Suchergebnisse

chapter 1 Environment and conflict -- chapter 2 Context matters: Ogoni and place making -- chapter 3 Locale: Political and cultural context of mobilisation -- chapter 4 Landscape, capital and violence -- chapter 5 Why the Ogoni mobilised -- chapter 6 From grievances to micro-mobilisation: How the Ogoni mobilised -- chapter 7 Cultural basis of mobilisation -- chapter 8 Mobilisation: A place for moral motivation? -- chapter 9 Place and limit of mobilisation -- chapter 10 Conclusion.

Hace unas décadas la filosofía de la ciencia era una disciplina centrada en estudios lógico-lingüísticos y basada en la distinción entre contexto de justificación y contexto de descubrimiento. Sin embargo, hoy sabemos que la ciencia es acción humana, por lo que la filosofía de la ciencia también es práctica. De ahí que hoy en día no haya separación entre razón teórica y razón práctica. Un ejemplo de ello es el falibilismo y la razonabilidad en la filosofía de la ciencia y en la hermenéutica filosófica. Tradicionalmente se ha visto al falibilismo como una metodología exclusiva de la filosofía de la ciencia teórica y se ha pensado que la razonabilidad se refiere a la moral y la política, que son cuestiones de la razón práctica. Sin embargo, tanto en la filosofía de la ciencia como en la hermenéutica filosófica, el falibilismo y la razonabilidad se hallan estrechamente relacionados, por lo que no habría separación en dichas disciplinas en un sentido teórico y práctico. A fin de mostrar lo anterior, presentamos cuatro secciones: en la primera, mostraremos las principales críticas a la separación entre razón teórica y razón práctica; en la dos siguientes, abordaremos el falibilismo y la razonabilidad en la filosofía de la ciencia y en la hermenéutica filosófica; en la última, trataremos el carácter predictivo de la razonabilidad en ambas disciplinas. ; A few decades ago, philosophy of science was focused in logical and linguistic studies and based in the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification. Nowadays we know that science is human action, hence philosophy of science has a practical side that prevents a sharp separation between theoretical and practical reason. Fallibilism and reasonability in philosophy of science and hermeneutics are an example of such a view. Fallibilism has been considered as a methodology of exclusive use in philosophy of science, while reasonability has been considered as referring to morals and politics which belong to practical reason. However, both in philosophy of science as in hermeneutics fallibilism and reasonability are closely related, hence there is no separation between both disciplines. To illustrate this, I will proceed in four parts. In the first one, I discuss the main criticisms to the separation between theoretical and practical reason; in parts two and three, I will consider fallibilism and reasonability in the philosophy of science and the practical reason. In the last part, I will discuss the predictive character of reasonability in both disciplines.

Recent crises in trade policy and globalization highlight both the problematic role of economic inequality in international trade law and the shortcomings of contemporary, largely economic, approaches to this problem and to international trade law generally. This book argues for an alternative approach to the problem of trade and inequality, as a problem of justice. Drawing on political and moral theory and legal philosophy, the author develops a Rawlsian model for justice as fairness in international trade law. This model highlights the important normative role of the principle of special and differential treatment, which can justify economic inequality by making the wealthy markets of developed states work to the benefit of smaller economies, thus satisfying the difference principle as applied to international economic relations. Applying this model to contemporary trade law, the author offers concrete proposals for modifying existing special and differential treatment doctrine, and suggests "second generation" policies for the problem of inequality once special and differential treatment is either fully implemented or rendered obsolete. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint

Global justice is an exciting area of refreshing, innovative new ideas for a changing world facing significant challenges. Not only does work in this area often force us to rethink ethics and political philosophy more generally, but its insights contain seeds of hope for addressing some of the greatest global problems facing humanity today. This book has been selective in bringing together some of the most pressing topics and issues in global justice as understood by the leading voices from both established and rising stars across twenty-five new chapters. The book explores severe poverty, climate change, egalitarianism, global citizenship, human rights, immigration, territorial rights, and much more.

Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. All are examples where humanitarian intervention has been called into action. This timely and important new volume explores the legal and moral issues which emerge when a state uses military force in order to protect innocent people from violence perpetrated or permitted by the government of that state. Humanitarian intervention can be seen as a moral duty to protect but it is also subject to misuse as a front for imperialism without regard to international law.In Humanitarian Intervention, the contributors explore the many questions surrounding the issue. Is humanitarian intervention permitted by international law? If not, is it nevertheless morally permissible or morally required? Realistically, might not the main consequence of the humanitarian intervention principle be that powerful states will coerce weak ones for purposes of their own? The current debate is updated by two innovations in particular, the first being the shift of emphasis from the permissibility of intervening to the responsibility to intervene, and the second an emerging conviction that the response to humanitarian crises needs to be collective, coordinated, and preemptive. The authors shed light on the timely debate of when and how to intervene and when, if ever, not to.Contributors: Carla Bagnoli, Joseph Boyle, Anthony Coates, Thomas Franck, Brian D. Lepard, Catherine Lu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Terry Nardin, Thomas Pogge, Melissa S. Williams, and Kok-Chor Tan

The paper provides a socio-philosophical analysis of the concept of personal autonomy, reveals its essential characteristics and the relationship with the value-semantic sphere. A conceptual scheme of the socio-ethical transformation of the public consciousness of the people of the Russian Federation has been developed as a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for the formation of a socio-cultural space favorable for the socialization of the younger generations and the development of a self-determined, autonomous personality of growing people. The inextricable connection between the direction of socio-political dynamics and the spiritual and moral status of the public consciousness of the Russian people during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been determined. The organic relationship between the spiritual and moral state of the public consciousness of the human community of the Russian Federation and the autonomy of the individual is shown. The necessity of creation and widespread use of the official state ideology is substantiated and, thus, the problem-thematic focus of the activity of the socio-humanitarian branch of scientific knowledge is determined. A comparative analysis of the theoretical positions of Russian philosophers of the second half of the 20th century V.S. Bibler and G.S. Batishchev regarding the formation and use of the mental properties of an autonomous individual during periods of radical socio-political transformations is implemented.

The financial crisis of 2008 has led to a re-evaluation of the role of financial institutions and their relationship with the wider economy and society. This process has meant an increased questioning of both the conduct of business itself and the principles behind commercial and financial activities. Yet non-western voices have been notably absent from this debate, as have alternatives to the dominant western-derived economic ideologies. From the ancient spiritual wisdom or Dharma of the Jains, there emerges a practical modern philosophy fully in tune with the re-emergence of India as a global economic power. Jain individuals, businesses and charities have played a powerful role in India's rise and within the global Indian Diaspora. Jain communities are noted everywhere for their contributions to business, the professions and science. These successes are based on the principles of interdependence and co-operation, with an emphasis on long-term consolidation rather than short-term bursts of growth. Researchers and students interested in the ethics of finance, accounting and economics will find Jainism and Ethical Finance a scholarly and illuminating evaluation of Jain Dharma as a non-western case study. In the light of current concerns about the way global finance and banking systems operate, this book offers a timely alternative perspective.

