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In the last few years, scientific consensus is that emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere is contributing to changes in the earth's climate. While uncertainty remains over the pace and dimensions of the change, a consensus on the need for action has grown among the public and elected officials. In part, this shift has been accelerated by concern over energy security and rising fuel prices. The new political landscape has led many cities, states, and regions to institute policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions. These policies and emerging initiatives have significant implications for the transportation planning process. The transportation sector accounts for approximately 27% of GHG production in the U.S. (as of 2003) and while the U.S. accounts for only roughly 5% of the world's population, it is estimated that it produces over 20% of the world's GHG emissions. Note that this does not include "lifecycle" emissions that result from the processes undertaken to extract, manufacture, and transport fuel. Carbon dioxide represents approximately 96% of the transportation sector's radiative forcing effects. Unlike conventional air pollutants, carbon dioxide emissions are directly tied to the amount of fuel consumed and its carbon intensity. Therefore, emissions reductions can be achieved by increasing the use of low-carbon fuels, improving fuel economy, or reducing total vehicle miles of travel - often called the three legged stool. (A fourth leg is congestion reduction, at certain optimal speeds). These same factors are related to our use of imported oil, so actions taken to reduce GHG emissions may actually produce benefits in both policy areas. The climatic risks of additional emissions associated with capacity projects must be balanced against the mobility, safety, and economic needs of a community or region. Consequently, this dissertation attempts to quantify the impacts of high-emitting vehicles on the environment and to propose solutions to enhance the currently-used high-emitting vehicle detection procedures. In addition, fuel consumption and emission models for high-speed vehicles are developed in order to provide more reliable estimates of vehicle emissions and study the impact of vehicle speeds on vehicle emissions. The dissertation extends the state-of-the-art analysis of high emitting vehicles (HEVs) by quantifying the network-wide environmental impact of HEVs. The literature reports that 7% to 12% of HEVs account for somewhere between 41% to 63% of the total CO emissions, and 10% are responsible for 47% to 65% of HC emissions, and 10% are responsible for 32% of NOx emissions. These studies, however, are based on spot measurements and do not necessarily reflect network-wide impacts. Consequently, the research presented in this dissertation extends the state-of-knowledge by quantifying HEV contributions on a network level. The study uses microscopic vehicle emission models (CMEM and VT-Micro model) along with pre-defined drive cycles (under the assumption that the composite HEV and VT-LDV3 represent HEVs and NEVs, respectively) in addition to the simulation of two transportation networks (freeway and arterial) to quantify the contributions of HEVs. The study demonstrates that HEVs are responsible for 67% to 87% of HC emissions, 51% to 78% of CO emissions, and 32% to 62% of the NOX emissions for HEV percentages ranging from 5% to 20%. Additionally, the traffic simulation results demonstrate that 10% of the HEVs are responsible for 50% to 66% of the I-81 HC and 59% to 78% of the Columbia Pike HC emissions, 35% to 67% of the I-81 CO and 38% to 69% of the Columbia Pike CO emissions, and 35% to 44% of the I-81 NOX and 35% to 60% of the Columbia Pike NOX emissions depending on the percentage of the normal-emitting LDTs to the total NEVs. HEV emission contributions to total HC and CO emissions appear to be consistent with what is reported in the literature. However, the contribution of NOX emissions is greater than what is reported in the literature. The study demonstrates that the contribution of HEVs to the total vehicle emissions is dependent on the type of roadway facility (arterials vs. highways), the background normal vehicle composition, and the composition of HEVs. Consequently, these results are network and roadway specific. Finally, considering that emission control technologies in new vehicles are advancing, the contribution of HEVs will increase given that the background emission contribution will decrease. Given that HEVs are responsible for a large portion of on-road vehicle emissions, the dissertation proposes solutions to the HEV screening procedures. First, a new approach is proposed for estimating vehicle mass emissions from concentration remote sensing emission measurements using the carbon balance equation in conjunction with either the VT-Micro or PERE fuel consumption rates for the enhancement of current state-of-the-art HEV screening procedures using RSD technology. The study demonstrates that the proposed approach produces reliable mass emission estimates for different vehicle types including sedans, station