Suchergebnisse

Aquesta tesi s'emmarca en l'espai polític etíop i abasta cronològicament la fase 1855-1930. Es tracta d'una anàlisi al voltant de les transformacions que es produeixen entre els regnats de Tewódros II (1855-1868) i Menelik II (1889-1913), on els principals eixos d'estudi són la tradició i la modernitat. La qüestió que s'hi planteja és: Que té l'espai polític etíop anterior a la coronació de Haile Sellassie d'estat modern i quina presència real te el model cultural i polític associat al salomonisme? Tot mirant de respondre a aquesta qüestió clau, s'hi analitzen altres temes que són complementaris i que d'alguna manera, es dedueixen del binomi modernitat-tradició. Entre aquests hi ha la batalla d'Adwa (1896) com a element fundador d'aquesta modernitat, o bé, de forma més diluïda el procés de Statebuilding dut a terme per Tewódros II, Yohannes IV i Menelik II, cadascú amb el seu propi projecte d'estat. Una altra qüestió que requereix atenció és el desplegament de l'autoritat de la reialesa: com a aquesta a través d'una sèrie de mecanismes es legitima, per mitjà del discurs escrit, però també per mitjà de l'escenografia del poder i de la selecció de determinades accions d'ordre polític. També caldrà analitzar les relacions entre el centre de poder i els centres secundaris, entre la capital i les províncies, entre totes elles i la perifèria immediata- o suburbial- i la que es troba més allunyada. Tot plegat va lligat amb els discursos sobre el poder i també emesos des d'aquest i té a veure amb l'apropiació i exercici d'una determinada narrativa històrica i un projecte de país. La investigació es recolza, a més a més d'un estudi del país com a realitat política en transformació a partir de textos històrics, en l'anàlisi comparatiu d'estudis de cas, tot comparant el procés abissini amb Egipte, Oman-Zanzíbar i Madagascar al llarg del s. XIX. Certament, l'aplicació i anàlisi d'estudis de cas permet establir una mesura qualitativa del grau d'implantació de la modernització a la llum de les grans transformacions del segle i de la penetració d'idees que en el llarg recorregut degotegen al continent des dels inicis de la presència europea. ; Esta tesis se enmarca en el espacio político etíope y abarca cronológicamente la fase 1855-1930. Se trata de un análisis en torno a las transformaciones que se produjeron entre los reinados de Tewodros II (1855-1868) y Menelik II (1889-1913), tomando como principal eje de estudio la tradición y la modernidad. La cuestión que se plantea es: ¿Qué tiene el espacio político etíope anterior a la coronación de Haile Sellassie de estado moderno y qué presencia real tiene el modelo cultural y político asociado al Salomonismo? Además de tratar de responder a esta cuestión clave, se analizan otros temas que son complementarios y que de alguna manera, se deducen del binomio modernidad-tradición. Entre estos está la batalla de Adwa (1896) como elemento fundador de esta modernidad, o si se prefiere, de forma más diluida, el proceso de Statebuilding llevado a cabo por Tewodros II, Yohannes IV y Menelik II, cada uno con su propio proyecto de estado. Otra cuestión que requiere atención es el despliegue de la autoridad de la realeza: como esta se legitima a través de una serie de mecanismos, recurriendo al discurso escrito, la escenografía del poder – el llamado Estado Teatral- y la elección de determinadas acciones de orden político. También habrá que analizar las relaciones entre el centro de poder y los centros secundarios, entre la capital y las provincias, entre todas ellas y la periferia inmediatamente suburbial- y la que se encuentra más alejada. Todo ello va ligado con los discursos sobre el poder y también emitidos desde este y tiene que ver con la apropiación y ejercicio de una determinada narrativa histórica y un proyecto de país. La investigación se apoya, además de un estudio del país como realidad política en transformación a partir de textos históricos, en el análisis comparativo de estudios de caso, comparando el proceso abisinio con Egipto, Omán-Zanzíbar y Madagascar a lo largo del s. XIX. Ciertamente, la aplicación y análisis de estudios de caso permite establecer una medida cualitativa del grado de implantación de la modernización a la luz de las grandes transformaciones del siglo, tomando en consideración que el concepto, "modernización" se refiera aquí principalmente a la penetración de ideas, proceso de largo recorrido que se remonta a los orígenes y gradual implantación de la presencia europea en el continente africano. ; The present thesis focuses on the Horn of Africa as a political region, between mid-nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It analyses the developments that took place between the reigns of Tewodros II (1855-1868) and Menelik II (1889-1913). This paper stresses the relevance of the relationship between tradition and modernity. The question at stake is: To what extent is the political Ethiopian entity prior to Haile Sellassie's coronation a modern state and how much is there of the political and cultural tradition associated with Neo-Salomonism? While trying to answer this two fold question, other issues will be analyzed. These issues are complementary and can be inferred from the binomial relationship that arises from tradition and modernity. Among them, the Batlle of Adwa (1896), which can be considered a hallmark in the modernizing process, along with Tewódros II's, Yohannes IV's and Menelik II's efforts, each of them including variations of a wider state-building scheme. Another issue that requires attention is the different ways in which royal authority deploys itself through written speech, the selection of different political strategies and mechanisms, and finally, royal etiquette and ritual, that is: the Theater State. The existing connections between the capital city and the provincial centers, the central and the local levels of power, what is the immediate periphery and the regions that fall far from the center need also to be discussed. The methodology used is based on thorough research of textual analysis of primary and secondary sources. Some case studies are considered in the light of changes occurring throughout the 19th Century in East Africa. The chosen case-studies refer to Egypt at the time of Muhammad Ali and Khedive Ismail, the sultanate of Oman-Zanzibar and, finally, Madagascar in the years before the French conquest. Certainly, a regional and synchronic approach through case-study analysis should help to establish a qualitative measure of the degree of modernization in the light of the great transformations of the century. Finally, it must be said that this modernization process is seen not from the traditional evolutionary perspective, but rather, a penetration of ideas and gradual transformation of local cultures, which began with the early contacts with European travelers.

Розкрито суспільне, художнє, моральне значення щорічних Міжнародних Пасхальних асамблей, їх сутність і своєрідність, виражені в гаслі «Духовність єднає Україну», зокрема особливості ювілейної Х Асамблеї – 2018. Докладно розглянуто зміст її заходів – музичних діалогів; концертів, присвячених ювілеям видатних композиторів і виконавців; Першого конкурсу скрипалів імені Богодара Которовича; благодійної програми «Вірою, надією єдині»; охарактеризовано їх програми, творчий шлях колективів та окремих виконавців, які взяли участь у цих заходах. Х Міжнародна Пасхальна асамблея – 2018 «Духовність єднає Україну» справді стала грандіозним святом духовності та єднання українського суспільства. У цьому переконують творчі виступи, концерти не лише в концертних залах Києва, а й у Софії Київській, Михайлівському Золотоверхому Соборі, Успенському соборі Києво-Печерської Лаври, Патріаршому соборі Воскресіння Христового, у Храмі Василя Великого. У цих заходах виявилося прагнення людей жити в мирі і злагоді. Український політикум усе більше переконується в тому, що краще неспокійний мир, ніж жахи воєнного лихоліття. Це має стати нормою для України! Висока гуманістична ідея Пасхальних асамблей спрямована на утвердження стабільності, миру і благополуччя в нашій країні. ; Relevance of research. In the twenty-first century some profound socio-political, economic, and spiritual shifts have become the realities of life both in Ukraine and the world. They not only open up perspectives for the socio-cultural progress of mankind, but also create crises in all spheres of life. State activity in the field of spirituality as well as artistic and aesthetic integrity of Ukrainian society should be aimed at overcoming destructive processes of stagnation and instability, humanization of universal moral and spiritual values, revival of Ukrainian national culture. An important role in this is related to the annual International Easter Assembly "Spirituality unites Ukraine".The purpose of the research is to reveal the social, artistic, and moral significance of the annual International Easter Assemblies, their essence and peculiarity, expressed in the slogan "Spirituality unites Ukraine". Particularly it has been pointed out the properties of this event from the point of view of its jubilee Tenth Assembly-2018. The author has described in detail the content of its events, expressed by musical dialogues, concerts devoted to the anniversaries of prominent composers and performers. The first Bogodar Kotorovych Contest of violinists, the charity program "Unity in faith and hope" were characterized with a detailed description of the program, the creative path of the teams and individual performers who took part in these events.The methodology of the study provides an analytical review of the main activities that took place during the jubilee Tenth Assembly-2018. The scientific novelty of the study consists in the fact that it first characterized the performances of leading performing groups that took part in this international event. Their creative peculiarity has been revealed in connection with the embodiment of the author's design. The importance of musical dialogues introduced with the assistance of Embassies of foreign states accredited in Ukraine has been emphasized. This is a quite new form of international cultural cooperation, the purpose of which is the spiritual rapprochement of nations and nationalities, the popularization of the cultures of different peoples. During the Tenth International Easter Assembly in 2018, ten dialogues were held with the participation of performers from Italy, Hungary, the USA, Lithuania, France, Israel, Germany and other countries. There were creative performances, concerts not only in the concert halls of Kiev, but also in Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, St. Michael's Cathedral, the Assumption Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ, at the Church of Basil the Great.The tradition of the Easter assemblies has become a honoring of prominent figures of musical culture. On April 17, 2018, a jubilee concert by Georgiy Agrathin "Musician-Magician" took place in the Great Hall of the Academy on his 70th anniversary with the participation of the National Orchestra of Folk Instruments of Ukraine (headed by V. Gutsal).The concluding Gala Concert of the winners of the 8th All-Ukrainian Television Children's Song Festival-Competition "Solovyenko of Ukraine" was the bright event of the Assembly. On 22nd April 2018, the First All-Ukrainian Bogodar Kotorovych Violinist Competition also has begun. The organizers of the contest are Petro Tchaikovsky National Music Academy of Ukraine with the support of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, the National Union of Composers of Ukraine, and the All-Ukrainian Foundation for International Communication "Ukrainian National Embassy", the National All-Ukrainian Music Union. The jury consists of well-known violinists from Ukraine, France, Poland, and Great Britain – students of the outstanding Maestro.The Grand Concert "Opera in the Academy" was dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Opera Studio of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. P. I. Tchaikovsky. This is a unique creative unit for the preparation of musicians of the world level. There is a spectator hall for 800 seats with a technically equipped stage, it has all the necessary theatrical workshops (decorative, lighting, sound, dressing room, engineering, costume, etc.), artistic, rehearsal and auxiliary premises. The artistic level of performances is provided by the constantly functioning choir, orchestra, ballet and mimic corpses; the production group – conductors, directors, artists, chormeisters, choreographers, concertmasters, who are outstanding persons of the musical theater. Academy educators and talented youth, winners of national and international artistic competitions and festivals constantly take part in all the productions and performances of the Opera Studio.The Opera Studio is not only an important academic unit of the Academy, but also a worldclass artistic center. On its scene there were many all-Ukrainian and international festivals and contests aimed at solving not only creative, artistic, but also social tasks, in particular to overcome confrontations and discord, spiritual impoverishment, depreciation of artistic heritage, national history. Among them there are international festivals "Vivat, Academia", "Italian Baroque in Ukraine", All-Ukrainian competitions of choral conductors and pianists of the firm "C. Bechstein", International Easter Assembly "Spirituality unites Ukraine".Findings and Conclusions. The Tenth International Easter Assembly-2018 "Spirituality unites Ukraine" has indeed become a grand holiday of spirituality and unity of Ukrainian society. It has revealed the desire of people to live in peace and harmony. ; Раскрыто общественное, художественное, моральное значение ежегодных Международных Пасхальных ассамблей, их сущность и своеобразие, выраженные в месседже «Духовность объединяет Украину», а также особенности юбилейной Х Ассамблеи-2018. Детально рассмотрено содержание её многообразных мероприятий – музыкальных диалогов, концертов, посвящённых юбилеям видающихся композиторов и исполнителей, Первого конкурса скрипачей имени Богодара Которовича, благотворительной программы «Верой, надеждой едины», охарактеризованы их программы, творческий путь коллективов и отдельных исполнителей, принявших участие в этих мероприятиях. Х Международная Пасхальная ассамблея-2018 «Духовность объединяет Украину» действительно стала грандиозным праздником духовности и единения украинского общества. В этом убеждают творческие выступления, концерты не только в концертных залах Киева, но и в Софии Киевской, Михайловском Золотоглавом Соборе, Успенском соборе Киево-Печерской Лавры, Патриаршем соборе Воскресения Христового, в Храме Василия Великого. В этих мероприятиях нашло своё выражение стремление людей жить в мире и согласии. Украинский политикум все больше убеждается в том, что лучше неспокойный мир, нежели ужасы войны. Это должно стать нормой для Украины! Высокая гуманистическая идея Пасхальных ассамблей направлена на утверждение стабильности, мира и благоденствия в нашей стране.

