Suchergebnisse

The stark failure of Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive, which Kyiv billed as the one-two punch that can knock Russia out of the war, has led proponents of maximalist war aims in Ukraine to revise their timetable for victory.The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), according to this emerging consensus, can fend off ongoing Russian attacks and replenish their capacity for renewed offensives in 2025 with sustained Western support. Key to these plans is a two-fold assessment of both sides' strike capabilities.This view argues that Ukraine, if supplied with enough "game-changing" medium and long-range missiles, can successfully degrade Russian logistics and command and control (C2) nodes and make large swathes of occupied territories — including Crimea — untenable for Russian forces. Such perspectives are complemented and often accompanied by the parallel observation that Russian forces are running critically low on key munitions and thus lack the ability to apply sustained long-term pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure.Both approaches, which invite Western policymakers to double down on Ukraine's maximalist war aims in hopes that something approximating a total victory can yet be secured with enough funding and persistence, are deeply flawed and risk putting Kyiv and its Western partners in an even more precarious military position over the coming year.The AFU received around 20 ground-launched ballistic M39 Block I Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, missiles from the United States in late 2023. These older variant missiles, which boast a range of 170 kilometers, were reportedly used by the AFU to strike Russian-controlled airfields in southern and eastern Ukraine.In a November 2023 letter, a group of lawmakers called on the Biden administration to transfer more ATACMS, including advanced longer-range variants, to Ukraine with the aim of sustaining the AFU's "requirement for deep-strike capability." Former U.S. General Ben Hodges argued that the provision of ATACMS and other Western missiles, including German Taurus cruise missiles, would isolate Russian-occupied Crimea and make it untenable for Russian forces. "ATACMS with 300km range will make Crimea untenable as soon they arrive in Theater. No place for Russian Navy, Air Force, Logistics to hide in Crimea," Hodges wrote. "On ATACMS for Ukraine, don't settle for a job half done."As with other plans formulated around Ukraine's use of game-changing "wunderwaffen," the thinking on massed ATACMS strikes all too often presumes a static Russian adversary incapable of adapting to these weapons over time.Consider the 2022 introduction of U.S.-supplied HIMARS missiles to the battlefield, which enabled a spate of successful AFU strikes on high-value Russian assets in Ukraine. The AFU's HIMARS honeymoon phase gradually came to an end as the Russians learned to disperse their munitions depots more effectively, jam Western precision missiles, and employ more sophisticated air defense practices.Russian command has a grasp of which Western arms have yet to be supplied to Ukraine and, at this stage in the war, has had months if not years to simulate their effects and preemptively draw up countermeasures against them, diluting the element of technological surprise that gave HIMARS missiles a brief but real window of operational success in 2022. It is all but certain that the Russian military will continue honing their force dispersion methods and developing additional countermeasures to mitigate the future battlefield impacts of Western medium and long-range missiles.Russia could likewise respond to expanded Western missile deliveries with a wide array of asymmetric measures facilitating a dangerous escalation in the war's intensity. Moscow, which has so far opted to attrit Ukraine and its Western backers at a deliberate pace, can leverage its considerable and growing escalation control by bringing more of its strike capabilities to bear on Ukrainian infrastructure and stepping up offensive operations across the line of contact in the country's east and south.Western-provided missiles can be used to impose operational costs on Russian forces with strikes on high-value targets and infrastructure, but these attacks carry limited long-run strategic value. There is no indication that they can be conducted on a large enough scale so as to decisively defeat Russian forces in Ukraine, nor — as noted by the Quincy Institute's Anatol Lieven — can they make the Russian presence in Crimea untenable if they are not accompanied by successful large-scale ground offensives to drive the Russians out of southeastern Ukraine.There is nothing to suggest, especially in light of the costly failure of the 2023 counteroffensive, that the AFU will develop the offensive potential necessary for such advances in the foreseeable future. Ukrainian strikes with Western-supplied missiles have driven parts of the Russian Navy out of Crimea, further stymying Moscow's long-abandoned plans for amphibious landings in Odessa and Mykolaiv. But the loss and relocation of these ships, though unquestionably a material setback for Russia, is not and has never been a critical factor in the ability of Russian ground forces to sustain their occupation of southern Ukraine. No less wrongheaded is the accompanying notion that Russia faces critical missile shortages of its own. Russian forces, predicted Ukraine's military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov in an interview on December 31, 2022, have enough missiles left for two large-scale attacks. Top Estonian intelligence official Margo Grosberg said in January 2023 that Russia has the precision-guided munitions to continue attacking Ukraine for "the next three to four months, or until spring, and from a more pessimistic point of view, six to nine months." These and similar assessments by Ukrainian and Western officials, despite being continuously contradicted by events on the ground over the past two years, have lingered even in the recent discourse on Ukraine.Though it is impossible to accurately estimate Russia's stockpiles of various precision munitions at any given moment, there are clear indications that the Kremlin has mitigated Western export controls and successfully consolidated its defense-industrial base to at least sustain, if not continue to grow, Russian long-range strike capabilities in the short to medium term. Russia's steady output of precision munitions offers a stark contrast against the ongoing degradation of Ukraine's air defenses in the face of relentless Russian strikes over the winter, further undermining the fraught notion that time is on Ukraine's side.Neither of these two ideas — namely, that Ukraine can win if flooded with Western heavy weaponry and that Russia is on the verge of depleting its stocks — is new. Indeed, both concepts are part of the initial thinking that led some Western policymakers and observers to conclude over the course of 2022 that the AFU can vanquish Russia on the battlefield.But, after two years of brutal fighting in which Russia has gradually gained the upper hand, and the stakes are higher than ever and the costs of continued miscalculation, potentially catastrophic. It is long overdue for Kyiv's backers on both sides of the Atlantic to repair to a realistic theory of victory that accounts for, rather than obfuscates, the dire conditions faced by Ukraine and offers a sustainable framework for war termination on the best possible terms for Kyiv and the West.

The Korean War ended more than 70 years ago, and a tense peace has reigned ever since on the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas have exchanged artillery fire, battled in the economic and diplomatic arenas, and even covertly dispatched spies to each other's territory. But the threats of a resumption of conflict, disproportionately coming from North Korea in recent years, have been rhetorical. The firepower of the South Korean military, backed by a U.S. defense pact, has deterred Pyongyang; the sheer number of soldiers in the North Korean army, backed by a small but operational nuclear arsenal, has deterred Seoul.But borders don't seem quite as inviolable as they once did. Russia has invaded Ukraine, Israel has sent forces into Gaza, and even Venezuela recently seemed to contemplate an incursion into Guyana. The United States, meanwhile, has recently attacked various targets abroad, from the Houthis in the Red Sea to Iranian commanders in Syria.Against this geopolitical backdrop, are the latest threats emanating from Pyongyang still rhetorical?North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sounds more and more embattled and belligerent. In power since the death of his father at the end of 2011, he has been constrained by a hemorrhaging economy and uncompromising adversaries abroad. The growth rate of the North Korean economy wasn't too bad at the beginning of his tenure. Since 2017, however, the arrow has simply gone downward, with a devastating 4.1 percent contraction in 2018, followed by a further 4.5 percent decline during the pandemic year of 2020. International sanctions have made North Korea dangerously dependent on China for trade, which explains in part Kim Jong Un's current interest in covering his bets by improving relations with Russia.Meanwhile, the two leaders that promised some form of engagement with Pyongyang—South Korea's Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump—are no longer in office. South Korea's current government is very cool toward engagement. Joe Biden, focused on a raft of other foreign policy challenges from Ukraine to Gaza, has not expressed much interest in expending political capital on a risky venture like negotiating with Pyongyang.Washington's failure to remain engaged with North Korea is the primary reason that longtime North Korea watchers Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker believe that Kim Jong Un has abandoned the default approach of more-or-less peaceful coexistence in favor of launching an attack against South Korea. In some ways, Kim is following the logic of Hamas, an illiberal force also in charge of a largely failed entity. Kim, too, perceives his adversaries as complacent, uninterested in any real negotiations, and vulnerable to a surprise attack. Presiding over an "open air prison" in Gaza, Hamas decided it had nothing left to lose. The North Korean leadership, in charge of an impoverished country with a horrific human rights record, may well have decided that it also has run out of options."The literature on surprise attacks should make us wary of the comfortable assumptions that resonate in Washington's echo chamber but might not have purchase in Pyongyang," Carlin and Hecker write in 38North. "This might seem like madness, but history suggests those who have convinced themselves that they have no good options left will take the view that even the most dangerous game is worth the candle."Carlin and Hecker don't have what the Israeli intelligence community possessed a year before the October 7 attacks, namely a detailed description of preparations to launch a surprise attack. They are relying on official North Korean statements eschewing reunification of the peninsula and a constitutional change that now identifies South Korea as an adversary rather than as tanil minjok ("one people, one blood"). This week, reports based on satellite images showed the destruction of Pyongyang's iconic Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification, also called the Arch of Reunification, which Kim earlier referred to as "an eyesore," and called for its demolition.North Korea has also recently conducted a rash of missile tests, including one with a hypersonic warhead, as well as military drills near the maritime border that seem designed to provoke a response from the South. As sober analysts, Carlin and Hecker are not given to overstatement, so their warnings must be taken seriously.At the same time, the usual North Korean approach has been to make wild threats to get the attention of an otherwise indifferent U.S. government in order to pave the way for a fresh round of negotiations. Missile launches, nuclear tests, and promises to turn South Korea into a "sea of fire" have all, in the past, signaled not an interest in war but, perversely, a determination to restart peace talks with newly attentive adversaries. Also, Kim might be eyeing elections in South Korea where the pro-engagement opposition party is hoping to increase its parliamentary majority in the April elections and in the United States where Donald Trump is now running even or better against Joe Biden in the polls. Trump has long boasted of the 27 "love letters" he exchanged with the North Korean leader. Perhaps, Kim strategizes, the love could continue if Trump is reelected.Beware wishful thinking. Most analysts misinterpreted Vladimir Putin's warlike rhetoric and military preparations at the end of 2021 as merely a bid for Western attention and a better bargaining position at the negotiations table. Conventional notions about the deterrence of superior force—Israel, NATO, South Korea—may not apply in a world of increasingly volatile leaders and increasingly violated borders.Kim's closer relationship with Putin may well prove pivotal in North Korean calculations. Beijing has traditionally attempted to rein in Pyongyang because an overly provocative neighbor is not good for the Chinese economy in addition to boosting U.S. military presence in the region. Moscow, on the other hand, might be sending different messages, given Putin's more confrontational approach to the West. Just as the war in Gaza has proven a boon to the Kremlin, in that it has distracted attention and military hardware away from the European theater of operations, a conflict on the Korean peninsula would be an even greater draw on U.S. and European resources.In the late 1940s, Stalin was skeptical about the advantages of North Korea attacking South Korea. Kim Jong Un's grandfather, Kim Il Sung, eventually convinced Stalin otherwise and won Soviet support for the attack on the south that took place on June 25, 1950. Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, has indicated that he will visit North Korea "at an early date," his first trip there since 2000. Pundits and policymakers take note: Putin's visit might tip the balance one way or the other in North Korea's deliberations over war and peace.In the meantime, it's not too late for the United States and South Korea to offer Kim Jong Un an offramp from the conflict he has yet to initiate.