wagons, full size vans, mini vans, pickup trucks, and SUVs. Second, a procedure is proposed for constructing on-road RS emission standards sensitive to vehicle speed and acceleration levels. The proposed procedure is broadly divided into three sub-processes. In the first process, HE cut points in grams per second are developed as a function of a vehicle's speed and acceleration levels using the VT-Micro and CMEM emission models. Subsequently, the HE cut points in grams per second are converted to concentration emissions cut points in parts per million using the carbon balance equation. Finally, the scale factors are computed using either ASM ETW- and model-year-based standards or engine-displacement-based standards. Given the RS emissions standards, the study demonstrated that the use of on-road RS cut points sensitive to speed and acceleration levels is required in order to enhance the effectiveness of RS. Finally, the dissertation conducted a study to develop fuel consumption and emissions models for high-speed vehicles to overcome the shortcomings of state-of-practice models. The research effort gathered field data and developed models for the estimation of fuel consumption, CO, CO, NO, NO2, NOx, HC, and PM emissions at high speeds. A total of nine vehicles including three semi-trucks, three pick-up trucks, and three passenger cars were tested on a nine-mile test track in Pecos, Texas. The fuel consumption and emission rates were measured using two portable emission measurement systems. Models were developed using these data producing minimum errors for fuel consumption, CO, NO2, HC, and PM emissions. Alternatively, the NO and NOx emission models produced the highest errors with a least degree of correlation. Given the models, the study demonstrated that the newly constructed models overcome the shortcomings of the state-of-practice models and can be utilized to evaluate the environmental impacts of high speed driving. ; Ph. D.

1. General observations Africa south of the Sahara is probably the most vulnerable region when it comes to the impact and consequences of climate changes. Yet the African continent runs a serious risk of being marginalized in the global dialogue on climate issues. Africa contributes little to the global emissions of CO2, and other greenhouse gases. The major focus of the Framework Convention on Climate Change is on abatement and mitigation of emissions rather than adaptation to the consequences of climate change, and African states have therefore been slow to ratify the treaty and not as active in the international negotiation process as states from other parts of the world. Curbing emissions if justifiably not a central African concern. Yet Africa's potential vulnerability should demand attention from both African policy makers and other decision makers. Africa's natural resource base is seriously threatened. The two central guiding principles of African climate policy both on the part of governments and of international institutions should be reducing vulnerability on the one hand and increasing resilience on the other. Decision makers should not use the remaining scientific uncertainty and the acknowledged dearth of detailed information on African resource management as an excuse for inaction. Not taking climate change into account could be a serious source of mismanagement and fallacious planning. Both increase in temperature and increasing variability of climate are serious dangers in the future. Land degradation policies as well as future energy development should be central concerns. Any strategy for Africa should seek to minimize the potential conflicts among the concerns and priorities for development, adaptation and abatement. Africa's vulnerability to climatic changes relates to a number of factors, including 1) the dependency on bio-fuel, 2) the importance of agriculture, 3) immobility, 4) poor health services, 5) population growth, and 6) low material standards. In the case of Africa, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between abatement and adaptation measures. Social and economic development are necessary in order to prepare the continent for adaptation. 2. African obligations and opportunities under the Climate Convention Forty-nine African states have signed the Climate Convention, but only 33 have ratified so far (23.06.95). Ratification is important because- 1) it signifies the acceptance of the principles of the convention and 2) ratification will be required for financial support under the FCCC. The substantive obligation of all African Parties is a commitment to formulate a climate policy and how it could be implemented. Developing countries shall report on their inventories of GHG emissions, along with their plans and measures to meet the convention's objective within three years after the entry into force of the convention. Least-developed countries may report at their own discretion. Multilateral financing institutions should invest in data gathering on all levels to enhance awareness and improve the possibility for responsible governance in respect to natural resource management and environmental protection. Joint Implementation (JI) can allow for cost effective implementation of the Climate Convention, and provide funding for climate related projects for countries where financial resources are scarce or lacking. 