[spa] La investigación «Fronteras y transmigraciones del diálogo intercultural: implicancias del acto educativo como acción estética y emancipadora» consiste en el diseño (en el marco de la metodología de modelización ecosistémica) de un proyecto pedagógico (investigativo/interventivo) cuyo objetivo es reflexionar críticamente acerca de los elementos fundamentales de la educación en perspectiva intercultural y dialógica. En tal sentido, se documentan algunas reflexiones episte-metodo-lógicas acerca de temáticas relevantes en este campo. Éstas se han trabajado en paralelo (e interconexión) a una serie de acciones socioeducativas en ámbitos formales e informales de la ciudad de Barcelona. En relación a las temáticas de interés investigativo, se abordan (en los capítulos respectivos) una serie de cuestiones importantes, a saber, los debates acerca de las diferencias entre las tradiciones multi e intercultural; el desarrollo de la filosofía intercultural durante las últimas décadas; las formas de la inteligibilidad (en ocho metáforas) del fenómeno intercultural; la alfabetización intercultural como referente teórico de la acción socioeducativa; también lo referente entre interculturalidad, hermenéutica diatópica e intertextualidad; se propone, por otra parte, hacer explícito el marco constituyente entre cultura y alteridad entendido como fundamento de principio del pensamiento intercultural; además se realiza un compendio de las conceptualizaciones en relación a la "cultura" en las tradiciones humanista y antropológica, y su traducción pedagógica en términos de vecindad e imaginación; lo anterior a la luz de las implicaciones que tiene la noción de la experiencia para la investigación educativa, y la compresión de la metodología como una forma de tekné. Como se señaló previamente, estas inquietudes son concurrentes a la formulación y ejecución de una serie de acciones socioeducativas en la ciudad de Barcelona: 1. La participación en la fundación Migra Studium en cuatro escenarios: el grupo de visitas y monitoreo al Centro de internamiento para extranjeros (CIE) de Barcelona, la construcción del programa de parejas lingüísticas "Alliberar la paraula", el montaje (junto al colectivo de teatro La Trilateral) de la obra "Ramon Llull a la ciutat nova", y el diseño de los espacios de "Espai de Trobada Intercultural". 2. La participación en la Comisión de Pedagogía de la Comunidad de Aprendizaje (Escola Coves d` En Cimany), los grupos interactivos, y la ejecución del proyecto comunitario "Las nuevas aventuras de las bacterias cromáticas". 3. La colaboración (en la organización) y participación en el encuentro "Imaginarios desarmados. Arte y exilio", que tuvo por objetivo apoyar los acuerdos de Paz de la Habana (entre el gobierno colombiano y las fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia) junto a un grupo de colombianos (y otros aliados) residentes en Barcelona. 4. Por último, la participación como profesor invitado a los seminarios de antropología para estudiantes de educación social y pedagogía de la UB (campus Mundet). Desde la complementariedad de estos niveles se delimita la hipótesis de trabajo de investigación, que se formuló tardíamente como «la (im) posibilidad de una educación intercultural». Esta consideración se expone en la introducción. Con base en esta hipótesis se invita a la filosofía de la educación, esto es, a la pedagogía, a convenir en un pacto donde poner entre paréntesis esas (im) posibilidades, entendidas en tanto retos pedagógicos. En otras palabras, se pone en consideración que establecer una agenda educativa sobre el diálogo intercultural se trata de un asunto que reviste unos retos significativos. De los cuales el principal sería estimar el pedagógico de dicha educación, dígase a propósito de los principios sobre los que se fundamenta. Esta reflexión se pone en contraste (e interlocución) con la discusión política sobre la posibilidad de una ciudadanía mundial, principalmente teniendo en cuenta algunas consideraciones acerca del arraigo, la solidaridad, la globalización y el cosmopolitismo. Acá se marca un escenario de complejidad. En el prefacio se establece que la "esperanza" pedagógica frente a las (im) posibilidades se enriquece en la analogía del "intercambio epistolar" (entendido como correspondencia en la amistad). A partir de estas consideraciones se propone a la correspondencia y la amistad como fundamentos del diálogo intercultural. En esto orden de ideas, se plantea comprender el horizonte de la interculturalidad en la perspectiva de una política de los afectos: donde los sujetos políticos son capaces de pactar alianzas. Lo que aparece de nuevo como interpelación sobre el alcance de esas alianzas, pregunta fundamental para la pedagogía que piensa la educación intercultural. Como cuando Gonzalo Arango afirmaba: "Ni usted ni yo necesitamos presentación. Tenemos tres cosas en común: esta tierra, la vida y la muerte. En eso somos semejantes, casi amigos." ; [eng] This research entitled points to design a pedagogical ecosystem modeling, consisting on a research/intervention project. It aims to enhance the critical pedagogical reflection on intercultural and dialogical education. Several subjects are documented to achieve it, including episte- methodological issues, which have been connected to formal and informal educational actions performed in Barcelona city. Concerning to the key conceptual topics important issues are addressed, namely, multi and intercultural discussions; last decades' intercultural philosophy developments; eight metaphorical interculturality understandings; intercultural literacy and socio-educational action; intertextuality and diatopical hermeneutics; culture and alterity as a intercultural constituent framework; humanistic and anthropological approaches to culture, and its pedagogical translation as neighborhood and imagination based on the experience`s role on systemic modeling methodological tradition. As previously noted, these concerns were linked to a number of socio-educational actions: 1. NGOs participation on four Migra Studium scenarios: the CIE´s visit and monitoring Group, linguistics couples program "Alliberar la paraula", design and execution on "Ramon Lllull a la Ciutat nova" social theater project, and the involvement on the intercultural space meetings "Espai de Trobada Intercultural". 2. Learning- Community contributions on pedagogical commission, interactive groups, and the project execution "Las nuevas aventuras de las bacterias cromáticas" (supported by the school Coves d´ En Cimany and Juan Marse´s neighborhood library). 3. "Imaginarios desarmados. Arte y Exilio" collaborations, which aimed to build community alliance around the Havana Agreements between Colombian government and Farc´s Guerrilla. 4. University of Barcelona Guest Professor on Anthropology classes. Related to this complementary "between-levels" analysis, the research hypothesis, which was later formulated, is defined as follows: . Based on this rhetoric statement an invitation is required to pedagogy: to put in parentheses those impossibilities as if were pedagogical challenges. In other words, establishing an educational agenda concerning to intercultural dialogue poses significant challenges. The main would be estimating it´s pedagogical «scope» based on certain principles. To make a contrast on this idea, some political arguments about world citizenship are brought: roots, solidarity, globalization and cosmopolitism. A complex scenario is thus marked. Because of these impossibilities, a pedagogical hope is suggested: as an analogy (to an exchange symbol) based on an epistolary frame. Correspondence and friendship notions are highlighted from this idea. Furthermore, an affections politics is proposed in this sense: the political subject´s power is thus understood as the ability to pact alliances. In short, pedagogical hope is referred to solidarity and potential arrangements. Both values whose "devaluation" appears worrisome, but involve the possible, as Gonzalo Arango used to say: "Neither You nor I need an introduction. We all have three common things: the land, life and death. Places where at least We are similar, almost friends."