The State Department has approved an $80 million military aid package to Taiwan. Though hardly a military game-changer, this modest transfer is unprecedented in its funding source: the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which is primarily a grant account for military assistance to foreign countries. The transfer, the State Department insists, does not imply the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. "Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our longstanding One China policy, which has not changed, the United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability," a State Department spokesperson said.Yet the FMF grant follows a consistent pattern of rhetoric and behavior that appears to dilute strategic ambiguity, or the longstanding U.S. policy of deliberately maintaining uncertainty around the question of whether the U.S. would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack. President Joe Biden explicitly stated, and reaffirmed in response to a clarifying question from 60 Minutes correspondent Scott Pelley, in September 2022 that U.S. forces will fight to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. The ongoing dilution of strategic ambiguity as a credible foreign policy concept, accompanied by a sharp and rapid decline in the overall U.S.-China relationship, raises the specter of military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Now more than ever, there is a pressing need to articulate a viable vision not only on Taiwan policy but on the broader issues surrounding the U.S. defense posture in the Asia-Pacific. To unpack the dynamics of the Taiwan conflict and what it means for U.S. strategy, it is worth revisiting an age-old concept of international politics: the security dilemma. The security dilemma, in short, holds that actions taken by states to increase their security can be perceived as threatening by other states, triggering a chain reaction that makes everyone involved less safe. It is a foundational idea in international relations thinking, and for good reason. It speaks to a deeply salient aspect of state behavior, observed over the course of thousands of years from the Peloponnesian War onwards and extensively reproduced in numerous geopolitical contexts. The dilemma has been most clearly and frequently expressed through cases of military buildup. Imagine a scenario in which you, as a leader, have come to believe that your neighbor harbors aggressive intentions toward your country. Your belief may be premised, as these situations so often are, on decades or even centuries of bad blood including real acts of aggression previously committed by your neighbor. So, you resolve to arm yourself to deter and, if need be, repel your neighbor's aggression. But it turns out that you are not the only one driven by such fears. Your neighbor, informed by their own history, interests, and strategic culture, believes something awfully similar about you and concludes that your defensive buildup is a prelude to an attack on them. They might respond with a buildup of their own, thus heightening the risk of miscalculation and catastrophic accident, or by launching a preemptive strike on you. The Taiwan situation is, admittedly, more complex than a simple border buildup crisis between two contiguous powers because it is a maritime conflict centered on a third actor that, despite not being recognized by Washington as a sovereign country, is widely considered key to U.S. regional and global interests. Yet the basic logic outlined by the security dilemma not only still applies but is more relevant than ever to understanding what makes the Taiwan conflict so dangerous and difficult to solve. Taiwan is the geopolitical fulcrum between competing Chinese and U.S. spheres of influence in the Asia-Pacific. Any U.S. effort to impose military costs on a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, or even to maintain relations with Taipei, will be bemoaned by Beijing as an attempt to "strangle" China and runs the risk of incurring reciprocal Chinese military actions. The security dilemma over Taiwan is, as former Pentagon official and Principal of the Marathon Initiative Elbridge Colby rightly observes, both real and unavoidable, but it need not lead to catastrophe. The dilemma cannot be solved outright, but it can and should be mitigated. Colby and others advocating for a more proactive Asia-Pacific policy are correct in their assessment that the train has left the station when it comes to strategic ambiguity. Chinese strategy is likely already premised on the assumption, increasingly reflected in American foreign policy discourse and military planning, that U.S. forces will directly intervene to defend Taiwan. Strategic ambiguity was a masterstroke of American diplomacy, guaranteeing Taiwan's integrity and advancing U.S. regional interests for over 50 years at exceedingly low cost and with little risk. But the veil has been lifted. The conditions in which strategic ambiguity thrived are not sustainable, not least of all because the Chinese, as the primary audience for which the message of ambiguity was designed, no longer view it as a credible sentiment. The illusion of ambiguity has been dispelled and cannot be recreated in the context of present U.S.-China relations.In thinking about solutions, it is important to highlight that strategic ambiguity and the One China Policy, though historically intertwined, are not and have never been a package deal. It is fully possible to acknowledge Taiwan's vital importance to U.S. interests and to act accordingly without recognizing it as a sovereign country. Recognition would bolster China's pretext for an invasion and massively increase the likelihood of a military showdown over Taiwan. Actions that can be interpreted as a signal that U.S. policymakers are mulling recognition, such as the recent FMF transfer, needlessly risk a disproportionate Chinese response. This is not to suggest that there isn't room for deterrence in the U.S. policy toolkit. Indeed, there is both military and political value in aiding Taiwan with the goal of conveying to Beijing that any attempt at "reunification" through force will be the opposite of quick and painless. But such efforts, while worthwhile, must be accompanied by a coherent and realistic Asia-Pacific strategy that leverages the unique advantages offered by America's regional alliances and balances competition with engagement where appropriate. Our rhetoric and policies on Taiwan should be firm, not bombastic; predictable, not shrill; and guided by concrete material interests, not the promulgation of abstract values. Asia-Pacific is the theater where the configuration of the international order will be decided in coming years and decades. There is no greater strategic challenge confronting American policymakers than to manage the Taiwan crisis in a judicious and forward-looking manner — U.S. global standing hinges on it.

Das Wintersemester hat für Deutschlands Studierende eine dramatische Verschlechterung ihrer sozialen Lage mit sich gebracht, zeigen unsere Befragungsergebnisse. Deshalb sind die Bafög-Sparpläne der Bundesregierung grundfalsch. Ein Gastbeitrag von Clemens Weitz und Philipp Seegers.





DER SEIT WENIGEN TAGEN vorliegende Haushaltsentwurf der Bundesregierung sieht für das kommende Jahr substanzielle Einsparungen beim Bafög vor. Im Raum steht auf der studentischen Seite der
Förderung ein Minus von über 400 Millionen Euro gegenüber diesem Jahr. Auch beim Schüler-Bafög dürften laut Vorlage viele Millionen wegfallen.



 



Freilich war absehbar, dass nach einer Reihe budgetärer Ausnahmejahre – geprägt von Not-, Sonder- und Extraausgaben – der Sparanspruch wieder tief ins Zentrum aller fiskalischen Planspiele rücken
würde. Dennoch sei die Frage erlaubt, warum ausgerechnet bzw. auch bei Studierenden und Schüler*innen der Rotstift angesetzt wird. Noch dazu tiefrot, da die auf dem Tisch liegenden Zahlen den
Topf de facto um über 20 Prozent kleiner machen würden. Zur Erinnerung: Vorgesehen waren laut Koalitionsvertrag eigentlich deutliche Verbesserungen, verbunden mit einer Bafög-Reform.



Die Studie und wer mitgemacht hat



Seit 2012 befragen" jobvalley" (die Studitemps GmbH) und das Department of Labour and Economics der Universität Maastricht halbjährlich Studierende aus ganz
Deutschland. An der 23. Erhebung zur Studienreihe "Fachkraft 2030" nahmen 15.469 Personen teil, es handelt sich um eine bundesweite, repräsentative Stichprobe.




Für den in diesem Artikel auszugsweise dargestellten Fragenkomplex wurden die Teilnehmenden mit insgesamt 15 Ich-Aussagen zu Reaktionen auf die gestiegenen
Verbraucherpreise konfrontiert. Eine Ergebnisdarstellung im pdf-Format mit weiteren Hinweisen zur Methodik findet sich unter diesem Link. 








Zwar heißt es, dass bereits bestehende Förderungen von den Kürzungen keineswegs betroffen sein sollen. Immerhin. Und dennoch wohnt den Plänen der Regierung etwas Strukturgefährdendes inne, was
vor allem beim Blick zurück ins Wintersemester 2022/23 deutlich wird. Ein Semester, um es klar auszusprechen, das für einen Gutteil aller Hochschülerinnen und Hochschüler wohl beispiellose
Einschnitte mit sich gebracht hat.



 



Zu diesem Ergebnis kommt die jüngste Erhebung der repräsentativen Studie "Fachkraft 2030", die jobvalley zusammen mit der Universität Maastricht im April dieses Jahres durchgeführt hat.
Bundesweit haben daran rund 16.000 Studierende teilgenommen. Um die problematische Richtung des vorliegenden Haushaltsentwurfs zu verdeutlichen, folgen einige ausgesuchte Ergebnisse.



 



200.000 Studienabbrüche und -unterbrechungen
aus finanzieller Not




Im Rahmen der Befragung gaben für das Wintersemester 2022/23 bundesweit 7 Prozent der Teilnehmenden an, ihr Studium aus Kostengründen entweder komplett aufgegeben oder pausiert zu haben (Aussage:
"Ich musste mein Studium aufgeben/pausieren"). Hochgerechnet auf die Gesamtzahl der Studierenden dürften damit über 200.000 Immatrikulierte von einer der beiden "Optionen" Gebrauch gemacht haben,
über deren Nachteile für den deutschen Bildungs- und Wirtschaftsstandort man wohl kein Wort verlieren muss.







Neben regionalen Unterschieden konnten in dieser Frage vor allem auf individueller Ebene teils erhebliche Disparitäten herausgearbeitet werden. So lag der Anteil der Studienabbrüche und
-unterbrechungen bei Befragten mit Migrationshintergrund bei neun Prozent – also messbar über dem Durchschnitt. Ähnlich ist das Bild mit Blick auf die Dimension "Alter". Hier zeigte sich, dass in
der Gruppe der mindestens 23-Jährigen rund acht Prozent der Befragten im Untersuchungszeitraum ihr Studium abgebrochen oder unterbrochen haben. Zum Vergleich: Bei den Jüngeren waren es aus
Kostengründen "lediglich" vier Prozent.



 



Fast 20 Prozent der Studierenden
mussten ihre Wohnung aufgeben



 



Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse zur Aussage "Ich musste meine Wohnsituation verändern (Auszug, Verkleinerung etc.)" legen nahe, dass bewusstes Energiesparen im Wintersemester für fast jeden fünften
Befragten nicht ausreichte, um die eigenen vier Wände halten zu können. Konkret gaben 18 Prozent der Teilnehmenden an, ihre Wohnsituation ungewollt verändert zu haben. Dazu auch hier die absolute
Zahl: Gemessen an der Gesamtheit der Studierenden in Deutschland entspricht diese Quote über 500.000 Hochschülerinnen und Hochschülern, wobei allerdings nicht explizit erfragt wurde, welchen
Anteil an den kostenbedingten Umzügen – als vermeintlich "einfachste" Alternative – die Rückkehr ins Elternhaus hatte.











Erhebliche Abweichungen liegen mit Bezug zur Wohnsituation auch in regionaler Hinsicht vor. So mussten laut eigener Aussage im vorangegangenen Semester in Sachsen-Anhalt und Brandenburg jeweils
25 Prozent (!) der Befragten ihren Wohnraum kostensparend anpassen (Auszug, Verkleinerung etc.) – deutliche Höchstwerte vor Stadtstaat Hamburg, wo die Quote bei 21 Prozent lag. Hinzu kommt:
Fast jeder zweite Teilnehmende sah sich im Wintersemester 2022/23 aus finanziellen Gründen gezwungen, im Wohnbereich weniger Energie zu verbrauchen. So gaben bei der Aussage "Ich musste mich beim
Heizen meines Zimmers/meiner Wohnung einschränken bzw. Strom sparen" exakt 49 Prozent der Hochschülerinnen und Hochschüler an, ihren Verbrauch entsprechend nach unten angepasst zu haben.
Interessanterweise weichen hierzu die Angaben von weiblichen und männlichen Befragten deutlich voneinander ab. Denn während Hochschülerinnen in bundesweit 57 Prozent der Fälle angaben, den
Energieverbrauch gesenkt zu haben, geschah dies auf Seite der Hochschüler deutlich seltener (41 Prozent).



 



Erhebliche Einschränkungen
auch beim Lebensmitteleinkauf




Welch gravierenden Einfluss die gestiegenen Verbraucherpreise im Wintersemester 2022/23 auch auf das alltägliche Konsumleben der Studierenden hatten, zeigt die Auswertung für die Aussage „Ich
musste mich beim Lebensmittelkauf einschränken“. Sie wurde von 58 Prozent (!) aller Befragten bejaht. Ferner fällt dazu auf, dass die Quote in keinem der 16 Bundesländer unterhalb der
50-Prozent-Marke liegt, hoch bedenkliche Spitzenwerte konnten in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (67 Prozent) und Thüringen (69 Prozent) gemessen werden.











Auch in zwei weiteren Bereichen des studentischen Konsumlebens musste laut Umfrage deutlich Verzicht geübt werden. Und zwar beim Einkauf von Kleidung sowie beim Essengehen und -bestellen. Was
letztgenanntes Thema betrifft, lag die studentische Verzichts-Quote ebenfalls (und erwartungsgemäß) auf hohem Niveau. So stimmten insgesamt 64 Prozent der Befragten der Aussage "Ich musste mich
beim Essengehen/-bestellen einschränken" zu. Auf weiblicher Seite waren es sogar 69 Prozent, während die Quote auf männlicher Seite bei 58 Prozent lag.