3. Modeling of climate change in Africa There are still substantial limitations in the ability to provide accurate predictions of future climate in Africa. Confidence in regional model predictions is low and there are substantial differences between the models. One can distinguish between three regions when it comes to climatic changes in Africa: 1) Sahel region, 2) corresponding dry regions south of the Equator in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, etc., and 3) the tropical region centered around the Equator. Major findings from IPCC -90 and -92 of relevance for Africa Temperature. Expected increases in annual average surface temperature at the time of C02 doubling: Northern subtropical region (including Sahel): 2 degrees Celsisus (0.5-3.0 degrees Celsisus), Tropical region: 1.5 degrees Celsisus (0.5-2.5 degrees Celsisus), and Southern subtropical region: 2 degrees Celsisus (0.5-3.0 degrees Celsisus). Precipitation: Increase in surface temperature and increased radiative cooling of the atmosphere due to doubling of CO2, concentrations lead to increased evaporation at the surface and increased intensity of convective precipitation (e.g. thunderstorms from large cumulus towers). Sea level rise: Thermal expansion is regarded as the most important process. Predictions are a 20±10cm increase in sea level at the time of CO2, doubling. IPCC-90 estimates up to a 65cm increase in sea level in year 2100, but this number is likely to be decreased to 40~45cm in the new IPCC-95 report. Observed trends. Since 1895, annual average temperatures has increased by 0.53'C over continental Africa. The recent 25 year dry period in Sahel is the most substantial change in observed precipitation in the global record. Explanations have been sought in 1) land use changes, and 2) circulation changes caused by changing patterns of sea surface temperatures (SST). If the drought represents the first sign of a global warming remains however uncertain. Current anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGS) in Africa. 1) Carbon dioxide (CO2): The major source is land use change (~70); the rest originates mainly from industry and transportation. The African contribution of CO2, was in 1990 estimated to be about 7 0f the world's total. 2) Methane (CH4,): Emissions in Africa are about 7 0f the world's total, with livestock being the main source. Industrial sources are oil and gas production and coal mining. 3) Nitrous oxide (N2O) sources are mainly of natural origin. 3) Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC): Africa's share of global CFC emissions is estimated at 3. 4. Natural resource management The uncertainties in predicting climate change impacts in Africa must be underlined, and other human or natural influences may mitigate or exacerbate the effects. Natural variability in Africa is also substantial, and people are to a large extent adapted to changes. Still, predicted human-induced climatic changes are expected to occur very rapidly, and little is known about the capability of the ecosystems - which forms the basis for human existence - to adapt to such changes. It is also clear that impacts of climate change will be unevenly distributed: groups with the highest present vulnerability, such as poor people and people living in marginal areas, will most likely suffer most. Generally, changes in the frequency of extreme weather events would probably have greater impact than changes in average conditions. Agricultural Resources. The fertilizing effect of enhanced CO2 level on plant growth is well documented in laboratory studies, but disputed when it comes to complex "real-world" systems. Other factors concerning climate change impacts on agriculture include 1) Warmer climate and changes in rainfall may reduce the appropriability of present crops. Already being a major problem today, loss of crop and livestock genetic resources may threaten sustainable agricultural development and adaptations to future changes. 2) Increased intensity of rainfall may increase soil erosion, nutrient leaching and crop damage, 3) Changes in timing and length of growing seasons may lead to planning problems, 4) Loss of rainfall in marginal and vulnerable areas would exacerbate drought and desiccation problems, increase risks for bushfire and put forests at their dry margins at risk, and increase problems in animal husbandry, 5) Some models predict a noticeable loss of food production in Africa, but regional variations would probably be large, and local differences (such as in cropping systems) will to a large extent determine how significant the climate change impacts will be. 6) Sea level rise will put low lying agricultural areas at risk, and may render major rivers unsuitable for irrigation. Fish resources. Fish make up a significant part of the food supply in Africa, with a total harvest potential estimated at 10.5 million tons. It is expected that global warming will, varying with species, relocate fish populations. Freshwater populations in small rivers and lakes are vulnerable