Der 'Avantgardefilm' – ein vielfach gebrauchter Begriff um innovative Kunstströmungen zu verorten, die ihrer Zeit voraus sind. Der 'Avantgardefilm'– ein vielfach missbrauchter Begriff um bestimmte Kunstwerke zu nobilitieren und von anderen Werken abzuheben. Dieses theoretische Korsett bricht Gabriele Jutz mit ihrer nun veröffentlichten Habilitationsschrift Cinéma brut. Eine alternative Genealogie der Filmavantgarde auf und kreiert mit äußerster Präzision einen neuartigen Blickwinkel im verhärteten 'Avantgardefilm-Diskurs'. Zum Einstieg rekapituliert Jutz die bis dato dominanten Avantgardetheorien des "Purismus", deren Programm es ist die 'Reinheit' des Mediums Film in Abgrenzung zu anderen Künsten als wichtigstes Kriterium zu etablieren. Angefangen bei den historischen Filmavantgarden der 1920er Jahre, wie dem anti-literarischen 'cinéma pur' und dem auf Abstraktion ausgerichteten 'absoluten Film', die sich radikal von der damals im Film vorherrschenden literarisch-theatralen Tradition abgrenzten, verfolgt sie den Diskurs weiter über die US-amerikanische Avantgarde nach 1945 bis in die Gegenwart. Hierbei liegt ein besonderes Augenmerk auf dem in den 1960er von P. Adam Sitney propagierten 'structural film'. In diesem, auf die Prinzipien der von Clement Greenberg formulierten, modernistischen Malerei zurückgreifenden Begriff, wird die 'Essenz' eines Films – und damit dessen avantgardistisches Potential – anhand der selbstreflexiven Auseinandersetzung mit den materiellen und apparativen Voraussetzungen des Mediums gemessen. Jutz kritisiert am puristischen Diskurs – zurecht – folgende Punkte: Zum einen zeigt sie auf, dass die zum structural film gezählten Filme der 1960er und 1970er wie Film in Which There Appear (1965-66) von George Landow oder Arnulf Rainer (1960) von Peter Kubelka nie dem von der Theorie konstatierten Grad des Purismus entsprechen, zum anderen thematisiert sie "die erstaunliche Selbstverständlichkeit, mit der so offensichtlich 'unreine' Filmpraktiken wie das 'expanded-cinema' oder der 'found-footage-Film' in das Schema einer puristisch-modernistischen Lektüre gepresst werden" (S. 35). Wie schon der Titel des Buches verrät, begnügt sich die Autorin aber nicht damit, den vorgegebenen tradierten Purismus-Diskurs in Frage zu stellen und zu erweitern. Sie entwickelt eine alternative, "brutistische" Betrachtungsweise – 'brut' im Sinne von roh, primitiv, unbearbeitet unverfälscht und natürlich –, die darauf abzielt "die Geschichte der Filmavantgarde von einem entgegengesetzten Blickwinkel neu aufzurollen: nicht als Endlosschleife eines 'cinéma pur', sondern als Geschichte eines 'cinéma brut'." (S. 12) Ihr Ansatz legitimiert sich durch eine subtile Methodologie, mit deren Hilfe sie drei spezifisch dem puristischem Avantgardefilm zugeordnete "Praktiken" (Jutz) unter neuen Gesichtspunkten untersucht: Arbeiten des 'direct films', eine Animationstechnik bei der direkt auf dem Filmstreifen gearbeitet wird – nicht zu verwechseln mit der Dokumentarfilmform 'direct cinema' –, der 'expanded-cinema-Aktion', in welcher die Grenzen des kinematographischen Apparats wie Kinosaal, Leinwand, Filmstreifen etc. radikal ausgelotet und erweitert werden, sowie des 'found-footage-Films', bei dem FilmkünstlerInnen 'gefundenes' Filmmaterial auf verschiedenste Weise in neue Arbeiten transformieren, erfahren einen Kurzschluss mit unterschiedlichsten Theorien und Praxisfeldern aus Kunst-, Film- und Medientheorie. Jutz bewegt sich dabei konsequent fernab romantisierter Vorstellungen, die brutistische Kunstpraktiken "jenseits der Zeichen" (S. 43) bzw. frei von kulturellen Konventionen ansiedeln. Verweisend auf die Zeichentheorie von Charles Sanders Peirce und deren Unterscheidung von Ikon, Symbol und Index sowie auf das "photographische Paradigma" von Rosalind Krauss verortet sie die drei genannten Praktiken des cinéma brut in der Nähe des traditionellerweise als 'primitiv' rezipierten Index. Als 'roh' wird das cinéma brut von Jutz auch wegen seiner Vorliebe für obsolete – also nicht mehr gebräuchliche – Techniken und Materialien bezeichnet. Sie bricht dabei bewusst mit dem in vielen Avantgardetheorien gesetzten, verabsolutierten Fokus "auf das Neue, den Bruch mit Traditionen" (S. 55) beziehungsweise auf die Verwendung von neuen künstlerischen Werkzeugen und Techniken. Der Argumentation von Bernd Hüppauf und Vivian Laska folgend, sollten Avantgarden vielmehr in einer generellen Opposition zu ihrer Gegenwart stehen und der "Begriff des Unzeitgemäßen in beide zeitliche Richtungen – Zukunft und Vergangenheit ­– gedacht werden" (S. 55). Die Autorin öffnet damit generell den Raum für viele innovative, bis dato nicht dem Avantgardefilm zugeordnete Filmwerke, deren Status in weiterer Folge neu bewertet werden sollte. Bezogen auf die Praktiken des cinéma brut bedeutet dies zum einen eine "technische Obsoleszenz", denn weder direct film, noch expanded-cinema-Aktion und in gewisser Weise auch der found-footage-Film bedürfen zwingend einer Kamera. Sie unterschreiten damit bewusst die technischen Möglichkeiten der filmischen Apparatur. Einen zweiten Punkt stellt die "materielle Obsoleszenz" dar, unter der einerseits eine vorsätzliche Materialbeeinträchtigung bzw. Materialzerstörung im direct film, andererseits der prekäre Zustand von vorgefundenem Filmmaterial im found-footage-Film zu verstehen ist. Als dritten Aspekt des "Obsoleten" bezeichnet Jutz in Anlehnung an Walter Benjamins Passagenwerk "Das utopische Potential des Unzeitgemäßen", welches besagt, dass neuartige Materialien und Technologien immer Sehnsüchte und kollektive Phantasien von Gesellschaften wecken, diese aber im Laufe der Zeit verloren gehen. Erst wenn im Zuge weiterer technischer Neuerungen Dinge wertlos geworden sind, besteht die Möglichkeit, verloren gegangenen Utopien in neuer Form wiederzuerwecken. Positiv hervorzuheben ist außerdem, dass Jutz in ihrer Annäherungsweise das Naheverhältnis des Avantgardefilms zur bildenden Kunst im Auge behält. So beschreibt die Autorin im Rahmen ihrer Verhandlung des filmtheoretischen Materialitätsbegriffs zunächst das Verständnis von Materialität in Malerei und Skulptur, bevor sie sich zentralen Positionen der Filmwissenschaft zuwendet und stellt – wieder zurecht – die Frage, warum die Theorie der Filmavantgarde immer noch so krampfhaft am Diskurs des structural films und damit am Purismus festhält, während die bildende Kunst und in Folge die Kunstwissenschaft sich schon längst einem postmodernen Diskurs zugewandt hat. Auf semiotischer Ebene bezieht sich Jutz unter anderem auf Theorien von Peter Wollen, der zwei Strömungen der Avantgardetheorie isoliert: eine "formale", selbstreflexive Strömung, die ihr Augenmerk auf den Signifikanten legt, und eine "literatisch-politische" Avantgarde, dessen zentrale Forderung es war "in gleichem Ausmaß ideologiekritische Inhalte zu transportieren wie bürgerliche Repräsentationsweisen zu brechen" (S. 95). Laut Wollen stellt diese Spaltung der Avantgarde das größte Hindernis für eine revolutionäre Filmpraxis dar. Jutz präzisiert Wollens Ausführungen dahingehend, dass der Film – ungleich der Malerei und der Literatur – nicht nur aus einer, sondern fünf Ausdruckssubstanzen (Bild, Ton, Bewegung, Licht, Montage) besteht. Eine Disjunktion ist daher nicht nur zwischen Signifikat und Signifikant, sondern auch zwischen den verschiedenen Kanälen des Mediums Film möglich. Weitere zentrale Anknüpfungspunkte der sehr ausführlichen allgemeinen theoretischen Verortung des cinéma brut sind unter anderem Roland Barthes' Die Rauheit der Stimme und John L. Austins Theorie des Sprechaktes, George Batailles Entwurf des "informe" sowie Michel Foucaults Dispositiv-Begriff. Nach der übergreifenden Neu-Kontextualisierung widmet sich Gabriele Jutz schließlich noch einmal den einzelnen Praktiken ihres filmtheoretischen Paradigmas: Wie zuvor erwähnt, verortet die Autorin das cinéma brut in der "Logik des Index", auf dem, wie Rosalind Krauss' in den 1970er Jahren provokant formulierte These verlautete, "die innovativsten Tendenzen in der modernen Kunst" basieren. (S. 154) Der direct film ist an den "Index als Spur" gekoppelt. Dabei unterscheidet die Autorin in weiterer Folge zwischen 'handmade' Filmen wie Su Friedrichs Gently Down the Stream (1981), die durch ein vorapparatives, Kratzen, Schaben, Stanzen, Bemalen, Ritzen oder Sich-Abdrücken manuell entstehen und 'autogenerativen' Filmen wie Stadt in Flammen (1984) des Künstler-Kollektivs Schmelzdahin, bei denen die Autorinstanz von äußeren Einflüssen wie der Witterung, Chemikalien oder Hitze getragen wird. Erwähnt sei auch die Nähe des direct film zu den von Nelson Goodman als "autographisch" klassifizierten Künsten wie Malerei, Druck oder Bildhauerei, bei der einerseits die Hand des/der KünstlerIn notwendig ist und andererseits Kategorien wie Original und Fälschung eine Rolle spielen. Im Rahmen der expanded-cinema-Aktion hingegen fungiert der "Index als Geste". Losgelöst aus der Klammer des strukturellen Films streicht Jutz die ursprüngliche Definition des expanded-cinemas hervor: "Mit seinen Wurzeln im künstlerischen Underground war das expanded-cinema ursprünglich Ausdruck einer Haltung, die vergleichbar mit jener der klassischen Avantgarden, eine Synthese von Kunst und Leben, von ästhetischer und politischer Fortschrittlichkeit anstrebte." (S. 162) Die Autorin begnügt sich nicht damit, die Erweiterung des Kinos in Richtung Theater zu beschreiben, sondern arbeitet die oppositionelle Stellung der expanded-cinema-Aktion zu textbasierten, theatralen Inszenierungen heraus. Wie am Beispiel von Nam Jun Paiks Zen for Film (1962-64) gezeigt wird, tritt die 'performative' Funktion, also der Vollzug der Handlung gegenüber der 'referentiellen' Funktion, also die Darstellung von Figuren, Handlungen etc., in den Vordergrund. Eine weitere Abgrenzung erfolgt gegenüber der kinematographischen Installation. Merkmale, die die expanded-cinema-Aktion als Praktik des cinéma brut erkennen lassen, werden unter anderem an Batailles Konzept der "Antiökonomie" festgemacht. Ein weiteres Kriterium ist die "Flüchtigkeit des performativen Aktes, seine Unwiederbringlichkeit" (S. 165), die Jutz als Zeichen der Obsoleszenz deutet. Wichtig ist zudem die Referenz auf vorhergehende (filmische) Diskurse und Praktiken, wie am Beispiel von VALIE EXPORTs TAPP und TASTKINO (1968) veranschaulicht wird, und die Hervorhebung "deiktischer" Gesten. Den found-footage-Film setzt Gabriele Jutz schließlich mit dem "Index als Relikt" in Beziehung. Kriterien für einen solchen sind einerseits, dass das Ursprungsmaterial nicht von den FilmemacherInnen selbst belichtet wurde, andererseits spielt – anders als beim Archivfilm oder beim Kompilationsfilm – die "niedere Herkunft des Materials" (S. 175) eine Rolle. Dieses wird durch eine künstlerische Verwendung aufgewertet. Die Indexikalität des found-footage-Films verweist auf die zeitliche Distanz zwischen dem Akt der Belichtung und der Verwendung des Materials. Gleich einem Relikt oder einer Ruine sind im Filmmaterial die Spuren historischer Differenz eingeschrieben. Der zitierende, resignifizierende Akt dieser brutistischen Praktik sprengt zudem das Material aus seinem ursprünglichen Kontext und eröffnet kritische Blickwinkel auf (massen)kulturelle Artefakte. "Dieses destabilisierende, entropische Potential, das der Wiederholung grundsätzlich innewohnt, manifestiert sich im 'found-footage-Film' einerseits durch eine Wuchern von Bedeutung, zum anderen durch die Vervielfachung von Autorpositionen." (S. 181) Gabriele Jutz setzt in ihrem Buch einen längst überfälligen Impuls in der Avantgardefilmtheorie. Ausgezeichnet recherchiert, erarbeitet sie ihre Genealogie einerseits eng an filmischen Gegenständen, andererseits durch ihre souveräne Zusammenführung klassischer film-, medien- und kunsttheoretischer Begrifflichkeiten. Stilistisch auf höchstem Niveau formuliert, sind die Grundzüge des cinéma brut leicht nachvollziehbar. Bei der detaillierten Argumentation erweisen sich gewisse Grundkenntnisse von Avantgardetheorien und Semiotik aber mit Sicherheit als Vorteil. Die ausführlichen Exkurse in verschiedenste Theorie- und Praxisfelder mögen vielleicht an manchen Stellen des Buches als Ablenkung vom eigentlichen Forschungsgegenstand erscheinen, zeigen jedoch die Anschlussfähigkeit der von Jutz entworfenen, alternativen Avantgardefilmtheorie. Die Autorin erstellt zudem bewusst keinen abgeschlossenen Kanon an 'brutistischen' Filmwerken, sondern gibt Einblick in die Reichweite ihrer Theorien, indem sie im zweiten Teil des Buches den Blick auf exemplarisch ausgewählte Arbeiten wirft. Beispiele wie Vita Futurista (1916), Len Lyes A Colour Box (1935), Isidore Isous Traité de bave et d´éternité (1951), Su Friedrichs Gently Down the Stream (1981) oder Peter Tescherkasskys Dream Work (2001) bilden einen Querschnitt der europäischen und US-amerikanischen Filmavantgarde vom frühen Film bis zur Gegenwart. Nicht eine lineare Skizzierung einer neuen Avantgardefilmtradition ist das Ziel. Es "soll anhand signifikanter Bespiele ein Feld abgesteckt werden, das ermöglicht, das Verwandte im scheinbar Unterschiedlichen hervortreten zu lassen." (S. 22) Grund genug im Anschluss an dieses Buch weitere Filme mit den Praktiken des cinéma bruts zu analysieren und in dessen Kontext zu bringen.