My latest paper, 'Pandemic Ethics and Status Quo Risk', has just been accepted for publication in Public Health Ethics. Here's the abstract:Conservative assumptions in medical ethics risk immense harms during a pandemic. Public health institutions and public discourse alike have repeatedly privileged inaction over aggressive medical interventions to address the pandemic, perversely increasing population-wide risks while claiming to be guided by "caution". This puzzling disconnect between rhetoric and reality is suggestive of an underlying philosophical confusion. In this paper, I argue that we have been misled by status quo bias—exaggerating the moral significance of the risks inherent in medical interventions, while systematically neglecting the (objectively greater) risks inherent in the status quo prospect of an out-of-control pandemic. By coming to appreciate the possibility and significance of status quo risk, we will be better prepared to respond appropriately when the next pandemic strikesThe central idea is that heuristics of ambiguity-aversion and favouring inaction over (potentially risky) action can be expected to backfire terribly in circumstances -- such as a pandemic -- in which "business as usual" is leading us towards disaster.  Instead, I suggest that our policy and institutional responses to such emergency circumstances need to be rebalanced towards (i) liberalizing access to experimental treatments and vaccines, and (ii) requiring an explicit cost-benefit analysis to justify any sort of vaccine obstructionism (e.g. failure to immediately grant Emergency Use Authorization to any credible candidate vaccine early in the pandemic, and of course any post-authorization suspensions).Other key points of the paper:(1) "Governments and their agencies are not generally entitled to describe vaccine suspensions as reflecting "an abundance of caution", unless they can show that the policy actually reduces overall risk. If it instead increases overall risk, it would seem more objectively accurate to describe such suspensions as "reckless"—as they would then reveal a reckless disregard of the objectively greater threat posed by the unchecked spread of the virus."(2) Non-consequentialists should be even more appalled by vaccine obstructionism, as it constitutes harmful coercion resulting in death (which is to say: killing) by the government -- no less than if the FDA sent out agents to steal a cure from the hands of those who will die without it.(3) Vaccine challenge trials were a no-brainer, and opposing them on ethical grounds constitutes anti-beneficent paternalism -- a kind of moral insanity.  The basic argument also carries over to "any research that has a feasible chance of reducing the population-wide toll of the pandemic," including research into variolation, and challenge trials for candidate preventative measures (such as antiseptic nasal sprays). (4) Early targeted immunity via variolation (ideally preceded with experimental vaccination) could have done a lot of good, slowing the spread of the virus and freeing many healthy young people from unnecessary lockdowns.(5) Fear of "vaccine hesitancy" provides but weak reasons to oppose liberalization.  I offer several reasons for this in the paper, but I think the strongest is that however much you'd like to reduce vaccine hesitancy, it isn't ethical to pursue this goal via killing innocent people, but (as per #2 above) that's precisely what obstructionism amounts to.(6) If you're on board with my conclusion that pandemic policy was rife with status quo bias, the next step is to design institutional reforms to change the incentives that lead to this result.  Right now, "policy-makers are more likely to be blamed if an intervention goes wrong (resulting in highly salient identifiable victims), whereas they tend to escape blame for inaction that results in grave preventable harms (many of which may be less salient, or only linkable to the policy decision on a statistical basis—we cannot identify which particular deaths would have been prevented by earlier access to vaccines, for example)."  My paper doesn't address this problem, but perhaps it could help to shift EUA-granting authority to a new institution that's authorized to make such decisions on the basis of explicit cost-benefit analysis, and very explicitly does not recommend that anyone take the experimental treatments that it authorizes (i.e. makes legally available) for personal use.

The translation of Christoph Türcke give account of a problem whose actualityis unavoidable, namely, the problem of political praxis, of political activism, andits relation to the theoretical work of philosophy. In Adorno, praxis means severalthings, as well as human action, in general. An action in which it is expressed theself-determined reason and rational self-determination. Only this would be a truepraxis worthy of man, namely, adequate to the human rational capacity. The social reality is very far from it. Hence, "praxis" also means the establishment of the conditions under which the aforementioned maxim of praxis is possible. ; La traducción de Christoph Türcke da cuenta de un problema cuya actualidad esinsoslayable, a saber, el problema de la praxis política, del activismo político, y su relación con el trabajo teórico de la filosofía. En Adorno, la praxis significa varias cosas, tanto como la acción humana, en general. Una acción en la que se expresen la razón auto determinada y la autodeterminación racional. Solamente esto sería una praxis verdadera digna del hombre, a saber, adecuada a la capacidad racional humana. De ella se encuentra muy lejos la realidad social. De ahí que "praxis" también signifique el establecimiento de las condiciones bajo las cuales sea posible la ya mencionada máxima de la praxis.