due to restricted ability to move in response to changes. In areas becoming drier, loss of habitat would also represent a threat. Fish populations are generally very sensitive to even small changes in frequency of extreme events. For the more mobile marine fish populations, relocation does not necessarily mean that production and potential yields are lowered, but subsistence and small scale-fishermen may suffer if institutional arrangements do not enable them to move within regions and across boundaries. Biodiversity. Impacts on biological diversity should be of particular concern, as the welfare of human beings strongly depends on the existence of biological systems and processes. Biological diversity provides a wide range of goods and services, including a genetic basis for agricultural development, and represents a heritage of unique species and ecosystems. Species will probably respond differentially to climatic changes, leading to new aggregations and ecosystems. In ecological terms, the predicted changes will occur over a short period of time. Migration is expected to be the main adaptation strategy, and adaptation success will be determined by the species' ability to respond quickly enough, as well as the suitability of the migration routes: Migration may be blocked by natural or human imposed barriers, or the natural environment (e.g. soils) may be inappropriate. A large part of the natural bio-diversity in Africa is confined to isolated reserves surrounded by agricultural land. Small populations are particularly vulnerable, and endemic species will be at risk of extinction. The changes would on the other hand favor species with high dispersal rates, ability to colonize a wide range of habitats and a high tolerance towards stress. Water resources. Past droughts have shown that for marginal and vulnerable areas, even a small reduction in water supply is critical. Water scarcity has substantial health and ecological consequences. Even today, there is growing scarcity of water in many African regions, and several countries rely on water originating outside their borders. Sea level rises can be expected to lead to increased saltwater intrusion in the groundwater. Desalinization is too costly for most countries. Hydro power generation is also vulnerable to temperature increases and rainfall changes. Social, political and economic impacts. Many authors mention the risk of getting more "eco-refugees". In addition to the social and health problems they may create, major migrations would also increase political tensions. Economic impacts include costs of climate-caused damages and costs of adapting to climate changes. In low-lying areas, sea level rise may cause substantial losses of land for human habitation, which in river deltas and urban centers will be aggravated by subsidence caused by extraction of water and hydrocarbons. 5. African priorities African policy statements emphasize that contributions to Climate Change mitigation efforts should not adversely affect their development targets. Few African countries have national policies explicitly aimed at combating climate change impacts, as they are not required to develop such plans until 1997. African policies are expected to concentrate on combating vulnerability. More specifically, this involves capacity building in a number of areas, including formulation of national and regional inventories and programs, development of effective negotiation skills, developing research capabilities, conducting cost-benefit analyses, and capacity building in the area of technology assessment and transfer. Improvement in planning capacity and governance would improve Africa's resilience to eventual climate changes. Future energy scenarios. African countries should get support in taking advantage of new technology for alternative energy resources, where no-regret options should be given priority. It should be underlined that effective mitigation measures against global warming must reinforce national economic policies and enhance the welfare of households. Three different energy scenarios for Africa are discussed: 1) Stagnation, 2) Growth based on fossil fuels, and 3) Sustainable growth. Scenario 1 is characterized by slow economic development and rapid population growth. Scenarios 2 and 3 involve high social and economic development and falling fertility rates. Scenario 2 is a fossilfuels based development, while scenario 3 provides large scale use of alternative energy sources and sustainable economic development. Economic development and improved living standards, especially among women, are necessary to reduce population growth. Abatement measures. Abatement measures may be carried out as part of a development strategy. Such no-regret options may however need additional funding to be carried out, since market failures and national constraints to the economy may make such options too costly for African governments. One should focus on measures with limited impacts on activities "outside" the market economy. The concern for climate change could make the support of new technology in Africa more attractive, but one should be aware that this may bias the countries' preferences for projects.