Die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe deutscher Klassiker wurde seit 1904 bis in die Zwanziger Jahre hinein im Insel Verlag in Leipzig publiziert. Die Buchreihe hat nicht nur für den Verlag und die Druckerei Poeschel in der sie gedruckt wurde eine ganze Reihe von Neuerungen nach sich gezogen, auch für den deutschen Buchmarkt hat die Klassikerausgabe einen Meilenstein bedeutet. Sie hat einige Eigenschaften des Taschenbuches vorweggenommen. Sie orientierte sich an der Qualität bibliophiler Buchpublikationen, aber war dennoch preislich erschwinglich. Zeitgenössische Klassikerausgaben erschienen zumeist mit einem Kommentar. Nicht so die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe. Der Text wurde zwar von führenden Wissenschaftlern editiert, aber sie war dennoch unkommentiert. Der Text war in einer Jenson-Antiqua gesetzt obwohl die Debatte um individuell gestaltete Künstlerschriften und die Diskussion um die als deutsche Schrift begriffene Fraktur unter den wichtigsten Protagonisten des deutschen Buchgewerbes ihren Höhepunkt noch nicht erreicht hatte. Ziel für die Klassikerausgabe war darüber hinaus, das zur Jahrhundertwende leicht angestaubte Image der Stadt Weimar aufzupolieren. Über das Patronat des Großherzogs hinaus hätte man die Gewinne aus dem Verkauf der Bücher der Permanenten Ausstellung für die Anschaffung von modernen Kunstobjekten zur Verfügung stellen wollen, die unter der Leitung von Harry Graf Kessler stand. Sieht man den Inhalt der Werke der in der Klassikerreihe erschienen Dichter Goethe, Schiller und Körner in einem ästhetischen Kontext mit dem der Philosophen Schopenhauer und Kant, wird im Spiegel der Formalästhetik der Klassikerausgabe Graf Kesslers Bildungs- und Kulturbegriff erkennbar, der sich in den Jahren nach der Jahrhundertwende zu seinem Lebenskunstideal verdichtete. Der zerrütteten Existenz der Zeitgenossen, wie Friedrich Nietzsche sie beschrieben hatte, sollte der Inhalt der Ausgabe in seiner modernen Form eine moderne Wertehaltung entgegensetzen. Die Lektüre der Klassiker sollte den deutschen Philister "entkrampfen" und ihm ein Stück der verloren geglaubten Lebensfreude wieder zurück bringen, in dem dieser auch die Facetten des Lebensleids als normal hinnehmen und akzeptieren lernte. Die Klassikerausgabe repräsentierte aus diesem Grund auch den kulturellen und politischen Reformwillen und die gesellschaftlichen Vorstellungen die der Graf für ein modernes Deutschland als überfällig erachtete. Die Buchreihe war aus diesem Grund auch ein politisches Statement gegen die Beharrungskräfte im deutschen Kaiserreich. Die Klassikerreihe wurde in der buchhistorischen Forschung zwar als bedeutender Meilenstein charakterisiert und als "wichtiges" oder gar "revolutionäres" Werk der Zeit hervorgehoben, die Ergebnisse der Forschung kann man überspitzt aber in der Aussage zusammenfassen, dass es sich bei der Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe um einen "zufälligen Glückstreffer" deutscher Buchgestaltung zu handeln scheint. Zumindest lassen die Aussagen, die bisher in dieser Hinsicht gemacht wurden, keine eindeutige Einordnung zu, außer vielleicht der, dass die Klassiker von der englischen Lebensreform inspiriert wurden und Henry van de Velde und William Morris einen Einfluss auf ihre äußere Form hatten. Gerade die Gedankenansätze dieser Beiden nutzte Graf Kessler aber für eigene Überlegungen, die ihn schließlich auch zu eigenen Vorstellungen von idealer Buchgestaltung brachten. Da für Kessler auch Gebrauchsgegenstände Kunst sein konnten, wird das Konzept der Klassikerausgabe bis zur Umsetzung in ihrer `bahnbrechenden´ Form in das ideengeschichtliche und ästhetische Denken des Grafen eingeordnet. Die Klassiker werden zwar in buchhistorischen Einzeluntersuchungen bezüglich ihrer Komponenten, dem Dünndruckpapier, ihrem Einband oder der Schrifttype exponiert. In buchwissenschaftlichen Überblicksdarstellungen wird ihr Einfluss hingegen weniger beachtet, denn verschiedene Kritiker bezogen sie seit ihrem ersten Erscheinen nicht als deutsches Kulturgut mit ein, denn sie lehnten sowohl die englischen Mitarbeiter Emery Walker, Edward Johnston, Eric Gill und Douglas Cockerell wie auch ihre Gestaltung als "welsche" Buchausgabe ab. Richtig ist, die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe hatte dieselbe Funktion wie die von Graf Kessler in Weimar konzipierten Kunstausstellungen und die dortige Kunstschule unter der Leitung seines Freundes Henry van de Velde. Auch das für Weimar geplante Theater, das unter der Leitung von Hugo von Hofmannsthal hätte stehen sollen und die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Schule, hätten dieselben Ideen der Moderne mit anderen Mitteln transportieren sollen, wie die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe deutscher Klassiker. ; The Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst Edition of German Classics was published by the Insel Verlag in Leipzig from 1904 well into the 1920s. While this series of books obviously sparked a range of innovations at both the publishing house and the printer Poeschel, the overall impact of the series was much wider, and as a whole it represents a significant milestone in the development of the modern German book market. In many ways, the series already anticipated some of the characteristics of the modern paperback. The level of quality echoed that of serious literary publications, but the pricing was reasonable. The Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series appeared without commentary, in stark contrast to other editions of the classics at the time. The text itself was edited by leading literary experts, but the content was delivered "pure". The books were typeset in Jenson-Antiqua; this at a time when the entire debate between new artistic typefaces and Fraktur, i.e. the "old German" script, hadn't even reached the main players in German publishing. One of the goals of this fresh repackaging of the classics was to give a new shine to Weimar's slightly dusty image as a city. Thanks to the patronage of the Grand Duke Wilhelm himself, it was planned that the profits from sales of the books would be made available to Weimar's Permanent Exhibition, managed by Harry Graf Kessler, for the purchase of modern art objects. Looking at how the series juxtaposes works of the poetic writers Goethe, Schiller and Koerner with the philosophical ideas of Schopenhauer and Kant, and brilliantly packages them all into a publishing work of such beauty, one can see Graf Kessler's concepts of education and culture clearly reflected in both the content and the form. These are the concepts he slowly solidified into an ideal "art of living" in the years just after the turn of the century. The rotten, decayed existence of contemporary man as Friedrich Nietzsche had viewed it, was to be answered with a set of modern values firmly rooted in the classics. Reading the classics was meant to "uncramp" the German philistine and bring him back a piece of his supposedly lost joy of life by learning to see life's suffering and accept it as normal. For this reason, the Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series of classics also embodied a slightly subversive will for political and cultural reform, as well as a spark of social imagination that Graf Kessler viewed as long overdue in a modern Germany. In effect, the series was a political statement against the conservative elements of the German Kaiserreich. Although researchers have characterised the series as a milestone and even gone so far as to label it an "important" or even "revolutionary" work for its time, the general opinion of these literary historians can be curtly summarised by saying that the great success of Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst editions was little more than a "happy accident." Their statements do not attribute any serious weight to the series, other than occasionally mentioning that it was inspired by the English arts and crafts movement, and that Henry van de Velde and William Morris had an influence on its appearance. But it was actually the fundamental ideas of these two men rather than just their design approach that Graf Kessler had used as a basis for further developing his own ideal approach to book publishing – and to other areas. Kessler was clear that everyday objects could also be works of art, so the very concept of a new edition of the classics and its groundbreaking execution is clearly an expression of the Graf's views of philosophical history and his aesthetic thinking. In literary research, the series is occasionally praised for specifics such as the quality and feel of its thin paper, its binding and its typeface. But in historical literary summaries, scant attention is paid to the overall influence of the series because many critics of the time simply excluded it from consideration as a work of German culture. They rejected the involvement of English employees such as Emery Walker, Edward Johnston, Eric Gill and Douglas Cockerell, and dismissed the "garden variety" design of the books. What is clear is the Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst Edition of German Classics did indeed have a very serious purpose; one that was shared by nearly all of Kessler's projects. Like the art exhibitions he conceived for Weimar, like the establishment of Art Academy under the care of his friend Henry van de Velde, like the Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst School, and like the planned theatre for Weimar that was to have been led by Hugo von Hofmannsthal, the Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series had a serious, somewhat provocative purpose: to unite art with life, to make the classics relevant to the common man, and in so doing, inject a breath of creativity into the stifled society of Germany under the Kaisers.