Chronology of Hegel's life and work -- G.W.F. Hegel : an introduction to his life and thought / Stephen Houlgate -- Part I: Early writings. Religion, love, and law : Hegel's early metaphysics of morals / Katerina Deligiorgi -- Part II: Phenomenology of spirit. The project of Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit / John Russon ; Self-consciousness, anti-Cartesianism, and cognitive semantics in Hegel's 1807 Phenomenology / Kenneth R. Westphal ; Spirit as the "unconditioned" / Terry Pinkard -- Part III: Logic. Thinking being : method in Hegel's Logic of being / Angelica Nuzzo ; Essence, reflexion, and immediacy in Hegel's Science of logic / Stephen Houlgate ; Conceiving / John W. Burbidge -- Part IV: Philosophy of nature. Hegel and the sciences / Thomas Posch ; The transition to organics : Hegel's idea of life / Cinzia Ferrini -- Part V: Philosophy of subjective spirit. Hegel's solution to the mind-body problem / Richard Dien Winfield ; Hegel's Philosophy of language : the unwritten volume / Jere O'Neill Surber -- Part VI: Philosophy of right. Hegel on the empty formalism of Kant's categorical imperative / Sally Sedgwick ; The idea of a Hegelian "science" of society / Frederick Neuhouser ; Hegel's political philosophy / Allen W. Wood -- Part VII: Philosophy of history. "The ruling categories of the world" : the Trinity in Hegel's philosophy of history and the rise and fall of peoples / Robert Bernasconi ; Hegel and Ranke : a re-examination / Frederick C. Beiser -- Part VIII: Aesthetics. Hegel and the "historical deduction" of the concept of art / Allen Speight ; Soundings : Hegel on music / John Sallis -- Part IX: Philosophy of religion. Love, recognition, spirit : Hegel's philosophy of religion / Robert R. Williams ; Hegel's proofs of the existence of God / Peter C. Hodgson -- Part X: History of philosophy. Hegel's Aristotle : philosophy and its time / Alfredo Ferrarin ; From Kant's highest good to Hegel's absolute knowing / Michael Baur -- Part XI: Hegel and post-Hegelian thought. Hegel and Marx / Andrew Chitty ; Kierkegaard and Hegel on faith and knowledge / Jon Stewart ; Thinking of nothing : Heidegger's criticism of Hegel's conception of negativity / Daniel O. Dahlstrom ; Adorno's reconception of the dialectic / Brian O'Connor ; Hegel and pragmatism / Robert Stern ; The analytic neo-Hegelianism of John McDowell and Robert Brandom / Paul Redding ; Diff̌érance as negativity : the Hegelian remains of Derrida's philosophy / Karin de Boer ; You be my body for me : body, shape, and plasticity in Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit / Catherine Malabou and Judith Butler

En este artículo muestro como la teoría política de Hobbes, un gigante no-liberal del canon de la filosofía occidental, se puede interpretar como comprometida con alguna forma de neutralidad. Al reconocer el rol que juega la neutralidad en el pensamiento de Hobbes logramos ver que un requisito de neutralidad no es exclusivo del liberalismo. Más allá de esto, sin embargo, intento mostrar que considerar a Hobbes en este contexto revela ciertos puntos útiles de comparación con el trabajo tardío de Rawls que plantea preocupaciones sobre la viabilidad de su liberalismo político. Voy a argumentar que el liberalismo político de Rawls, mientras no ofrece una solución de modus vivendi a la justificación política, no está bien dotado para asegurar la estabilidad. ; In this paper, I show how the political theory of a non-liberal giant of the western philosophy canon, Hobbes, can be interpreted as having a commitment to some form of neutrality. In recognizing the role neutrality plays in Hobbes's thought we come to see that a neutrality requirement is not exclusive to liberalism. Beyond this, however, I intend to show that consideration of Hobbes in this context reveals certain helpful points of comparison with Rawls's later work that raise concerns about the viability of his political liberalism. I argue that Rawls's political liberalism, while not a modus vivendi solution to political justification, is ill suited for the securing stability.

Este ensayo presenta una revisión crítica de la llamada teoría "decisionista" de Carl Schmitt tal como fuera expuesta en sus principales trabajos políticos durante el periodo de Weimar. El autor argumenta que el decisionismo de Schmitt no es, como frecuentemente se ha afirmado, una simple variante del voluntarismo ético asociado a filosofías morales existencialistas y positivistas. Decisionismo es en cambio una particular doctrina política que sostiene que el Estado es la fuente absoluta de toda decisión legal y moral en la vida política. Desde esta perspectiva, el autor demuestra que el decisionismo de Schmitt es una doctrina puramente negativa, fundada en la negación simétrica de todos y cada uno de los valores políticos del liberalismo.