This report seeks to inform the development of a framework for addressing governance reform in fragile and conflict affected environments through are view of international experiences. The report analyzes the experience both of countries that sustained a transition to peace and those that fell back into conflict. Pertinent lessons will be drawn selectively from a range of fragile and conflict affected countries, including Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mozambique, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. No specific typologies have been adopted or formed in order to assess these lessons, because typologies can be limiting and experiences can be better assessed based on the specificity of each country's context. The first section of the report sets out broadly accepted definitions of key terms such as governance, state building, and fragility. The second section reviews experiences with diverse governance dimensions and explores the objectives, opportunities, and constraints associated with each.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

In 2013, the Chinese central government launched a war on air pollution. As a new and major source of information, the Internet plays an important role in diffusing environmental news emotion and shaping people's perceptions and emotions regarding the pollution. How could the government make use of the environmental news emotion as an informal regulation of pollution? The paper investigates the causal relationship between web news emotion (defined by the emotional tone of web news) and air pollution (SO2, NO2, PM2.5 and PM10) by exploiting the central government's war on air pollution. We combine daily monitoring data of air pollution at different levels (cities and counties, respectively the second and third administrative levels in China) with the GDELT database that allows us to have information on Chinese web news media (e.g. emotional tone of web news on air pollution). We find that a decrease of the emotional tone in web news (i.e. more negative emotions in the articles) can help to reduce air pollution at both city and county level. We attribute this effect to the context of China's war on air pollution in which the government makes use of the environmental news emotion as an informal regulation of pollution.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

This paper presents new data on the micro structure of the export sector for 45 countries and studies how exporter behavior varies with country size and stage of development. Larger countries and more developed countries have more exporters, larger exporters, and a greater share of exports controlled by the top 5 percent. The extensive margin (more firms) plays a greater role than the intensive margin (average size) in supporting exports of larger countries. In contrast, the intensive margin is relatively more important in explaining the exports of richer countries. Exporter entry and exit rates are higher and entrant survival is lower at an early stage of development. The paper discusses the results in light of trade theories with heterogeneous firms and the empirical literature on resource allocation, firm size, and development. An implication from the findings is that developing countries export less because the top of the firm-size distribution is truncated.

Jack Solowey and Jennifer J. Schulp


Last Wednesday, July 12, an updated version of the Lummis‐​Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act (RFIA) became public. The updated RFIA, like its predecessor, looks to tackle crypto regulation comprehensively, covering in its 274 pages major topics including market structure, crypto exchanges, stablecoins, illicit finance, and taxation.
The proposal confronts the reality of longstanding legal uncertainty for American crypto market participants. Last week's highly anticipated order in the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ripple Labs, Inc., along with both the RFIA in the Senate and ongoing efforts in the House, all demonstrate that there's still significant work to be done before the United States can credibly claim regulatory clarity for crypto.
The RFIA takes important steps toward providing more legal certainty to U.S. market participants, but on some of crypto policy's most nettlesome questions there remains room for improvement. We offer our initial thoughts on the RFIA's market structure, crypto exchange, and stablecoin components below. (Our colleague Nicholas Anthony will cover the illicit finance and taxation portions in additional posts.)
Market Structure
One of the most hotly contested issues in crypto policy is the seemingly endless debate over whether and when a crypto token is properly considered to be a security or a commodity under U.S. law. The RFIA takes a swing at this issue by seeking to establish the concept of a crypto token as an "ancillary asset." The idea is that while a crypto token may be sold pursuant to a type of securities transaction known as an investment contract, the token itself need not be considered a security.
Under the RFIA, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) would have exclusive jurisdiction over a crypto token that qualifies as an ancillary asset but not the "security that constitutes an investment contract." To qualify as an ancillary asset, the token must not offer the holder any financial rights in a business, such as to debt or equity, liquidation, or interest or dividend payments.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), however, would have a role to play: where the average daily aggregate value of transactions in the ancillary asset exceeds a certain threshold and where the issuer engaged in "entrepreneurial or managerial efforts that primarily determined the value of the ancillary asset," the issuer would be required to file detailed disclosures with the SEC. (Where the issuer certifies—and the SEC does not reject—that those efforts have ceased, disclosures are no longer required.) When the issuer complies with the disclosure requirement, ancillary assets owned by the issuer or affiliates will be "presumed" to be commodities and not securities. This presumption could be overturned by a court finding that an ancillary asset does confer a financial right.