 



Was den Aspekt Kleidung betrifft, gab weit mehr als jeder zweite Befragte an, im Untersuchungszeitraum weniger als geplant / gewünscht erworben zu haben. Konkret: Die Aussage "Ich musste mich
beim Einkaufen von Kleidung einschränken" wurde von fast 60 Prozent der Studierenden bejaht, wobei auch hier die Quote auf weiblicher Seite recht deutlich über der Quote der männlichen Befragten
lag.



 



Freizeitaktivitäten aus Kostengründen
deutlich runtergefahren
















Dass die allgemein gestiegenen Verbraucherkosten im studentischen Leben auch abseits von Studium und alltäglichem Bedarf tiefe Spuren hinterlassen haben, zeigen die vorliegenden Zahlen für die
Aussage "Ich musste mich bei meiner Freizeitgestaltung (Sport, Theater, Kino etc.) einschränken". Sie wurde von nahezu 60 Prozent aller Befragten bejaht, was folglich gerade an den
Hochschulstandorten zu messbaren Umsatzeinbußen in primär studentisch genutzten Freizeiteinrichtungen und -unternehmen geführt haben dürfte. Überdies gaben rund 30 Prozent der Befragten an, im
zurückliegenden Wintersemester eine bereits fest eingeplante Reise aus Kostengründen verschoben oder abgesagt zu haben.










Die Umfrageergebnisse schreien nicht nach
weniger Bafög, sondern eindeutig nach mehr



 



"Die Bundesregierung lässt das Bafög ausbluten", hat sich dieser Tage – allen voran – Matthias Anbuhl, Vorstandsvorsitzender des Deutschen Studierendenwerks, mit markigen Worten des
Unverständnisses zu den Plänen der Regierung geäußert. In seiner Kritik verweist er auf unzureichende Erhöhungen "über viele Jahre", die nun, vor dem Hintergrund der gestiegenen
Verbraucherpreise, ihre ganze Negativwirkung entfalten würden. "Studienabbrüche aus Geldmangel kann sich unsere Gesellschaft nicht leisten. Diese jungen Menschen sind die künftigen Lehrkräfte,
Ärzt*innen und Ingenieur*innen, die wir so händeringend brauchen", lautet sein dringlicher Appell nach Berlin. 



 



Aus der Perspektive unserer eigenen Forschung kann man Matthias Anbuhl da nur zustimmen. Denn hinter den Studierenden in Deutschland liegt (mindestens) ein Halbjahr, das in vielerlei Hinsicht
nicht nach gleich viel und schon gar nicht nach weniger schreit, sondern eindeutig nach mehr – und zwar nicht nur für den Bereich Bafög. Daher: Mit ihren Planungen setzt die Bundesregierung ein
erschreckend kaltes Signal gegen die Verbesserung der Chancengleichheit, das dem deutschen Bildungs- und Wirtschaftsstandort langfristig schaden wird. Noch dazu ein Signal zur Unzeit, weit an der
ohnehin verzichtsreichen Lebensrealität vieler Studierender vorbei.



 



Clemens Weitz ist Geschäftsführer von jobvalley. Philipp Seegers ist Research Fellow an der Universität Maastricht.




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Im hymnologischen Bereich sind die Entstehung und jahrhundertelange Tradierung deutscher evangelischer Kirchenlieder von großer Bedeutung. Sie übten in zahlreichen Ländern großen Einfluss aus. Im 19. Jahrhundert beispielsweise wurden sie in das Englische übersetzt und in Ländern dieses Sprachraums gesungen. Bei der Missionierung Koreas wurden westliche – darunter auch einige deutsche – Kirchenlieder eingeführt. Es fällt aber auf, dass im Übertragungsprozess inhaltliche und sprachliche Unterschiede zwischen deutschen und koreanischen Fassungungen auftreten konnten. Auf dieses Geschehen hat die Verfasserin der vorliegenden Studie bei ihrer Tätigkeit als Kirchenmusikerin in Deutschland das Augenmerk gerichtet und es zum Ausgangspunkt ihrer Dissertation gewählt. Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts wurde Korea von anderen Ländern gezwungen, sich zu öffnen. Daraufhin kamen viele Ausländer – unter ihnen auch christliche Missionare – ins Land, die je eine eigene Gesangbuchliteratur mitbrachten. Insbesondere die amerikanische Mission fasste Fuß. Das erste koreanische Gesangbuch Chanmiga wurde im Jahr 1892 veröffentlicht; ihm folgten weitere Ausgaben. In der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts waren amerikanische Missionare Mitherausgeber dieser Gesangbücher. Folgerichtig dominierte westliches Liedgut. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht jene deutschen Kirchenlieder, die vor 1945 in das Koreanische Gesangbuch aufgenommen wurden. Sie fragt danach, auf welche Weise sie übernommen wurden und sich Änderungen bei ihrer Übermittlung vollzogen haben. Methodisch werden Quellen miteinander verglichen, die zum Zeitpunkt der Aufnahme relevant waren. Dank der älteren deutschen, englischen und amerikanischen Gesangbücher, die online und in deutschen Bibliotheken (Online-Archive) freigeschaltet sowie im Gesangbucharchiv Mainz vorhanden sind, ist diese umfangreiche Forschung möglich geworden. Die Bedeutung des Singens ist für die koreanische Christenheit während der Annexion durch Japan (1910-1945) groß gewesen. Sie sang als Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Kirchenlieder, unter denen besonders Martin Luthers Choral Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott unverzichtbar wurde. Aussagen zeitgenössischer Christen belegen seine damalige Beliebtheit. Ein Grund dafür liegt darin, dass in ihm zahlreiche Analogien zur Situation der unterdrückten Koreaner erkennbar waren. Das Lied vermittelte ihnen Trost, Mut und einen festen Gottesglauben. Seine besondere Bedeutung erkannte auch das japanische Regime und verbot es während der gesamten Besatzungszeit. Auch nach 1945 wurden deutsche Kirchenlieder in koreanische Gesangbücher aufgenommen. Ihre Anzahl sank jedoch gegen Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts; das aktuelle Gesangbuch, 21st Century Hymnal, von 2006 enthält nur noch 21. Es ist schließlich festzuhalten, dass Ein feste Burg nicht nur im Gottesdienst, sondern auch im Theater zu hören ist – paradigmatisch in der Oper Son Yang Won, eine Komposition des Kirchenmusikers Chae Hoon Park (*1922) aus dem Jahr 2011. Die Oper trägt den Namen des Märtyrers Yang Won Son (1902-1950) und thematisiert geschichtliche Ereignisse von nationaler Bedeutung: die Problematik der Anarchie, beginnend mit der Landesteilung durch die Sowjetunion und USA in zwei Besatzungszonen 1945 sowie die Yeosu-Sucheon-Rebellion von 1948, organisiert von wenigen kommunistischen Soldaten gegen die südkoreanische Regierung. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, welche Bedeutung das Lied Ein feste Burg in der Oper einnimmt und wie Chae Hoon Park es bearbeitet hat. Die Dissertation beschränkt ihre hymnologische Forschung nicht auf die Übernahme und Rezeption deutscher Kirchenlieder in Korea; sie blickt umgekehrt auch auf die Rezeption koreanischer Gesänge in Deutschland. Durch Begegnungen von deutschen mit koreanischen Christen entstanden bzw. entstehen neue Gesänge und Kompositionen und werden durch ökumenische Gottesdienste und Veranstaltungen verbreitet. Die ökumenische Bewegung bewirkte nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg Änderungen im Liedrepertoire. Gesänge, nicht nur aus England, Europa und Nordamerika, sondern auch aus Afrika, Asien und Südamerika, wurden überall aufgenommen und gesungen. Die aktuellen deutschen und koreanischen Gesangbuchinhalte belegen dies. Die Ausführungen der Studie halten fest, dass religiöse Bewegungen – Missions- und ökumenische Bewegung – bei der Übermittlung althergebrachter und der Entstehung neuer Lieder eine große Rolle spielten. Dies ist anhand der Entwicklung des Koreanischen Gesangbuchs erkennbar. Früher wurden westliche Kirchenlieder von amerikanischen Missionaren nach Korea transferiert; die einheimischen Christen vernachlässigten wiederum ihre eigene Kultur und Musik. Deshalb dominierte für geraume Zeit westlich geprägtes Liedgut. Die Koreanisierung der Kirchenlieder bzw. Gesangbücher wird nun seit einigen Jahrzehnten forciert. Die wachsende kirchenmusikalische Qualifikation koreanischer Musiker, das zunehmend selbstbewusst werdende einheimische Christentum und die ökumenische Öffnung der Kirchen leisten hier wertvolle Beiträge. ; In the hymnological realm, the origin and age-long tradition of German Protestant hymns are of great importance. They have left a great impact in numerous countries. In the 19th century, for example, they were translated into English and have been sung in its language area. By evangelizing Korea, Western – including some German – church hymns were introduced. However, it is noticeable that content and linguistic differences between the German and Korean versions could occur in the translation process. As a church musician in Germany, the author of this study paid attention to this aspect and chose it as the starting point for this dissertation. At the end of the 19th century, Korea was forced, by other countries, to open. As a result, many foreigners – including Christian missionaries – came to the country who brought their own hymnals. Especially the American mission gained a foothold. The first Korean hymnal Chanmiga was published in 1892, followed by further editions. In the first half of the 20th century, American missionaries were co-editors of these hymnals. Consequently, Western hymn repertoire dominated. This dissertation examines those German church hymns that were included in the Korean hymnals before 1945. It explores the questions of how they were adapted and how changes took place in their transmission. Methodologically, sources were compared that were relevant at the time of adaption. This extensive research was possible thanks to the older German, English, and American hymnals that are available online and in German libraries (online archives) as well as in the Gesangbucharchiv (Hymnal Archive) Mainz. The importance of singing was great for Korean Christians during the annexation by Japan (1910-1945). In the independence movement, they sang church hymns; among them, especially Martin Luther's chorale Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott was indispensable. Statements by contemporary Christians prove its popularity at that time. One reason for this is that it shows numerous analogies to the situation of the oppressed Koreans. The church hymn gave them comfort, courage, and a firm belief in God. The Japanese regime also recognized its particular importance and banned it during the entire occupation. German church hymns were also adapted after 1945. However, their number decreased towards the end of the 20th century; the current hymnal 21st Century Hymnal of 2006 contains only 21. It is to note that one can hear Ein feste Burg not only in the worship service, but also in theatre. It occurs paradigmatically in the opera Son Yang Won, a composition from 2011 by Korean church musician Chae Hoon Park (born 1922). The opera has the name of the martyr Yang Won Son (1902-1950) as its title and thematizes historical events of national importance: the problem of anarchy, beginning with the division of the country by the Soviet Union and the United States into two occupation zones in 1945 and the Yeosu-Sucheon-Rebellion of 1948, organized by a few communist soldiers against the South Korean government. This study examines the meaning of the hymn Ein feste Burg in the opera and how Chae Hoon Park arranged it. This dissertation does not restrict its hymnological research to the adaption and reception of German church hymns in Korea, but it also deals with the reception of Korean hymns in Germany. Because of meeting between German and Korean Christians, new songs and composition have been composed, and they have been spreading through ecumenical church services and events. The ecumenical movement has caused changes in the song repertoire after World War II. Songs, not only from England, Europe, and North America, but also from Africa, Asia, and South America, have been adapted and sung everywhere. The current German and Korean hymnals prove it. Though the examinations in this study, it is shown that religious movements – missionary and ecumenical movements – played as a major role in the transmission of traditional church hymns and in the creation of new songs. This can be seen in the development of the Korean hymnals. In the past, Western church hymns were transferred by American missionaries to Korea, whereby the Korean Christians neglected their own culture and music. Therefore, Western hymns dominated for some time. In the most recent decades, the Koreanization of hymns and hymnals has been intensified. The growing qualification of Korean church musicians, the increasingly self-assured native Christianity, and the ecumenical opening of the churches make valuable contributions here.

Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg von 1936 bis 1939 war, wenngleich das hierzulande mitunter übersehen wird, ein bedeutsames historisches Zwischenspiel, dessen Implikationen und Konsequenzen weit über die Landesgrenzen Spaniens hinausreichten. In ihrer Dissertationsschrift spürt die Literatur- und Medienwissenschaftlerin Daniela Kuschel der Aufarbeitung des Bürgerkrieges in populärkulturellen Produkten nach. Eines vorweg: Dieses Buch beruht auf einer Dissertationsschrift. Es ist sinnvoll, auf diesen Umstand hinzuweisen, da derartige Publikationen die Charakteristika wissenschaftlicher Qualifikationsschriften recht deutlich umsetzen. Das betrifft in diesem Fall nicht lediglich Aufbau und Struktur der Arbeit (mit einer Unterteilung zwischen theoretischer Aufarbeitung der jeweiligen Themenbereiche, gefolgt von ausführlichen Analyseteilen), sondern etwa auch den Umstand, dass die zahlreichen Zitate ausschließlich in Spanischer Sprache gebracht werden. Ein Umstand, der auch gleich etwas über die Stoßrichtung des Buches verrät: Die Autorin wendet sich explizit an eine Leser*innenschaft, die ein spezielles Interesse für das verhandelte Thema mitbringt. In Anbetracht der hohen Komplexität des Spanischen Bürgerkriegs ist das nicht die schlechteste Strategie. Wäre das nicht so, müsste man wohl einen weit umfangreicheren Einleitungsteil voranstellen. Kuschel springt stattdessen direkt ins Feld. Ihre Einleitung gilt demnach nicht dem Kriegsverlauf oder dessen Vorbedingungen, sondern dem für ihre Analyse wesentlichen Bereich der Aufarbeitung und der Erinnerungskultur. Hier liegt dann auch gleich eine Stärke dieser Arbeit. Ziemlich genau das erste Drittel des Buches lässt sich als solides Arbeitsbuch verstehen. In atemberaubendem Tempo jongliert Kuschel die maßgebende Referenzliteratur, stellt Entwicklungslinien dar, streicht Tendenzen und Moden heraus. Dabei nimmt sie oft auch Bezug auf Analysen anderer Ereignisse mit traumatischer Qualität, allen voran des Zweiten Weltkriegs und des Holocausts. Ein Vergleich, der einerseits der Quellenlage geschuldet ist, andererseits dabei hilft, das eigentliche Thema der Arbeit, das im deutschsprachigen Raum keine herausragende Aufmerksamkeit erfährt, besser zu verorten.Nach dieser profunden und gekonnten Abhandlung, widmet sich die Autorin ihrem zu untersuchenden Material. Für die Gattung der erzählenden Literatur sind dies zwei Werke: Soldados de Salamina (2001) von Javier Cercas undLa comedia salvaje (2009) von José Ovejero. Ersterer Roman ist bereits so etwas wie ein Referenzwerk jener spanischen Bürgerkriegsliteratur, deren Autor*innen der Nachgeborenengeneration angehören. Cercas, Schriftsteller und Literaturwissenschaftler ist Jahrgang 1962, war also zum Ende der Franco-Diktatur (1975) gerade einmal dem Kindesalter entwachsen. Wichtig ist das deshalb, weil mit diesem Generationswechsel eine Diskussion über einen Wandel der Erzählweisen in der Bürgerkriegsliteratur einhergeht, für den Cercas Roman als beispielhaft gilt.Man muss hierfür kurz ausholen: Soldados de Salamina beruht auf einer formalen Dreiteilung des Textes in Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Nachgeschichte. Das Herzstück bildet dabei eine Episode um den Schriftsteller und Falange-Mitbegründer Rafael Sánchez Mazas, der in den letzten Tagen des Bürgerkriegs seiner Erschießung entkommen kann und dessen Leben in Folge von einem republikanischen Soldaten geschont wird. Die Vorgeschichte ist die des fiktiven (!) Cercas, der sich des Themas annimmt, die Nachgeschichte die des republikanischen Soldaten, dem Sánchez Mazas sein Leben zu verdanken hat, und den der (abermals fiktive) Cercas ausfindig zu machen versucht. Das Buch wurde ein riesiger Erfolg. Nicht zuletzt, weil – wie Kuschel für alle von ihr verhandelten Werke präzise ausführt – Spanien zu dieser Zeit inmitten einer leidenschaftlich geführten Diskussion um die Erinnerungskultur an den Bürgerkrieg steckte (und im Grunde noch immer steckt). Die Beschäftigung eines als politisch links verorteten Autors mit dem rechten Ideologen Sánchez Mazas, dessen Charakterisierung noch dazu nicht ausschließlich negativ ausfiel, war ein beachtliches Wagnis. Wer es guthieß, sprach von einer historischen und notwendigen Versöhnung der beiden Lager, wer nicht, von Verrat. Sicher scheint dabei vor allem eines: Die Polemik hat der Popularität des Romans nicht geschadet. Die bereits erörterte Erzählperspektive, die Cercas geschickt anwendet, um die unvermeidliche Fiktionalisierung eines weit zurückliegenden Ereignisses im Text selbst erfahrbar zu machen, fand große Zustimmung und machte das Buch rasch zu einem Referenzwerk. So weit, so bekannt. Kuschel referiert all diese Stationen ausführlich. So gut die Autorin es auch vermag, bekannte Stimmen zusammenzufassen, so wenig versteht sie es, eigenes hinzuzufügen oder gar zu widersprechen. Ordentlich reiht sie Beleg an Beleg, bemüht Literaturwissenschaft und -kritik. Was gelobt wurde, lobt auch sie, was kritisiert wurde, streicht auch sie negativ hervor. Dabei wäre eine derart affirmative Haltung gar nicht notwendig, ist zu diesem Roman doch noch lange nicht alles gesagt. Und auch nicht alles, was gesagt wurde, muss widerspruchslos hingenommen werden. So ließe sich etwa die durchwegs als positiv gewertete Erzählstrategie auch kritisch hinterfragen. Wenn der reale Javier Cercas einen fiktiven Javier Cercas einführt, um durch dieses selbstreflexive, die Fiktion entzaubernde Manöver einer vermittelnden Instanz Rechnung zu tragen – und seinen Text von der Masse der Bürgerkriegsromane abzuheben – ist dies, so ließe sich argumentieren, nichts anderes als der Versuch, den sprichwörtlichen Teufel mit dem Beelzebub auszutreiben: Eine Fiktion soll eine andere retten. Alles andere wäre nämlich kein Roman mehr. Spätestens an dieser Stelle wäre dann die Brücke zu Enzensbergers Der kurze Sommer der Anarchie (1972) zu schlagen. Ein bis heute weit herausragendes Werk, das – auf Interviews beruhend und eben doch auch als Roman ausgewiesen – das Verhältnis zwischen Fiktion und authentischem Zeugnis am Beispiel der Biographie des berühmten Anarchisten Buenaventura Durruti genau von der entgegengesetzten Richtung her befragt. Dass weder dieses Werk, noch andere vergleichbare Referenztexte (etwa von George Orwell oder Franz Borkenau) Erwähnung finden, mag verwundern, kann aber kein Zufall sein. Stattdessen lässt sich die Autorin gleich zweimal dazu hinreißen, einer Kritik am "emotionalen Ende" von Soldados de Salamina stattzugeben (S. 70 und 82). Hier scheint – einmal mehr – ein Missverständnis zwischen Literaturkritik und Literaturwissenschaft zu bestehen. Ganz so, als ob es die Aufgabe Letzterer wäre, zu entscheiden, wann ein Autor/eine Autorin "emotional" – ohne zu belegen, was das überhaupt sein soll – schreiben dürfe, und wann nicht. Dabei gäbe es an Cercas Roman auch konkret Belegbares zu kritisieren: das nachgerade erschreckende Frauenbild etwa, das dieses sonst so bemerkenswerte Buch begleitet. Doch darüber kein Wort. Fraglich bleibt bei all dem also das Warum. Alles was man hier liest, ist bereits bestens bekannt, zähltSoldados de Salamina doch seit bald zwanzig Jahren zu den am eifrigsten verhandelten Beiträgen der Bürgerkriegsliteratur. Ganz anders beim zweiten Beispiel zeitgenössischer Literatur. Allein die Wahl des WerksLa comedia salvaje ist ein guter Griff, ist der Roman des im deutschen Sprachraum wenig bekannten Autors José Ovejero von der Literaturwissenschaft bisher doch kaum beachtet worden. Das holt Kuschel nun nach. Gründlich beleuchtet sie dieses mit Querverweisen, Referenzen und Zitaten gespickte – vielleicht auch überladene – Werk, das von der Frage nach der Bedeutung von Geschichten und deren Wahrheitsgehalt durchzogen wird. Nicht umsonst lautet der erste Satz des Buches "¡Todo es mentira!, Alles ist Lüge!", um im nächsten Moment eine ausladende, bildsprachlich überhöhte Eröffnungsszene folgen zu lassen, in der Blut, Staub, Schmutz, schlechter Atem, würgende Griffe, eingeschlafene und abgerissene Extremitäten und schließlich gar Gottes Abwesenheit bemüht werden, um die Gräuel eines Krieges sprachlich zu fassen. Eine implizite und weniger offensichtliche Form – gleichzeitig ein Kontrapunkt zur betont nüchternen Sprache eines Javier Cercas – die für erzählende Literatur notwendige Fiktionalisierung zu thematisieren. Kuschel analysiert diesen Ansatz anhand ausgewählter Szenen und kann dabei das einlösen, was sie bei Cercas Roman verfehlt hat. Gleichzeitig leistet sie Pionierarbeit. Zumindest in Bezug auf diesen Abschnitt der Arbeit geht allerdings ihr Titel fehl: Ovejero und Cercas mögen vieles sein, Vertreter einer Populärkultur sind sie nicht. (Ein Off-topic Hinweis sei an dieser Stelle erlaubt: Ovejeros fesselnder Wirtschaftskrimi Las vidas ajenas (2005) ist ein Meisterwerk der multiperspektivischen Erzählkunst und ein guter Einstieg in das Oeuvre des Autors.) Sehr wohl aus dem Bereich der Populärkultur stammen hingegen die in Folge untersuchten filmischen Arbeiten. Kuschel hat hierfür drei Beispiele gewählt. Einerseits La espinaza del diablo (2001) undEl laberinto del fauno (2006) des aus Mexiko stammenden, mittlerweile mit einem Oscar bedachten Regisseurs Guillermo del Toro, undLa balada triste de la trompeta (2010) des spanischen Kult-Regisseurs Alex de la Iglesia. Die drei Arbeiten eint, dass sie den Spanischen Bürgerkrieg nicht explizit adressieren, sondern als Hintergrund für andere Erzählungen verhandeln. Aus Kuschels Analyse spricht dann eine ähnliche Ambivalenz, wie sie schon in Hinblick auf die Romanbeispiele bemerkbar wurde: Es besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass die Autorin ihr Feld überblickt und ihre Materialien genauestens kennt. Ihre Einführung, in der sie relevante Literatur und die daran anknüpfenden Diskurse beleuchtet, ist vorbildlich, die eigentliche Analyse fällt dann trotzdem zwiespältig aus. Umfangreich recherchierte biografische und filmische Daten reihen sich an seminararbeitsähnliche Inhaltsangaben und genrespezifische Ergänzungen – im Falle von de la Iglesia etwa Betrachtungen zur Bedeutung der Groteske in Literatur, Theater und Malerei. Auch werden die Filme gründlich auf ihre Anschlussfähigkeit in Bezug auf die einleitend diskutierten Fragestellungen einer aktuellen Erinnerungskultur überprüft. Und dennoch: Nach mehr als sechzig Seiten, die die Autorin diesem Abschnitt widmet, fragt man sich, was denn nun die Erkenntnis dieser Analyse, was denn nun das Besondere an den so umfangreich untersuchten Filmen sein soll. Vergleichsweise präzise fällt ein Kapitel über den Comic aus. Nach einer Einführung in das Thema unter besonderer Beachtung der spanischen Tradition als auch der thematischen Orientierung an Werken, die Kriege thematisieren, wobei Art Spiegelmans bekannter Comic über die Shoah (MAUS, 1989) als Referenzpunkt dient, wendet sich Kuschel dem Comic1936 – La batalla de Madrid zu. Dass sie in diesem Fall bei einem einzigen Werk bleibt, erweist sich als Vorteil. Kuschel macht den 2014 erschienen Comic, in dem der in Bedrängnis geratenen Republik eine Einheit von Superhelden zur Hilfe eilt, als Werk begreifbar, das seine genretypische, offensichtliche Vermittlungsstruktur nutzt, um dem Postulat des Historisch-Authentischen erzählerische Freiheiten abzutrotzen und tradierte Mythen zu hinterfragen. Nun kann man die hier wirksamen Genrespezifika der Superheldencomics US-amerikanischer Prägung mögen oder nicht, die Analyse macht jedenfalls Neugierig auf das untersuchte Werk und beweist, dass mitunter auch eine Fallstudie reichen kann, um ein ganzes Genre zu umreißen. (Hinweis: Michel Matlys OpusEl cómic sobre la guerra Civil wäre das Gegenprogramm dazu.) Nicht zufällig widmet sich das letzte Kapitel des Buches der Welt des Videospiels. Hieraus sei nur ein Gedanke hervorgehoben, der in seiner Dimension jedoch noch einmal all das umfasst, was dieses Buch sich zu untersuchen vorgenommen hat: "Tú decides la historia, Du entscheidest die Geschichte", der Marketingslogan des ComputerspielsSombras de Guerra bringt das Missverhältnis zwischen Spiel (das per Definition einen offenen Ausgang haben muss) und historischer Authentizität deutlich auf den Punkt. Eben diesen Widerspruch problematisiert die Autorin am Schluss ihrer Arbeit. Derartige Computerspiele erscheinen ihr dabei als Antwort auf sich verändernde Bedürfnisse in Hinblick auf eine kollektive Identitätsbildung und Erinnerungskultur, wobei einer damit eihergehenden Offenheit von Geschichte Tendenzen der Banalisierung und Enttabuisierung entgegengehalten werden. Wie eingangs angemerkt, beruht Kuschels Buch auf einer Dissertationsschrift. Das ist in diesem Fall auch ein bisschen eine vergebene Chance. Etwas abgespeckt, dem bemüht akademischen Duktus enthoben und gründlich lektoriert, hätte so ein Standardwerk für den untersuchten Gegenstandsbereich entstehen können. Was bleibt, ist ein solides Arbeitsbuch, das vor allem durch seine Einführungen in die untersuchten Genres und die Aufarbeitung eines aktuellen Forschungsstandes besticht. Literatur: Borkenau, Franz: Kampfplatz Spanien. Politische und soziale Konflikte im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1986 [orig. 1937]. Cercas, Javier: Soldados de Salamina, Barcelona: Tusquets 2008. Enzensberger, Hans Magnus: Der kurze Sommer der Anarchie. Buenaventura Durrutis Leben und Tod, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1972. Jiménez, Rafael/Sollero, José Antonio: 1936 La batalla de Madrid, Córdoba: Almuzara 2014. Orwell, George: Mein Katalonien. Bericht über den Spanischen Bürgerkrieg, Zürich: Diogenes 1975 [orig. 1938]. Malty, Michel: El cómic sobre la guerra civil, Madrid: Cátedra 2018. Ovejero, José: La comedia salvaje, Madrid: Alfaguara 2009. Ovejero, José: Las vidas ajenas, Madrid: Espasa 2005.