To the psalmist the age of seventy marks the end of one's days on earth, the last days so dimly lit in the poet's eyes. The calendar reminds us that 1996 marks the seventieth birthday of one of the most influential and enduring judicial decisions upholding the rights of communities to determine their demographic, economic, and societal future- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. Case reporters, code compilations, and proposed legislation, along with treatises and law review articles warn us that the broad deference to regulators symbolized by the Euclid text is under attack. The eighth decade of constitutionally blessed regulation of land use and abuse would seem to be one of "labor and sorrow" for advocates of traditional planning, zoning, and environmental controls, and with good reason.

The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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Hoslett, Schuyler Dean. "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. Jacobson Eric A. and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War: A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971. Jordan, Brian Matthew. Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. Longacre, Edward G. To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 60 McClellan, H. B. The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry. Edison, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1993. McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Miller, Donald L. Vicksburg: Grants Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020. Muehlbauer, Matthew S. and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. Murfin, James V., and James I. Robertson. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lees Maryland Campaign, September 1862. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2004. Noe, Kenneth W. Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. Pohanka, Brian C. Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. Pooley, Andrew. "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australasian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. Rhea, Gordon C. The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. Royster, Charles. The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1991. Sanders, Stuart W. Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. Tucker, Phillip Thomas. Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. Volpe, Vernon L. "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 61 Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. Weigley, Russell Frank. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. Woodworth, Steven E. Nothing but Victory the Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. Primary Sources: Allan, William. The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. Alexander, Edward Porter. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Volumes 1-4, edited by Robert Underwood Johnson, and Clarence Clough Buel. New York: The Century Company, 1885. Donaldson, Francis Adams. Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. Fleming, Francis P. A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. Marshall, Charles. Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. Newman, Simon P. "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. Rhodes, Elisha Hunt. All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. Small, Abner Ralph. The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 62 United States War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. Tourgée Albion W. The Story of a Thousand: Being a History of the Service of the 105th Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the War for the Union, from August 21, 1862, to June 6, 1865. Edited by Peter C. Luebke. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2011.Watkins, Samuel R.Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011

Long description: Handlungstheorien stehen im Zentrum der gegenwärtigen soziologischen Theoriediskussion. Zugleich blicken diese Ansätze auf eine lange Tradition zurück und zählen zum unbestrittenen Kanon des Fachs. Dennoch geben die verschiedenen Theorien keine eindeutige Antwort auf die Frage, was soziales Handeln ist und inwiefern es gesellschaftlich bestimmt wird. Dieses Lehrbuch bringt mit einer systematischen und konzisen Darstellung der wichtigsten Handlungstheorien von David Hume und Max Weber über George H. Mead und Talcott Parsons bis James S. Coleman und Jürgen Habermas Klarheit in dieses unübersichtliche Theoriefeld. Das didaktische Konzept des Bandes, anhand von Leitfragen die einzelnen Positionen miteinander in Beziehung zu bringen, ist konsequent auf die Bedürfnisse eines strukturierten BA-Studiums zugeschnitten.; Review quote: Besprochen in: Portal für Politikwissenschaft, 12.03.2014, Hendrik Claas Meyer

Der Bericht gibt Auskunft über die Themen der erweiterten Redaktionskonferenz der Zeitschrift "Osteuropa" im Februar 1988. Im einzelnen werden folgende Themenblöcke erörtert: Aspekte der inneren Entwicklung der UdSSR, Lockerung des zentralistischen Meinungs- und Organisationsmonopols, Nationalitätenproblematik, Implementierungsstand der Reformmaßnahmen, sowjetische Außenpolitik, die Stellung Westeuropas und die Frage nach den Chancen der Politik der Perestrojka. (BIOst-Jhn)

It's official — the Pentagon is becoming a bank. Well, sort of. At a March 8th event on dual-use technology at SXSW in Austin, Texas, director of the Office of Strategic Capital Jason Rathje announced that his team has officially received the internal authority to grant executive loans and loan guarantees, a first within the Pentagon.
The Office of Strategic Capital, or OSC, was created in response to growing concern over China's investment in next-generation technology. According to its investment strategy, released Friday, March 8th, the OSC will invest in firms researching and developing 14 "critical technologies," including hypersonics, quantum computing, microelectronics, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence.
After surviving a rocky first year — punctuated by allegations of conflicts of interest from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and hard questions over its funding — the OSC is now close to licensing its first funds as part of a joint lending program with the Small Business Administration. OSC loans require private funding to match their loans, giving a pathway for smaller defense tech companies with aggressive investment strategies to enter the mix.
Venture capitalists have poured money into many of the items now on the "critical technologies" list, making them well-poised to benefit from OSC loans. By one New York Times estimate, venture capital firms went from spending around $6.7 billion on military tech in 2016 to $34 billion in 2022.
However, they have generated relatively few government contracts so far, leading some tech entrepreneurs to accuse the Pentagon of paying lip service to innovation without actually funding innovative ventures. According to Palantir, a "unicorn" of the defense tech world founded by Peter Thiel, the top 100 venture-funded military start-ups have only generated somewhere between $2-5 billion in government contracts. Part of this is because of Silicon Valley's"move fast and break things" approach, which sees the Pentagon's bureaucracy as little more than a straightjacket.
Marc Andreessen, the co-founder of Andreessen Horowitz and an investor in many defense tech firms through his American Dynamism initiative, embodies this psyche, defined by an infatuation with new technology and a repudiation of the precautionary principle, which urges prudence in the face of uncertainty. In an essay Andreessen authored entitled "The Techno-Optimist Manifesto," he writes, "We believe the techno-capital machine is not anti-human – in fact, it may be the most pro-human thing there is. It serves us. The techno-capital machine works for us. All the machines work for us."
This is where the message of defense tech venture capitalists differs from that of the prime contractors like RTX (previously known as Raytheon) and Lockheed Martin; instead of waxing lyrical about security, tech stalwarts evangelize about wielding artificial intelligence to overcome the frailties of human nature itself. Buoyed by their "yes, and…" theater-kid ethos, their beguiling promise is to usher in a near-utopia at the hands of the "Techno-Capital Machine."
That is, if the government steps aside. "Silicon valley is a builder culture, and Washington is never going to be a builder culture," argued Katherine Boyle, the co-founder of Andreessen's American Dynamism initiative. "I think people just have to come to terms with that."
So what does this "material philosophy" look like in practice? Shield AI, a company Andreessen has invested in through American Dynamism, offers AI-powered autonomous swarms that claim to own "the kill chain from start to end" like a "scene from Top Gun 2." Palantir has demonstrated a language model that analyzes battlefields and generates courses of action for a human operator. As defense analyst Van Jackson puts it, the OSC has "created various regulatory exemptions and federally guaranteed loans to incentivize VCs to go big on death-tech."
Even if their promises are more grandiose, the business model of capitalizing on instability remains familiar. On a panel about public/private partnerships at SXSW, former Olympian turned venture capitalist Larsen Jensen said that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a "tremendous catalyst" for changing the national security investing environment.
"There have been many other catalysts that have occurred, if you think back prior to that, 9/11 was a catalyst," Jensen said. "Many companies that otherwise would not exist in the defense industry, such as General Atomics, probably owe a big portion of their success due to a geopolitical catalyst that was, you know, unfortunate for the United States obviously, but the Predator probably wouldn't be as prolific as it is now, and the early innings of autonomy wouldn't be as important as it is now, were it not for that tragedy."
It doesn't take a Luddite to realize that the Pentagon should exercise caution when partnering with VC firms on exploring technologies such as AI-powered language models and autonomous weapons. As Craig Martell, the head of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office at the Pentagon, warns, AI chatbots "speak authoritatively, so we just believe them," despite the fact that these devices often spit out misleading or outright false answers. In a new report from Public Citizen, Robert Weissman and Savannah Wooten argue that autonomous weapons can lead to dehumanization or even loss of human control. "AI-driven swarms involve autonomous agents that would interact with and coordinate with each other, likely in ways not foreseen by humans and also likely indecipherable to humans in real-time," Weissman and Wooten write.
The Pentagon has some guardrails in place that urge caution with technology like artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons. A Pentagon directive, issued just a month after the creation of the OSC in January 2023, requires autonomous weapons to be designed to allow human operators to exercise "appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force," establishes testing and evaluation standards for autonomous weapons, and mandates a chain of review for approval, among other requirements.
But a number of critics outside of the department question whether this approach goes far enough. A Human Rights Watch/Harvard Law School International Human Rights clinic review of the policy noted that the directive allows for significant loopholes, among them allowing the senior review of autonomous weapons to be waived "in cases of urgent military need." Weissman and Wooten argue that the "biggest shortcoming of the directive, however, is that it permits the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons at all."
Venture capital firms are looking for more buy-in on the back end, an issue the OSC can't quite solve. As adjunct professor at Stanford University Steve Blank explains, "There's a demand problem, not a funding problem." For the venture capitalists, this requires convincing the U.S. government to sideline concerns they may have about emerging technologies and buy into the techno-utopian vision they are selling.