Required disclosures to the SEC hinge on whether the issuer is engaged in relevant entrepreneurial or managerial efforts. This "efforts" language is familiar; the third prong of the Howey test for investment contracts asks whether the purchaser "is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." This element is frequently key to thinking about whether a crypto token should be treated as a security. One reason is that crypto technology allows token projects to develop such that the issuer's efforts are no longer essential to the functioning or benefits of the project—in other words, projects can become decentralized.
The RFIA does not explicitly invoke decentralization when it comes to classifying crypto tokens as securities or commodities, but it implicitly grapples with the concept to some extent by incorporating the third prong of Howey. Perhaps for that reason, the RFIA's co‐​author Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D‑NY) told Yahoo! Finance that, at least in general, decentralization is relevant in determining a token's legal character: "If it meets the Howey test, then it's a digital security. If it does not, and it is fully decentralized and has the hallmarks of a commodity, then it's a digital commodity."
One benefit of the "ancillary asset" approach is that it potentially streamlines the token classification process. Nonetheless, as the RFIA's effort to implement the approach demonstrates, it remains difficult in practice to avoid the "efforts of others" concept given the realities of existing (and convoluted) capital markets regulation and the characteristics of crypto. And in incorporating the idea of entrepreneurial or managerial efforts without further defining it—such as by more explicit reference to and definition of a decentralized token network—the current version of the RFIA leaves important questions unanswered.
Fortunately, one place to turn for such a definition—in addition to other proposals—would be the RFIA itself, which defines a decentralized crypto asset exchange (DEX). The RFIA largely defines DEXs as software where no person, or group of people agreeing to act together, can unilaterally control that protocol, including by altering transactions or functions. That's a sound place to begin defining a decentralized token network as well.
In addition, distinguishing the token from the investment contract "arrangement or scheme" through which the token is offered or sold can leave questions about the investment contract itself. As noted above, under the RFIA, the SEC would retain jurisdiction over the investment contract. Yet the bounds of that jurisdiction are not clearly circumscribed. For example, would SEC jurisdiction over the investment contract be strictly limited to primary market token sales between the issuer and the counterparty, or could the SEC also extend its investment contract jurisdiction to secondary market token sales on theories related to the overall arrangement or scheme? Nothing about the SEC's recent crypto enforcement activity suggests anything other than a willingness to aggressively assert, or expand, its jurisdiction. And the recent Ripple opinion, while containing important implications for secondary markets in crypto assets, expressly left open the question of whether secondary market token sales constituted offers and sales of investment contracts. If the RFIA envisions SEC crypto jurisdiction as covering only primary—not secondary—market token sales, it should say so unequivocally.
Exchanges
The RFIA contains provisions addressing both centralized and decentralized crypto asset exchanges. The bill requires any trading facility offering a market in crypto assets or stablecoins to register with the CFTC as a crypto asset exchange. Registered exchanges must both confirm that ancillary assets meet applicable disclosure requirements before they're listed, as well as comply with core exchange principles, including safeguarding systems and customer assets, monitoring trading to provide an efficient market and prevent manipulation, and providing price and trade volume information.
While making important strides to define decentralized exchanges, as described above, the RFIA leaves somewhat uncertain their ultimate regulatory obligations. On the one hand, some sections regulate DEXs only indirectly by imposing risk management requirements on the centralized institutions that interact with DEXs, not the DEXs themselves. That registered crypto asset exchanges are subject to specific requirements regarding their interactions with decentralized crypto asset exchanges also suggests that the former (registered exchanges) does not necessarily include the latter (DEXs). Similarly, the RFIA defines a crypto asset exchange to expressly include a "centralized or decentralized platform" only for purposes of a tax provision, implying that the term crypto asset exchange is not generally meant to cover both centralized and decentralized platforms when used elsewhere in the bill.
On the other hand, by amending the Commodity Exchange Act's definition of "trading facility," which excludes systems that allow for bilateral transactions, to clarify that decentralized crypto asset exchanges that allow for multiple bids and offers to interact are distinguishable from such excluded systems, the RFIA suggests that at least some DEXs could be considered trading facilities subject to crypto asset exchange registration requirements. How exactly a DEX that enables trading pairs of crypto assets would mesh with this provision is perhaps open to interpretation.