Aquesta tesi s'emmarca en l'espai polític etíop i abasta cronològicament la fase 1855-1930. Es tracta d'una anàlisi al voltant de les transformacions que es produeixen entre els regnats de Tewódros II (1855-1868) i Menelik II (1889-1913), on els principals eixos d'estudi són la tradició i la modernitat. La qüestió que s'hi planteja és: Que té l'espai polític etíop anterior a la coronació de Haile Sellassie d'estat modern i quina presència real te el model cultural i polític associat al salomonisme? Tot mirant de respondre a aquesta qüestió clau, s'hi analitzen altres temes que són complementaris i que d'alguna manera, es dedueixen del binomi modernitat-tradició. Entre aquests hi ha la batalla d'Adwa (1896) com a element fundador d'aquesta modernitat, o bé, de forma més diluïda el procés de Statebuilding dut a terme per Tewódros II, Yohannes IV i Menelik II, cadascú amb el seu propi projecte d'estat. Una altra qüestió que requereix atenció és el desplegament de l'autoritat de la reialesa: com a aquesta a través d'una sèrie de mecanismes es legitima, per mitjà del discurs escrit, però també per mitjà de l'escenografia del poder i de la selecció de determinades accions d'ordre polític. També caldrà analitzar les relacions entre el centre de poder i els centres secundaris, entre la capital i les províncies, entre totes elles i la perifèria immediata- o suburbial- i la que es troba més allunyada. Tot plegat va lligat amb els discursos sobre el poder i també emesos des d'aquest i té a veure amb l'apropiació i exercici d'una determinada narrativa històrica i un projecte de país. La investigació es recolza, a més a més d'un estudi del país com a realitat política en transformació a partir de textos històrics, en l'anàlisi comparatiu d'estudis de cas, tot comparant el procés abissini amb Egipte, Oman-Zanzíbar i Madagascar al llarg del s. XIX. Certament, l'aplicació i anàlisi d'estudis de cas permet establir una mesura qualitativa del grau d'implantació de la modernització a la llum de les grans transformacions del segle i de la penetració d'idees que en el llarg recorregut degotegen al continent des dels inicis de la presència europea. ; Esta tesis se enmarca en el espacio político etíope y abarca cronológicamente la fase 1855-1930. Se trata de un análisis en torno a las transformaciones que se produjeron entre los reinados de Tewodros II (1855-1868) y Menelik II (1889-1913), tomando como principal eje de estudio la tradición y la modernidad. La cuestión que se plantea es: ¿Qué tiene el espacio político etíope anterior a la coronación de Haile Sellassie de estado moderno y qué presencia real tiene el modelo cultural y político asociado al Salomonismo? Además de tratar de responder a esta cuestión clave, se analizan otros temas que son complementarios y que de alguna manera, se deducen del binomio modernidad-tradición. Entre estos está la batalla de Adwa (1896) como elemento fundador de esta modernidad, o si se prefiere, de forma más diluida, el proceso de Statebuilding llevado a cabo por Tewodros II, Yohannes IV y Menelik II, cada uno con su propio proyecto de estado. Otra cuestión que requiere atención es el despliegue de la autoridad de la realeza: como esta se legitima a través de una serie de mecanismos, recurriendo al discurso escrito, la escenografía del poder – el llamado Estado Teatral- y la elección de determinadas acciones de orden político. También habrá que analizar las relaciones entre el centro de poder y los centros secundarios, entre la capital y las provincias, entre todas ellas y la periferia inmediatamente suburbial- y la que se encuentra más alejada. Todo ello va ligado con los discursos sobre el poder y también emitidos desde este y tiene que ver con la apropiación y ejercicio de una determinada narrativa histórica y un proyecto de país. La investigación se apoya, además de un estudio del país como realidad política en transformación a partir de textos históricos, en el análisis comparativo de estudios de caso, comparando el proceso abisinio con Egipto, Omán-Zanzíbar y Madagascar a lo largo del s. XIX. Ciertamente, la aplicación y análisis de estudios de caso permite establecer una medida cualitativa del grado de implantación de la modernización a la luz de las grandes transformaciones del siglo, tomando en consideración que el concepto, "modernización" se refiera aquí principalmente a la penetración de ideas, proceso de largo recorrido que se remonta a los orígenes y gradual implantación de la presencia europea en el continente africano. ; The present thesis focuses on the Horn of Africa as a political region, between mid-nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It analyses the developments that took place between the reigns of Tewodros II (1855-1868) and Menelik II (1889-1913). This paper stresses the relevance of the relationship between tradition and modernity. The question at stake is: To what extent is the political Ethiopian entity prior to Haile Sellassie's coronation a modern state and how much is there of the political and cultural tradition associated with Neo-Salomonism? While trying to answer this two fold question, other issues will be analyzed. These issues are complementary and can be inferred from the binomial relationship that arises from tradition and modernity. Among them, the Batlle of Adwa (1896), which can be considered a hallmark in the modernizing process, along with Tewódros II's, Yohannes IV's and Menelik II's efforts, each of them including variations of a wider state-building scheme. Another issue that requires attention is the different ways in which royal authority deploys itself through written speech, the selection of different political strategies and mechanisms, and finally, royal etiquette and ritual, that is: the Theater State. The existing connections between the capital city and the provincial centers, the central and the local levels of power, what is the immediate periphery and the regions that fall far from the center need also to be discussed. The methodology used is based on thorough research of textual analysis of primary and secondary sources. Some case studies are considered in the light of changes occurring throughout the 19th Century in East Africa. The chosen case-studies refer to Egypt at the time of Muhammad Ali and Khedive Ismail, the sultanate of Oman-Zanzibar and, finally, Madagascar in the years before the French conquest. Certainly, a regional and synchronic approach through case-study analysis should help to establish a qualitative measure of the degree of modernization in the light of the great transformations of the century. Finally, it must be said that this modernization process is seen not from the traditional evolutionary perspective, but rather, a penetration of ideas and gradual transformation of local cultures, which began with the early contacts with European travelers.