In order to persuade the government to be more in line with the brash futurism of Silicon Valley, venture capital-backed defense tech firms are ramping up their lobbying operations. In 2023, Palantir spent over $5 million on their formal lobbying operations, lobbying Congress against "the regulation of AI." Shield AI, which spent over $1 million on lobbying in 2023, lobbied the Department of Defense directly on "issues around autonomy and artificial intelligence." Anduril, another defense technology company backed by Andreessen, spent over $1.5 million lobbying Congress on issues related to "unmanned and autonomous systems," including autonomous sentry towers on the U.S.-Mexico border.
OpenAI, the creator of ChatGPT, has also signaled it may want in on Pentagon dollars. As the Intercept reported, earlier this year OpenAI quietly removed language that prohibits the military from using its technology. This week, former Sen. Norm Coleman registered as a lobbyist for OpenAI.The OSC is Silicon Valley's biggest step toward molding the Pentagon in its own image, a sign they are making inroads with top brass leaders. But should the venture capitalists continue to rush the development and deployment of untested, risky technologies, even as they cash in massively in the process, someone needs to commit the cardinal sin of prudence by stepping in and setting some rules.

The paper addresses the history of excavations of the largest Roman tomb, the Mausoleum of the Emperor Caesar Augustus. The author focuses on the results of recent archaeological activities and how they have transformed the perception of the monument. The tomb of the fi rst Roman Emperor in the post-classical era underwent various transformations and was repeatedly plundered. As a result, the tomb has preserved in a severely damaged condition. The monument had been used for utilitarian purposes until the 1930s. The mausoleum was used as a quarry, a fortress which has been repeatedly destroyed, a vineyard, a garden, an amphitheater for bullfi ghting, a theater, and a concert hall. The fi rst archaeological excavation in the territory of the monument was carried out in the 16th century. It is them which marked the beginning of the monument's study history. The material obtained during these fi eld works is still of great importance for scholars who engage in the study of the monument. For a long time after the Renaissance era the Mausoleum was studied only periodically due to construction works carried out in its territory. The archaeological study of the monument has intensifi ed since the beginning of the 20th century. Ambitious works were carried out in the 1920s and 1930s. Their implementation was not dictated by scholarly interest: Benito Mussolini sought to use the heritage of Ancient Rome for his propaganda. Nevertheless, as a result of the completed excavations, the mausoleum was not only freed from the post-antique layers, but the obtained results laid the foundation for the modern idea of the monument. New interest in the monument arose only after seventy years. The immediate reason to that was the government's plan for the reconstruction of the mausoleum and the surrounding area. Excavations were carried out by the Department of Cultural Heritage of the Capital of Rome. The obtained archaeological data have greatly changed the modern perception of the monument and make it possible to put an end to the discussion of the issue. ; В статье рассматривается история раскопок крупнейшей римской гробницы, а именно мавзолея императора Цезаря Августа. Основное внимание уделяется результатам недавних археологических работ и тому, как они повлияли на представление о памятнике. Гробница первого римского императора в пост-античную эпоху претерпела различные трансформации и неоднократные грабежи, в результате которых сильно пострадала. Памятнику находили практическое применение вплоть до 1930-х гг. За многовековую историю мавзолей использовали как каменоломню, крепость, которую не раз разрушали, виноградник, сад, амфитеатр для корриды, театр и концертный зал. Первые археологические работы на территории памятника проводились уже в XVI в. Именно с них начинается история исследования монумента и результаты, полученные тогда, до сих пор имеют большое значение для науки. На протяжении длительного времени после эпохи Ренессанса объект изучался только периодически, в связи с какими-либо строительными работами, проводившимися на его территории. Работы на памятнике активизируются с начала XX в. Масштабные раскопки состоялись в 1920-30-е гг. Их проведение диктовалось не научными целями: Бенито Муссолини стремился использовать римское наследие в своей пропаганде. Тем не менее, в результате проведенных работ мавзолей был не только освобожден от пост-античных наслоений, но полученные тогда результаты заложили современное представление о памятнике. Интерес к мавзолею возобновляется только через семьдесят лет. Непосредственным толчком было решение реконструировать мавзолей и площадь вокруг него. В результате раскопок, проведенных департаментом культурного наследия столицы Рима, были получены археологические данные, изменяющие взгляд на внешний облик монумента и позволяющие поставить точку в дискуссии по данному вопросу. Библиографические ссылки Agnoli N., Carnabuci E., Caruso G., Maria Loreti E. Il Mausoleo di Augusto. Recenti scavi e nuove ipotesi ricostruttive // Apoteosi. Da uomini a dei. Il Mausoleo di Adriano, Catalogo della Mostra / Eds. Abbondanza L., Coarelli F., Lo Sardo E. Roma: Munus, Palombi, 2014. P. 214–229. Albers J. Die letzte Ruhestätte des Augustus: Neue Forschungsergebnisse zum Augustusmausoleum // Antike Welt. 2014. №4. P. 16–24. Betti F. Il Mausoleo di Augusto. Metamorfosi di un monument // Mausoleo di Augusto. Demolizioni e scavi. Fotografi e 1928/1941 / Ed. F. Betti. Milano: Electa, 2011. P. 20–41. Borg B. Roman Tombs and the Art of Commemoration: Contextual Approaches to Funerary Customs in the Second Century CE. 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Tombs and Funerary Monuments // A Companion to the Archaeology of the Roman Republic / Ed. J. DeRose Evans. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. P. 67−80. Fugate Brangers S. L. Political Propaganda and Archaeology: The Mausoleum of Augustus in the Fascist Era // International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 2013. № 3. Р. 126–135. Fugate Brangers S. L. The mausoleum of Augustus: expanding meaning from its inception to present day. PhD diss. Louissville, 2007. 220 p. Gatti G. Nuove osservazioni sul Mausoleo di Augusto // L'Urbe 1938. № 3. P. 1–17. Giglioli, G.Q. and A. M. Colini. II Mausoleo d'Augusto. Milan and Rome: Bestetti e Tumminelli, 1930. 51 p. Hase Salto M. A. von «L'augusteo» Das Augustusmausoleum im Wandel der Geschichte // Antike Welt. 1997. № 28. S. 297–308. Hesberg H., Panciera S. Das Mausoleum des Augustus. Der Bau und seine Inschriften. München: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994. 199 p. Johnson M.J. 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URL: http://www.urbanistica.comune.roma.it/citta-storica-mausoleoaugusto.html. Дата обращения 25.05.2020. Vögtle S. »ubi saepe sedebat Octavianus« Das Augustusmausoleum – Innen und Aussen eines imperialen Grabbaus // Das Marsfeld in Rom : Beiträge der Berner Tagung vom 23./24. November 2007 / Ed. J. Albers. Bern: Bern Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 2008. P. 63-78.

Das postjugoslawische Dokumentarfilmschaffen hat, entgegen der Spielfilme und abgesehen von ein paar wenigen Beiträgen in Fachzeitschriften, bislang nur wenig filmwissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Dies ändert sich nun mit Andrea Reiters als Monografie publizierter Dissertationsschrift. Sie geht von der Annahme aus, dass sich in den dokumentarischen Arbeiten, die während und unmittelbar nach den jugoslawischen Zerfallskriegen produziert wurden, divergierende Strategien des politischen Widerstands finden lassen. Diese ortet sie nicht in einer etwaigen Haltung pazifistischer Narrative und Themen der Filme, sondern in deren formalästhetischer Umsetzung. In diesen Filmen liege, so die Argumentation, nicht nur ein politisch-aktivistisches Potenzial, sondern eben auch ein politisch-aktivierendes, mit dem Anspruch, einen gesellschaftlichen demokratischen Wandel mitzugestalten. Unter dem "politisch-aktivistischen" Charakter wird auf ein Verständnis von Aktivismus als politisches Handeln oder auf die Agitation innerhalb politischer Bewegungen referenziert, welche Filme als Mittel zur Durchsetzung ihrer Ziele nutzen. Das "politisch-aktivierende" Vermögen wiederum ist ein diskurstheoretischer Begriff, mit dem eine Aktivierung eines kritischen, dem dirigistischen Mainstream entgegengesetzten Denkens erfasst wird. Um das Potential eines aktivistischen Filmschaffens im postjugoslawischen Dokumentarfilm jener Zeit zunächst zu kontextualisieren, leitet die Autorin 70 Seiten lang in die historischen Parameter der Jugoslawienkriege ein. Die historischen Voraussetzungen für das Ende der Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawiens werden auch für eine balkanhistorisch wenig bewanderte Leser*innenschaft verständlich und präzise zusammengefasst. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit erhalten dabei die Umbrüche in den dokumentarfilmproduzierenden Medienlandschaften Serbiens, Kroatiens und Bosnien und Herzegowinas, welche weitgehend dem jeweiligen dominanten Politdiskurs im Land gleichgeschalten waren und – nach der Liquidation und (Teil-)Privatisierung der staatlich geförderten Produktionsgesellschaften, Filmzentren sowie Fernsehanstalten in den frühen 90er-Jahren – durch direkten politischen Einfluss gesteuert wurden. Hierbei seien die Grenzen "zwischen 'objektiver' Berichterstattung und interessensgesteuerter Kommunikation" fließend: "Was wahr ist und was falsch, was Informationen oder Deutung, tendenziös oder manipulativ, lässt sich für den Einzelnen oder die Einzelne oft schwer entschlüsseln, da er oder sie auf die Informationsvermittlung durch die Medien angewiesen ist, um sich ein Bild machen zu können" (S. 44). An diese Beobachtung schließen die Analysen der Dokumentarfilme an, welche "Denkanstöße liefern und so auf ein Zukünftiges verweisen, was aufseiten der Zuschauer*innen zu einer spezifischen filmischen Erfahrung führt, welche die Vision eines demokratischen Wandels der Gesellschaft anregt" (S. 20). Die Frage nach Gattungen des Dokumentarfilms und insbesondere der Aspekt objektiver oder objektivierbarer Fakten und 'Wahrheiten' in dokumentarfilmischen Praktiken wird in einer film- und medienwissenschaftlichen Vielstimmigkeit problematisiert, wobei die Autorin insbesondere auf den vielzitierten US-amerikanischen Dokumentarfilmtheoretiker Bill Nichols zurückgreift. In der theoretischen Verortung des Dokumentarfilmbegriffs und dessen Verfahren wird aufgezeigt, dass sich filmische Aktivierung nicht in einem einheitlichen Konzept zusammenfassen lässt. Je nach Film würden filmische Agitation, Vision und Reflexion facettenreich ineinander verwoben. Somit müsse jeder Film auch als Einzelfall erörtert und in seinen Spezifika betrachtet werden. Reiter betont in ihrem Verständnis des politisch-filmischen Aktivismus mit Nachdruck, dass die Dokumentarfilme des Forschungskorpus weder als propagandistisch noch als gegenpropagandistisch einzustufen sind. Sie greift dabei auf die zehn Kriterien des funktionalen Analysemodells von Garth S. Jowett und Victoria O'Donnell in Propaganda & Persuasion (2012) (Jowett/O'Donnel 2012) zurück, das propagandistische Tendenzen von Filmen prüft, um anhand dieser Konzeptualisierung aufzuzeigen, dass es sich bei ihren Analysebeispielen nicht um Propaganda handelt. Propaganda sei, jenen Konzepten folgend, stets um Überzeugung und emotionale Lenkung bemüht, während die politisch-aktivistische Perspektive gegenteilige Ziele verfolge. Diese stelle eine Form dar, welche an das natürliche Urteilsvermögen der Zuschauer*innen appelliert, Widersprüche zulässt und das kritische Hinterfragen fördert: "Der politisch-aktivierende Dokumentarfilm wird vielmehr als eine Kommunikationsform verstanden, der es maßgeblich um die Aufforderung zur politischen Reflexion geht" (S. 96). Demnach ist Reiters Dokumentarfilmverständnis, nicht unähnlich demjenigen von Bill Nichols, eines, welches bei den Zuschauer*innen eine individuelle Auseinandersetzung mit dem jeweiligen Thema anstoßen soll und somit Ideologiekritik als ästhetische Praxis begreift. Das Politische kritischer Dokumentarfilme liege demzufolge nicht in den etwaigen Zielsetzungen der Werke selbst, sondern in einer Bedeutungszuschreibung, die sich erst in der Rezeption vollzieht. Dieses Denkmodell behält Reiter auch im Auge, wenn sie von den konkreten Filmen spricht, denn diese werden von ihr stets in den jeweiligen Rezeptionskontext gebettet, welcher von internationalen Festivalkarrieren bis hin zu klandestinen Vorführungen in kleinen Filmclubs reicht. Somit würden die Dokumentarfilme Gegendiskurse erzielen, welche "[aufdecken und konterkarieren], was ihr Widerpart zu verbergen sucht" (S. 138). Die aktive Rolle der Zuschauer*innen in der Rezeption dieser zum Nachdenken anregenden Filme bezeichnet die Autorin als "Prospektivität" (S. 19f). Dieser geht sie in den Filmanalysen anhand der Frage nach, wie die Filme ein Bewusstsein für das Werden der Wirklichkeit im Allgemeinen sowie für einen gesellschaftlichen Wandel im Konkreten schaffen. Formalästhetische Parameter etwa würden die Zuschauer*innen dazu anregen, über die thematisierten Fragen zu reflektieren, wodurch diese sich selbst in weiterer Folge als handlungsmächtige politische Subjekte begreifen würden, die sich dominanten politischen Diskursen durch konkrete politische oder ästhetische Intervention widersetzen können. Dieses prospektive Moment der Dokumentarfilme sucht Andrea Reiter in den filmischen Strategien selbst. Um die jeweiligen Filme spezifisch zu kontextualisieren, sind die Analysekapitel nach Ländern geordnet, was angesichts der zentralen Forschungsfrage zwar sinnvoll erscheint, sich jedoch zugleich den Potenzialen komparatistischer Betrachtungen (bewusst) entzieht. Dokumentarfilme aus Serbien etwa seien in einer weitgehend gleichgeschalteten Medienlandschaft unter der autokraten Herrschaft Slobodan Miloševićs primär unter der Ägide des unabhängigen Radios B92 entstanden. Reiter beginnt hier mit einem besonders prominenten, international aufgrund der Bekanntschaft des Filmemachers breit rezipierten Beispiel: In Želimir Žilniks Tito po drugi put među Srbima (Tito zum zweiten Mal unter den Serben, BRJ 1994) begleitet der Regisseur den als Josip Broz Tito verkleideten Mimen Dragoljub S. Ljubičić auf den Straßen Belgrads und beobachtet dabei die spontanen Gespräche zwischen den Bürger*innen und dem Darsteller des verstorbenen ehemaligen Anführers der bereits zerfallenen sozialistischen Republik. Die gefilmte öffentliche Performance zeichnet ein kaleidoskopisches Bild der damaligen serbischen Gesellschaft, welches von der Staatsseite gänzlich negiert wurde: Hier begegnen wir Bürger*innen, die die dominanten politischen Diskurse hinterfragen und sich gar in der Öffentlichkeit kritisch und reflektiert zur aktuellen Lage ihres Landes äußern – es zeigt sich somit ein gänzlich konträres Bild zu der in Mitteleuropa wahrgenommenen, vermeintlich mehrheitlichen Unterstützung der serbischen Bevölkerung für die nationalistische Agenda ihrer Regierung: Ein Misstrauen gegenüber Milošević kommt in den Gesprächen zwischen dem Tito-Mimen und den Passant*innen ebenso zum Ausdruck wie auch Distanzierungen zur sozialistischen Vergangenheit. Der Dialog, welchen der Tito-Imitator provoziert und befördert und welcher in Žilniks Film mitdokumentiert wird, zeigt eine Polyphonie an Meinungen und politischen Haltungen, welche im Mainstreamdiskurs häufig negiert wird. Janko Baljak wiederum, der zu den Gründungsmitgliedern des Video-Departments des B92-Senders gehörte, widmet sich in seiner Dokumentarfilmreihe Kosovska Trilogija (Kosovo Trilogy: The Parallel Worlds of Kosovo, BRJ 1994) der Parallelgesellschaft der serbischen und albanischstämmigen Bevölkerung im Kosovo. Seine Filme, die Reiter als nächstes inspiziert, konfrontieren die Zuschauer*innen mit der harten sozialen Realität der beiden Minderheiten. Doch durch einen politisch nicht zuzuordnenden Off-Kommentator entzieht sich der Film einer 'proserbischen' oder 'prokosovarischen' Lesart – vielmehr liegt der Referenzpunkt der Kritik, laut Reiter, "in einem allgemeinen gesellschaftlichen Normen- und Wertekanon und weist über ethnische Differenzierungen zwischen den beiden Parteien [.] hinaus" (S. 170). Ebenso von Baljak stammt Vidimo se u Čitulji (The Crime that changed Serbia – See you in the Obituary, BRJ 1995), ein kontrovers diskutierter Dokumentarfilm, welcher sich der während des Krieges ausbreitenden 'Unterwelt' des Landes widmet. Mitglieder gewaltbereiter Gangs kommen zu Wort und prahlen teilweise über ihre Taten. Die Kamera folgt auch Polizeibeamt*innen an Tatorte und zeigt dabei Spuren von Gewalt und Tod. Der Film problematisiert somit eine neue, besonders zu hinterfragende Schatten-Elite und ihre Einflusssphären innerhalb der postjugoslawischen serbischen Gesellschaft. Die Filme der B92-Bewegung, welche weitgehend innerhalb geschlossener Filmvorführungen in oppositionellen Zirkeln Belgrads zur Aufführung kamen, sieht Reiter als "eine Komponente [der] sich aus unterschiedlichen Bevölkerungsschichten langsam konsolidierenden Bewegung [.], die im Laufe der 1990er-Jahre eine immer breitere Basis erreichte, bis Milošević im Jahr 2000 endgültig von der Bevölkerung gestürzt wurde" (S. 165). Die B92-Filme seien, so die Schlussfolgerung, nicht auf Belehrung aus, sondern würden die Zuschauer*innen dazu anleiten, die neuen Verhältnisse in ihrem Land kritisch zu hinterfragen, indem sie politisch Verleugnetes oder Verdrängtes bezeugen. Die Suche nach politisch-aktivierenden Dokumentarfilmen in Kroatien wiederum gestaltete sich dabei für die Autorin besonders schwierig. Anders als in Serbien hatte sich unter den Dokumentarfilmer*innen der jungen Republik kein Kommunikationsraum eines engagierten Gegendiskurses etablieren können – finanzielle Unterstützung für Dokumentarfilme gab es unter der rechten HDZ-Regierung Franjo Tuđmans kaum. Umso spannender sind im entsprechenden Kapitel Reiters Analysen zu lesen, denn sie fokussiert sich auf para- und metapolitische Aspekte in zuteil staatlich mitproduzierten, doch politisch nicht klar verortbaren Dokumentarfilmen. Die drei Beispiele – Petar Kreljas Na Sporednom Kolosijeku (At the Railway Siding, HR 1992), Ivan Saljas Hotel Sunja (HR 1992) und Zvonimir Jurićs The Sky Below Osijek (HR 1996) – lassen Kriegsbeteiligte mit unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen zu Wort kommen und entziehen sich dabei, entgegen der meisten kroatischen Dokumentarfilme jener Zeit, einer eindeutigen Schwarzweiß-Zeichnung von Freund*in-Feind*in bzw. Opfer-Täter*in-Narrativen. Somit wird die dominante patriotisch-heroische Perspektive in Frage gestellt. Die Kroatienstudie schließt mit einem Kapitel zu Lordan Zafranovićs essaystischem Dokumentarfilm Zalazak Stoljeća: Testament L.Z. (Decline of the Century: Testament L.Z., 1993), dessen Produktion mit 1986 schon deutlich vor dem Kroatienkrieg begann und der die Ustaša-Vergangenheit des Staates zum Thema hat. Zafranović verwendet filmische Strategien, die seinen Arbeitsprozess als Regisseur mitreflektieren, beispielsweise indem er sich selbst am Schneidetisch filmt. Dies akzentuiert nicht nur die Konstruktion des Films als Kunstwerk, sondern reflektiert zugleich die Gestaltung und Konstruierbarkeit von Geschichte. Die behandelten Filmbeispiele, die in Bosnien und Herzegowina während des Kriegs produziert wurden, sind allesamt innerhalb des belagerten Sarajevos entstanden. Hier findet man den mit über 50 kürzeren und längeren Dokumentarfilmen quantitativ größten Korpus eines regionalen Dokumentarfilmschaffens vor – was keineswegs eine Anomalie ist, denn auch in Theater, Literatur und anderen Künsten zeigt sich ein äußerst reges Schaffen während der Belagerung der bosnischen Hauptstadt. Die Filme handeln vom Alltag der von serbischen Streitkräften umzingelten Zivilbevölkerung. Sie entziehen sich jeglicher Spaltung der Ethnien und inszenieren Sarajevo als multiethnische und -kulturelle Stadt. Da Reiter hier natürlich auch mit Filmen konfrontiert ist, die sich mit explizitem Krieg und Gewalt beschäftigen, ja sogar tote Menschen zeigen, werden auch ethische Komponenten des Betrachtens des Leidens Anderer (Susan Sontag) miteinbezogen – insbesondere im Fall von Vesna Ljubićs Film Evo Čovjeka: Ecce Homo (Ecce Homo: Behold the Man, BIH 1994), welcher sich der Ausweglosigkeit der Bevölkerung in einem beobachtenden Modus nähert. In ästhetisierten Kadragen verweilt hier die Kamera auf den Straßen, Plätzen und Hügeln der Stadt und beobachtet den Alltag einer Bevölkerung in einem Belagerungszustand. Trotz der Gefahr, der die Sarajevoer*innen ausgeliefert sind, werden auch Menschen auf offener Straße beobachtet, die sich ohne Hast und scheinbar entspannt fortbewegen, während um sie herum