Given these questions, the RFIA should make more explicit that disintermediated crypto exchange protocols are not subject to inapt requirements designed for centralized intermediaries.
Stablecoins
The RFIA would only permit "depository institutions," such as banks, credit unions, and savings associations, to issue payment stablecoins (tokens redeemable on a 1‑to‑1 basis with instruments denominated in U.S. dollars). Notably, the RFIA would amend the definition of depository institution under the Federal Reserve Act to incorporate a category of "covered depository institutions" that includes non‐​banks exclusively engaged in issuing payment stablecoins and approved to operate by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a similar state authority. Under the RFIA, such OCC‐​authorized payment stablecoins would not be required to maintain federal deposit insurance.
It's welcome when a bill allows for the operation of stablecoin issuers beyond federally insured depository institutions. Nonetheless, in giving federal banking regulators discretion to reject applications of prospective stablecoin issuers on the basis of subjective and open‐​ended criteria beyond basic reserve and disclosure requirements, the RFIA risks further constraining future payment services competition.
Concluding Thoughts
Providing clarity to crypto entrepreneurs, developers, and users in the United States remains a work in progress. Even with important case law evolving in the courts, Congress ultimately must provide a stable and practical framework for U.S. crypto policy.

Samuel D. Bond (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") is an assistant professor at the College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology. He received his Ph.D. from the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. Professor Bond's research focuses primarily on judgment and decision making in consumer settings. In prior work, he has examined confirmatory processing during the decision process and prescriptive methods for mitigating the effects of irrelevant context. More recently, he has been involved in various projects related to objectives-based decision making, focusing on impediments to the generation or elicitation of objectives. In other work, Professor Bond is exploring the interplay of intuitive and reason-based approaches to information processing and preference formation, and he is examining the ways in which descriptions of an experience can alter consumer forecasts, experience, and memory. Professor Bond teaches courses in marketing management and consumer behavior at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Address: College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30308-0520; sam.bond@mgt.gatech.edu . Kurt A. Carlson (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") was born in Kenosha, Wisconsin. He has a B.S. and M.S. in agricultural and applied economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. He has worked for the Wisconsin Center for Dairy Research and Wisconsin Milk Marketing Board, and most recently he was on the faculty at Duke University from 2001 to 2009. Dr. Carlson is an assistant professor at Georgetown University. Dr. Carlson's research focuses on the intersection of economics and psychology, with a specific emphasis on individual decision processes. Though much of his research explores consumer decision making, he also studies how voters, jurors, and managers make decisions. His research has been published in several top journals in marketing, psychology, and management. Dr. Carlson teaches courses on market intelligence, consumer behavior, and marketing management. Address: McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, 578 Hariri Building, Washington, DC 20057; kc377@georgetown.edu . Michel Denuit (" Bivariate Stochastic Dominance and Substitute Risk-(In)dependent Utilities ") is a professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), Institut de Statistique, Biostatistique et Sciences Actuarielles. He has done extensive research in the area of actuarial risk theory, especially in stochastic inequalities and dominance relations. Address: Institut de Statistique, Biostatistique et Sciences Actuarielles (ISBA), Université Catholique de Louvain, 20 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; michel.denuit@uclouvain.be . Louis Eeckhoudt (" Bivariate Stochastic Dominance and Substitute Risk-(In)dependent Utilities ") received a Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University in 1970. Since then and until his retirement in 2004 he taught economics at the Catholic Faculties of Mons, Belgium. He now holds a research position at IÉSEG School of Management (Lille, France) and is also a research associate with CORE (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium). His work deals mostly with the economics of risk and the analysis of risk attitudes. Address: IÉSEG, 3 Rue de la Digue, F-59000 Lille, France; louis.eeckhoudt@fucam.ac.be . Charles M. Harvey (" Cardinal Scales for Health Evaluation ") is a retired professor from the Department of Decision and Information Sciences at the University of Houston. He received his Ph.D. in pure mathematics at Stanford University. Soon afterward, he changed his research interests to applied mathematics, and a decade later— after writing the textbook Operations Research, published by North-Holland in 1979—he focused on decision analysis. His research has been primarily in the development of prescriptive models in which preferences are shown to satisfy certain conditions