Розкрито суспільне, художнє, моральне значення щорічних Міжнародних Пасхальних асамблей, їх сутність і своєрідність, виражені в гаслі «Духовність єднає Україну», зокрема особливості ювілейної Х Асамблеї – 2018. Докладно розглянуто зміст її заходів – музичних діалогів; концертів, присвячених ювілеям видатних композиторів і виконавців; Першого конкурсу скрипалів імені Богодара Которовича; благодійної програми «Вірою, надією єдині»; охарактеризовано їх програми, творчий шлях колективів та окремих виконавців, які взяли участь у цих заходах. Х Міжнародна Пасхальна асамблея – 2018 «Духовність єднає Україну» справді стала грандіозним святом духовності та єднання українського суспільства. У цьому переконують творчі виступи, концерти не лише в концертних залах Києва, а й у Софії Київській, Михайлівському Золотоверхому Соборі, Успенському соборі Києво-Печерської Лаври, Патріаршому соборі Воскресіння Христового, у Храмі Василя Великого. У цих заходах виявилося прагнення людей жити в мирі і злагоді. Український політикум усе більше переконується в тому, що краще неспокійний мир, ніж жахи воєнного лихоліття. Це має стати нормою для України! Висока гуманістична ідея Пасхальних асамблей спрямована на утвердження стабільності, миру і благополуччя в нашій країні. ; Relevance of research. In the twenty-first century some profound socio-political, economic, and spiritual shifts have become the realities of life both in Ukraine and the world. They not only open up perspectives for the socio-cultural progress of mankind, but also create crises in all spheres of life. State activity in the field of spirituality as well as artistic and aesthetic integrity of Ukrainian society should be aimed at overcoming destructive processes of stagnation and instability, humanization of universal moral and spiritual values, revival of Ukrainian national culture. An important role in this is related to the annual International Easter Assembly "Spirituality unites Ukraine".The purpose of the research is to reveal the social, artistic, and moral significance of the annual International Easter Assemblies, their essence and peculiarity, expressed in the slogan "Spirituality unites Ukraine". Particularly it has been pointed out the properties of this event from the point of view of its jubilee Tenth Assembly-2018. The author has described in detail the content of its events, expressed by musical dialogues, concerts devoted to the anniversaries of prominent composers and performers. The first Bogodar Kotorovych Contest of violinists, the charity program "Unity in faith and hope" were characterized with a detailed description of the program, the creative path of the teams and individual performers who took part in these events.The methodology of the study provides an analytical review of the main activities that took place during the jubilee Tenth Assembly-2018. The scientific novelty of the study consists in the fact that it first characterized the performances of leading performing groups that took part in this international event. Their creative peculiarity has been revealed in connection with the embodiment of the author's design. The importance of musical dialogues introduced with the assistance of Embassies of foreign states accredited in Ukraine has been emphasized. This is a quite new form of international cultural cooperation, the purpose of which is the spiritual rapprochement of nations and nationalities, the popularization of the cultures of different peoples. During the Tenth International Easter Assembly in 2018, ten dialogues were held with the participation of performers from Italy, Hungary, the USA, Lithuania, France, Israel, Germany and other countries. There were creative performances, concerts not only in the concert halls of Kiev, but also in Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, St. Michael's Cathedral, the Assumption Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ, at the Church of Basil the Great.The tradition of the Easter assemblies has become a honoring of prominent figures of musical culture. On April 17, 2018, a jubilee concert by Georgiy Agrathin "Musician-Magician" took place in the Great Hall of the Academy on his 70th anniversary with the participation of the National Orchestra of Folk Instruments of Ukraine (headed by V. Gutsal).The concluding Gala Concert of the winners of the 8th All-Ukrainian Television Children's Song Festival-Competition "Solovyenko of Ukraine" was the bright event of the Assembly. On 22nd April 2018, the First All-Ukrainian Bogodar Kotorovych Violinist Competition also has begun. The organizers of the contest are Petro Tchaikovsky National Music Academy of Ukraine with the support of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, the National Union of Composers of Ukraine, and the All-Ukrainian Foundation for International Communication "Ukrainian National Embassy", the National All-Ukrainian Music Union. The jury consists of well-known violinists from Ukraine, France, Poland, and Great Britain – students of the outstanding Maestro.The Grand Concert "Opera in the Academy" was dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Opera Studio of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. P. I. Tchaikovsky. This is a unique creative unit for the preparation of musicians of the world level. There is a spectator hall for 800 seats with a technically equipped stage, it has all the necessary theatrical workshops (decorative, lighting, sound, dressing room, engineering, costume, etc.), artistic, rehearsal and auxiliary premises. The artistic level of performances is provided by the constantly functioning choir, orchestra, ballet and mimic corpses; the production group – conductors, directors, artists, chormeisters, choreographers, concertmasters, who are outstanding persons of the musical theater. Academy educators and talented youth, winners of national and international artistic competitions and festivals constantly take part in all the productions and performances of the Opera Studio.The Opera Studio is not only an important academic unit of the Academy, but also a worldclass artistic center. On its scene there were many all-Ukrainian and international festivals and contests aimed at solving not only creative, artistic, but also social tasks, in particular to overcome confrontations and discord, spiritual impoverishment, depreciation of artistic heritage, national history. Among them there are international festivals "Vivat, Academia", "Italian Baroque in Ukraine", All-Ukrainian competitions of choral conductors and pianists of the firm "C. Bechstein", International Easter Assembly "Spirituality unites Ukraine".Findings and Conclusions. The Tenth International Easter Assembly-2018 "Spirituality unites Ukraine" has indeed become a grand holiday of spirituality and unity of Ukrainian society. It has revealed the desire of people to live in peace and harmony. ; Раскрыто общественное, художественное, моральное значение ежегодных Международных Пасхальных ассамблей, их сущность и своеобразие, выраженные в месседже «Духовность объединяет Украину», а также особенности юбилейной Х Ассамблеи-2018. Детально рассмотрено содержание её многообразных мероприятий – музыкальных диалогов, концертов, посвящённых юбилеям видающихся композиторов и исполнителей, Первого конкурса скрипачей имени Богодара Которовича, благотворительной программы «Верой, надеждой едины», охарактеризованы их программы, творческий путь коллективов и отдельных исполнителей, принявших участие в этих мероприятиях. Х Международная Пасхальная ассамблея-2018 «Духовность объединяет Украину» действительно стала грандиозным праздником духовности и единения украинского общества. В этом убеждают творческие выступления, концерты не только в концертных залах Киева, но и в Софии Киевской, Михайловском Золотоглавом Соборе, Успенском соборе Киево-Печерской Лавры, Патриаршем соборе Воскресения Христового, в Храме Василия Великого. В этих мероприятиях нашло своё выражение стремление людей жить в мире и согласии. Украинский политикум все больше убеждается в том, что лучше неспокойный мир, нежели ужасы войны. Это должно стать нормой для Украины! Высокая гуманистическая идея Пасхальных ассамблей направлена на утверждение стабильности, мира и благоденствия в нашей стране.

[spa] La investigación «Fronteras y transmigraciones del diálogo intercultural: implicancias del acto educativo como acción estética y emancipadora» consiste en el diseño (en el marco de la metodología de modelización ecosistémica) de un proyecto pedagógico (investigativo/interventivo) cuyo objetivo es reflexionar críticamente acerca de los elementos fundamentales de la educación en perspectiva intercultural y dialógica. En tal sentido, se documentan algunas reflexiones episte-metodo-lógicas acerca de temáticas relevantes en este campo. Éstas se han trabajado en paralelo (e interconexión) a una serie de acciones socioeducativas en ámbitos formales e informales de la ciudad de Barcelona. En relación a las temáticas de interés investigativo, se abordan (en los capítulos respectivos) una serie de cuestiones importantes, a saber, los debates acerca de las diferencias entre las tradiciones multi e intercultural; el desarrollo de la filosofía intercultural durante las últimas décadas; las formas de la inteligibilidad (en ocho metáforas) del fenómeno intercultural; la alfabetización intercultural como referente teórico de la acción socioeducativa; también lo referente entre interculturalidad, hermenéutica diatópica e intertextualidad; se propone, por otra parte, hacer explícito el marco constituyente entre cultura y alteridad entendido como fundamento de principio del pensamiento intercultural; además se realiza un compendio de las conceptualizaciones en relación a la "cultura" en las tradiciones humanista y antropológica, y su traducción pedagógica en términos de vecindad e imaginación; lo anterior a la luz de las implicaciones que tiene la noción de la experiencia para la investigación educativa, y la compresión de la metodología como una forma de tekné. Como se señaló previamente, estas inquietudes son concurrentes a la formulación y ejecución de una serie de acciones socioeducativas en la ciudad de Barcelona: 1. La participación en la fundación Migra Studium en cuatro escenarios: el grupo de visitas y monitoreo al Centro de internamiento para extranjeros (CIE) de Barcelona, la construcción del programa de parejas lingüísticas "Alliberar la paraula", el montaje (junto al colectivo de teatro La Trilateral) de la obra "Ramon Llull a la ciutat nova", y el diseño de los espacios de "Espai de Trobada Intercultural". 2. La participación en la Comisión de Pedagogía de la Comunidad de Aprendizaje (Escola Coves d` En Cimany), los grupos interactivos, y la ejecución del proyecto comunitario "Las nuevas aventuras de las bacterias cromáticas". 3. La colaboración (en la organización) y participación en el encuentro "Imaginarios desarmados. Arte y exilio", que tuvo por objetivo apoyar los acuerdos de Paz de la Habana (entre el gobierno colombiano y las fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia) junto a un grupo de colombianos (y otros aliados) residentes en Barcelona. 4. Por último, la participación como profesor invitado a los seminarios de antropología para estudiantes de educación social y pedagogía de la UB (campus Mundet). Desde la complementariedad de estos niveles se delimita la hipótesis de trabajo de investigación, que se formuló tardíamente como «la (im) posibilidad de una educación intercultural». Esta consideración se expone en la introducción. Con base en esta hipótesis se invita a la filosofía de la educación, esto es, a la pedagogía, a convenir en un pacto donde poner entre paréntesis esas (im) posibilidades, entendidas en tanto retos pedagógicos. En otras palabras, se pone en consideración que establecer una agenda educativa sobre el diálogo intercultural se trata de un asunto que reviste unos retos significativos. De los cuales el principal sería estimar el pedagógico de dicha educación, dígase a propósito de los principios sobre los que se fundamenta. Esta reflexión se pone en contraste (e interlocución) con la discusión política sobre la posibilidad de una ciudadanía mundial, principalmente teniendo en cuenta algunas consideraciones acerca del arraigo, la solidaridad, la globalización y el cosmopolitismo. Acá se marca un escenario de complejidad. En el prefacio se establece que la "esperanza" pedagógica frente a las (im) posibilidades se enriquece en la analogía del "intercambio epistolar" (entendido como correspondencia en la amistad). A partir de estas consideraciones se propone a la correspondencia y la amistad como fundamentos del diálogo intercultural. En esto orden de ideas, se plantea comprender el horizonte de la interculturalidad en la perspectiva de una política de los afectos: donde los sujetos políticos son capaces de pactar alianzas. Lo que aparece de nuevo como interpelación sobre el alcance de esas alianzas, pregunta fundamental para la pedagogía que piensa la educación intercultural. Como cuando Gonzalo Arango afirmaba: "Ni usted ni yo necesitamos presentación. Tenemos tres cosas en común: esta tierra, la vida y la muerte. En eso somos semejantes, casi amigos." ; [eng] This research entitled points to design a pedagogical ecosystem modeling, consisting on a research/intervention project. It aims to enhance the critical pedagogical reflection on intercultural and dialogical education. Several subjects are documented to achieve it, including episte- methodological issues, which have been connected to formal and informal educational actions performed in Barcelona city. Concerning to the key conceptual topics important issues are addressed, namely, multi and intercultural discussions; last decades' intercultural philosophy developments; eight metaphorical interculturality understandings; intercultural literacy and socio-educational action; intertextuality and diatopical hermeneutics; culture and alterity as a intercultural constituent framework; humanistic and anthropological approaches to culture, and its pedagogical translation as neighborhood and imagination based on the experience`s role on systemic modeling methodological tradition. As previously noted, these concerns were linked to a number of socio-educational actions: 1. NGOs participation on four Migra Studium scenarios: the CIE´s visit and monitoring Group, linguistics couples program "Alliberar la paraula", design and execution on "Ramon Lllull a la Ciutat nova" social theater project, and the involvement on the intercultural space meetings "Espai de Trobada Intercultural". 2. Learning- Community contributions on pedagogical commission, interactive groups, and the project execution "Las nuevas aventuras de las bacterias cromáticas" (supported by the school Coves d´ En Cimany and Juan Marse´s neighborhood library). 3. "Imaginarios desarmados. Arte y Exilio" collaborations, which aimed to build community alliance around the Havana Agreements between Colombian government and Farc´s Guerrilla. 4. University of Barcelona Guest Professor on Anthropology classes. Related to this complementary "between-levels" analysis, the research hypothesis, which was later formulated, is defined as follows: . Based on this rhetoric statement an invitation is required to pedagogy: to put in parentheses those impossibilities as if were pedagogical challenges. In other words, establishing an educational agenda concerning to intercultural dialogue poses significant challenges. The main would be estimating it´s pedagogical «scope» based on certain principles. To make a contrast on this idea, some political arguments about world citizenship are brought: roots, solidarity, globalization and cosmopolitism. A complex scenario is thus marked. Because of these impossibilities, a pedagogical hope is suggested: as an analogy (to an exchange symbol) based on an epistolary frame. Correspondence and friendship notions are highlighted from this idea. Furthermore, an affections politics is proposed in this sense: the political subject´s power is thus understood as the ability to pact alliances. In short, pedagogical hope is referred to solidarity and potential arrangements. Both values whose "devaluation" appears worrisome, but involve the possible, as Gonzalo Arango used to say: "Neither You nor I need an introduction. We all have three common things: the land, life and death. Places where at least We are similar, almost friends."