Detonationen und Schüsse zu hören sind – die beobachtende Distanz zeigt also auch einen Gewohnheitseffekt, der sich unter der leidenden Bevölkerung einstellt – Gewalt als Alltag. Das letzte Kapitel des Buchs widmet sich Beispielen nach 1995, also folgend dem Friedensabkommen von Dayton, welches die Kriege in Kroatien und Bosnien beendete. Serbische Filmemacher*innen rücken, folgt man Reiter, in dieser Zeit die Opposition und die gegen Milošević demonstrierende Öffentlichkeit ins Zentrum ihrer Werke, während in Kroatien eine Fokussierung auf die Enttabuisierung kroatischer Kriegsverbrechen eintritt. Als eine weitere Konfiguration des politisch-aktivierenden Dokumentarfilmschaffens stellt Reiter im Schlusskapitel subjektive Erzählstrategien in den Mittelpunkt: Regisseur*innen richten hier zunehmend die Kamera auf sich selbst und gehen offenen Fragen der Nachkriegsgesellschaften nach. Dies ist eine weitere Strategie im breiten untersuchten Korpus, durch welchen einem vermeintlichen Objektivitätsparadigma des Dokumentarfilms offensiv entgegengetreten wird: Die Ausstellung der Konstruiertheit dokumentarischen Erzählens durch den je subjektiven Blickwinkel wird nicht nur zum Gegenstand des jeweiligen Films, sondern damit auch die Erzählperspektive als hinterfragbar herausgestellt. "Die Filme führen die politische Dimension persönlichen Denkens und Handelns vor Augen sowie die Wichtigkeit, einerseits unterschiedliche Diskurse zu erkennen und anzuerkennen und andererseits die Macht und Einflussmöglichkeiten dominanter Rhetoriken wahrzunehmen" (S. 321f). Ein paar wenige ungenaue, teils saloppe Formulierungen ("Die Bilder vermitteln einen dokumentarischen 'Look'", S. 159 oder "Selbst wenn [.] die serbische Unterwelt aus einem chaotischen, [.] – man kann es nicht anders sagen – Haufen intellektuell beschränkter Verbrecher besteht [.]", S. 174f) trüben den Gesamteindruck des sonst sprachlich präzisen Textes nicht. Bislang noch unerwähnt blieb der sparsame und kluge Einsatz von Interviews mit den Filmschaffenden jener Zeit, welche immer wieder in den Text einfließen. Die Verzahnung von Dokumentarfilmtheorie mit (post)jugoslawischen politischen Diskursen und dem argumentativ präzisen Close Reading des Filmmaterials macht dieses Buch zu einem unverzichtbaren Beitrag zur Grundlagenforschung des rezenten südslawischen Filmschaffens. Andrea Reiters Studie beleuchtet nicht nur bislang marginalisiertes und außerhalb der Region seitens der Filmwissenschaft wenig beachtetes Material, sondern sie regt durch die Perspektivierung auf Prospektivität und Aktivismus implizit dazu an, auch das Filmschaffen anderer Konfliktregionen unter diesem Augenmerk zu untersuchen. Literatur: Jowett, Garth/O'Donnel, Victoria: Propaganda and Persuasion. 4. Aufl.Thousand Oaks, CA 2012.

El objetivo del presente trabajo de investigación viene constituido por el análisis de las modulaciones del discurso teórico-crítico que sobre el teatro se genera en los años que llevan a España de una dictadura a una democracia. Se halla pues en el centro de su interés la determinación del dibujo de la conversación sobre el teatro que ha tenido lugar en el periodo que va desde 1966 a 1982. El estudio se detiene, en primer lugar, en el establecimiento del horizonte teórico desde el que nace la investigación. Procede, seguidamente, a tantear el diagnóstico de un momento esencial de la cultura española en el que se produce desde la plataforma teatral el surgimiento de la España silenciada. Tras el marco introductorio, dos bloques diferenciados, aunque con evidentes paralelismos, urden el conjunto de la investigación. De una parte, el análisis crítico de los discursos que sobre el teatro se han generado de 1966 a 1982; y de otra, el análisis del desplazamiento de los focos de atención de la crítica teatral. Dentro del trazado de la genealogía de las ideas teatrales, el estudio contempla la esencial dualidad poética-política, inherente a toda manifestación artística y particularmente operativa en el caso teatral. A la ruptura de los realismos y la inauguración de poéticas espectaculares sigue la institucionalización progresiva de ciertos cambios durante la transición política. La insuficiencia de las poéticas realistas para los fines políticos y estéticos del momento pronto precisarán una nueva escritura y una nueva escena. El oxígeno del exterior hace arder la llama. La nueva escritura será la propuesta por los llamados nuevos autores en textos dramáticos y prólogos de clara filiación vanguardista; y la nueva escena, la que improvisan desde el teatro independiente originando poéticas escénicas que hasta el momento no habían tenido cabida en los escenarios españoles. Estos dos lugares constituyen los puntos de inflexión claves en el paso de planteamientos textocentristas a enfoques en los que la dimensión espectacular se hace centro insubordinable al texto. En el ámbito ya de las cuestiones relativas a la política teatral, el estudio constata la anterioridad del cambio teatral respecto al político e indaga en las razones del paradójico silencio del teatro en tiempos de libertad. Otro nudo de la especulación se halla en la estructura político-económica que le da cabida. La habitual dualidad teatro privado/teatro público se ramifica en una tercera posibilidad: la del teatro independiente a cuya sombra se forja la revolución escénica. La perspectiva teórica tiene en la perspectiva crítica el complemento perfecto para el estudio conjunto y global de la cuestión. El dibujo de los movimientos dentro del mapa de la crítica teatral constituye la segunda mitad del trabajo resultando esencial en el estudio de la mirada de un tiempo ante el acontecimiento escénico. El trabajo aborda, en primer lugar, el análisis de la crítica inmediata mediante el examen de las críticas procedentes de Abc, Triunfo, la Gaceta Ilustrada y El País, procediendo seguidamente al examen de la crítica especializada mediante el análisis de las procedentes de Primer Acto, Yorick y Pipirijaina. El estudio se detiene en la determinación del tiempo y espacio dedicado al análisis del texto y del espectáculo, en el examen de la terminología teatral empleada así como en la búsqueda de los principales focos de la atención en cada uno de los aspectos textuales o espectaculares (escenografía, iluminación, interpretación, etc.). Comprobamos así cómo tanto el examen de las ideas teatrales como el de los movimientos de la atención de la crítica teatral convergen hacia un dibujo común que se exige y se explica de forma mutua, el del discurso crítico sobre lo teatral. RESUMEN EN INGLÉS: The aim of the present study consists in the analysis of the changes in the theoretical-critical discourse which emerges around theatre in the years that see Spain move from a dictatorship to a democracy. In the heart of this work lies the outlining of the conversation about theatre in the period 1966-1982. The study focuses, in the first place, on the delimitation of the theoretical horizon from which this research stems. Then it moves on to consider the diagnostic of a crucial moment in Spanish culture; a moment in which the silenced Spain emerges from the theatrical platform. Following this introductory framework, two different blocks which, nevertheless, keep evident parallelisms shape the body of this research. On the one hand, we present the critical analysis of the discourses about theatre that appeared between 1966 and 1982 and, on the other hand, the analysis of the shifts of focus of theatre criticism. In the second block, entitled "The genealogy of theatrical ideas", we address the essential poetics-politics duality, which is inherent to every artistic manifestation and is particularly convenient in the case of theatre. The rupture of the realisms and the inauguration of staging poetics are followed by the progressive institutionalization of certain changes during the political transition to democracy. The insufficiency of the realist poetics to fulfil the political and aesthetic aims of the moment will soon make necessary a new writing and a new scene. Outside oxygen makes the flame spark and burn. The new writing will be the one proposed by the so-called new authors in dramatic texts and prologues about the human and the divine with a clear avant-garde identity. The new scene will be the one improvised from independent theatre, giving birth to scenic poetics which had not been given room in Spanish stages up to that moment. These two places constitute the key turning points in the advancement from textcentric approaches to approximations in which the spectacular dimension becomes a centre that cannot be subordinated to the text. In the realm of the issues pertaining to theatrical politics, the analysis confirms the fact that the theatrical change preceded the political change and looks into the reasons for the paradoxical silence of the theatre in times of freedom. Another node of the study regarding politics and theatre is the political-economical structure that gives room to it. The habitual duality private theatre/public theatre branches out into a third possibility: that of independent theatre that gives shelter to the scenic revolution. The theoretical perspective finds the perfect complement to undertake a comprehensive study of the issue in the critical perspective and in the analysis of the then focus of attention of the theatrical criticism. The movement patterns in the map of theatrical criticism are thus essential for the study of the look of a time before the theatrical event. The study addresses, first, the analysis of the criticism appearing in the general press, followed by the analysis of the specialized periodicals, inserted into specifically theatrical means. The study approaches reviews from Abc, Triunfo, Gaceta Ilustrada and El País within the framework of journalistic criticism; and from Primer Acto, Yorick and Pipirijaina as specialized criticism. The study focuses on the identification of time and space devoted to the analysis of text and performance, on the examination of theatrical terminology and on the search of the main focal point in each of the textual or dramatic aspects (scenery, lighting, performance, etc.). This research proves how the studies of both the theatrical ideas and the shift of attention of theater criticism converge towards a common pattern that is mutually required and explained, that of the critical discourse on theatricality. TÉRMINOS TESAURO: 550514 FILOLOGIA ESPAÑOLA 570107 LENGUA Y LITERATURA CÓDIGOS UNESCO: 6202Teoría, análisis y crítica literarias 6203Teoría, análisis y crítica de las Bellas Artes