Suchergebnisse

A review essay on books by (1) Hugh Brogan, Alexis de Tocqueville: A Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007) & (2) Roger Boesche, Tocqueville's Road Map: Methodology, Liberalism, Revolution, and Despotism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006). References.

The interpretive strategy of this article is to identify the joint stock company as an independent unit of analysis in Adam Smith's theory of international political economy. Such companies, in Smith's view, had corrupted and captured many European and non-European governments and undermined their societies' ability to engage in peaceful transnational affairs and equitable self-rule. In contrast with Smith's well-known concerns about the rise of commerce in modern Europe in his four-stage account of social development— which were outweighed, in his view, by the many material benefits and personal liberties brought about by the eclipse of feudalism—his narrative of globalization offers a trenchantly critical appraisal of commercial practices that ultimately undermine many of the gains that the initial rise of modern commerce once made possible. Even in his rare moments of optimism about the future of global relations, Smith remained deeply ambivalent about globalization.

The traditional conception construes human rights as moral rights all people have due to some basic feature or interests deemed intrinsically valuable. This comported well with the revival of the discourse of human rights in the wake of atrocities committed during WWII. It served as a useful referent for local struggles against foreign rule and domestic dictatorship in the 1980s. Since 1989, human rights discourse acquired a new function: the justification of sanctions, military invasions, and transformative occupation administrations by outsiders, framed as enforcement of international law against violators. The traditional conception doesn't fit this new function, hence the efforts to counter-pose a "political" to the "traditional" approach. This essay analyzes two recent versions of the political conception, and argues for a third. The thesis is that sovereign equality and human rights are normative principles of our dualist international system and both are needed to construct a more just version of that system.

This essay systematically reformulates an earlier argument about Locke and new world slavery, adding attention to Indians, natural law, and Locke's reception. Locke followed Grotian natural law in constructing a just-war theory of slavery. Unlike Grotius, though, he severely restricted the theory, making it inapplicable to America. It only fit resistance to "absolute power" in Stuart England. Locke was nonetheless an agent of British colonialism who issued instructions governing slavery. Yet they do not inform his theory—or vice versa. This creates hermeneutical problems and raises charges of racism. If Locke deserves the epithet "racist," it is not for his having a racial doctrine justifying slavery. None of this makes for a flattering portrait. Locke's reputation as the champion of liberty would not survive the contradictions in which new world slavery ensnared him. Evidence for this may be found in Locke's reception, including by Southern apologists for slavery.

A review essay on books by (1) Janet Afary & Kevin B. Anderson, Foccault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) & (2) Ryszard Kapuscinski, Shah of Shahs (New York: Vintage International, 1992). References.