Self-esteem is deemed to be the "most important primary good". The care for self-esteem and individual dignity is regularly restated in international treaties and international conventions. Nevertheless, contemporary moral philosophy tends to leave the redistribution issues aside to concentrate on the issues of recognition although Rawls initially set the question of recognition in the framework of distributive justice. Although the discrepancy between redistribution – concerned with resources – and recognition – dealing with identity – is notable, it is not insuperable. On the reverse, we will demonstrate that the concern for "basic social outcomes" is a way to conciliate the preoccupation for recognition and the concern for redistribution. In order to show this, we will first focus on the social relevance of the concept of self-esteem. Then we will analyze the role of the social institutions of redistribution in order to identify the conditions under which these institutions preserve self-respect and avoid social stigmatization. Finally we will identify the processes and the tools of redistribution which appear most able to promote and induce self-respect (such as a fair distribution of primary goods, the universal basic income, a fair allocation of basic social outcomes). Key words: self-esteem, redistribution, recognition, basic social outcomes. ; Le respect de soi est considéré, en philosophie politique contemporaine, comme « le bien premier le plus important ». La protection du respect de soi et de la dignité des personnes est constamment réaffirmée dans les déclarations internationales de droits. Sans qu'elle soit contestée par la philosophie morale la plus récente, celle-ci tend néanmoins aujourd'hui à se détourner des enjeux de la redistribution – cadre au sein duquel Rawls a posé la question du respect de soi – pour considérer des problématiques de reconnaissance. Bien que la divergence entre les deux orientations soit forte – l'une traitant principalement de ressources, l'autre d'identité –, cette dichotomie n'est en réalité pas irréductible. Nous montrerons à l'inverse que la prise en compte des « réalisations sociales fondamentales » ouvre une perspective à partir de laquelle concilier le souci pour la reconnaissance et le souci pour la redistribution. Pour le montrer nous dégagerons, en premier lieu, la pertinence sociale de la notion de respect de soi. Puis, à partir d'une analyse de la fonction des institutions sociales dans le processus redistributif, nous cernerons les conditions auxquelles celles-ci peuvent contribuer à la construction et la préservation du respect de soi, en évitant toute stigmatisation sociale. Nous identifierons enfin les procédures et mesures redistributives les plus à même de garantir et de contribuer à la consolidation du respect de soi (biens premiers, allocation universelle, accomplissements sociaux). Mots-clés: respect de soi, redistribution, reconnaissance, réalisations sociales fondamentales.

Broadside describing a select school for young ladies and gentlemen in Norwich, Vermont, with a fall term opening 4 September 1848. ; Cover to "Capt. Alden Partridge" on reverse side not scanned. ; SELECT SCHOOL, NORWICH, VT. DANIEL S. C. M. POTTER, A. M., PRECEPTOR. MRS. MARY F. W. POTTER, PRECEPTRESS THE FALL TERM of this School will open on Monday, Sept. 4th, and continue 11 weeks, under the supervision of the above named Teachers, who will give full and thorough instruction in the branches of a Primary, Academic and Collegiate Preparatory Course, and pledge to devote their best talents and energies to the advancement of all pupils under their charge, in manners, morals and science. The government will be uniform, and discipline strict, but parental. COURSE OF STUDIES. The branches taught in the Male and Female Departments comprise Spelling, Defining, Reading, Writing, Geog-raphy, Grammar, Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry, Astronomy, Chemistry, Botany, Natural and Political History, Physiology, Mythology, Logic, Rhetoric, Natural and Mental and Moral Philosophy, Evidences of Christianity, Ele-ments of Criticism, Technology, Political Economy, Natural Theology, Composition, Elocution, and the English. French, Greek and Latin Languages, &c., &c. REMARKS. Mrs. Potter will superintend the Female Department, wherein Young Ladies may pursue the Course of Studies usually taught in Female Academies. Mr. Potter will have charge of the Male Department, wherein young men may pursue an English or Classical Course; thereby fitting them for Teachers or for admittance to College. The Proprietors will spare no effort in rendering the School worthy of public confidence, and the patronage of all who are friends of a sound education. TUITION. The charge for instruction, per term, in the First Class, is $2,00. Second Class, $2,75. Third Class, $3,50. Fourth Class, $4,25. Students received at any period of the Term, and charged from the time of entrance until the close, except in cases of protracted illness or special arrangement, made by parents and guardians. Tuition to be paid, at or before the close of the Term. To those who pay in advance, a deduction of five per cent will be made. For Text Books used, apply to the Teachers. REFERENCES. Applications for admission may be made to the Proprietors of the School, or to either of the following gentlemen of this village, to whom they are permitted to refer, viz :-Gen. H. S. Wheaton, A. M., Pres. N. U.; Alonzo Jack-man, A. M., Prof. Math. N. U.; Dea. S. Morris ; J. T. Burnham, Esq.; Dr. Ira Davis; Gen. W. E. Lewis; Messrs F. L. & E. W. Olds; J. L. Currier, Esq.; John Wright, Esq.; S. S. Booth, Esq. Norwich, Windsor County, Vermont, July 14th, 1848.