Der 'Avantgardefilm' – ein vielfach gebrauchter Begriff um innovative Kunstströmungen zu verorten, die ihrer Zeit voraus sind. Der 'Avantgardefilm'– ein vielfach missbrauchter Begriff um bestimmte Kunstwerke zu nobilitieren und von anderen Werken abzuheben. Dieses theoretische Korsett bricht Gabriele Jutz mit ihrer nun veröffentlichten Habilitationsschrift Cinéma brut. Eine alternative Genealogie der Filmavantgarde auf und kreiert mit äußerster Präzision einen neuartigen Blickwinkel im verhärteten 'Avantgardefilm-Diskurs'. Zum Einstieg rekapituliert Jutz die bis dato dominanten Avantgardetheorien des "Purismus", deren Programm es ist die 'Reinheit' des Mediums Film in Abgrenzung zu anderen Künsten als wichtigstes Kriterium zu etablieren. Angefangen bei den historischen Filmavantgarden der 1920er Jahre, wie dem anti-literarischen 'cinéma pur' und dem auf Abstraktion ausgerichteten 'absoluten Film', die sich radikal von der damals im Film vorherrschenden literarisch-theatralen Tradition abgrenzten, verfolgt sie den Diskurs weiter über die US-amerikanische Avantgarde nach 1945 bis in die Gegenwart. Hierbei liegt ein besonderes Augenmerk auf dem in den 1960er von P. Adam Sitney propagierten 'structural film'. In diesem, auf die Prinzipien der von Clement Greenberg formulierten, modernistischen Malerei zurückgreifenden Begriff, wird die 'Essenz' eines Films – und damit dessen avantgardistisches Potential – anhand der selbstreflexiven Auseinandersetzung mit den materiellen und apparativen Voraussetzungen des Mediums gemessen. Jutz kritisiert am puristischen Diskurs – zurecht – folgende Punkte: Zum einen zeigt sie auf, dass die zum structural film gezählten Filme der 1960er und 1970er wie Film in Which There Appear (1965-66) von George Landow oder Arnulf Rainer (1960) von Peter Kubelka nie dem von der Theorie konstatierten Grad des Purismus entsprechen, zum anderen thematisiert sie "die erstaunliche Selbstverständlichkeit, mit der so offensichtlich 'unreine' Filmpraktiken wie das 'expanded-cinema' oder der 'found-footage-Film' in das Schema einer puristisch-modernistischen Lektüre gepresst werden" (S. 35). Wie schon der Titel des Buches verrät, begnügt sich die Autorin aber nicht damit, den vorgegebenen tradierten Purismus-Diskurs in Frage zu stellen und zu erweitern. Sie entwickelt eine alternative, "brutistische" Betrachtungsweise – 'brut' im Sinne von roh, primitiv, unbearbeitet unverfälscht und natürlich –, die darauf abzielt "die Geschichte der Filmavantgarde von einem entgegengesetzten Blickwinkel neu aufzurollen: nicht als Endlosschleife eines 'cinéma pur', sondern als Geschichte eines 'cinéma brut'." (S. 12) Ihr Ansatz legitimiert sich durch eine subtile Methodologie, mit deren Hilfe sie drei spezifisch dem puristischem Avantgardefilm zugeordnete "Praktiken" (Jutz) unter neuen Gesichtspunkten untersucht: Arbeiten des 'direct films', eine Animationstechnik bei der direkt auf dem Filmstreifen gearbeitet wird – nicht zu verwechseln mit der Dokumentarfilmform 'direct cinema' –, der 'expanded-cinema-Aktion', in welcher die Grenzen des kinematographischen Apparats wie Kinosaal, Leinwand, Filmstreifen etc. radikal ausgelotet und erweitert werden, sowie des 'found-footage-Films', bei dem FilmkünstlerInnen 'gefundenes' Filmmaterial auf verschiedenste Weise in neue Arbeiten transformieren, erfahren einen Kurzschluss mit unterschiedlichsten Theorien und Praxisfeldern aus Kunst-, Film- und Medientheorie. Jutz bewegt sich dabei konsequent fernab romantisierter Vorstellungen, die brutistische Kunstpraktiken "jenseits der Zeichen" (S. 43) bzw. frei von kulturellen Konventionen ansiedeln. Verweisend auf die Zeichentheorie von Charles Sanders Peirce und deren Unterscheidung von Ikon, Symbol und Index sowie auf das "photographische Paradigma" von Rosalind Krauss verortet sie die drei genannten Praktiken des cinéma brut in der Nähe des traditionellerweise als 'primitiv' rezipierten Index. Als 'roh' wird das cinéma brut von Jutz auch wegen seiner Vorliebe für obsolete – also nicht mehr gebräuchliche – Techniken und Materialien bezeichnet. Sie bricht dabei bewusst mit dem in vielen Avantgardetheorien gesetzten, verabsolutierten Fokus "auf das Neue, den Bruch mit Traditionen" (S. 55) beziehungsweise auf die Verwendung von neuen künstlerischen Werkzeugen und Techniken. Der Argumentation von Bernd Hüppauf und Vivian Laska folgend, sollten Avantgarden vielmehr in einer generellen Opposition zu ihrer Gegenwart stehen und der "Begriff des Unzeitgemäßen in beide zeitliche Richtungen – Zukunft und Vergangenheit ­– gedacht werden" (S. 55). Die Autorin öffnet damit generell den Raum für viele innovative, bis dato nicht dem Avantgardefilm zugeordnete Filmwerke, deren Status in weiterer Folge neu bewertet werden sollte. Bezogen auf die Praktiken des cinéma brut bedeutet dies zum einen eine "technische Obsoleszenz", denn weder direct film, noch expanded-cinema-Aktion und in gewisser Weise auch der found-footage-Film bedürfen zwingend einer Kamera. Sie unterschreiten damit bewusst die technischen Möglichkeiten der filmischen Apparatur. Einen zweiten Punkt stellt die "materielle Obsoleszenz" dar, unter der einerseits eine vorsätzliche Materialbeeinträchtigung bzw. Materialzerstörung im direct film, andererseits der prekäre Zustand von vorgefundenem Filmmaterial im found-footage-Film zu verstehen ist. Als dritten Aspekt des "Obsoleten" bezeichnet Jutz in Anlehnung an Walter Benjamins Passagenwerk "Das utopische Potential des Unzeitgemäßen", welches besagt, dass neuartige Materialien und Technologien immer Sehnsüchte und kollektive Phantasien von Gesellschaften wecken, diese aber im Laufe der Zeit verloren gehen. Erst wenn im Zuge weiterer technischer Neuerungen Dinge wertlos geworden sind, besteht die Möglichkeit, verloren gegangenen Utopien in neuer Form wiederzuerwecken. Positiv hervorzuheben ist außerdem, dass Jutz in ihrer Annäherungsweise das Naheverhältnis des Avantgardefilms zur bildenden Kunst im Auge behält. So beschreibt die Autorin im Rahmen ihrer Verhandlung des filmtheoretischen Materialitätsbegriffs zunächst das Verständnis von Materialität in Malerei und Skulptur, bevor sie sich zentralen Positionen der Filmwissenschaft zuwendet und stellt – wieder zurecht – die Frage, warum die Theorie der Filmavantgarde immer noch so krampfhaft am Diskurs des structural films und damit am Purismus festhält, während die bildende Kunst und in Folge die Kunstwissenschaft sich schon längst einem postmodernen Diskurs zugewandt hat. Auf semiotischer Ebene bezieht sich Jutz unter anderem auf Theorien von Peter Wollen, der zwei Strömungen der Avantgardetheorie isoliert: eine "formale", selbstreflexive Strömung, die ihr Augenmerk auf den Signifikanten legt, und eine "literatisch-politische" Avantgarde, dessen zentrale Forderung es war "in gleichem Ausmaß ideologiekritische Inhalte zu transportieren wie bürgerliche Repräsentationsweisen zu brechen" (S. 95). Laut Wollen stellt diese Spaltung der Avantgarde das größte Hindernis für eine revolutionäre Filmpraxis dar. Jutz präzisiert Wollens Ausführungen dahingehend, dass der Film – ungleich der Malerei und der Literatur – nicht nur aus einer, sondern fünf Ausdruckssubstanzen (Bild, Ton, Bewegung, Licht, Montage) besteht. Eine Disjunktion ist daher nicht nur zwischen Signifikat und Signifikant, sondern auch zwischen den verschiedenen Kanälen des Mediums Film möglich. Weitere zentrale Anknüpfungspunkte der sehr ausführlichen allgemeinen theoretischen Verortung des cinéma brut sind unter anderem Roland Barthes' Die Rauheit der Stimme und John L. Austins Theorie des Sprechaktes, George Batailles Entwurf des "informe" sowie Michel Foucaults Dispositiv-Begriff. Nach der übergreifenden Neu-Kontextualisierung widmet sich Gabriele Jutz schließlich noch einmal den einzelnen Praktiken ihres filmtheoretischen Paradigmas: Wie zuvor erwähnt, verortet die Autorin das cinéma brut in der "Logik des Index", auf dem, wie Rosalind Krauss' in den 1970er Jahren provokant formulierte These verlautete, "die innovativsten Tendenzen in der modernen Kunst" basieren. (S. 154) Der direct film ist an den "Index als Spur" gekoppelt. Dabei unterscheidet die Autorin in weiterer Folge zwischen 'handmade' Filmen wie Su Friedrichs Gently Down the Stream (1981), die durch ein vorapparatives, Kratzen, Schaben, Stanzen, Bemalen, Ritzen oder Sich-Abdrücken manuell entstehen und 'autogenerativen' Filmen wie Stadt in Flammen (1984) des Künstler-Kollektivs Schmelzdahin, bei denen die Autorinstanz von äußeren Einflüssen wie der Witterung, Chemikalien oder Hitze getragen wird. Erwähnt sei auch die Nähe des direct film zu den von Nelson Goodman als "autographisch" klassifizierten Künsten wie Malerei, Druck oder Bildhauerei, bei der einerseits die Hand des/der KünstlerIn notwendig ist und andererseits Kategorien wie Original und Fälschung eine Rolle spielen. Im Rahmen der expanded-cinema-Aktion hingegen fungiert der "Index als Geste". Losgelöst aus der Klammer des strukturellen Films streicht Jutz die ursprüngliche Definition des expanded-cinemas hervor: "Mit seinen Wurzeln im künstlerischen Underground war das expanded-cinema ursprünglich Ausdruck einer Haltung, die vergleichbar mit jener der klassischen Avantgarden, eine Synthese von Kunst und Leben, von ästhetischer und politischer Fortschrittlichkeit anstrebte." (S. 162) Die Autorin begnügt sich nicht damit, die Erweiterung des Kinos in Richtung Theater zu beschreiben, sondern arbeitet die oppositionelle Stellung der expanded-cinema-Aktion zu textbasierten, theatralen Inszenierungen heraus. Wie am Beispiel von Nam Jun Paiks Zen for Film (1962-64) gezeigt wird, tritt die 'performative' Funktion, also der Vollzug der Handlung gegenüber der 'referentiellen' Funktion, also die Darstellung von Figuren, Handlungen etc., in den Vordergrund. Eine weitere Abgrenzung erfolgt gegenüber der kinematographischen Installation. Merkmale, die die expanded-cinema-Aktion als Praktik des cinéma brut erkennen lassen, werden unter anderem an Batailles Konzept der "Antiökonomie" festgemacht. Ein weiteres Kriterium ist die "Flüchtigkeit des performativen Aktes, seine Unwiederbringlichkeit" (S. 165), die Jutz als Zeichen der Obsoleszenz deutet. Wichtig ist zudem die Referenz auf vorhergehende (filmische) Diskurse und Praktiken, wie am Beispiel von VALIE EXPORTs TAPP und TASTKINO (1968) veranschaulicht wird, und die Hervorhebung "deiktischer" Gesten. Den found-footage-Film setzt Gabriele Jutz schließlich mit dem "Index als Relikt" in Beziehung. Kriterien für einen solchen sind einerseits, dass das Ursprungsmaterial nicht von den FilmemacherInnen selbst belichtet wurde, andererseits spielt – anders als beim Archivfilm oder beim Kompilationsfilm – die "niedere Herkunft des Materials" (S. 175) eine Rolle. Dieses wird durch eine künstlerische Verwendung aufgewertet. Die Indexikalität des found-footage-Films verweist auf die zeitliche Distanz zwischen dem Akt der Belichtung und der Verwendung des Materials. Gleich einem Relikt oder einer Ruine sind im Filmmaterial die Spuren historischer Differenz eingeschrieben. Der zitierende, resignifizierende Akt dieser brutistischen Praktik sprengt zudem das Material aus seinem ursprünglichen Kontext und eröffnet kritische Blickwinkel auf (massen)kulturelle Artefakte. "Dieses destabilisierende, entropische Potential, das der Wiederholung grundsätzlich innewohnt, manifestiert sich im 'found-footage-Film' einerseits durch eine Wuchern von Bedeutung, zum anderen durch die Vervielfachung von Autorpositionen." (S. 181) Gabriele Jutz setzt in ihrem Buch einen längst überfälligen Impuls in der Avantgardefilmtheorie. Ausgezeichnet recherchiert, erarbeitet sie ihre Genealogie einerseits eng an filmischen Gegenständen, andererseits durch ihre souveräne Zusammenführung klassischer film-, medien- und kunsttheoretischer Begrifflichkeiten. Stilistisch auf höchstem Niveau formuliert, sind die Grundzüge des cinéma brut leicht nachvollziehbar. Bei der detaillierten Argumentation erweisen sich gewisse Grundkenntnisse von Avantgardetheorien und Semiotik aber mit Sicherheit als Vorteil. Die ausführlichen Exkurse in verschiedenste Theorie- und Praxisfelder mögen vielleicht an manchen Stellen des Buches als Ablenkung vom eigentlichen Forschungsgegenstand erscheinen, zeigen jedoch die Anschlussfähigkeit der von Jutz entworfenen, alternativen Avantgardefilmtheorie. Die Autorin erstellt zudem bewusst keinen abgeschlossenen Kanon an 'brutistischen' Filmwerken, sondern gibt Einblick in die Reichweite ihrer Theorien, indem sie im zweiten Teil des Buches den Blick auf exemplarisch ausgewählte Arbeiten wirft. Beispiele wie Vita Futurista (1916), Len Lyes A Colour Box (1935), Isidore Isous Traité de bave et d´éternité (1951), Su Friedrichs Gently Down the Stream (1981) oder Peter Tescherkasskys Dream Work (2001) bilden einen Querschnitt der europäischen und US-amerikanischen Filmavantgarde vom frühen Film bis zur Gegenwart. Nicht eine lineare Skizzierung einer neuen Avantgardefilmtradition ist das Ziel. Es "soll anhand signifikanter Bespiele ein Feld abgesteckt werden, das ermöglicht, das Verwandte im scheinbar Unterschiedlichen hervortreten zu lassen." (S. 22) Grund genug im Anschluss an dieses Buch weitere Filme mit den Praktiken des cinéma bruts zu analysieren und in dessen Kontext zu bringen.

