging for the environment and for human health. When regulating farming practices under free trade, governments face a trade-off: they are tempted to restrict the use of pesticides compared to under autarky because domestic consumption partly relies on imports and thus depends less on them, but they also want to preserve the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Contrary to the environmental race-to-the-bottom tenet, we show that at the symmetric equilibrium under free trade restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky. As a result, trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries, and, depending on the intensity of the biodiversity effects, of some or all of the crops that are country-specific.

Two duopolists compete in price on the market for a homogeneous product. They can 'profile' consumers, i.e., identify their valuations with some probability. If both firms can profile consumers but with different abilities, then they achieve positive expected profits at equilibrium. This provides a rationale for firms to (partially and unequally) share data about consumers, or for data brokers to sell different customer analytics to competing firms. Consumers prefer that both firms profile exactly the same set of consumers, or that only one firm profiles consumers, as this entails marginal cost pricing (so does a policy requiring list prices to be public). Otherwise, more protective privacy regulations have ambiguous effects on consumer surplus.

Certification schemes are becoming increasingly important within aquaculture management, but the indicators that are used by these schemes are subject to considerable debate. Many have questioned their actual impact on improving the industry, and whether they effectively address the many externalities of aquaculture production. In this paper, we study the choice of indicators in eight major certification scheme standards for salmon aquaculture and examine to what degree they manage to address impacts beyond individual production sites. We find that, in accordance with the criticism, the majority of indicators pertain only to the site-level. However, indicators related to traceability, and to coordination and sharing of information among producers can elevate local concerns to a higher level of impact. We, therefore, argue that among all the certification scheme standards considered here, these types of indicators should be emphasized to a larger extent. ; Level up or game over: The implications of levels of impact in certification schemes for salmon aquaculture ; publishedVersion ; © 2019 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Academic leaders in higher education must increasingly deal with demands from stakeholders such asstudents, parents, and government at the same time that they are held accountable for the curriculumand student learning environment (Newman, Couturier & Scurry, 2004; Smith, 2004). In addition, newtypes of higher education institutions, i.e. the for-profit schools, purport to be more agile in respondingto the needs of these various constituencies, putting more pressure on the traditional colleges anduniversities to react more quickly. Gone are the days of unhurried deliberations and incrementalchanges that could take years to institute. The loosely coupled organizational nature of traditionalcolleges and universities results in a lack of authority for the very individuals who are responsible for thecurriculum and learning environment at the school and department level, the deans and academicchairs (Glassman, 1973; Weick, 1978). Faculty, whose role is to develop curriculum and teach in theclassroom, tend to be reluctant change agents and typically prefer that the Chair keep the business ofthe department running as usual. This makes gaining faculty support for the necessary responses tochanging student needs both crucial and difficult.