if and only if they are represented by functions having a certain structure. Sections 4–7 of the present paper present models of this type. He is a proponent of new theory that is applicable. He has taught at six universities and has held nonteaching positions at the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis. Address: 5902 NW Pinewood Place, Corvallis, OR 97330; cmharvey1@earthlink.net . Ralph L. Keeney (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") is a research professor at Duke University, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, North Carolina. Professor Keeney's areas of expertise are decision analysis, risk analysis, and management decision-making. He is an authority on decision making with multiple objectives. His experience includes corporate management problems, risk analyses, public policy, large-scale siting studies (e.g., airports, power plants), and environmental studies. Dr. Keeney has been a consultant for several organizations including Fair Isaac, Seagate Technology, American Express, British Columbia Hydro, Pacific Gas and Electric, Kaiser Permanente, GTE, Hunton & Williams, the Electric Power Research Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Energy. Address: Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, P.O. Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120; keeney@duke.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editor… ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from UCLA. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) and is now on the Scientific Advisory Committee for the USC Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorist Events. Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; lrkeller@uci.edu . Alen Nosić (" How Riskily Do I Invest? The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, and Overconfidence ") recently completed his Ph.D. at the University of Mannheim in the area of behavioral finance. In his current research he focuses on determinants of risk-taking behavior in investment decisions and on the question of which factors drive changes in risk-taking behavior over time. Address: Chair of Business Administration, University of Mannheim, L 5, 2, 68131 Mannheim, Germany; alennosic@yahoo.de . Lars Peter Østerdal (" Cardinal Scales for Health Evaluation ") is a professor in the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Copenhagen in 2004. His research interests include health economics, welfare economics, and game theory. His current research focuses on rationing methods and cost-sharing methods, pricing in networks, quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) models, stochastic dominance theory, and studies of childhood poverty in Mozambique and Vietnam. He teaches courses in health economics, game theory, and general microeconomics. Address: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark; lars.p.osterdal@econ.ku.dk . Bjørn Sandvik (" Sensitivity Analysis of Risk Tolerance ") is an associate professor of economics at the University of Bergen and holds a Ph.D. from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. He teaches finance and does research in finance and public economics. Address: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgate 14, N-5007 Bergen, Norway; bjorn.sandvik@econ.uib.no . Lars Thorlund-Petersen (" Sensitivity Analysis of Risk Tolerance ") is the Sparebanken Nord-Norge Professor of Financial Economics at the Bodø Graduate School of Business, Norway. He teaches courses in decision analysis and game theory. His research interests include game theory and strategic behavior of agents in the presence of incentive systems determined, for example, by specific cost-sharing or rationing rules. He investigates decisions under uncertainty, with emphasis on risk preferences, utility functions, and stochastic dominance. He received his Ph.D. in mathematical economics from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Address: Bodø Graduate School of Business, Mørkvedtraakket, N-8049 Bodø, Norway; lars.thorlund-petersen@hibo.no . Martin Weber (" How Riskily Do I Invest? The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, and Overconfidence ") holds a chair for Banking and Finance at the University of Mannheim. Born in 1952, he studied mathematics and business administration and received his Ph.D. as well as his Habilitation for Business Administration from the University of Aachen. He spent about three years as a visiting scholar at UCLA, the Wharton School, Stanford University, and the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. His main interests lie in the area of banking, behavioral finance, and its psychological foundations. He is the author of numerous publications in these areas and coauthor of textbooks on decision analysis and banking. He served as director (1997–2002) and deputy director (2003–2008) for the Sonderforschungsbereich 504 of the German National Science Foundation (rationality, decision making, and economic modelling), and he serves on the editorial board of various national and international journals. Dr. Weber was dean of the Faculty for Business Administration, University of Mannheim from April 2004 to March 2006, is a member of the German Academy of Natural Scientists Leopoldina, and is a member of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. He was awarded an honorary doctoral degree by the University of Münster in June 2007. Address: Chair of Business Administration, University of Mannheim, L 5, 2, 68131 Mannheim, Germany; weber@bank.bwl.uni-mannheim.de .