Die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe deutscher Klassiker wurde seit 1904 bis in die Zwanziger Jahre hinein im Insel Verlag in Leipzig publiziert. Die Buchreihe hat nicht nur für den Verlag und die Druckerei Poeschel in der sie gedruckt wurde eine ganze Reihe von Neuerungen nach sich gezogen, auch für den deutschen Buchmarkt hat die Klassikerausgabe einen Meilenstein bedeutet. Sie hat einige Eigenschaften des Taschenbuches vorweggenommen. Sie orientierte sich an der Qualität bibliophiler Buchpublikationen, aber war dennoch preislich erschwinglich. Zeitgenössische Klassikerausgaben erschienen zumeist mit einem Kommentar. Nicht so die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe. Der Text wurde zwar von führenden Wissenschaftlern editiert, aber sie war dennoch unkommentiert. Der Text war in einer Jenson-Antiqua gesetzt obwohl die Debatte um individuell gestaltete Künstlerschriften und die Diskussion um die als deutsche Schrift begriffene Fraktur unter den wichtigsten Protagonisten des deutschen Buchgewerbes ihren Höhepunkt noch nicht erreicht hatte. Ziel für die Klassikerausgabe war darüber hinaus, das zur Jahrhundertwende leicht angestaubte Image der Stadt Weimar aufzupolieren. Über das Patronat des Großherzogs hinaus hätte man die Gewinne aus dem Verkauf der Bücher der Permanenten Ausstellung für die Anschaffung von modernen Kunstobjekten zur Verfügung stellen wollen, die unter der Leitung von Harry Graf Kessler stand. Sieht man den Inhalt der Werke der in der Klassikerreihe erschienen Dichter Goethe, Schiller und Körner in einem ästhetischen Kontext mit dem der Philosophen Schopenhauer und Kant, wird im Spiegel der Formalästhetik der Klassikerausgabe Graf Kesslers Bildungs- und Kulturbegriff erkennbar, der sich in den Jahren nach der Jahrhundertwende zu seinem Lebenskunstideal verdichtete. Der zerrütteten Existenz der Zeitgenossen, wie Friedrich Nietzsche sie beschrieben hatte, sollte der Inhalt der Ausgabe in seiner modernen Form eine moderne Wertehaltung entgegensetzen. Die Lektüre der Klassiker sollte den deutschen Philister "entkrampfen" und ihm ein Stück der verloren geglaubten Lebensfreude wieder zurück bringen, in dem dieser auch die Facetten des Lebensleids als normal hinnehmen und akzeptieren lernte. Die Klassikerausgabe repräsentierte aus diesem Grund auch den kulturellen und politischen Reformwillen und die gesellschaftlichen Vorstellungen die der Graf für ein modernes Deutschland als überfällig erachtete. Die Buchreihe war aus diesem Grund auch ein politisches Statement gegen die Beharrungskräfte im deutschen Kaiserreich. Die Klassikerreihe wurde in der buchhistorischen Forschung zwar als bedeutender Meilenstein charakterisiert und als "wichtiges" oder gar "revolutionäres" Werk der Zeit hervorgehoben, die Ergebnisse der Forschung kann man überspitzt aber in der Aussage zusammenfassen, dass es sich bei der Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe um einen "zufälligen Glückstreffer" deutscher Buchgestaltung zu handeln scheint. Zumindest lassen die Aussagen, die bisher in dieser Hinsicht gemacht wurden, keine eindeutige Einordnung zu, außer vielleicht der, dass die Klassiker von der englischen Lebensreform inspiriert wurden und Henry van de Velde und William Morris einen Einfluss auf ihre äußere Form hatten. Gerade die Gedankenansätze dieser Beiden nutzte Graf Kessler aber für eigene Überlegungen, die ihn schließlich auch zu eigenen Vorstellungen von idealer Buchgestaltung brachten. Da für Kessler auch Gebrauchsgegenstände Kunst sein konnten, wird das Konzept der Klassikerausgabe bis zur Umsetzung in ihrer `bahnbrechenden´ Form in das ideengeschichtliche und ästhetische Denken des Grafen eingeordnet. Die Klassiker werden zwar in buchhistorischen Einzeluntersuchungen bezüglich ihrer Komponenten, dem Dünndruckpapier, ihrem Einband oder der Schrifttype exponiert. In buchwissenschaftlichen Überblicksdarstellungen wird ihr Einfluss hingegen weniger beachtet, denn verschiedene Kritiker bezogen sie seit ihrem ersten Erscheinen nicht als deutsches Kulturgut mit ein, denn sie lehnten sowohl die englischen Mitarbeiter Emery Walker, Edward Johnston, Eric Gill und Douglas Cockerell wie auch ihre Gestaltung als "welsche" Buchausgabe ab. Richtig ist, die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe hatte dieselbe Funktion wie die von Graf Kessler in Weimar konzipierten Kunstausstellungen und die dortige Kunstschule unter der Leitung seines Freundes Henry van de Velde. Auch das für Weimar geplante Theater, das unter der Leitung von Hugo von Hofmannsthal hätte stehen sollen und die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Schule, hätten dieselben Ideen der Moderne mit anderen Mitteln transportieren sollen, wie die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe deutscher Klassiker. ; The Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst Edition of German Classics was published by the Insel Verlag in Leipzig from 1904 well into the 1920s. While this series of books obviously sparked a range of innovations at both the publishing house and the printer Poeschel, the overall impact of the series was much wider, and as a whole it represents a significant milestone in the development of the modern German book market. In many ways, the series already anticipated some of the characteristics of the modern paperback. The level of quality echoed that of serious literary publications, but the pricing was reasonable. The Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series appeared without commentary, in stark contrast to other editions of the classics at the time. The text itself was edited by leading literary experts, but the content was delivered "pure". The books were typeset in Jenson-Antiqua; this at a time when the entire debate between new artistic typefaces and Fraktur, i.e. the "old German" script, hadn't even reached the main players in German publishing. One of the goals of this fresh repackaging of the classics was to give a new shine to Weimar's slightly dusty image as a city. Thanks to the patronage of the Grand Duke Wilhelm himself, it was planned that the profits from sales of the books would be made available to Weimar's Permanent Exhibition, managed by Harry Graf Kessler, for the purchase of modern art objects. Looking at how the series juxtaposes works of the poetic writers Goethe, Schiller and Koerner with the philosophical ideas of Schopenhauer and Kant, and brilliantly packages them all into a publishing work of such beauty, one can see Graf Kessler's concepts of education and culture clearly reflected in both the content and the form. These are the concepts he slowly solidified into an ideal "art of living" in the years just after the turn of the century. The rotten, decayed existence of contemporary man as Friedrich Nietzsche had viewed it, was to be answered with a set of modern values firmly rooted in the classics. Reading the classics was meant to "uncramp" the German philistine and bring him back a piece of his supposedly lost joy of life by learning to see life's suffering and accept it as normal. For this reason, the Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series of classics also embodied a slightly subversive will for political and cultural reform, as well as a spark of social imagination that Graf Kessler viewed as long overdue in a modern Germany. In effect, the series was a political statement against the conservative elements of the German Kaiserreich. Although researchers have characterised the series as a milestone and even gone so far as to label it an "important" or even "revolutionary" work for its time, the general opinion of these literary historians can be curtly summarised by saying that the great success of Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst editions was little more than a "happy accident." Their statements do not attribute any serious weight to the series, other than occasionally mentioning that it was inspired by the English arts and crafts movement, and that Henry van de Velde and William Morris had an influence on its appearance. But it was actually the fundamental ideas of these two men rather than just their design approach that Graf Kessler had used as a basis for further developing his own ideal approach to book publishing – and to other areas. Kessler was clear that everyday objects could also be works of art, so the very concept of a new edition of the classics and its groundbreaking execution is clearly an expression of the Graf's views of philosophical history and his aesthetic thinking. In literary research, the series is occasionally praised for specifics such as the quality and feel of its thin paper, its binding and its typeface. But in historical literary summaries, scant attention is paid to the overall influence of the series because many critics of the time simply excluded it from consideration as a work of German culture. They rejected the involvement of English employees such as Emery Walker, Edward Johnston, Eric Gill and Douglas Cockerell, and dismissed the "garden variety" design of the books. What is clear is the Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst Edition of German Classics did indeed have a very serious purpose; one that was shared by nearly all of Kessler's projects. Like the art exhibitions he conceived for Weimar, like the establishment of Art Academy under the care of his friend Henry van de Velde, like the Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst School, and like the planned theatre for Weimar that was to have been led by Hugo von Hofmannsthal, the Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series had a serious, somewhat provocative purpose: to unite art with life, to make the classics relevant to the common man, and in so doing, inject a breath of creativity into the stifled society of Germany under the Kaisers.

To the psalmist the age of seventy marks the end of one's days on earth, the last days so dimly lit in the poet's eyes. The calendar reminds us that 1996 marks the seventieth birthday of one of the most influential and enduring judicial decisions upholding the rights of communities to determine their demographic, economic, and societal future- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. Case reporters, code compilations, and proposed legislation, along with treatises and law review articles warn us that the broad deference to regulators symbolized by the Euclid text is under attack. The eighth decade of constitutionally blessed regulation of land use and abuse would seem to be one of "labor and sorrow" for advocates of traditional planning, zoning, and environmental controls, and with good reason.

The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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Long description: Handlungstheorien stehen im Zentrum der gegenwärtigen soziologischen Theoriediskussion. Zugleich blicken diese Ansätze auf eine lange Tradition zurück und zählen zum unbestrittenen Kanon des Fachs. Dennoch geben die verschiedenen Theorien keine eindeutige Antwort auf die Frage, was soziales Handeln ist und inwiefern es gesellschaftlich bestimmt wird. Dieses Lehrbuch bringt mit einer systematischen und konzisen Darstellung der wichtigsten Handlungstheorien von David Hume und Max Weber über George H. Mead und Talcott Parsons bis James S. Coleman und Jürgen Habermas Klarheit in dieses unübersichtliche Theoriefeld. Das didaktische Konzept des Bandes, anhand von Leitfragen die einzelnen Positionen miteinander in Beziehung zu bringen, ist konsequent auf die Bedürfnisse eines strukturierten BA-Studiums zugeschnitten.; Review quote: Besprochen in: Portal für Politikwissenschaft, 12.03.2014, Hendrik Claas Meyer